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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines whether Australia acted as a 'good international citizen' in its 
engagement with international climate change law (ICCL) during the term of the first 
Rudd Labor government (3 December 2007 – 24 June 2010). The assessment is 
undertaken by examining the Rudd government's engagement with the key 
development in ICCL during its term of office, namely, the 'post-2012' negotiations 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto 
Protocol. Launched by the Bali Roadmap, December 2007, the period of negotiations 
reviewed by this thesis culminated in the adoption of the landmark Copenhagen 
Accord in December 2009.  
 
Given the complexity and breadth of issues addressed by the post-2012 negotiations, 
the thesis focuses on one major aspect of the negotiations, namely: the mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions. This was the central issue for the post-2012 negotiations to 
resolve and the key negotiating priority of the Rudd government. The thesis 
undertakes its assessment by utilising the concept of good international citizenship – a 
foreign policy goal first espoused in Australia by former Labor Foreign Minister, Gareth 
Evans, in the late 1980s – and later endorsed by the Rudd government. While there is 
no agreed definition of good international citizenship, essentially it requires states to 
adopt a more ethical approach to foreign policy. This means that states must forego 
the dogged pursuit of narrow national interests, recognising that they have a 
responsibility to promote the common good of the international community, not just 
self-interest. The concept is associated with a number of attributes such as showing 
respect for international law and providing leadership in the international sphere. The 
ramifications of good international citizenship for governmental engagement with ICCL 
have received little attention in the literature, and thus this thesis explores the 
practical requirements of the concept in this field. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
'Climate change is the great moral challenge of our generation'. Kevin Rudd, Opposition Leader, 
March 2007.1 
 
'The new Australian government came to office intent on making a difference as a good 
international citizen.' Stephen Smith, Australian Foreign Minister, August 2008.2 
A Research Question  
This thesis examines whether Australia acted as a 'good international citizen' (GIC) in 
its engagement with international climate change law (ICCL) during the term of the 
first Rudd Labor government (3 December 2007 – 24 June 2010).3 The assessment is 
undertaken by examining the Rudd government's engagement with the key 
development in ICCL during its term of office, namely, the 'post-2012' 
intergovernmental negotiations under the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The Bali Roadmap, 
adopted at the Bali Climate Change Conference, December 2007,4 saw Parties to the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol launch a historic negotiating process to establish a new 
global agreement on climate change, with Kyoto's first commitment period due to 
expire in 2012.5 The Parties' intention was to complete negotiations by the 
                                                     
 
1 Kevin Rudd, 'Opening Remarks' (Speech delivered at the National Climate Change Summit, Canberra, 
31 March 2007). 
2 Stephen Smith, 'A New Era of Engagement with the World' (Speech delivered at the Sydney Institute, 
Sydney, 19 August 2008) <http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2008/080819_si.html>. 
3 The term international climate change law in this thesis is used to refer to the body of international law 
that specifically seeks to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, namely: the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 
March 1994) ('UNFCCC'); the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, opened for signature 16 March 1998, 2303 UNTS 148 (entered into force 16 February 2005) 
('Kyoto Protocol'); and the subsequent decisions that have been made by Parties to those agreements. 
See overview of ICCL in chapter 4. This thesis was originally submitted in December 2013. The final 
version has been revised to reflect examiners' comments. The law stands as at the original date of 
submission. 
4 UNFCCC, Now, Up to and Beyond 2012: The Bali Road Map 
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/bali_road_map/items/6072.php>. The Bali Conference served 
as the 13th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC and 3rd Conference of the Parties serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.  
5 Kyoto Protocol arts 3.1, 3.7. 
 2 
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, December 2009.6 While this objective was 
not met, this round of negotiations was nonetheless highly significant for the 
development of ICCL, with Parties agreeing to the landmark Copenhagen Accord.7 
Many aspects of the Accord were later formally adopted by the Parties in 2010 in the 
'Cancun Agreements'.8 As of October 2013, Parties were still yet to agree to the new, 
broader climate agreement envisaged by the Bali Roadmap. However, Parties hoped to 
establish such an agreement by 2015, to come into effect by 2020.9 Kyoto Parties had 
also agreed to a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, from 2013 to 
2020.10 
 
The post-2012 climate negotiations took place under two negotiating 'tracks', the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-
LCA) (established by the 'Bali Action Plan' (BAP))11 and the Ad Hoc Working Group to 
Consider Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-
KP).12 The Parties agreed under the BAP to conduct negotiations on the mitigation of 
greenhouse gas (GHGs) emissions; adaptation; technology development and transfer; 
and financing for mitigation, adaptation and technology cooperation.  
 
                                                     
 
6 UNFCCC, Bali Climate Change Conference – December 2007 
<http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php>; UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties 
on its Thirteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008), decision 
1/CP.13, [1]; UNFCCC, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties 
under the Kyoto Protocol on its Resumed Fourth Session, UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5 (5 February 
2008) annex I. 
7 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010), decision 2/CP.15. 
8 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (15 March 2011), decision 1/CP.16. 
9 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventeenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN 
Doc FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (15 March 2012), decision 1/CP.17, [4]; UNFCCC, Looking Beyond 2012: The 
Durban Outcomes <http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6825.php>. 
10 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol on its Eighth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1 (28 February 
2012), decision 1/CMP.8, [1, 4], annex I; UNFCCC, Doha Amendment 
<http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php>. The Doha Amendment had yet 
to enter into force: see chapter 4. 
11 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008), decision 1/CP.13, [1].  
12 UNFCCC, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the 
Kyoto Protocol on its Resumed Fourth Session, UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5 (5 February 2008) annex I. 
 3 
Given the complexity and breadth of issues discussed under each of these broad 
topics, this thesis focuses its analysis on the first of these concerns: mitigation. 
Mitigation was the central issue for the negotiations to address, with the primary 
objective of the UNFCCC being to reduce GHG emissions.13 Furthermore, this issue was 
the key negotiating priority of the Rudd government. Notwithstanding the intended 
focus of the thesis, several other topics such as climate finance receive more limited 
attention where relevant to the analysis of mitigation issues. While largely concerned 
with the government's activities at the international level, the thesis also examines the 
government's domestic abatement response – especially the Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme (CPRS) – this being a crucial part of its engagement with the post-
2012 negotiations.  
B Rationale 
Commenced in 2008, this thesis initially intended to examine the conservative Howard 
government's engagement with international environmental law during its term in 
office (1996-2007). However, it soon became apparent that the launch of the Bali 
Roadmap in December 2007 presented a unique opportunity to study Australia's 
engagement with a crucial area of international environmental law as it unfolded. Of 
all the environmental issues on the international legal agenda, climate change also 
appeared to be particularly worthy of consideration, not least because of Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd's personal commitment to the issue. Labelling climate change as 
the 'great moral challenge' of his generation,14 climate change became a 'totemic' and 
crucial part of Labor's November 2007 election victory,15 with Rudd promising to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol and introduce an emissions trading scheme (ETS) to reduce 
Australia's GHG emissions.16 This provided a sharp policy difference between the 
Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Liberal National government it succeeded, which 
                                                     
 
13 UNFCCC art 2.  
14 Rudd, 'Opening Remarks', above n 1. 
15 ABC, ‘ETS Postponed by Rudd Government’, The 7.30 Report, 27 April 2010. See generally Verity 
Burgmann and Hans Baer, 'The World's First Climate Change Election' (Paper presented at Australian 
Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Melbourne, 27-29 September 2010) 
<http://apsa2010.com.au/full-papers/pdf/APSA2010_0161.pdf>. 
16 Kevin Rudd, 'An Action Agenda for Climate Change' (Speech delivered at the Annual Fraser Lecture, 
Canberra, 30 May 2007); Leslie Nielsen et al, Bills Digest: Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 2009, 
No 165 of 2008-09, 15 June 2009, 13. 
 4 
had steadfastly refused to ratify Kyoto,17 and only reluctantly promised to introduce an 
ETS prior to the 2007 election18 in the face of strong domestic political pressure to act 
on climate change. The post-2012 negotiations also presented a potentially significant 
period for the development of ICCL, with Parties aiming to have a new agreement in 
place by the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15) in Copenhagen. Spurred into 
action by the warnings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2007 that 
global warming was 'unequivocal'19 and would lead to significant environmental, 
economic and social consequences if GHG emissions were not significantly reduced,20 
the Parties' commitment to the Bali Roadmap was indicative of the new sense of 
vigour in the international community to strongly tackle the growing threat presented 
by human-induced climate change. 
 
The contemporaneous nature of the research topic also meant that there was an 
opportunity to make a contribution to a new area of scholarship. As would be 
expected, some legal scholarship has emerged since the thesis was commenced that 
addresses various aspects of the Rudd government's engagement with the post-2012 
negotiations.21 However, there remains little comprehensive analysis of the topic, 
especially from a GIC perspective.22 This thesis therefore aims to fill this gap in legal 
scholarship. 
 
                                                     
 
17 Australian Government, Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White 
Paper (2003) 67. 
18 See Australian Government, Australia’s Climate Change Policy: Our Economy, Our Environment, Our 
Future (2007) 7. 
19 Core Writing Team, Rajendra K Pachauri and Andy Reisinger (eds), Climate Change 2007: Synthesis 
Report (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2008) 30. 
20 Ibid 48-54. 
21 See, eg, Frank Nicholls, 'Environmental Policy in the Howard and Rudd Eras' (2010) 40 Environmental 
Policy and Law 247; David Leary, 'From Bali to Poznan: An Assessment of Australia's Response to Climate 
Change in 2008' 26 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 190; Ben Saul et al, Climate Change and 
Australia: Warming to the Global Challenge (Federation Press, 2012). See also the literature cited in 
subsequent chapters. 
22 The author's early assessment of this issue was presented in Cordes-Holland, Owen, 'The National 
Interest v Good International Citizenship: Competing Discourses in Australia's Engagement with 
International Climate Law' (Paper presented at the CIPL-ACEL Workshop: Environmental Discourses in 
International and Public Law, Canberra, 13 August 2009). These findings were published in Cordes-
Holland, 'The National Interest or Good International Citizenship? Australia and its Approach to 
International and Public Climate Law' in Brad Jessup and Kim Rubenstein (eds), Environmental 
Discourses in Public and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
 5 
Given the author's background as a legal scholar, the obvious approach for the thesis 
was to examine the government's involvement in the climate negotiations from a 
strictly 'legal' perspective, examining issues such as its compliance with relevant norms 
and principles of ICCL. However, the thesis instead undertakes the more problematic, 
but perhaps ultimately more illuminating, task of assessing the Rudd government's 
performance as a GIC. This was a foreign policy goal first espoused in Australia by 
former Labor Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, in the late 1980s.23 According to Evans, 
in addition to traditional security and economic interests, every nation has a national 
interest in being a GIC.24 While there is no agreed definition of the concept, essentially 
the practise of GIC involves the pursuit of a more ethical foreign policy. It requires 
states to forego the dogged pursuit of narrow national interests, recognising that they 
owe a duty to promote the common good of the international community, not just 
self-interest. It should be noted that such a brief definition of GIC is not entirely useful 
on its own. As this thesis will explain, there are many qualities associated with GIC that 
help to define the concept in more concrete terms, among them, leadership, activism, 
altruism, and a commitment to multilateralism and international law. 
 
Several factors suggested that employing the concept of GIC to assess the Rudd 
government's activities would be a worthwhile endeavour.25 First, it was not clear that 
a strictly legal analysis of the government's engagement with the climate negotiations 
would in fact be possible, given that treaty-making – the making of new law – requires 
many policy issues to be addressed. As participation in treaty negotiations falls within 
the ambit of foreign policy, it also appeared that a foreign policy concept such as GIC 
could provide a useful 'lens' or framework from which to assess the government's 
activities. Ultimately, the research for this thesis found that the legal principles 
established by the UNFCCC actually provided Parties with very strong legal and ethical 
guidance as to what was expected of them in negotiating a post-2012 agreement. As 
such, this thesis chiefly assesses GIC by examining the government's compliance with 
                                                     
 
23 See, eg, Gareth Evans, Making Australian Foreign Policy (Australian Fabian Society, 1989) 7-19.   
24 Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations: In the World of the 1990s (Melbourne 
University Press, 2nd ed, 1995) 33-34. 
25 The author acknowledges and thanks his supervisor, Professor Donald Rothwell, for proposing the use 
of GIC for this study. 
 6 
established principles and provisions of ICCL. However, the concept of GIC was 
nonetheless found to be highly useful, enabling international legal activities to be 
assessed within a broader conceptual framework. 
 
Second, GIC – often used interchangeably by governments, scholars and 
commentators with the term 'good global citizen' –26 has become a notable feature of 
Australia's political discourse since first articulated by Evans, being referred to by both 
sides of politics,27 as well as in the media.28 The term also features in global political 
discourse, with New Zealand29 and Canada30 providing prominent examples of other 
states which have adopted the term at various times. Perhaps most notably (because 
of the global influence of the United States (US)), the term was employed by 
Republican Presidential nominee, Senator John McCain, during the US 2008 federal 
election.31  
 
It is worth highlighting that a range of similar terms to GIC are used in domestic and 
global political discourse to describe 'better' and less nationalistic forms of statecraft, 
for example: 'effective international citizen',32 'good international environmental 
                                                     
 
26 See, eg, Hans Schattle, The Practices of Global Citizenship (Rowman and Littlefield, 2008) 137-158. 
27 See, eg, former Liberal Prime Minister John Howard: AAP, 'Howard, Rudd Tout Rival Climate 
Strategies', The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 31 May 2007 <http://news.smh.com.au/national/pm-
rudd-tout-rival-climate-strategies-20070530-fr3.html>. See chapter 2. 
28 See, eg, Carolyn Hardy, 'Good International Citizen, But Only When it Suits', The Age (online), 11 
November 2009 <http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/good-international-citizen-but-only-
when-it-suits-20091110-i7ji.html>; Keith Suter, 'Australia as a Good International Citizen' on On Line 
Opinion (15 December 2001) <http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=1590>. 
29 See New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, International Organisations (2 February 2012) 
<http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/2-International-Organisations/index.php>. On New 
Zealand as an international citizen generally see, eg, Anthony L Smith (ed), Southeast Asia and New 
Zealand: A History of Regional and Bilateral Relations (Victoria University Press, 2005) and Malcolm 
Templeton, New Zealand As an International Citizen: Fifty Years of United Nations Membership (New 
Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995). 
30 See Schattle, above n 26, 139. On Canada as an international citizen see, eg, Kim Richard Nossal, 
'Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of 'Good International Citizenship' in Canadian Foreign Policy' 
(1998-99) 54 International Journal 88; Lana Wylie, 'We Care What They Think: Prestige and Canadian 
Foreign Policy' (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, 
Toronto, 3 June 2006) <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2006/Wylie.pdf>.  
31 John McCain, 'Speech on Foreign Policy' (Speech delivered at the World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, 
26 March 2008) <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89115847>.  
32 Kevin Rudd, 'Advancing Australia's Global and Regional Economic Interests' (Speech delivered at the 
East Asia Forum in conjunction with the Australian National University, Canberra, 26 March 2008) 
<http://webdiary.com.au/cms/?q=node/2318>; Robert McClelland, (Speech delivered at the Annual 
Conference of the Australian and New Zealand Society of International Law, Canberra, 26 June 2008).  
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citizen',33 'good neighbour',34 'responsible stakeholder',35 'idealist', 'internationalist', 
'liberal internationalist' and 'good state', among others.36 GIC, however, appears to 
have a distinctive meaning within Australia at least, and is the focus of attention of this 
thesis.  
 
Third, Rudd's Labor (both in opposition and then government) itself explicitly stated its 
desire to 'restore Australia's reputation as a good international citizen', including on 
the issue of climate change.37 The view of the ALP was that Australia's international 
reputation had been damaged by the Howard government, especially by its rejection 
of the Kyoto Protocol.38 Thus the government itself raised GIC as a standard of 
behaviour by which its actions ought to be judged. 
 
Fourth, at the time the thesis was commenced, analysis existed of GIC by international 
relations (IR) scholars,39 but there was a dearth of legal scholarship properly examining 
the concept. Because of the differences in approach and emphasis of IR and legal 
scholars, much of the GIC scholarship was difficult to directly apply to the assessment 
of governmental engagement with international law. Legal scholarship that referred to 
GIC also generally did so without doing much to define the concept and neglected to 
                                                     
 
33 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 3 November 2003, 21802 (Kelvin 
Thompson). 
34 The notion of the 'good neighbour' was popularised in the 1930s and 1940s by US President Franklin 
Roosevelt, who adopted a 'Good Neighbour Policy': see Tom Barry, Laura Carlsen and John Gershman, 
The Good Neighbour Policy – A History to Make Us Proud (2005) International Relations Centre 
<http://www.irc-online.org/content/pdf/0503ggn.pdf>, 1-8. This concept is also expressed in the 
Charter of the United Nations preamble, art 74.  
35 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, 15 May 2008 (Harry Harding,  
Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University) 
<http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HardingTestimony080515p.pdf> 1. 
36 Eg 'model citizen', 'model UN member', 'creative middle power', 'middle power internationalist', 
'multilateralist', 'global leader', 'responsible member of the international community', 'solidarist',  'good 
steward'. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the finer differences of these terms but several 
are discussed in chapter 1. 
37 See, Robert McClelland, 'Time to Repair Our Reputation: The Rise and Fall of Australia As a Good 
International Citizen' (Speech delivered at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 14 March 
2007) <http://webdiary.com.au/cms/?q=node/1869>; Rudd, 'An Action Agenda for Climate Change', 
above n 16. 
38 Ibid. 
39 See, eg, Andrew Linklater, 'What Is a Good International Citizen?' in Paul Keal (ed), Ethics and Foreign 
Policy (Allen & Unwin, 1992) 21; David Goldsworthy, 'Australia and Good International Citizenship' in 
Stephanie Lawson (ed), The New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond (Allen & 
Unwin, 1995) 171; Nicholas J Wheeler and Tim Dunne, 'Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for 
British Foreign Policy' (1998) 74 International Affairs 847. See chapter 1. 
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draw upon Evans' statements on GIC or the IR literature.40 Thus there was a clear need 
to better define the concept and in a manner relevant to legal scholarship.   
 
The author presented initial findings on GIC in 2009.41 Pert then made a substantial 
contribution to scholarship on GIC from an international lawyer's perspective in 
2010.42 This thesis arguably provides a fuller account of the concept than Pert, 
engaging in a more thorough examination of Evans' account of GIC as well as relevant 
IR scholarship. The subject matters of the two theses are also substantially different. 
Pert examined the record of previous Australian governments as a GIC in relation to 
international law, ending with the Howard government, and provided only limited 
analysis of climate change issues. More recently, Pert also assessed the Rudd 
government's record as a GIC, but again only briefly addressed Australia's engagement 
with ICCL.43   
C Thesis Outline 
The thesis addresses the research question in the following manner.  
 
Chapter 1 examines the concept of GIC in order to address the question: 'what is a 
GIC?' The chapter outlines the concept of GIC as articulated by Evans, as well as 
interpretations and critiques of the concept within the 'GIC literature'. The literature 
review helps to illuminate both the general characteristics of GIC as well as its 
conceptual basis.  
 
Chapter 1 suggests that Evans' writings and speeches on GIC provide the best starting 
point for understanding the concept, and identifies a number of attributes or 
characteristics that Evans associated with the concept. These include: 
                                                     
 
40 See, eg, Elizabeth Evatt, 'Australia's Performance in Human Rights' (2001) 26 Alternative Law Journal 
11; Alisa Newman Hood, 'Australia Adrift: The Timor Sea Oil and Gas Dispute' (2005-2006) 12 Brown 
Journal of World Affairs 239. 
41 Cordes-Holland, 'The National Interest v Good International Citizenship: Competing Discourses in 
Australia's Engagement with International Climate Law', above n 22. 
42 Alison Pert, 'Australia as a Good International Citizen from Barton to Howard: An International Law 
Perspective' (PhD Thesis, University of Sydney, 2010).  
43 See Alison Pert, 'The Good International Citizenship of the Rudd Government' (2011) 30 Australian 
Yearbook of International Law 93, 108-110, 135-136. 
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 an internationalist, cooperative approach to international affairs, rather than 
an isolationist one;  
 an activist, rather than passive or reflexive, approach to addressing 
international issues; 
 the display of leadership; 
 'pitching in' to international tasks – such as contributing to humanitarian or 
peacekeeping efforts; 
 promoting more ethical or moral courses of action – including seeking to 
advance 'purposes beyond ourselves', not just narrow self-interest; 
 practising a values-based foreign policy – especially one influenced by 
universal values such as human rights;  
 embracing a broader or more 'enlightened' approach to determining where 
the national interest actually lies – that is, advancing 'enlightened self-
interest'; 
 supporting multilateralism and international institutions like the United 
Nations; 
 supporting, and complying with, international law; 
 being a good neighbour – that is, being a good citizen within one's own region;  
 acting consistently on the domestic front with the GIC values and agendas 
promoted abroad; and 
 striking a defensible balance between idealism and realism – that is, promoting 
a more idealistic approach to foreign policy, while also being 'realistic' about 
what can be achieved in international affairs. 
 
While the above attributes can all be indicative of GIC, the qualities that distinguish 
'good' from lesser forms of international conduct (and which are most relevant) are 
impacted by the context in which a government is operating; whether legal, policy, 
ethical or otherwise. Therefore, an assessment of GIC must always take into account 
the particular circumstances of the issue on which a government is engaged. 
 
Specifically regarding international law, Evans' writings and speeches indicate that a 
GIC would be expected to demonstrate ethical or 'good' behaviour in the four major 
stages of the international legal process, namely by: 
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 helping to develop international law in a positive direction – such as in 
negotiating new treaties to tackle global problems; 
 adopting relevant international treaties and other instruments such as 
declarations (through ratification or signature, as required); 
 complying with all of its international legal obligations; and 
 generally playing a role in the advancement and upholding of international 
legal norms within the international community, such as by encouraging other 
nations to adopt treaties or holding them to account for any infractions. 
 
The general attributes of GIC identified above can also be highly relevant when 
qualitatively assessing a state's engagement with the international legal system. For 
example, a GIC may be expected to display activism and leadership in developing new 
international law, and generally advance its legal interests in a more ethical fashion. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of earlier Australian governments' engagement 
with ICCL, providing useful historical context for the later examination of the Rudd 
government's activities. Chapter 3 then provides a basic introduction to the Rudd 
government's general discourse on GIC and climate change. 
 
Chapter 4 expands upon the brief discussion of ICCL in chapters 1, 2 and 3, outlining 
the basic features of the ICCL regime and the climate negotiations. The chapter then 
explains how GIC will be assessed by this thesis. It argues that the central task for the 
government in its international and domestic response was to act consistently with the 
established principles and provisions of the ICCL regime. This is therefore the primary 
focus of this thesis. 
 
The remaining chapters examine five key aspects of the Rudd government's 
engagement with the post-2012 negotiations. The topics were judged to be the most 
relevant to assessing the government's performance as a GIC in the area of mitigation. 
The chapters address the following issues: 
 chapter 5: the government's preferred long-term global mitigation goal – 450 
parts per million carbon dioxide-equivalent/no more than 2°C warming; 
 11 
 chapter 6:  the government's 5 to 25 per cent mitigation target for 2020 and 
associated conditions; 
 chapter 7: implementation – the government's approach to implementing its 
mitigation targets. This includes analysis of the government's laws and policies 
for reducing emissions – chiefly the proposed CPRS – and its intention to make 
significant use of international carbon credits to supplement domestic 
abatement; 
 chapter 8: the government's preference for a market-based mechanism to 
reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing 
countries (REDD) and its involvement in a REDD demonstration project – the 
Kalimantan Forest and Carbon Partnership; and 
 chapter 9: the government's efforts to reform the rules on land use, land-use 
change and forestry, especially those relating to forest management. 
 
The conclusion to the thesis provides a holistic assessment of whether the Rudd 
government's activities were consistent with GIC. While the thesis finds evidence of 
many positive statements and activities by the Rudd government in its engagement 
with ICCL, ultimately it is argued that its efforts were insufficient to demonstrate the 
higher form of conduct associated with GIC.  
D Research Methodology 
The research methodology for chapters 1, 2 and 3 of the thesis involved examining 
both primary and secondary sources. Primary evidence of Evans' conceptualisation of 
GIC was collated from his various writings and speeches on the topic. Primary evidence 
of subsequent governments' views on GIC, including the Rudd government, was also 
collated from various public documents and speeches. An extensive literature search 
was also conducted of academic literature examining GIC. 
 
The research methodology for chapters addressing the climate negotiations first 
involved examining the negotiating positions of Australia and other Parties. Given the 
impossibility of knowing everything that was said and done by Australia and other 
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states within the negotiations, evidence of Party positions is chiefly drawn from official 
submissions to the UNFCCC.44 This evidence was supplemented with a range of other 
primary and secondary sources including the eyewitness record of many negotiating 
sessions provided by the Earth Negotiations Bulletin45 and a variety of government 
reports, public statements, briefings, and media and academic publications. Second, an 
extensive literature search was conducted in order to properly understand the issues 
raised in the negotiations. This allowed for an informed and critical assessment to be 
made of the Rudd government's legal and policy positions. The author's understanding 
of the subject matter was also enhanced by a field trip to COP 15 in Copenhagen, 
December 2009, as an accredited observer. 
 
The period of review for this thesis covers the term of the first Rudd government: 3 
December 2007 to 24 June 2010.46 This incorporates the climate negotiations from 
COP 13 in Bali (December 2007) to COP 15 in Copenhagen. As noted, the main 
outcome of this negotiating period was the non-binding Copenhagen Accord. Little 
further progress was made in the climate negotiations prior to Kevin Rudd being 
ousted as Prime Minister by Julia Gillard on 24 June 2010. As such, the thesis 
concentrates on the period between COP 13 and COP 15, except where broader 
comment is needed for the completeness of the analysis.   
 
 
                                                     
 
44 Available at the UNFCCC website: <http;//.unfccc.int>. Australia government submissions are also 
available at the Department of Environment website: <http://www.climatechange.gov.au>. 
45 Available at the International Institute for Sustainable Development website: <www.iisd.ca>.  
46 The Labor government remained in power after this date but under a new leader, Julia Gillard. Kevin 
Rudd was later re-elected as Labor leader, becoming Prime Minister for a second time on 27 June 2013 
until Labor's loss at the federal election on 7 September 2013. This thesis only examines the activities of 
the first Rudd government. 
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CHAPTER 1. THE MEANING OF 'GOOD INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP' 
 
Australia has a 'national interest in being, and being seen to be, a good international citizen'. 
Gareth Evans, Australian Foreign Minister, 1989.1 
 
'A key aspect of the Government’s recommitment to multilateralism is our strong wish to see 
Australia speak and act on the world stage as a good international citizen'. Stephen Smith, 
Australian Foreign Minister, August 2008.2 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine what is meant by the term 'good international 
citizenship' (GIC). It does so by outlining GIC as it was first articulated by Gareth Evans 
as well as the broader literature which has subsequently examined its features. It 
should be noted that while there are a number of clearly identifiable attributes of GIC, 
its precise requirements are not settled. Furthermore, what GIC entails always 
depends to some extent on the subject matter – in the case of this thesis, the Rudd 
government's engagement with international climate change law (ICCL).3 Thus, while 
this chapter provides an in-depth examination of the broad features of GIC, this only 
serves as an introduction to the concept. Later chapters explore in more detail what 
GIC specifically required of the Rudd government in its engagement with the post-2012 
climate negotiations.  
A Good International Citizenship according to Gareth Evans 
The concept of GIC was first espoused in Australia in the late 1980s by Gareth Evans, 
Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1988 to 1996 under the Hawke and Keating 
Labor governments.4 It has been suggested that the concept may have originated in 
                                                     
 
1 Gareth Evans, Making Australian Foreign Policy (Australian Fabian Society, 1989) 9. 
2 Stephen Smith, 'A New Era of Engagement with the World' (Speech delivered at the Sydney Institute, 
Sydney, 19 August 2008) <http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2008/080819_si.html>. 
3 All references in this thesis to the Rudd government are to its first term in office (2007-2010). 
4 Evans appeared to first articulate the idea in the following speech: Gareth Evans, 'Australia's Place in 
the World: The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decision-Making' (Speech delivered at the ANU Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre Bicentennial Conference, Canberra, 6 December 1988), reprinted and revised in 
Evans, Making Australian Foreign Policy, above n 1, 7-19.   
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Canadian political discourse,5 but Evans certainly did most to popularise it, especially in 
Australia, and also to flesh out the meaning of the term. Evans elaborated on the 
concept in a range of writings and speeches as Foreign Minister,6 as well as in post-
political capacities, including while President and CEO of the International Crisis Group 
(2000-2009).7 Evans' conception of GIC is the most comprehensive political exposition 
of the term in Australia and probably still best reflects how it is understood within an 
Australian political context.  
                                                     
 
5 There is some dispute about the exact origins of the term good international citizen. Peter Lawler 
states that GIC was first enunciated by former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson in the 1970's: 
Peter Lawler, 'The Core Assumptions and Presumptions of "Cooperative Security"' in Stephanie Lawson 
(ed), The New Agenda for Global Security (Allen & Unwin, 1995) 39, 39. Pert, however, notes that while 
Pearson spoke about themes later associated with GIC, there is no record of him using the term. 
Canadian Governor-General, Daniel Mitchener, is known to have used the exact term in a speech in 
1967: Alison Pert, 'Australia as a Good International Citizen from Barton to Howard: An International 
Law Perspective' (PhD Thesis, University of Sydney, 2010); D Roland Michener, 'Canada’s New Status' in 
John Griffin (ed), The Empire Club of Canada Speeches 1967-1968 (Empire Club Foundation, 1968). 
6 See especially: Gareth Evans, 'Australian Foreign Policy: Priorities in a Changing World' (Speech 
delivered at the Australian Institute of International Affairs Roy Milne Memorial Lecture, Melbourne, 27 
April 1989), reprinted in Gareth Evans, 'Australian Foreign Policy: Priorities in a Changing World' (1989) 
43 Australian Outlook 1 and reprinted and revised in Evans, Making Australian Foreign Policy, above n 1, 
20-46; Gareth Evans, 'Foreign Policy and Good International Citizenship' (Speech, Canberra, 6 March 
1990) <http://www.gevans.org/speeches/old/1990/060390_fm_fpandgoodinternationalcitizen.pdf>; 
Gareth Evans, 'International Law and Australia's Interests' (Speech delivered at the Inaugural Australian 
Branch of the International Law Association Lecture, Sydney, 30 March 1989), reproduced in Gareth 
Evans, 'International Law and Australia's Interests' (1989) Australian International Law News 185; Gareth 
Evans, 'Foreign Policy and the Environment' (Speech delivered at the Queensland Branch of the 
Australian Institute of International Affairs, Brisbane, 14 March 1990) reprinted in Gareth Evans 'Foreign 
Policy and the Environment' (1990) 61 Australian Foreign Affairs and Trade: The Monthly Record 112; 
Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations: In the World of the 1990's (Melbourne 
University Press, 1991); Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations: In the World of the 
1990s (Melbourne University Press, 2nd ed, 1995); Gareth Evans, 'Cooperating with My Critics: A 
Rejoinder' in Stephanie Lawson (ed), The New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and 
Beyond (Allen & Unwin, 1995) 189. Evans' speeches are available at: 
<http://www.gevans.org/speeches.html>. 
7 Gareth Evans, 'The Labor Tradition: A View from the 1990s' in David Lee and Christopher Waters (eds), 
Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy (Allen & Unwin, 1997) 11; Moises Naim 
and Dave Case, 'True Believer' (2001) (Mar/April) Foreign Policy 26 (interview with Gareth Evans); 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (2001) 8, 
36, 72 (co-chaired by Gareth Evans); Gareth Evans, 'International Challenges After September 11' 
(Speech delivered at the Cranlana Programme Alumni, Melbourne, 11 June 2002) 
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2002/international-challenges-after-
september-11.aspx>; Gareth Evans, 'Preventing Deadly Conflict and the Problem of Political Will' 
(Speech delivered at the Montague Burton Professor of International Relations Lecture, 17 October 
2002) <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2002/preventing-deadly-conflict-and-
the-problem-of-political-will.aspx>; Gareth Evans, 'Australia's Foreign Policy Response to Global 
Challenges' (Speech delivered at the Advance 100 Global Australians Summit, Sydney, 19 December 
2006) <http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech200.html>. 
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1 The Third Category of 'National Interest' 
GIC, as outlined by Evans, is a foreign policy concept that concerns how government 
pursues the national interests of the state. Evans argued that 'all foreign policy is, or 
should be, directed at the protection and advancement of the national interest'.8 
According to Evans, Australia's national interests lay in three key areas: 'geo-political or 
strategic interests' (especially the defence of Australian sovereignty and political 
independence); 'economic and trade interests' (especially securing a liberal 
international trading regime, allowing reasonable access to overseas markets for 
Australian exports); and 'the national interest in being, and being seen to be, a good 
international citizen.'9  
 
The first two categories identified by Evans – essentially security and economic 
interests – represent the traditional national interests of the state. According to 
Gyngell and Wesley, the traditional view is that '[s]ecurity and prosperity will always be 
the primary foreign policy motivations of any government elected to protect and 
advance the interests of its society.'10 As stated by Evans, most political leaders define 
national interests 'in quite narrow security and economic terms – what's necessary or 
desirable to protect the country from threat or attack, and to increase the income and 
quality of life of its people.'11  Australian governments have, however, also long 
recognised the importance of promoting less self-interested values and concerns in 
foreign policy 'that are more concerned with a nation's sense of self and 
responsibilities to people and institutions beyond its borders.'12 This was evident, for 
example, in the aftermath of World War II, when Australia, led by Dr Herbert Evatt, 
Minister for External Affairs in the Curtain and Chifley Labor governments, made a 
significant contribution to the founding of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 and the 
                                                     
 
8 Evans, Making Australian Foreign Policy, above n 1, 9. 
9 Evans and Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations (1995), above n 6, 33-34.  
10 Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2nd ed, 2007) 273. See also Evans and Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations (1995), above n 6, 33. 
11 Evans, 'Australia's Foreign Policy Response to Global Challenges', above n 7. 
12 Gyngell and Wesley, above n 10, 273. 
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promotion of universal human rights.13 The novel contribution of Evans' was to 
articulate this more ethical aspect of foreign policy explicitly in terms of GIC, and also 
to elevate its importance in the discourse and practise of Australian foreign policy.14 
Under Evans' Foreign Ministership, GIC became an explicit goal of government policy,15 
and was frequently invoked in public, especially by Evans.16  
 
What then are the general characteristics of a GIC? Evans generally spoke about GIC in 
similar terms, however, a range of his writings and speeches need to be considered 
together in order to fully appreciate his vision of GIC. A number of scholars have 
analysed Evans' writings and speeches,17 yet have often failed to clearly tease out the 
various elements articulated by Evans. The major exception is Pert, who recently 
sought to better isolate the various qualities or attributes of GIC. Pert suggests that 
there are five key attributes of GIC (as outlined by Evans), namely: compliance with 
international law (or more broadly, 'engagement' with international law);18 support for 
multilateralism; a willingness to 'pitch in' to international tasks; morality or ethics – or 
'international good deeds'; and 'leadership' – improving or raising international 
standards.19 Evans never specified the requirements of GIC in any formulaic manner, 
meaning that his conception of GIC is open to interpretation. This thesis agrees that 
                                                     
 
13 See Evans, 'The Labor Tradition: A View from the 1990s', above n 7, 12; David Goldsworthy, 'Australia 
and Good International Citizenship' in Stephanie Lawson (ed), The New Agenda for Global Security: 
Cooperating for Peace and Beyond (Allen & Unwin, 1995) 171, 177. Evatt was the first President of the 
UN General Assembly and oversaw the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
14 See Richard Leaver and Dave Cox, ‘Introduction: The World According to Gar’ in Richard Leaver and 
Dave Cox (eds), Middling, Meddling, Muddling: Issues in Australian Foreign Policy (Allen & Unwin, 1997) 
1, 6; Goldsworthy, 'Australia and Good International Citizenship', above n 13, 171. 
15 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 1993-94 (1994) 14. The department's 
international goals were articulated as: increasing Australia’s economic prosperity through trade and 
investment flows; ensuring a favourable security environment for Australia; advancing Australia's 
standing as a good international citizen; promoting global cooperation based on fair rules; and helping 
Australians overseas. 
16 See Evans' speeches and writings on GIC, above n 6. 
17 See, eg, Goldsworthy, 'Australia and Good International Citizenship', above n 13; Peter Lawler, 'The 
Good Citizen Australia?' (1992) 16 Asian Studies Review 241; Marianne Hanson, 'Australia and Nuclear 
Arms Control as "Good International Citizenship"' (Working Paper No 2/1999, Department of 
International Relations, ANU, 1999) 4. 
18 Pert initially states that 'compliance' with international law is an attribute of GIC, but then 
redefines/expands compliance to mean 'engagement'. Thus GIC requires compliance with existing 
international obligations, adherence to all relevant treaties, exceeding existing obligations, working to 
create new or better law where necessary; or encouraging other states to do all or any of these things: 
Pert, above n 5, 1-32. See further discussion of GIC and international law below. 
19 Ibid 13.  
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the attributes of GIC identified by Pert are relevant attributes. However, it is 
suggested, also based on a primary examination of Evans' writings and speeches, that 
the qualities or attributes of GIC (many of which overlap) are broader than proposed 
by Pert.  
2 Internationalism – International Cooperation 
The most basic attribute of GIC was the practise of 'internationalism' or 'international 
cooperation'. Rather than being disinterested or 'isolationist'20 in approach, a GIC was 
prepared to cooperate on the 'new internationalist agenda' which emerged during 
Evans' stint as Foreign Minister.21 Following the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s – 
which had greatly hindered international cooperation – a range of global issues, once 
considered as 'internal matters or nobody's business', began receiving greater 
international attention.22 These included environmental issues such as climate change, 
the ozone layer and sustainable development; the advancement of human rights; and 
health problems like AIDS, among others.23 While GIC is strongly associated with 
notions of 'activism' and 'leadership' (see below) Evans' statements suggest that, at 
minimum, a GIC ought to be a constructive participant in world affairs, as opposed to 
ignoring global concerns or actively blocking international progress.24 Given that a 
state cannot adopt an activist or leadership position on every issue (due to limited 
diplomatic resources),25 being a cooperative member of the international community 
represented the minimum expectation of GIC. 
                                                     
 
20 On the American internationalist versus isolationist approach to foreign policy see, eg, Kim Richard 
Nossal, 'Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of 'Good International Citizenship' in Canadian Foreign 
Policy' (1998-99) 54 International Journal 88, 96-98.  
21 See Evans and Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations (1995), above n 6, 40. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Other examples included: apartheid in South Africa and racial intolerance more generally; the drug 
trade; refugee care and resettlement; terrorism; the use of the death penalty; debt, poverty and 
national calamities in developing countries; security issues like peace-keeping and arms control, 
especially the threat and proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons: ibid 34-35, 40. 
24 See ibid 40. 
25 Ibid. Evans and co-author Grant suggest that Australia must focus on issues in which it has 'a 
particularly useful contribution to make,' whether because of its 'established profile, expertise, 
complimentary policy objectives or some other relevant factor'. 
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3 Activism, Leadership and 'Pitching in' 
Global activism and the demonstration of leadership were particularly important 
attributes of GIC. Evans commented that the multilateral objectives he advocated as 
Foreign Minister were 'primarily activist rather than reflective or responsive' and 
involved 'providing international leadership and constructing a better international 
environment.'26 He noted that there was a significant reputational benefit to be gained 
from 'being regularly willing to pitch into international tasks for motives that appear to 
be relatively selfless'.27 The Hawke-Keating governments demonstrated activism, 
leadership and pitching in on numerous occasions. Prominent examples included 
Australia's successful efforts, in coalition with other states, to: establish the Antarctic 
Environmental Protocol;28 craft a sanctions strategy to end apartheid in South Africa; 
establish a Chemical Weapons Convention;29 implement the Cambodian peace plan;30 
launch the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in 1989; renew the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty in 1995;31 and establish the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty,32 among others.  
4 A More Ethical Foreign Policy: Advancing 'Purposes Beyond Ourselves'  
GIC was also about acting more ethically or morally in international affairs.33 This was 
implied from the placement of the term 'good' before 'international citizen'. But Evans 
was also explicit that GIC required a commitment to pursuing 'purposes beyond 
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ourselves', a phrase borrowed from influential international relations (IR) academic, 
Hedley Bull.34 Evans characterised issues on the GIC's agenda, such as environmental 
protection and human rights, as 'ends that are inherently valuable'.35 Seeking to 
address such issues was 'proper, if for no other reason than to maintain our own sense 
of worth'.36 On issues such as human rights protection, a 'moral obligation' was 'its 
own justification' for acting as a GIC.37 For Evans, GIC was about helping to realise an 
idealistic vision of a 'peaceful and prosperous Australia and a peaceful and prosperous 
world'38 and pursuing the 'common good'.39 Long after leaving public office, Evans 
stated that pursing 'global public goods' was 'at the heart' of GIC.40 One particularly 
important aspect of this altruism, which itself could be regarded as a significant 
characteristic of GIC, was the need to maintain a 'credible and effective overseas aid 
program'.41  
5 Advancing 'Enlightened Self-interest' 
While GIC was in part motivated by altruism, it should be emphasised that ultimately 
Evans conceptualised GIC as a means of advancing the national interest, albeit in a 
more ethical fashion. GIC was not just 'the foreign policy equivalent of Boy Scout good 
deeds.'42 Rather, it was the practice of 'enlightened self-interest'.43 In other words, GIC 
involved taking a broader view of what was actually in the 'national interest', looking 
beyond narrow security and economic concerns.44 The motivation for doing so was not 
merely an idealistic or moral one. Rather, Evans argued that in an increasingly 
globalised and interdependent world, many so-called 'value' issues (such as addressing 
human rights or environmental issues) could adversely impact Australia's traditional 
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national interests.45 Being at most a 'middle power', Australia's interest lay in a world 
governed 'by principles of justice, equality, talent and achievement, rather than status 
and power'.46 International cooperation was not 'an idealistic endeavour' but a 
'practical necessity'.47 Evans also argued that Australia stood to gain a 'reputational 
benefit' (that is, diplomatic capital) from being, and being seen to be, a GIC.48 This 
could assist it in pursuing its various national interests at the global level, including 
traditional interests such as commercial objectives.49  
6 Blending 'Realism and Idealism'  
Evans further characterised GIC as an approach blending 'realism and idealism'.50 IR 
scholars have analysed this statement in detail as the terms realism and idealism have 
specific meanings within this academic discipline. In IR terms, 'realism' often refers to a 
narrow, self-interested approach to international affairs; the form of behaviour that 
GIC is intended to counter (see discussion of idealism and realism at section B). Evans, 
however, appeared to use the term realism in the sense of being 'realistic' or 
'pragmatic'.51 In Evans' words, the conduct of foreign policy was about 'responding 
realistically to the world as we find it.'52 Moral concerns had to be balanced against the 
'pragmatic acceptance of irreversible fact'.53 A middle power like Australia also needed 
to avoid having 'exaggerated ideas of [its] influence'.54 Instead, it needed to set 
realistic priorities that were both 'important' and 'achievable'.55 Governments also 
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needed to temper 'what we want with what we can deliver and at what cost – social, 
economic and political'.56  
 
While thus a pragmatist, Evans also argued the 'case for idealism in international 
affairs', believing that the world could 'be changed – gradually – for the better.'57 
Rather than seeing realism and idealism as 'competing objectives', Evans believed that 
the challenge for government was in 'getting the blend right'.58 GIC did not require 
Australia to 'set aside [traditional] national interests, any more than a citizen who lives 
as a law-abiding, socially cooperative member of a national community, sets aside 
personal rights.'59 Instead, GIC was about 'idealistic pragmatism'.60 
7 Values-based Foreign Policy 
It should be evident from the above discussion on 'purposes beyond ourselves' that 
GIC involved projecting values, not just interests, into the foreign policy realm. Evans 
made this clear, stating that GIC required 'an extension into our foreign relations of the 
basic values of the Australian community: values at the core of our sense of self and 
which a democratic community expects its government to pursue.'61 Whereas 
traditional national interests were said to be more 'objective', existing 'quite 
independently of community values', GIC flowed from 'the community's self-image, 
and what it judge[d] to be its guiding principles.'62 GIC did not involve 'arrogantly 
insisting' that the world accept 'Australian' values,63 but nor did it condone 'crude 
cultural relativism'.64 Evans' emphasis was on advancing values that were increasingly 
being accepted as 'fundamental' and 'universal', such as those widely adopted in 
international human rights treaties.65  
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8 Support for Multilateralism and International Institutions 
In more practical terms, GIC involved a commitment to multilateralism as well as 
international institutions (through which multilateralism is generally conducted). For 
Evans, there was a 'direct link' between Australia's pursuit of GIC and its 'long standing 
support for multilateralism'.66 Because of growing global interdependence and the 
practical reality that multilateral forums are chiefly responsible for addressing global 
issues, Evans argued that GICs ought to place 'considerable emphasis' on multilateral 
diplomacy.67  This did not diminish the need for bilateral diplomacy,68 but Evans had a 
clear preference for global problems to be addressed multilaterally. Related to this, 
GICs were expected to be active participants in international institutions and also be 
engaged in strengthening the institutional architecture,69 particularly the UN.70 Evans 
regarded the UN as the 'only truly universal organisation' and 'the symbol and the 
hope of … international cooperation' which lay at 'the heart of good international 
citizenship'.71 
9 Support for International Law 
Of particular interest to this thesis, Evans indicated that a commitment to international 
law was a fundamental aspect of GIC. Evans, himself a lawyer, strongly defended the 
value of the international legal order, believing that it served all nations' long-term 
interests.72 Despite its 'inherent weaknesses'73 – especially its lack of an effective 
enforcement mechanism74 – international law provided a necessary 'framework for 
promoting peace, order and predictability in international relations; for promoting co-
operation between nations and the resolution of common problems; and for setting 
new and higher standards of both international and national behaviour.'75 
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Various statements by Evans on the Hawke and Keating governments' approach to 
international law highlighted the types of activities that were expected of a GIC in 
relation to international law (what might be termed 'good international legal 
citizenship'). These aspects logically reflected four key phases of the international legal 
process. 
 
First, Evans suggested that Australia had been 'very active in the negotiation of 
treaties, declarations and resolutions'.76 This highlighted that GIC required active 
engagement in the development phase of international law. Second, GIC involved the 
adoption of international treaties and other instruments. Evans noted, for example, 
that Australia had ratified a variety of human rights treaties, and had accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice without reservation.77 
Third, GIC involved compliance with international law, whether in relation to treaty or 
customary international law norms. Evans stated that Australia took its 'international 
obligations very seriously'78 and attached great importance to the fundamental norms 
of international law such as pacta sunt servanda.79 Evans enthused that Australia 
regarded its international legal commitments to be more than 'just good intentions'.80 
Rather overgenerously, he stated that Australia abided by its treaty requirements 'in 
every detail', and was at 'pains to observe to the full the rules of customary 
international law.'81 Fourth, Evans drew attention to the valuable role states can play 
in advancing and upholding international legal norms. For example, Australia had 
encouraged 'universal adherence' to environmental treaties,82 criticised other states in 
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forums like the UN General Assembly when the international legal order was 
violated,83 and made 'vigorous' diplomatic protests when human rights were abused.84 
 
Evans' statements on GIC in relation to international law also need to be interpreted in 
light of other general characteristics of GIC. Reflecting the approach of advancing 
'enlightened self-interest', for example, Evans noted that Australia would not be shy in 
'appealing to self interest' when engaging with international law,85 but also that the 
'force and relevance' of international law lay in it serving 'the long-term interests of all 
nations'86 (indicating that a GIC should not advance its interests in an overly 
nationalistic fashion). 
10 Good Neighbourliness/Good Regional Citizenship and Consistent Domestic 
Behaviour 
Evans briefly alluded to the idea that GIC involved 'good neighbourliness'87 (what could 
also be termed 'good regional citizenship'). In the context of peace and disarmament 
issues, for example, Evans noted that GIC required both international and regional 
endeavours.88 This aspect of GIC was not particularly fleshed out, but examples of 
good neighbourliness included cooperating with neighbouring countries on regional 
issues (such as in the making of regional environmental treaties);89 presenting a 
regional perspective in international discussions and treaty making negotiations;90 and 
generally being 'a helpful neighbour ready to use our resources for the common 
good.'91 
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Another attribute of GIC highlighted by Evans was the need for domestic behaviour to 
be consistent with the values that were being espoused abroad.92 According to Evans, 
the 'most basic obligation' of GIC was 'to ensure that our own house is in order before 
we raise issues on the international scene'.93 This was important for maintaining 
international credibility and diplomatic influence.94 If Australia was involved in 'double 
standards' its influence would be diminished.95 'Hypocrites' were both 'disliked', and if 
Australia's size, 'ignored.'96 As co-author of the Responsibility to Protect Report by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Evans labelled 
'[s]overeignty as responsibility' (incorporating internal responsibility to 'respect the 
dignity and basic rights of all the people' within a state) as the 'minimum content' of 
GIC.97 In the context of international law, the need for consistent domestic behaviour 
of course included complying with international legal norms. 
11 Effective Diplomacy 
It should be noted that Evans associated GIC, for practical reasons, with a particular 
style of diplomacy. Making an impact as a GIC required influence, something which 
according to Evans was determined by the combination of a state's diplomatic assets 
and constraints.98 A key asset was enjoying international credibility.99 Other assets 
included capitalising on Australia's geographic location within the Asia Pacific (giving 
Australia practical advantages in seeking to influence regional issues)100 and Australia's 
status as a western nation (offering opportunities to play the role of an 'honest broker' 
between Western allies like the US and Australia's regional neighbours).101  
 
The major constraint on Australia's ability to make a difference as a GIC was its 
relatively small size. Evans considered Australia to be a middle power (as do most 
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foreign policy analysts).102 By this he meant that Australia was not 'a great or even 
major power' but neither was it 'small or insignificant'.103 While being relatively weak 
in terms of material power (especially in comparison to the military and economic 
strength of the US), Evans argued that middle powers could be 'as well-equipped as 
any other nation, and in some respects better equipped, to generate acceptable 
solutions' to global problems.104 Evans strongly associated GIC with 'middle power 
diplomacy' – building coalitions with 'like-minded' countries – as well as 'niche' 
diplomacy – focusing resources on issues likely to generate worthwhile returns.105 
Middle powers could not generally 'impose their will', instead needing to rely on 
powers of persuasion,106 a 'degree of intellectual imagination and creativity', and the 
'force of ideas'.107  
 
Middle power diplomacy is probably best not described as a universal attribute of GIC. 
All nations, whether large, medium or small, must adopt diplomatic methods that are 
appropriate to their national circumstances. But middle power diplomacy was the 
approach Evans regarded as most effective in terms of achieving Australia's GIC 
objectives.  
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12 The Role of Non-State Actors 
Finally, something should be said about the role of non-state actors in a nation's 
efforts to be a GIC. Evans' writings and speeches focused on the role of the state, as 
represented by the national government, in responding to international issues. 
However, Evans stated that it was not his 'intention to suggest that good international 
citizenship is a matter for governments alone', and indeed, the advancement of GIC 
issues would 'benefit greatly from active and informed public support.'108 Community 
groups, for example, could also make 'an important contribution to the formulation 
and achievement of … national objectives.'109 This highlights that the performance of a 
state as a GIC can be seen in broader terms than just the activities of national 
governments.110 This is only logical given that various other domestic actors, whether 
businesses, non-government organisations or individuals, are involved in activities in 
the international arena and have a role to play in whether or not governments pursue 
and meet GIC objectives.  
 
Evans' articulation of GIC, however, was heavily focused on the state and 
intergovernmental activities. This thesis adopts a similar approach, simply because 
assessing the behaviour of a national government is an important topic of study in its 
own right. Furthermore, national governments are the most significant players in 
international law, being responsible for negotiating, adopting, complying with and 
enforcing a state's legal rights and obligations. Notwithstanding the likely value in 
assessing GIC from a broader perspective, such an approach is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
B Review of Academic 'GIC literature' 
Since Evans first spoke about GIC in the late 1980s, scholars have increasingly turned 
their attention to the topic. As such, a loose body of academic 'GIC literature' now 
exists beyond Evans' own contribution. Scholarship has chiefly emerged from the IR 
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discipline, and to a lesser extent, law. This literature review adopts a thematic 
approach, examining several of the major themes which have emerged in the 
literature.  
1 Explaining the Salience of GIC under Evans 
Several scholars have explored why GIC rose to prominence under Evans.111 Australia 
has a tradition of 'liberal internationalism' under Labor governments dating back to the 
post-World War II era (an ideology some scholars regard GIC as emanating from – see 
below). Yet the explicit notion of GIC only came to prominence in the late 1980s under 
Evans.112 Goldsworthy suggests that this is explained by four key factors. First, the 
elevation of Evans to Foreign Minister was crucial. Evans had a known philosophical 
enthusiasm for aspects now associated with GIC, strongly favouring the UN and 
multilateralism.113 In addition, he had a known 'predilection for imposing greater 
intellectual coherence on the foreign policy agenda' and a 'compulsive desire to erect 
intellectual frameworks' to structure decision-making.114 For Evans, GIC had a codifying 
function, drawing together disparate policy concerns into 'a coherent theme', which 
could take their place alongside traditional security and economic interests.115 
 
Second, it was significant that Evans was a member of a Labor government. Issues on 
the GIC agenda are often regarded as more of a Labor than Liberal National 
government concern,116 a view apparently confirmed by the Howard government's 
diminished enthusiasm for the concept and the subsequent re-emergence of GIC 
under the Rudd government (see chapters 2 and 3).  
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Third, Evans' approach to foreign policy was influenced by global political 
circumstances. GIC was in part a response to historical circumstances, both structural 
and ideological.117 Following the end of the Cold War, United States (US) and British 
intentions in the Asia-Pacific region had become ambiguous.118 Given the involvement 
of Australia's major allies in the region was no longer guaranteed, supporting a 
stronger UN and multilateralist norms were seen as a means of creating a more certain 
security environment.119 At the same time, the UN was then regaining some 
legitimacy, which had been diminished during the Cold War.120 The collapse of Soviet 
communism also liberated Australia from Cold War preoccupations and 'an excessive 
sense of clientage towards the United States'.121 Moreover, the post-Cold War era, no 
longer dominated by US-Soviet bipolarity, provided an opportunity for middle powers 
like Australia to adopt a more proactive role in international affairs.122 Ideologically, 
liberal internationalist themes – such as interdependence, globalisation and human 
rights – were also generally becoming more prevalent in global discourse.123  
 
Fourth, was Australia's status as a middle power. Goldsworthy draws on Nossal's view 
that the more activist middle powers like Australia and Canada have a tendency to 
believe that 'it is right and proper' to be fully involved in the affairs of the international 
community, and that 'from such a belief, notions such as acting in the 'international 
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interest' or GIC come easily.124 It is argued that middle powers like Australia 'seek to 
make up in diplomatic effort what they lack in political, economic or military clout'.125 
2 The Conceptual Basis for GIC: Citizenship, Realism, Idealism and Rationalism  
A number of scholars have sought to explain the philosophical or ideological basis for 
GIC. In particular, it has been suggested that GIC draws upon notions of citizenship 
(both in its domestic and global forms); realism; idealism (including liberal 
international and cosmopolitan traditions); and rationalism. While GIC adopts 
distinctive terminology, Goldsworthy notes that it draws upon 'a multi-dimensional 
conceptual base.'126 Rather than being a relatively recent phenomenon, Wheeler and 
Dunne suggest that GIC is located within a broader, historic, and continuing debate 
about the moral responsibilities which derive from membership of the international 
community.127 
a) GIC and the Notion of Citizenship   
For Evans, the label 'international citizen' was a convenient way of expressing the idea 
that the state is a member of the international community. As such, it had both ethical 
and legal obligations to other states, as well as to humanity more broadly (the latter, 
as indicated by Evans' strong support for universal human rights norms).128 While 
Evans himself never did so, several scholars have sought to better understand the 
conceptual links between GIC and broader citizenship discourse. 
 
Before considering this scholarship, it is helpful to outline the basic features of 
citizenship discourse. Traditionally, citizenship is presumed to occur within the nation-
state.129 As Bosniak writes, citizenship in the domestic sphere refers to the formal 
                                                     
 
124 Goldsworthy, 'Australia and Good International Citizenship', above n 13, 171, citing Kim Richard 
Nossal, 'Middle Power Diplomacy in the Changing Asia-Pacific Order: Australia and Canada Compared' in 
Richard Leaver and James L Richardson (eds), The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnosis and Prognosis (Allen & 
Unwin, 1993) 213.  
125 Goldsworthy, 'Australia and Good International Citizenship', above n 13, 171. See also Hanson, 
'Australia and Nuclear Arms Control as "Good International Citizenship"', above n 17, 1-2.  
126 Goldsworthy, 'Australia and Good International Citizenship', above n 13, 181. 
127 Wheeler and Dunne, 'Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for British Foreign Policy', above n 
122, 854. 
128 Evans and Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations (1995), above n 6, 40.  
129 Linda Bosniak, 'Citizenship' in Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet, The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies 
(Oxford University Press, 2003) 183, 191. 
 31 
membership of an individual within an organised political community, in modern times 
represented by the nation-state.130 Citizenship in this context has been understood by 
scholars in different ways. First, as a formal legal category, with citizenship conferring 
legal status upon a person, bringing with it a range of legal rights and 
responsibilities.131 Second, in terms of those rights (and freedoms), as citizens of a 
state are typically granted a range of civil, political and social rights,132 and perhaps 
also economic and cultural.133 Third, in terms of responsibility, based on republican 
ideas, with citizens expected to be actively engaged in the political life of the 
community.134 Republican citizenship may also advocate the concept of 'civic virtue', 
establishing obligations to, for example, foster moral character or a common 
culture.135 Fourth, in terms of the collective identity that members of a national 
community may develop with others beyond the nation-state.136 That is, individuals 
may identify themselves as 'citizens of the world', feeling a sense of solidarity with the 
broader human community.137 While the latter understanding of citizenship is often 
more psychological than legal or political,138 a broader approach to citizenship now 
exists in the European Union (EU)139 in which citizens of member states enjoy a range 
of rights, albeit more limited, across the EU community.140 Some scholars thus see 
evidence of 'global citizenship' emerging (often also referred to as transnational, post-
national or cosmopolitan citizenship),141 or at least argue that it ought to occur.142  
 
                                                     
 
130 Ibid 185. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
133 See Linda Bosniak, 'Citizenship Denationalized' (2000) 7 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 447, 
464. 
134 Bosniak, 'Citizenship', above n 129, 185-86.  
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As noted, several scholars have discussed the parallels between GIC and broader 
citizenship discourse.143 Needless to say, the analogy is obvious to an international 
legal scholar. Citizenship as a formal legal category has its parallel in the idea of 
sovereignty, which grants a state legal and political recognition as a member of the 
international community by other states. Once recognised as a sovereign member of 
the international community, states enjoy a host of legal and political rights and 
responsibilities, with political participation occurring through forums such as the UN 
General Assembly.  
 
Linklater suggests that it is the republican or civic virtue conception of citizenship that 
is most relevant to understanding GIC, that is, the idea that GIC involves 'a willingness 
to place constraints on self-interest because of the duty to promote the more general 
good'.144 The collective identity or cosmopolitan aspect of citizenship is also evident in 
GIC in the notion that the state owes ethical obligations to both the community of 
states and the community of humankind (such as to protect human rights or the global 
environment).145 It should be noted, however, that while global citizenship discourse 
may promote a radical re-organisation of global politics that dispenses with the state 
system (in favour of global citizenship), GIC seeks to cement the legitimacy of the state 
system by improving the quality of state conduct. Linklater argues that GICs have an 
ethical obligation to advance the cause of global citizenship.146 However, Williams' 
view that GICs ought to be regarded as 'allies' in the promotion of global citizenship 
causes, such as human rights,147 more realistically reflects the limits of what GIC is 
about.  
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b) Realism 
Several scholars argue that 'realism' (not to be confused here with simple pragmatism 
or being 'realistic') is an essential element of GIC. Realists in the academic IR field claim 
to describe the 'reality' of international relations. As described by Bull, realists 
generally adopt a very pessimistic view of international affairs, likening the 
international system to a Hobbesian state of nature – an 'arena of struggle' in which 
states are pitted against each other in a game of survival.148 While domestic societies 
establish governments and law to escape this condition, the international domain is 
said to be 'anarchic' because it lacks a central enforcement body to maintain law and 
order.149 Given this view of the international arena, realists argue that states must 
always preference national interests – especially security – before legal or 
ethical/moral considerations.150 The classical realist position, attributed to Hans 
Morgenthau, asserts that international politics is governed by laws of human nature, 
and that human nature (specifically its darker element) causes states to pursue power 
in international affairs. Thus statespersons ought to be solely concerned with 
safeguarding and advancing the national interest, understood in narrow strategic and 
economic terms. While states might frame their behaviour in ethical terms, moral 
language is said to be used merely as a cloak to justify the advancement of narrow self-
interest.151  
 
At first glance, a realist approach encouraging the pursuit of what Goldsworthy labels 
'naked self-interest',152 appears to represent the antithesis of GIC. But as Goldsworthy 
points out, realism is evident in GIC in Evans' self-interest justification for acting as a 
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GIC.153 The above literature helps to highlight the point that whether a state meets the 
standard of GIC will often depend on the extent to which it pursues narrow self-
interest over and above the interests of those who reside beyond the national border. 
As suggested by Goldsworthy, Evans advocated for the pursuit of 'reasonable self-
interest',154 rather than self-interest at any cost. 
c) Idealism 
Idealism is the second major tradition of IR after realism, and provides a counterpoint 
to the latter's moral scepticism. As noted, Evans was an idealist, believing that progress 
in international affairs is possible. Goldsworthy suggests that Evans' idealism was 
particularly evident in his commitment to promoting justice and equity at the 
international level155 while Hanson sees it in GIC's altruism  and willingness to place 
constraints on self-interest in order to promote 'a more general good.'156 In this vein, 
Lawler uses the term 'global do-gooders' to describe aspiring GICs.157  
 
Beyond the concept of idealism at a basic level (a term not always used consistently in 
IR discourse), scholars have highlighted the links between GIC and two particular 
idealistic traditions: liberal internationalism and cosmopolitanism.  
i) Liberal Internationalism 
Cox, Leaver, Smith and Burchill all strongly associate Evans' approach to foreign policy 
and GIC with 'liberal internationalism'.158 Lawler even suggests that GIC is in fact 
'simply a pseudonym for a well-established style of moderate liberal 
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internationalism'.159 Liberal internationalism is a political and intellectual tradition 
which, as its name suggests, advocates an internationalist approach to global issues 
informed by liberal ideals and values. The domestic tradition of liberalism, which dates 
back to figures such as Rousseau, Kant and Cobden, champions principles such as 
limited government; scientific rationality; political freedom; democracy; 
constitutionally guaranteed rights; the liberty of the individual and equality before the 
law; respect for private property; individual competition in civil society and market 
capitalism.160 Liberal internationalism is a continuation of this tradition. It adopts a 
number of principles, relevant to the international sphere, with the essential aim of 
helping to realise domestic liberal values on a global scale.161 
 
Liberal internationalist principles (then usually labelled idealism, or more pejoratively 
as 'utopianism') heavily influenced the attempted creation of a new world order 
following World War I. Idealists led by US President Woodrow Wilson wanted to 
abolish war as an instrument of statecraft and believed that this was achievable 
through the implementation of liberal principles. Chief among these were that: self-
determination and statehood be made available to all national groups; that 'secret 
diplomacy' by unelected elites be abolished along with the 'balance of power' 
principle;162 that collective security arrangements be created through a League of 
Nations; that autocratic regimes be replaced by democratically elected governments; 
the creation of international institutions to facilitate cooperation (such as the League); 
and the creation of a Permanent Court of International Justice to help peacefully 
mediate disputes, with respect for the rule of international law being a significant 
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aspect of liberal internationalism. Other important aspects included a belief in free 
trade and universal human rights.163 
 
While suffering a major setback with the onset of World War II, the liberal 
internationalist project re-emerged stronger in its aftermath, with the creation of the 
UN, and a host of other international institutions including the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, an International Trade Organisation (which evolved into the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and later the World Trade Organisation), and 
the International Court of Justice.164 Human rights were given much greater expression 
and legal protection through the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 
later the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights165 and International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights166 (and a host of other human rights 
instruments). 
 
Evans' support for an internationalist approach followed an Australian Labor Party 
tradition dating back to the post-World War II era, particularly to the Chifley 
government.167 The Labor party (including Evans and later Rudd), as well as various 
scholars, generally regard internationalism as a significant characteristic of Labor's 
general approach to foreign policy, as first demonstrated by Dr Evatt while serving as 
External Affairs Minister under Prime Minister Chifley.168 While, as stated above, 
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several scholars associate Evans' conception of GIC with liberal internationalism, it 
should be noted that Labor itself views its internationalism as stemming more from its 
social democratic beliefs – namely, a commitment to achieving social justice both 
domestically and internationally.169 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully assess 
the role of liberal and social democratic values on Evans' conception of GIC, suffice to 
say that it appears to have been influenced by elements of both. 
 
Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (UK) have also been seen as practising a 
liberal form of internationalism at certain times in the post-world war II era.170 This has 
been contrasted with the conceptually similar 'classical internationalism' practised by 
the 'like-minded' group of North-West European states (Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Norway and Sweden), characterised by these states' greater emphasis on meeting or 
exceeding the UN Official Development Assistance target of 0.7 per cent of GDP; 
significant contributions to international peacekeeping missions and conflict 
mediation; and UN activism generally.171  
ii) Cosmopolitanism 
As noted earlier, scholars such as Linklater and Williams believe that GICs can help to 
promote cosmopolitan ideals. However, while GIC endorses certain cosmopolitan 
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ideals such as universal human rights, Goldsworthy points out that GIC 'stops well 
short of cosmopolitanism' proper.172 Belonging more to the liberal internationalist 
tradition, GIC seeks to 'reinforce the roles and identities of nation-states'.173 By 
contrast, Linklater describes cosmopolitanism as a form of idealism which ultimately 
envisages the demise of the state system in favour of a cosmopolitan world order and 
cosmopolitan citizenship.174 Dunne suggests that GIC advances 'a middle ground' 
between realism and cosmopolitanism, recognising that 'political actors are neither 
animated solely by power politics [realism] nor on an irreversible journey towards a 
post-sovereign universal community.'175 
d) Rationalism 
Several scholars also suggest that rationalism, sometimes referred to as the 'English 
School' or 'Grotian tradition',176 provides an intellectual underpinning for GIC,177 or at 
least operates 'within a comparable conceptual ballpark'.178 The English School is most 
well-known for its analysis of the 'international society of states'.179 The English School 
accepts the realist view that the international system is ultimately anarchic, but figures 
like Bull have examined the way in which the rules and institutions of international 
society have heavily moderated this condition.180 According to Hanson, 'the rationalist 
paradigm, which sees the preserving of the society of states and a liberal international 
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order through rules, norms, institutions and regular dialogue between members of this 
order, was also an essential foundation' of Evans' conception of GIC.181  
3 When Must National Interests Give Way to Idealistic/Ethical Concerns? 
A key concern of IR scholarship has been to examine the extent to which it is 
permissible to blend realism (in the self-interested sense) with idealism and still qualify 
as a GIC; a line of enquiry spurred by Evans' suggestion that GIC involves blending the 
two. Several scholars, regarding GIC as drawing upon the rationalist approach, have 
utilised this tradition in seeking to answer this question. These approaches are largely 
concerned with the tension between security and human rights, and thus are not 
directly relevant to the present research question. Nonetheless, they do highlight the 
importance of moderating narrow self-interest for states wishing to be regarded as 
GICs. 
 
In the seminal IR article on GIC, Linklater drew upon the writings of Emmerich de 
Vattel (an early figure in both international law and rationalist discourse), to suggest 
that, '[f]or Vattel, the good international citizen is the state which is prepared to put 
the welfare of international society [by which is meant the survival of 'order'] ahead of 
the relentless pursuit of its own national interests.'182 A GIC was not expected to 
'sacrifice its own national independence' nor act in a manner that 'would jeopardise its 
survival or endanger its vital national interests' but it was 'beholden to other states to 
place the survival of order before the satisfaction of minimal national advantages.'183 
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Wheeler and Dunne subsequently developed Linklater's formulation in a more 
cosmopolitan direction, suggesting that the 'welfare' of international society should 
include not just the preservation of order, but also respect for human rights.184 As 
such, more than simply placing 'order before the pursuit of narrow commercial and 
political advantage', GICs were obligated to forsake such advantages 'where they 
conflict with human rights.'185 The 'guardianship' of human rights was argued to 
represent the 'litmus test' for the UK's performance as an international citizen (in the 
context of the ongoing debate on the merits of humanitarian intervention to protect 
civilians from gross human rights violations).186  
 
In more general terms, Hanson suggests that GIC, as explained by Evans, did 'not imply 
forfeiting national interests completely for the sake of moral principles, any more than 
it implied that foreign policy must always be dictated by calculations of self-interest.'187 
Rather, it 'was a means of aiming for morally acceptable outcomes while working 
within the constraints inherent in government.'188 Hanson suggests that '[u]timately, 
our judgement of GIC will be dependent on the extent to which we concede that 
foreign policy can indeed claim to be informed by moral and ethical global and 
                                                     
 
184 Wheeler and Dunne, 'Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for British Foreign Policy', above n 
122, 855. This formulation of GIC reflects a 'solidarist' rationalist approach, which in the tradition of 
Hugo Grotius, places more emphasis on the rights of individuals as subjects of international law and 
international society in their own right, leading to support for norms such as humanitarian intervention: 
Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary 
Reassessment (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 227; Dunne, 'Good Citizen Europe', above n 139, 21-
22.  
185 Wheeler and Dunne, 'Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for British Foreign Policy', above n 
122, 855. 
186 Ibid 856. Later articles in the rationalist tradition further developed a distinctly rationalist approach 
to GIC, outlining numerous 'pluralist' and 'solidarist' principles of GIC, drawing upon various rationalist 
scholarship: see Linklater and Suganami, The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary 
Reassessment, above n 184, ch 7 ('The Good International Citizen and the Transformation of 
International Society'); Dunne, 'Good Citizen Europe', above n 139, 13. This approach to GIC is 
particularly discipline specific and removed from Evans' conception of GIC, and is not drawn upon 
further by this thesis. Linklater and Suganami suggest (in an approach later extended by Dunne) that 
GICs must vary their behaviour and pursuit of the national interest depending on whether they are 
dealing with pluralist or solidarist-leaning countries: 232. The overarching aim of this approach is the 
'ethical aspiration to build a global community that institutionalizes respect for the harm principle' – 
that is, the moral responsibility not to harm other peoples: 233-34. 
187 Hanson, 'Australia and Nuclear Arms Control as "Good International Citizenship"', above n 17, 4. 
188 Ibid. 
 41 
humanitarian considerations while still retaining the right to uphold and at times even 
favour a particularly national interest.'189  
 
More recently, writing from an international lawyer's perspective, Pert also considers 
the need to balance pragmatism and idealism when pursuing the national interest. 
Pert notes that the appropriate balance between pragmatism and idealism (that is, the 
ethical or moral aspect of a policy or practice) will vary from issue to issue. Thus Pert 
suggests that 'the only general conclusion that can be drawn is that an ethical or moral 
element in a policy or practice is a positive, but not determinative, indicator of good 
international citizenship while an unethical policy or practice will always be 
incompatible with good international citizenship.'190  
 
Singer and Gregg's analysis of this issue is the most directly relevant to the current 
research question. Singer and Gregg suggest that the difference between a realist and 
a GIC's approach to foreign policy chiefly lies in how it interprets the notion of the 
'national interest'.191 Rather than focusing on short-term and narrow interests, the 
authors suggest that GICs will focus on broader and longer-term interests192 (what 
Evans described as 'enlightened self-interest'). That is: 'Are we thinking of the security 
and economic prosperity of Australians over the next ten years? Or do we have a 
broader and more long-term view of the national interest, which includes a direct 
concern about the nature of the world in which Australia and Australians will exist for 
the next century?'193 Thus on climate change, for example, Singer and Gregg criticise 
the Howard government's emphasis on protecting Australia's short-term economic 
interests at the expense of addressing Australia's longer-term interest in avoiding 
dangerous climate change (see discussion in chapter 2).194 As with Pert, Singer and 
Gregg also regard acting ethically as fundamental to GIC.195 
                                                     
 
189 Ibid 20. 
190 Pert, above n 5, 21. 
191 Singer and Gregg, above n 33, 15. Note that Singer and Gregg use the term 'good global citizen' in a 
manner essentially interchangeable with GIC. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid 15, 52-53. 
195 Ibid 53. 
 42 
4 Leadership 
Several scholars, especially Hanson, have highlighted the importance of leadership in 
Evans' articulation of GIC.196 Hanson argues that more than 'merely complying with 
existing norms and rules', GIC requires 'innovative and active diplomatic ventures to 
progress those norms and rules,' or 'intellectual, creative and sometimes risk-taking 
leadership'.197 Also highlighting this element, Lightfoot compares the leadership 
approach of the Hawke and Keating governments to the 'veto state' actions of the 
Howard government at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, where it 
attempted to 'block strong international action by forcing conclusions and declarations 
to be no more than the lowest common denominator' (especially on climate 
change).198 Lightfoot contrasts leadership behaviour from mere 'followership'.199 
Nossal also suggests that leadership is particularly important to GIC because a major 
purpose of GIC is to 'convince others to alter their behaviour and join in what ideally 
becomes a bandwagon effect, where the cost to recalcitrants goes up sharply.'200 On 
the topic of leadership, Pert also notes the weight Evans put on 'raising international 
standards', especially in relation to human rights.201 
5 On the Significance of International and Domestic Constraints 
As noted, Evans believed that a GIC, while idealistic in outlook, must also be realistic in 
pursuing its objectives. This could be interpreted as providing an excuse for poor 
behaviour, but scholars have generally accepted the relevance of constraints upon 
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government when assessing GIC. Goldsworthy suggests that 'at the analytical level the 
obstacles and dilemmas faced by government, and the need for trade-offs which 
necessarily arise, must be acknowledged'.202 GIC activities are not a discrete policy 
agenda, but an aspect of 'a complex whole'.203 He notes that if GIC activities 'appear 
inadequate, tokenistic, compromised, or whatever, the reasons may not always spring 
from governmental cynicism'.204 Rather, they may 'lie, to quite a large extent, in 
constraining factors over which the government has little control, such as policy 
complexity' and 'Australia's relative lack of international clout'.205 While constraining 
factors should be given 'due weight', Goldsworthy nonetheless urges that these 'not be 
used as a reason for avoiding normative judgement … or for muting calls upon the 
government to strive for better GIC outcomes.'206 
 
Scholars have noted that a wide range of domestic and international constraints may 
be relevant to assessing GIC (which are always context dependent). Lawler highlights 
the importance of domestic political constraints such as the need for public support for 
policy initiatives and pressure by lobby groups.207 Lawler poses the question: if the 
voting public 'appears to prefer a government driven by … more hard-nosed 
international sensibilities', to what extent is government obliged to 'reproduce these 
sentiments in its foreign policy, rather than appeal to some transcendent general 
interest or moral purpose?'208 On the domestic front, Pert also recognises the potential 
challenges for Australia presented by federalism. Pert suggests that 'the particular 
difficulties faced by Australia as a federal state should be recognised – to a degree – 
where … [a violation of international law] is due to State laws or practices.'209 This is 
not an excuse for Commonwealth inaction, but political realities should be 
acknowledged and the Commonwealth must have a reasonable period in which to 
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remedy any violation.210 Similarly, difficulties in enacting legislation to comply with 
international law must be acknowledged where a government does not possess a 
parliamentary majority. Pert suggests that a government should not be disqualified as 
a GIC 'by reason of a violation of international law if it has tried, but failed, to enact 
legislation that would remedy the violation.'211 
 
Internationally, Dunne and Wheeler highlight the challenges for GICs created by the 
weakness of international institutions such as the UN,212 while Williams accepts the 
difficulties in practising multilateralism 'in the face of powerful states pursuing 
perceived national interests regardless of international law or the resolutions and 
declarations of … [international] organisations.'213  
6 GIC and International Law  
As noted, it was implicit in Evans' conception of GIC that there are specific activities 
and types of behaviour that a GIC would be expected to undertake in relation to 
international law. These include:  
 
1. contributing positively to the development of international law; 
2. adopting relevant instruments of international law, whether treaties or so-
called 'soft law' (non-binding instruments such as political declarations); 
3. complying with its international legal obligations; and  
4. contributing to the advancement and upholding of international legal norms 
and associated institutions, for example, by encouraging other nations to both 
adopt and implement their international legal obligations. 
 
A state's activities in relation to these various aspects of the international legal process 
logically need to be consistent with the broader attributes of GIC, where relevant. 
Thus, for example, a GIC would be expected to contribute to the development of 
international law in a manner that does not unreasonably push narrow self-interest at 
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the expense of the common good. Or GIC may be demonstrated in the development of 
international law by playing an activist or leadership role on particular issues. 
 
A number of legal scholars have employed the concept of GIC when examining state 
engagement with international law, although typically (with the recent exception of 
Pert) without examining the requirements of GIC in detail.214 Writing in 2008, Rothwell 
and Rubenstein noted that the standard for assessing what makes a 'good 
international law citizen' (a narrower version of the concept) is not clear.215 As 
mentioned above, the present author,216 and Pert,217 have more recently explored GIC 
in relation to international law in greater depth. Notwithstanding the previous lack of 
critical analysis of GIC with respect to international law, early legal scholarship has 
generally recognised (albeit, often implicitly) that a GIC must demonstrate satisfactory 
conduct in relation to the four phases or elements described above.   
  
Regarding the development phase, for example, Evatt regards Australia as having 
demonstrated GIC by being a founding member of the UN and actively participating in 
the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other human rights 
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instruments and the Statute of the International Criminal Court.218 Pert suggests that 
GIC may require a state to work 'to create new or better law where necessary',219 a 
view consistent with statements by Evans. 
 
In relation to the adoption of legal instruments, Evatt approvingly refers to Australia's 
ratification of many human rights instruments, but criticises the long delays in the 
ratification of some human rights treaties and complaints procedures. Evatt also refers 
disapprovingly to several reservations and declarations made in relation to human 
rights treaties (potentially diminishing their legal effect).220 Pert suggests that failing to 
ratify a treaty that benefits developing countries would disqualify a state from being a 
GIC.221 
 
With respect to compliance, Evatt highlights that the UN human rights treaties impose 
legal obligations to bring domestic laws and practices into compliance with these 
treaties, which has not always occurred in Australia, with treaties often being given 
only partial effect in domestic law, or not at all. As such, many international human 
rights cannot be enforced by Australian courts.222 Evans and most scholars regard 
compliance with international law as generally being essential for GIC.223 Going 
further, Pert suggests that GIC may even require a state to exceed its legal 
obligations.224  
 
Scholars have also accepted, however, that compliance might not always be necessary 
for GIC. Wheeler and Dunne argue that GIC may require a state to use military force 
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externally in order to prevent or stop mass human rights violations, even in the 
absence of Security Council authorisation under the UN Charter, and 'even if this 
weakens the rule of law in the society of states.'225 Humanitarian intervention, 
however, is regarded as an exception to the general rule that international law ought 
to be respected.226 While regarding compliance with international law as generally 
necessary for GIC, Pert suggests that exceptions may be possible where a violation is 
'minor or technical, or of short duration'227 or, as noted above, where political realities 
prevent compliance being possible. Pert also argues that for a violation of international 
law to disqualify a state from GIC, 'it must be one that is both clear (in terms of degree 
as well as obviousness) and deliberate.'228 Further, 'even a clear and deliberate 
violation must be at the upper end of the spectrum of severity.'229 '[E]gregious 
violations of international law', however, will disqualify a state from being regarded as 
a GIC 'in any sphere.'230 
 
A relevant question to this thesis, which does not appear to have received much direct 
attention in the literature, is to what extent must a state 'comply' with, or 'respect', so-
called soft law: that is, non-binding norms, principles or provisions of international 
law.231 This thesis will argue that compliance with soft law is highly relevant to 
assessing GIC under ICCL. This is especially so in relation to the negotiation of new 
agreements under the framework provided by the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which contains a number of non-binding 
principles to guide the Parties' conduct; for example, that developed countries should 
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take the lead in addressing climate change (see chapter 4).232 While violations of 
binding international obligations would logically tend to carry more weight when 
assessing GIC, this thesis suggests that a failure to respect non-obligatory principles or 
provisions of international legal instruments can also be highly relevant to assessing 
GIC.  
 
With respect to the fourth stage (advancing and upholding international norms and 
institutions), Evatt notes that Australia has contributed to the promotion of human 
rights through its work in many UN bodies and specialised agencies.233 However, the 
Howard government is criticised for attacking the credibility of the UN treaty bodies in 
response to criticism regarding its indigenous and asylum seeker policies.234  Evatt 
suggests that a GIC would not only fulfil its treaty obligations in good faith, but also 
show 'respect and due consideration for the comments and recommendations of the 
monitoring body.'235 Related to this, Pert also regards 'persistent and strident (as 
opposed to constructive) criticism of the UN' as an example of bad international 
citizenship.236  
7 Methodological Approaches 
It is evident from the literature that assessing GIC – what Wheeler and Dunne label the 
'good international citizen calculus'237 – involves two basic steps. First, identifying the 
characteristics or attributes of GIC. The difficulty in this step is that there is no general 
agreement on precisely what these characteristics are.  Some scholars have 
emphasised the importance of attributes referred to by Evans, such as leadership, 
while others such as Linklater, Wheeler and Dunne have proposed their own attributes 
or tests of GIC, drawing upon their preferred political and academic traditions.  
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The second step is assessing whether the relevant attributes of GIC have been 
demonstrated in practice. While these attributes could be assessed 'cumulatively' 
(with all required to be present for GIC to be satisfied),238 generally scholars have 
emphasised certain characteristics of GIC, as relevant to the context. Ultimately, it 
must be emphasised that assessing GIC is always context dependent; meaning that 
precisely which attributes of GIC are most relevant will depend on the subject matter 
at hand. 
 
As practice by states is often mixed in quality, scholars have also highlighted the need 
to balance the various 'good' and 'bad' activities of a state when assessing overall 
performance. Rothwell and Rubenstein, for example, highlight the various 'credits and 
'debits' on the Howard government's 'good international citizen scoreboard', 
concluding that its overall performance as an international legal citizen was 'mixed'.239 
Singer and Gregg meanwhile argue that the Howard government performed poorly 
overall as a GIC by marking its performance on a range of global issues as either 'poor', 
'very poor', 'moderate' or 'good'.240 Similarly, Pert uses the adjectives 'poor', 'average' 
and 'good'.241 
 
Pert's work deserves special mention, being the most similar to the current thesis. 
Pert's thesis examines Australia's record as a GIC from Federation in 1901 to the fall of 
the Howard government in 2007. As noted, Pert identifies five attributes of GIC (based 
on her interpretation of Evans' statements on GIC), namely: 
a) compliance/engagement with international law; 
b) support for and engagement in multilateralism; 
c) willingness to 'pitch in' to international tasks; 
d) a moral or ethical dimension – doing 'international good deeds'; 
e) and an element of proactivity or leadership – seeking to raise international 
standards.242 
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Pert argues that attributes (a) to (d) are necessary, but not in themselves sufficient, 
attributes of GIC. Additional qualities or factors are needed to demonstrate GIC in 
relation to each attribute. For example, in the case of compliance with international 
law, this might comprise: adherence to all relevant treaties, exceeding existing 
obligations,243 working to create new or better law where necessary, or encouraging 
other states to do all or any of these things.244 Regarding support for multilateralism, 
additional qualities or factors indicative of GIC might include, for example, active 
support for and engagement in multilateral institutions and initiatives.245  
 
As noted earlier, this thesis argues that the attributes of GIC are broader than those 
identified by Pert. The thesis also emphasises that determining the precise 
requirements of GIC is always context dependent. This thesis therefore outlines its 
general approach to assessing GIC in chapter 4 after first examining the relevant 
context, namely, the broad features of the ICCL regime and the post-2012 climate 
negotiations.  
8 Critique of GIC: Is it a Normatively and Analytically Useful Concept? 
The final significant theme of the literature on GIC has been to explore whether it 
actually provides a viable analytical and normative concept, and whether it has value 
in practice for both policymakers and scholars. 
a) Major Criticisms 
An initial concern has been that the concept is too ambiguous. Hanson suggests that 
Evans' conception of GIC may be 'too broad and allowing of too many possibilities to 
have any real credibility.'246 Goldsworthy sees difficulties in the mixed realist-idealist 
conceptual basis: realists will reject the idealism of GIC – believing that the state's 
obligations are owed only to its own citizens, not to those abroad – while 
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cosmopolitan-leaning idealists will see every government failing as evidence of double 
standards.247 
 
As noted, the ambiguity of the concept as articulated by Evans prompted scholars such 
as Linklater and Wheeler and Dunne to propose more definitive principles or attributes 
of GIC. Scholars, however, have also been dismissive of these attempts. In relation to 
Linklater's principle – that GIC requires international order to be placed above the 
relentless pursuit of narrow national interests, unless vital national interests are at 
stake – Buller and Harrison argue that this formulation is also 'shot through with 
ambiguity'.248 Indeed, Buller and Harrison, in the constructivist tradition of IR,249 
question whether notions such as the national interest, integral to understanding GIC, 
can ever be 'objectively determined'.250  
 
Other critics have dismissed GIC on the basis that it is overly conservative and state-
centric. Williams, a proponent of global citizenship, notes that GIC accepts the reality 
that the state remains central to the present international political system, and 'offers 
a way to protect this privileged position of the state and, hopefully, reinvigorate it as a 
mechanism for promoting and extending already existing positive trends in 
international politics.'251 GIC is rejected because it fails to 'suggest much in the way of 
radical developments in the ways in which international agreements are reached, 
implemented and policed'.252 Williams argues that the state-centricness of GIC may 
ultimately hamstring its effectiveness 'in the face of non-state based challenges such 
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as the environment'.253 Williams is also concerned that GIC reflects a liberal 
internationalist worldview and approach to addressing global issues. Liberal 
internationalist approaches such as trade liberalisation and global capitalism are said 
to be 'inimical, or at least very damaging', to developing countries.254 
 
A third criticism, again by Williams, is that it is problematic to conceptualise a state as 
a 'citizen'.255 Williams questions whether the state really represents a 'coherent and 
unified national community', or an 'individual writ large with the unity of identity and 
purpose we often associate with the individual'.256 The implication of this is that there 
may be a degree of unreality about assessing the 'state' as a moral agent.257  
 
A fourth criticism, by Linklater, is that language like GIC may be deliberately employed 
by states to convince others of their 'ethical bona fides' while they are actually 
pursuing narrow 'self-interested motives'.258 Similarly, Burchill notes that GIC may be 
interpreted 'as little more than image-building for liberal democratic states'.259 
 
Lastly, some scholars are concerned that GIC, in its liberal conception, can introduce 
'the risk of cultural imperialism and excessive interference and interventionism.'260 
Williams suggests that GIC could be regarded as imposing a particular set of Western 
values on others.261 GIC appeals 'to a particular view of what constitutes goodness in 
the conduct of international relations'.262 To address this, Linklater suggests that the 
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focus of GIC ought to be on 'proceeding where there is international consensus' and 
being 'sensitive to issues of unwarranted exclusion.'263 In this context, it should be 
noted that Evans specifically promoted a non-confrontational, dialogic approach to 
diplomacy,264 not wishing to force Australian values on others. 
b) The Defence of GIC 
While criticised by some, the concept of GIC has also been strongly defended. Singer 
and Gregg reject the realist position that it is acceptable 'for nations to be selfish to a 
degree that would be wrong if practised by an individual', instead preferring an ethic of 
'do unto others as you would have them do unto you'.265 This is said to justify GIC's 
recognition of 'duties beyond borders'.266  
 
While the normative and analytic value of GIC has been challenged, Wheeler and 
Dunne support GIC as a 'conceptual rationale' for prioritising between security and 
human rights goals, and a 'framework' to guide 'ethical audit[s]' of foreign policy.267 
Likewise, Williams, despite his various criticisms, sees appeal in GIC as a 'tool for 
assessing, and perhaps even formulating, foreign policy'.268 Hanson also suggests that 
it offers a 'moral and principled declaratory basis … [for] policy formulation'.269 While 
the practical effect of the concept ultimately depends on the extent to which states 
seek to apply it, Linklater suggests that if 'taken seriously' and 'invoked frequently' 
enough over time, the notion may at least 'encourage more sophisticated discussion 
and debate about the ethical content and purpose of foreign policy'.270 
 
Although Williams criticises the state-centric nature of GIC, he also suggests that while 
delivering less than the cosmopolitan may want, GIC could offer a viable middle path 
between realist state practice and more revolutionary cosmopolitan approaches. He 
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concedes that '[a] world in which the major liberal democratic states adopted a foreign 
policy of [GIC] would be a better one than that in which we currently live'.271 While 
more revolutionary proposals to address global issues involving the reordering of 
international politics 'are often criticised as being 'utopian', 'unrealistic' or 'wishful 
thinking', GIC may escape this charge.272 Others, who are more supportive of the state 
system, defend GIC precisely because it seeks to improve the state system, rather than 
replace it.273  
 
At this point, it is worthwhile highlighting some of Evans' own comments regarding the 
state-centric approach of GIC. In a post-political interview in 2001, Evans discussed the 
ongoing significance of sovereignty and realist conceptions of the national interest in 
international politics. In Evans' words, '[s]overeignty [still] matters to countries… 
sovereignty is just a given in international discourse and will be for some considerable 
time to come'.274 While he accepted that the force of traditional sovereignty was being 
eroded, developing countries still regarded sovereignty as being 'hard-won' and a 
'recent phenomenon'. Thus, the 'passionate commitment to the notion of sovereignty' 
needed to be respected.275 By categorising GIC so heavily in terms of self-interest, 
Evans explained that he was seeking to 'expand the concept of national interest' so 
that nations might recognise the benefits to be obtained from GIC activities and how it 
promoted their 'core interests'.276  
 
Finally, scholars have highlighted the value of idealistic language itself in international 
affairs. While noting that critics argue that 'language is merely ephemeral; what 
matters are the actions themselves', Wheeler and Dunne suggest that this 'view of 
language as instrumental has become increasingly discredited by philosophers and 
sociologists who point to the constitutive aspect of language in the production of 
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meaning.'277 It is suggested that the 'constitutive role that language plays in 
international relations can be seen from the fact that other governments take seriously 
what is said to them and about them.'278 That is, all 'governments recognise the need 
to justify their actions and this presupposes a shared language within which these 
actions are endorsed or contested.'279 While the content of discourse evolves over 
time, Wheeler and Dunne believe that 'in every epoch it is central in shaping the range 
of permissible actions.'280 The argument being made here is that GIC language has 
value in itself because it can help to shift the terms of debate in international 
discourse. 
 
Legal scholars have also recognised the utility of the concept for legal scholarship. 
Rothwell and Rubenstein, in their introduction to the 2008 Australian Yearbook of 
International Law, which provided a retrospective assessment of the Howard 
government's engagement with various aspects of international law, suggest that GIC 
could offer a standard for judging a government's record with respect to international 
law.281 Pert, who examines Australia's record as a GIC from Federation to the Howard 
government, also regards GIC as a useful tool for international lawyers to assess 
engagement with international law in a more 'qualitative, and perhaps deeper' 
fashion.282 Pert also sees the possibility of GIC being adopted by the international 
community in the same way that business has adopted the notion of the 'good 
corporate citizen' and suggests that increased use of the term may act as an incentive 
for states to increase their treaty participation and contribution to multilateral 
activities.283 
                                                     
 
277 Wheeler and Dunne, 'Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for British Foreign Policy', above n 
122, 851. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Ibid.  
280 Ibid. This view appears to be supported by political practitioners who adopt idealistic language. For 
example, UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook argued in 1998 that '[i]nternational debate is shaped by 
speeches by foreign secretaries and the rhetoric they use': ibid. Kevin Rudd, while in Opposition, 
asserted that realist language did 'not simply describe a pre-existing reality' but 'actively assists in the 
construction of that reality', being critical of it on that basis: Kevin Rudd, 'ANZUS and the 21st Century' 
(2001) 55 Australian Journal of International Affairs 301, 309. 
281 Rothwell and Rubenstein, above n 215, 5.  
282 Pert, above n 5, 329. 
283 Ibid 330. 
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C Summary of GIC 
This chapter has provided a detailed examination of the concept of GIC. It has been 
seen that there is no accepted definition of GIC or means of assessing whether a state 
has met this standard of behaviour. This makes the concept difficult to apply to an 
analysis of government activities. The thesis suggests, however, that Evans' articulation 
of GIC remains the best and most relevant starting point for understanding the 
concept. In general terms, Evans conceptualised GIC as a more ethical and globally-
minded approach to pursuing the national interest. In addition to pursuing traditional 
security and economic interests, Evans argued that the state has a national interest in 
pursuing less immediately and directly self-interested objectives. Thus, the state 
should moderate its traditional, narrow interests in favour of advancing broader global 
concerns such as the need for a stable rules-based international community, a safe 
environment for future generations, protecting universal human rights and the like.  
 
This chapter argued, based on a primary examination of Evans' major writings and 
speeches, that his conception of GIC can be characterised by a number of features. At 
minimum, a GIC is expected to be internationalist in outlook, being prepared to 
cooperate with others to address issues of international concern. More than this, 
however, a GIC is expected to demonstrate activism and leadership in international 
affairs, and to 'pitch in' to international tasks as required.  
 
While Evans' conceptualised GIC as a means of advancing the national interest, this 
was at least in part motivated by a sense of altruism, or a commitment to acting 
ethically. Thus, a GIC is expected to promote 'purposes beyond ourselves', not just 
narrow self-interest. On the other hand, GIC is not just a matter of 'boy scout good 
deeds'. Rather than single-mindedly pursuing narrow national interests, such as the 
protection of the economy and jobs, a GIC is expected to act with 'enlightened self-
interest'. Thus on an issue like climate change, a GIC would look beyond its immediate 
economic interests, recognising the broader and longer-term value to both the nation 
and the international community of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Evans also 
described GIC as blending pragmatism with idealism, emphasising that while a GIC 
should pursue altruistic or idealistic causes, it is not expected to act without regard for 
traditional national concerns, or practical limitations. Australia would not, for example, 
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be expected to completely sacrifice its economic interests in addressing climate 
change. Rather, the goal would be to find an acceptable balance between protecting 
the national economy and jobs and achieving the objective of preventing harmful 
climate change. 
 
In more practical terms, GIC was associated with the liberal internationalist tradition of 
support for multilateralism, international institutions and international law. Other 
characteristics of GIC include acting as a good neighbour (in one's immediate region) 
and acting consistently at home with the values being promoted abroad. While not 
necessarily a general characteristic of GIC, Evans also linked the concept to Australia's 
use of middle power diplomacy, this being seen as an effective means of increasing 
Australia's ability to implement its GIC objectives. 
 
The review of the academic 'GIC literature' helped to clarify the conceptual basis for 
GIC, the reasons for its emergence under Evans, and further considerations relevant to 
the assessment of GIC. Scholars have noted the influence of, or links between, 
citizenship, realist, idealist and rationalist discourse or theories, helping to locate GIC 
within a broader conceptual framework. Discussion of the link between GIC with 
realism and idealism also helped to emphasise that whether or not a state meets the 
standard of GIC is often determined by the extent to which it pursues its narrow self-
interest at the expense of the common good.  
 
The review of Evans' statements on GIC in relation to international law also suggested 
that a GIC would be expected to meet a higher standard of conduct when engaging 
with the four broad stages of the international legal process, namely: the development 
of international law; the adoption of international legal instruments; compliance with 
international law; and more generally, the advancing and upholding of international 
law within the international community. It was evident that when assessing GIC in 
relation to these four stages, it is often relevant to examine whether a state has 
demonstrated the more general attributes of GIC such as activism, leadership, altruism 
and so forth. 
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The review of GIC literature also revealed further legal aspects relevant to assessing 
GIC, such as whether or not a state enters a reservation to a treaty, or whether any 
violation of international law is substantive or procedural. The chapter also suggested 
that whether or not a state complies with or respects non-binding international law, 
such as various principles and provisions of the UNFCCC, is certainly relevant to the 
assessment of GIC in relation to the ICCL regime. This latter point is elaborated on in 
chapter 4 which outlines the key elements of the UNFCCC and related instruments. 
 
As noted in the introduction, while there are a number of broad features of GIC, the 
elasticity of the concept means that any final determination of its requirements must 
be made in the context of the issue under consideration. This is because the 
characteristics which are most relevant to assessing GIC will vary according to the 
factual, legal, policy and ethical context. For example, while a GIC would typically be 
expected to comply with international law, there may be instances in which non-
compliance is the more ethically justifiable course of action (such as when 
humanitarian intervention is needed to prevent gross human rights violations, but 
appropriate authorisation under international law cannot be obtained). Similarly, while 
leadership is often associated with GIC, it would be unrealistic to expect an aspiring 
GIC to be a leader in all instances, given the significant number of issues on the 
international agenda. Moreover, the attributes articulated by Evans (and indeed, 
various scholars) cannot be regarded as fixed, as the qualities of behaviour that will 
distinguish good from lesser forms of international conduct will not be identical for 
every issue on the global agenda. As such, this thesis reserves its view on what GIC 
generally required of the Rudd government until proper consideration has been given 
to the general features of the ICCL regime and the post-2012 negotiations in chapter 4. 
Subsequent chapters of the thesis also continue to explore the practical requirements 
of GIC in relation to the specific topics assessed by each chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2. GOOD INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE: FROM HAWKE TO HOWARD 
 
'Upon coming to power in March 1996 the Liberal National Coalition removed reference to 
Australia being a "good international citizen" as an objective of Australian foreign policy. 
Examination of the Coalition’s 11 years in office confirms that omission was deliberate.' Robert 
McClelland, Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, March 2007.1 
 
This chapter provides a brief historical overview of Australian governmental 
engagement with international climate change law (ICCL) from the Hawke to Howard 
governments. This examination draws upon on literature applying the good 
international citizenship (GIC) concept, as well as these governments' political 
statements on GIC and climate change. The purpose of this overview is to provide 
more concrete examples of 'good', 'average' and 'bad' international citizenship in 
relation to ICCL, as well as essential historical context for the later assessment of the 
Rudd government.  
A The Hawke and Keating Governments  
1 The Hawke Government 
Gareth Evans has been glowing in his praise of his and the Hawke and Keating 
governments' achievements with respect to GIC, in particular what he regarded as its 
leading role on a range of multilateral initiatives (several of which were referred to in 
chapter 1).2 Evans was not afraid of using the term 'success' in this regard.3 While 
scholars have identified notable flaws in the Hawke-Keating governments' record, such 
                                                     
 
1 Robert McClelland, 'Time to Repair Our Reputation: The Rise and Fall of Australia as a Good 
International Citizen' (Speech delivered at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 14 March 
2007) <http://webdiary.com.au/cms/?q=node/1869>. 
2 See Gareth Evans, 'The Labor Tradition: A View from the 1990s' in David Lee and Christopher Waters 
(eds), Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy (Allen & Unwin, 1997) 11, 18-20. 
3 See David Goldsworthy, 'Australia and Good International Citizenship' in Stephanie Lawson (ed), The 
New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond (Allen & Unwin, 1995) 171, 175, 182. 
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as the perceived toleration of widespread human rights violations in East Timor,4 
failure to fully implement human rights conventions in domestic legislation,5 and a 
relatively weak commitment to official development assistance,6 the overall appraisal 
of Australia's record as a GIC in this period is generally positive.7 
 
The issue of climate change, the focus of this thesis, first emerged as a significant topic 
of international concern during the late 1980s when the Hawke government was in 
power and Evans was Foreign Minister.8 The Hawke government framed global 
warming, and atmospheric protection generally, as 'the biggest ecological problem, the 
biggest challenge, faced in this or any other age'.9 Consistent with a GIC's preference 
for multilateral solutions, the utilisation of international institutions and international 
law, Evans strongly supported moves to develop a new legal regime to address climate 
change.10  
 
Evans' statements on how Australia should approach the issue were generally 
consistent with his views on GIC. According to Evans, a new international legal 
agreement, which was then under discussion, would need to carefully balance 
                                                     
 
4 Marianne Hanson, 'Australia and Nuclear Arms Control as "Good International Citizenship"' (Working 
Paper No 2/1999, Department of International Relations, ANU, 1999) 4. See also Nicholas J Wheeler and 
Tim Dunne, 'Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for British Foreign Policy' (1998) 74 
International Affairs 847, 861. 
5 See, eg, Elizabeth Evatt, 'Australia's Performance in Human Rights' (2001) 26 Alternative Law Journal 
11, 11-12. 
6 See, eg, Goldsworthy, 'Australia and Good International Citizenship', above n 3, 171; Peter Lawler, 'The 
Good Citizen Australia?' (1992) 16 Asian Studies Review 241, 248.  
7 See, eg, Coral Bell, 'Political Objectives' in F A Mediansky (ed), Australian Foreign Policy: Into the New 
Millennium (Macmillan, 1997) 55, 68; Marianne Hanson, 'From 'Good International Citizen' to 
'Regressive' State: Hansonism and Australia's International Reputation' in Michael Leach, Geoffrey 
Stokes and Ian Ward (eds), The Rise and Fall of One Nation (University of Queensland Press, 2000) 220, 
221; Goldsworthy, 'Australia and Good International Citizenship', above n 3, 183; Alison Pert, 'Australia 
as a Good International Citizen from Barton to Howard: An International Law Perspective' (PhD Thesis, 
University of Sydney, 2010) 270, 272.  
8 The phenomenon of climate change itself first received major global attention as early as 1979 at the 
first World Climate Conference. Sponsored by the World Meteorological Organisation, this scientific 
Conference issued a declaration calling upon the international community 'to foresee and to prevent 
potential man-made changes in climate that might be adverse to the well-being of humanity': UNFCCC, 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook (UNFCCC, 2006) 17. 
9 Gareth Evans 'Foreign Policy and the Environment' (1990) 61 Australian Foreign Affairs and Trade: The 
Monthly Record 112, 116-117.  
10 Gareth Evans, 'International Law and Australia's Interests' (1989) Australian International Law News 
185, 188. 
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Australia's 'national interests and international responsibilities'.11 Evans recognised 
that Australia had plenty of self-interested reasons to be active on the issue, with 
climate change potentially creating 'massive' long-term 'economic, social and security 
costs'.12  '[L]arge costs' could also be involved in meeting 'new environmental 
responsibilities', while new international regulations could have 'implications for 
[Australia's] … energy exports, especially coal'.13 Climate change could also devastate 
island nations in the South Pacific, destabilising Australia's immediate region and 
potentially creating scores of thousands of 'environmental refugees' who would look 
to Australia for resettlement and place heavy demands on Australia's aid budget.14  
 
Evans' statements also recognised many of the ethical concerns which Australia and 
other nations needed to confront. Evans, for example, argued that: 
 the possibility of rising sea levels displacing South Pacific peoples – and the 
associated 'human misery' – were ample reasons for concern;15  
 the international community had a 'responsibility to protect the environment 
for future generations';16  
 that for developing countries issues of 'equity, responsibility and development' 
lay 'at the heart' of the solution to climate change;17 
 that developing countries could not be expected to meet the costs of new 
environmental responsibilities 'alone and unaided',18 requiring the assistance 
of the developed world;19 and  
 that a 'new environmental order' would have little prospect of success without 
an 'equitable transfer of resources and technology from the north to the 
south'.20 
 
                                                     
 
11 Ibid 191. 
12 Evans, 'Foreign Policy and the Environment', above n 9, 113. 
13 Ibid 113. 
14 Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations: In the World of the 1990s (Melbourne 
University Press, 2nd ed, 1995) 164. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Evans, 'International Law and Australia's Interests', above n 10, 190. 
17 Evans 'Foreign Policy and the Environment', above n 9, 114. 
18 Evans, 'International Law and Australia's Interests', above n 10, 114. 
19 Evans, 'Foreign Policy and the Environment', above n 9, 114. 
20 Ibid. 
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Several scholars believe that the Hawke government demonstrated leadership in 
practice on climate change.21 The Hawke government supported a number of early 
non-binding intergovernmental political statements on the issue. These included the 
'Call for Action' announced at the Toronto Conference on 'The Changing Atmosphere – 
Implications for Global Security' (June 1988) which urged the international community 
to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 20 per cent by 2005 (below 1988 levels).22 
The Hawke government then signed the non-binding Declaration of the Hague, 
developed at the 1989 Hague Summit,23 which was generally regarded as significant 
because it acknowledged the equitable responsibilities of industrialised nations to 
assist developing countries in addressing climate change.24 
 
The first major step of the Hawke government on the domestic front was taken in 
October 1990, with the government adopting an interim 'planning target' to stabilise 
CO2 emissions at 1988 levels by 2000, and cutting emissions by 20 per cent by 2005 
(consistent with the Call for Action).25 This was one of the most stringent targets 
announced by any nation at the 1990 World Climate Conference in Geneva.26 Notably, 
however, this announcement came with the caveat that Australia would not adopt 
emission reduction measures that would have 'net adverse economic impacts 
nationally or on Australia's trade competitiveness' unless similar action was taken by 
other major greenhouse gas (GHG) producers27 – a position that has remained central 
to all subsequent Australian governments' involvement in international climate 
negotiations. 
                                                     
 
21 See, eg, Peter Singer and Tom Gregg, How Ethical Is Australia? An Examination of Australia's Record as 
a Global Citizen (The Australian Collaboration, 2004) 50; Matt McDonald, 'Fair Weather Friend? Ethics 
and Australia's Approach to Global Climate Change' (2005) 51 Australian Journal of Politics and History 
216, 221; Clive Hamilton, Running from the Storm: The Development of Climate Change Policy in 
Australia (University of New South Wales Press, 2001) 31-34; Dave Cox, 'The Road from Rio: Multilateral 
Cooperation Gives Way to National Interest' in Richard Leaver and Dave Cox (eds), Middling, Meddling, 
Muddling: Issues in Australian Foreign Policy (Allen & Unwin, 1997) 215, 215; Pert, above n 7, 263. 
22 McDonald, above n 21, 221. The Conference was attended by scientists and policy-makers from 48 
countries. The Conference statement is available at 
<http://www.cmos.ca/ChangingAtmosphere1988e.pdf>. See also Hamilton, above n 21, 31-34. 
23 The Summit was attended by 24 nations. See The Hague Declaration, 
<http://wrmin.nic.in/index3.asp?subsublinkid=292&langid=1&sslid=375>. 
24 See Cox, above n 21, 220-21; Evans, 'Foreign Policy and the Environment', above n 9, 114. 
25 McDonald, above n 21, 221. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid 222. 
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While the Hawke government adopted a relatively progressive approach to climate 
change, notwithstanding its concern to protect Australia's economic interests, its true 
mettle was never properly tested, with the major legal and policy decisions falling to 
later governments. 
2 The Keating Government 
Treasurer Paul Keating deposed Bob Hawke as Australian Prime Minister in December 
1991, meaning that the Keating government assumed responsibility for Australia's 
involvement in the international negotiations to develop a climate change treaty that 
were then under way. These negotiations resulted in the adoption of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change28 (UNFCCC) at the Rio Conference 
on Environment and Development in 1992 (also known as the 'Earth Summit'). 
 
The adoption of the UNFCCC was momentous for the development of ICCL (see 
detailed discussion of the UNFCCC in chapter 4). Critically, however, it failed to 
establish legally binding emission reduction targets for developed countries, which had 
been supported by Australia, the European Community and others, but were opposed 
by the United States (US).29 Article 4 of the Convention instead only committed 
developed countries to a non-binding goal of stabilising their GHG emissions at 1990 
levels by 2000.30  
 
The Keating government characterised Australia as a leader in the UNFCCC 
negotiations,31 with Environment Minister, Ros Kelly, describing Australia as a 'vigorous 
and respected 'middle' power' on the issue.32 According to Kelly, Australia had 'worked 
and negotiated for stronger outcomes' in the treaty,33 and was disappointed that the 
                                                     
 
28 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1771 
UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994) ('UNFCCC'). 
29 McDonald, above n 21, 223. 
30 UNFCCC arts 4.2(a)(b). 
31 Cox, above n 21, 215. 
32 Ibid 219-220, citing Ros Kelly, 'The UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED): Where 
to Now and What Does It Mean for Australia?' (Speech delivered the National Press Club, Canberra, 19 
June 1992).  
33 Cox, above n 21, 219-20. 
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agreement had not gone as far as it would have liked.34 Although expressing 
dissatisfaction, Kelly did not, however, see the UNFCCC as a failure. Her view was that 
the non-binding target adopted by developed countries and associated GHG reporting 
obligations at least represented 'a major opportunity for continued pressure to bring 
about real action.'35 To the government's credit, Australia was the eighth country to 
ratify the UNFCCC and actively called upon other states to both ratify the agreement 
and meet their new obligations.36 Several scholars share the Keating government's 
positive assessment of Australia's performance in the UNFCCC negotiations. 
McDonald, for example, labels Australia's actions as that of a 'leader',37 while Lightfoot 
describes Australia as a GIC, being 'committed to significant reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions and more generally [to] multilateralism in environmental policy.'38  
 
Cox, however, is more cynical about the Keating government's approach. He suggests 
that the Keating government took advantage of the US opposition to binding 
mitigation targets to create a perception that Australia had been 'one of the leading 
states'.39 As evidence for this, Cox cites the government's 'no-regrets' policy on climate 
change – the government's position that Australia would only reduce emissions if 
economic costs were not involved.40 The importance of protecting Australia's 
economic interests in the UNFCCC negotiations was later confirmed by Prime Minister 
Keating and Minister for Resources, David Beddall, who stated in 1994 that 'there 
ha[d] always been a caveat in our negotiations that … [the UNFCCC would not] be at an 
economic cost to Australia'.41 The implication of Cox's argument is that in order to be 
regarded as a leader on climate change, Australia actually needed to be prepared to 
make economic sacrifices for the greater good. 
 
                                                     
 
34 McDonald, above n 21, 223. 
35 Cox, above n 21, 219-20, citing Kelly, above n 32, 2-3.  
36 McDonald, above n 21, 223. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Simon Lightfoot, 'A Good International Citizen? Australia at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development' (2006) 60 Australian Journal of International Affairs 457, 459. See also Hamilton, above n 
21, 53. 
39 Cox, above n 21, 220. 
40 Ibid 223. 
41 Ibid, citing M Dwyer, 'Greenhouse "Won't Put us in the Red"', Australian Financial Review 
(Melbourne), 17 June 1994. 
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The Keating government's desire to protect Australia's economic interests was also 
evident in its domestic policies. In 1992 the federal government and Australian states 
endorsed Australia's first major GHG policy initiative, the National Greenhouse 
Response Strategy, which focused on greening Australia's energy supply as well as 
improving energy efficiency.42 Regrettably, the voluntary scheme proved to be a failure 
in terms of reducing emissions.43 According to the 1994 national GHG inventory, 
Australia was one of the few developed nations whose emissions had actually 
increased since the adoption of the UNFCCC,44 with overall emissions expected to rise 
7 per cent above the UNFCCC's stabilisation target.45 Also reflecting poorly on the 
government, Australia was one of the world's five highest emitters on a per capita 
basis.46  
 
In March 1995, the Keating government introduced a new voluntary emissions 
reduction strategy – Greenhouse 21C.47 In doing so, the government rejected 
introducing both a carbon tax, earlier favoured by Environment Minister John 
Faulkner, and an emissions trading scheme (ETS), once supported by Kelly.48 Even by 
September 1995 it had become obvious that Greenhouse 21C would, as with earlier 
voluntary measures, fail to curb emissions growth.49 With emissions continuing to 
increase, the government publically downplayed the importance of Australia meeting 
its UNFCCC obligations. As early as June 1994, the Keating government indicated that 
Australia may not meet its UNFCCC target50 and in February 1995, Treasurer Ralph 
Willis stated that the UNFCCC contained 'let-out clauses' and that the government 
might decide that a less ambitious target was appropriate.51 
 
                                                     
 
42 See Hamilton, above n 21, 34-53. 
43 Ibid 40. 
44 Cox, above n 21, 224. 
45 Ibid 222.  
46 Ibid 224. 
47 Ibid 225. Greenhouse 21C again emphasised voluntary emissions reductions from the business sector: 
see Hamilton, above n 21, 34-53. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Cox, above n 21, 228. 
50 Ibid 224, 226-227, citing P Gill, 'Australia May Refuse to Cut Greenhouse Gas Levels: Evans', Australian 
Financial Review (Melbourne), 29 June, 1994.  
51 Cox, above n 21, 225, citing Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 7 
February 1995, 582 (Ralph Willis, Treasurer).  
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The Keating government's desire to protect Australia's economy also had ramifications 
for Australia's engagement in the new round of international climate negotiations that 
commenced in 1995. Following the UNFCCC's adoption in 1992, developing countries, 
supported by the European Union (EU), had begun pushing for the international 
community to establish a stronger international agreement – this time including 
binding targets for developed countries.52 In March–April 1995, Parties to the UNFCCC 
held their first Conference of the Parties (COP 1). The Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) urged Parties to adopt a protocol including a commitment by developed 
countries to reduce their CO2 emissions by 20 per cent below 1990 levels by 200553 
(the same target once endorsed by the Hawke government). Australia refused, 
however, to support the AOSIS proposal, in part because of this target.54 While the 
Keating government agreed that the UNFCCC was too weak and needed strengthening, 
it argued against the inclusion of the word 'reductions' in conference deliberations, a 
position eventually relaxed in response to widespread criticism.55 Ultimately, the 
Keating government refused to support any future agreement setting targets and 
timetables to reduce GHG emissions.56  
 
At COP 1, the Keating government also argued that while developed countries ought to 
shoulder the primary burden for emission reductions, developing countries also 
needed to play a greater role.57 In coalition with its JUSCANZ partners (Japan, US, 
Canada and New Zealand) Australia pushed for the major developing countries – Brazil, 
Korea, Malaysia and China – to also adopt mitigation commitments.58 Australia's 
position was ultimately rejected by the COP at Berlin with the 'Berlin Mandate' 
(launching negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol) deciding that only developed countries 
would be required to strengthen their mitigation targets.59 As one of only a few 
                                                     
 
52 Cox, above n 21, 226-27.  
53 See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(21) (28 
March to 7 April 1995) 3. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Cox, above n 21, 225-26. 
56 Ibid 226. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (6 June 1995), decision 1/CP.1, [2(a)(b)]. 
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developed countries resisting the adoption of specific mitigation targets and 
timetables at COP 1, Cox describes the Keating government as a 'spoiler', who 
attempted 'to undermine the multilateral process'.60 Despite 'wanting to be seen to be 
a good international citizen', ultimately 'the government perceived that its first priority 
was the domestic economy.'61 Smith, Cox and Burchill also label the Keating 
government's approach as 'distinctly realist'.62 Singer and Gregg, however, suggest that 
unlike the later Howard government, Labor did at least show some restraint in 
promoting its 'short-term, particularistic national interests', being ultimately unwilling 
to take the blame for blocking international consensus.63 
B The Howard Government 
1 The Howard Government's General Foreign Policy Statements 
The Liberal-National Coalition government led by John Howard was elected in March 
1996, bringing to an end almost 13 years of federal Labor government. The Howard 
government's general political statements on foreign policy and climate change are 
worth examining in detail as they help to clarify what GIC is not. In essence, the 
Howard government favoured a narrower, more traditional approach to foreign policy; 
that which Evans' conception of GIC was intended to counteract. 
 
The Liberal party's 1996 election manifesto, A Confident Australia, directly repudiated 
its predecessor's philosophical approach to foreign policy, declaring that: 'We do not 
subscribe to unrealistic notions of global idealism. Foreign policy must be pursued with 
a realistic perspective of how to advance Australia's security and economic interests.'64 
Continuing in this vein, Australia's first foreign policy and trade White Paper, In the 
National Interest (1997), proclaimed that preparing for the future was 'not a matter of 
                                                     
 
60 Cox, above n 21, 215-16. 
61 Ibid 222. 
62 Gary Smith, Dave Cox and Scott Burchill, Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign 
Policy (Oxford University Press, 1996) 199, 199.  
63 Singer and Gregg, above n 21, 50. See also McDonald, above n 21, 224. 
64 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'New Australian Government: Foreign Policy' (1996) 5 
Insight 3, 6. See David Goldsworthy, 'An Overview' in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds), The 
National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996-2000 (Oxford University Press, 2001) 
10, 11. 
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grand constructs.'65 Rather it was about 'the hard-headed pursuit of the interests 
which lie at the core of foreign and trade policy: the security of the nation and the jobs 
and standard of living of the Australian people.'66 Australian security and economic 
well-being would become the 'basic test of national interest' which would guide all 
future foreign and trade policy.67  
 
Consistent with this 'hard-headed' approach, the term GIC was absent from the White 
Paper. Various attributes associated with GIC were also lacking or downplayed.68 
Notably, the government promised a greater emphasis on bilateral over multilateral 
diplomacy, it being sceptical of the effectiveness of multilateralism.69 Where Australia 
was engaged in multilateralism, it would be with a focus on advancing Australia's vital 
security and economic interests, rather than the broader multilateral/GIC agenda.70 
Activism and leadership would also be directed more narrowly towards advancing 
Australia's security and economic interests.71 Similar views were expressed in the 
government's second White Paper, Advancing the National Interest (2003).72  
 
This significant discursive shift has been analysed extensively in the literature.73 
Instead of notions like GIC, Goldsworthy notes that the Coalition emphasised terms 
                                                     
 
65 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy 
White Paper (1997) iii. 
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67 Ibid. 
68 Note, however, that the Howard government did make some statements far more consistent with 
GIC. For example, the White Paper acknowledged that Australia's national interest lay in having an 
'international reputation as a responsible member of the international community, committed to the 
rule of law, ready to assist in cases of humanitarian need, and a constructive contributor to the 
economic development of its neighbourhood': ibid 1-11, 13. 
69 Ibid 47. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid ii, vi, viii,  
72 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and 
Trade Policy White Paper (2003).  
73 See, eg, Goldsworthy, 'An Overview', above n 64, 10; Lorraine Elliott, 'Australia in World 
Environmental Affairs' in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds), The National Interest in a Global Era: 
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like 'realistic', 'hard-headed', 'practical', and the 'national interest'.74 Gyngell and 
Wesley suggest the label 'pragmatic bilateralism' as being an apt description of the 
Howard government's approach.75  
 
While GIC was not a feature of the Howard government's foreign policy discourse, it 
did sporadically argue that Australia was, or at least desired to be, a GIC on a range of 
global issues including international security and peace enforcement, refugees, war 
crimes, the environment, human rights76 and climate change.77 If nothing else, this 
probably reflected the growing legitimacy of the concept within Australia's political 
discourse. That is, while the Howard government did not appear to have a genuine 
belief in the concept, it did seem to recognise the political appeal of the term within 
certain sectors of the Australian electorate, and perhaps also with international 
audiences. 
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2 The Howard Government's General Record as an International Citizen  
Several scholars believe that Australia's international reputation was damaged during 
the Howard era. Indeed, Cotton and Ravenhill suggest that for critics of the Howard 
government, 'the single most deleterious consequence of Australian foreign policies' 
during this era came 'in the damage that they did to Australia's reputation as a good 
international citizen'.78 While the government did undertake some GIC activities, such 
as the Australian-led INTERFET operation to help secure the independence of East 
Timor in 1999,79 and the later RAMSI operation to restore law and order in the 
Solomon Islands,80 among others,81 these were overshadowed by major negatives such 
as Australia's involvement in the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 (likely in breach of 
international law),82 arguable violations of international law in relation to asylum 
seekers,83 and numerous other acts of poor international citizenship.84  
 
Pert suggests that the final years of the Howard government could be described as 
'exceptionalism', with the national interest (as narrowly interpreted by the 
government) prevailing over all other considerations including, at times, international 
law.85 While, as noted, the Howard government was involved in various GIC activities, 
Pert argues that 'these were overwhelmed by its disregard for the rule of law, 
international law, the United Nations and multilateralism – and this to a degree not 
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family-of-nations/>; Tony Kevin, 'Howard's Foreign Policy Legacy' on New Matilda (29 April 2008) 
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its role as Chair of the UN Human Rights Commission, and its support for nuclear disarmament: Pert, 
above, n 6, 323.  
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exhibited by any other government since Federation.'86 Thus Pert categorised the 
Howard government's overall record as that of a 'poor international citizen.'87 
3 The Howard Government's Record on Climate Change 
The Howard government's narrower approach to foreign policy was particularly 
evident in its approach to climate change. While, as has been seen, the desire to 
protect Australia's economic interests was also a feature of Labor's climate change 
policies, the Howard government's emphasis on this was far more strident. With the 
upcoming Kyoto Protocol negotiations in mind, the 1997 White Paper declared that 
Australia would be prepared to 'stand aside from an international agreement' that did 
'not adequately protect Australia's national interests' and if others could not be 
convinced that Australia's proposals were 'superior in terms of both the environment 
and the global economy.'88  
 
At Kyoto, the government's negotiating strategy clearly reflected a more traditional 
approach to advancing Australia's national interests. As noted, the Berlin Mandate 
(establishing the Kyoto negotiations) stipulated that only developed countries would 
be required to strengthen their emission reduction commitments under a future 
agreement. Ignoring this, the Coalition sought to have new obligations imposed on 
developing countries.89 This was unsuccessful, but the government did win two 
significant concessions intended to minimise the cost of GHG abatement for Australia.  
 
First, Australia gained a very generous mitigation target under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Collectively, Annex I countries (the developed countries) agreed to reduce their GHG 
emissions by at least 5 per cent by 2008-12 (below 1990 levels).90 Intense negotiations 
took place concerning the individual contribution each developed country would make 
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to this collective effort.91 The EU showed leadership in adopting an emissions 
reduction target of 8 per cent92 and had been prepared to go as high as 15 per cent.93 
By contrast, the Howard government won Australia the right to increase its emissions 
by 8 per cent.94 The government argued that Australia's special circumstances 
warranted this target, including the importance of fossil fuels to its export and 
domestic energy sectors (which made emission reductions relatively more expensive 
than for many other developed countries and put jobs at risk if strong mitigation 
targets were adopted).95 Although the Berlin Mandate had indicated that Parties 
'individual circumstances' would be relevant to the allocation of targets,96 it appears 
that Australia won its very weak target only by threatening to withdraw from the 
negotiations, not because other Parties regarded it as fair.97  
 
Second, the Howard government gained the inclusion of the so called 'Australia 
clause'. This provided that emissions of CO2 caused by land clearing could be included 
in Australia's 1990 baseline emissions figure.98 This increased Australia's baseline by 30 
per cent, yet land clearing rates had already dropped – by 33 per cent between 1990-
95 – and the government had already committed to phasing it out.99 This actually 
                                                     
 
91 See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(76) (1 
December to 11 December 1997) 7-8. 
92 Kyoto Protocol annex B. 
93 See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(76) (1 
December to 11 December 1997) 3. 
94 Kyoto Protocol annex B. 
95 Elliott, 'Australia in World Environmental Affairs', above n 73, 250. In developing this position, the 
Howard government relied heavily on economic modelling undertaken by the Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) which concluded that the cost to the Australian economy 
of reducing GHG emissions would be 22 times higher than the average European country and six times 
higher than the US. ABARE's economic modelling was later criticised as it did not consider the potential 
social, environmental and economic cost of climate change for Australia or the possible economic 
benefits of developing and selling renewable energy technologies. The Commonwealth Ombudsman 
also criticised the consultation process ABARE used in drawing its conclusions, in part because of the 
close involvement of industry in its modelling: see Rosemary Lyster, 'Common But Differentiated? 
Australia's Response to Global Climate Change' (2004) 16 Georgetown International Environmental Law 
Review 561, 564-565. Note, however, that recent studies have confirmed that the cost of reducing 
emissions in Australia is relatively high compared to most developed countries: see chapter 6. 
96 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (6 June 1995), decision 1/CP.1, [2(a)]. 
97 See The Australia Institute, 'A Poisoned Chalice: Australia and the Kyoto Protocol' (Background Paper 
13, June 1998) 11 <www.tai.org.au/file.php?file=web_papers/WP13.pdf>; Hamilton, above n 21, 89-90. 
98 See Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(76), above n 91, 7–8; Kyoto Protocol art 3(7).  
99 See The Australia Institute, above n 97, 5, 12-13; Hamilton, above n 21, ch 8. See further discussion of 
the Australia clause in chapter 9 of this thesis. 
 73 
provided Australia with an opportunity to adopt a far more ambitious target (as the 
increased baseline made its emissions reduction task easier), but was instead used to 
reduce the mitigation effort required by Australia relative to other nations.100 
 
Following Kyoto, Federal Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, John Anderson, 
boasted that Australia's Kyoto deal would 'preserve the interests of [Australia's] 
farmers, miners, manufacturing industry and the economy in general.'101 The 
government portrayed Australia's diplomacy as 'forthright [and] realistic', moderate 
and sensible, and as striking the 'right balance between our national interests and our 
international responsibilities'.102 A number of scholars, however, characterise its 
approach as that of a realist (in the narrow, self-interested sense).103 In this vein, 
Hamilton describes Australia as a 'laggard',104 arguing that its reputation as 'a good 
global citizen' was sacrificed over Kyoto.105 Similarly, Elliott likens Australia to an 
'environmental criminal'106 and suggests that the government's fight to protect 
Australia's narrow economic interests indicated a new style of Australian diplomacy, 
characterised by caution, or suspicion, of multilateralism 'as well as a dogged pursuit of 
the national interest that can seem outdated in a globalised world.'107 
 
Despite initially labelling Australia's deal at Kyoto as 'an absolutely extraordinary 
achievement … against all the odds',108 the Howard government later refused to ratify 
the agreement. According to its 2003 foreign policy White Paper, Advancing the 
National Interest, the government would 'continue to strive for an effective global 
response' that did 'not unfairly compromise the competitiveness of Australian 
industry'.109 The Coalition argued that Australia would lose competitive advantages in 
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emission-intensive and trade-exposed industries like oil, gas, coal and aluminium, 
unless a global agreement included the US (the only other developed nation not to 
ratify) and major developing countries like China.110 Further, it claimed that because 
Australian emissions only represented 1.5 per cent of global emissions, ratifying Kyoto 
would have negligible impacts on global warming.111 This latter argument downplayed 
the fact that Australia was one of the top emitters on a per capita basis, in the top 15 
polluters outright,112 and as a developed country, was expected to show leadership in 
reducing emissions.  
 
The government also argued that without emission reduction commitments by the US 
and major developing country emitters, the Protocol did not provide an 'enduring 
global response'.113 To make the point, Downer noted that the Protocol's binding 
target for developed nations only covered one third of global GHG emissions, meaning 
that global emissions were projected to rise by 41 per cent over 1990 levels during the 
Kyoto commitment period.114 Overall, the government's views were similar to that of 
the US Senate, which through the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, prevented the US Senate 
from ratifying any international agreement that did not require developing countries 
to make emission reductions and that 'would seriously harm the economy of the 
United States'.115 
 
In addition to refusing to ratify Kyoto, the Howard government called for it to be 
abandoned.116 In preference, it espoused the virtues of the 2005 Asia-Pacific 
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, an emissions reduction technology 
agreement that included only six nations (Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea 
                                                     
 
110 Ibid 67. 
111 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australia’s Climate Change Policy: Our Economy, Our 
Environment, Our Future (2007) v. 
112 Ross Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
54. 
113 Alexander Downer, 'Australia Turns up the Heat on Climate Change' The Age (online), 21 August 2007 
<http://www.theage.com.au/news/business/australia-turns-up-the-heat-on-climate-
change/2007/08/20/1187462177433.html#>. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S Res 98, 105th Congress (1997).  
116 See Friends of the Earth Australia, 'Australia Isolates Itself at Climate Change Negotiations' (Media 
Release, 2006) <www.foe.org.au/media-releases/2006-media-releases/mr_14_11_06.htm>. 
 75 
and the US) and no emission reduction targets.117 Some observers of international 
climate negotiations that took place in 2006 also argued that Australia's hard-line 
position undermined efforts by Kyoto Parties to develop a second commitment period 
for the Protocol beyond 2012.118 Australia's decision not to ratify Kyoto may have also 
helped to legitimise the US' decision to do likewise.119  
 
The Howard government stated, somewhat paradoxically, that it remained committed 
to achieving Australia's Kyoto target,120 even though it was not legally obliged to do so. 
This likely reflected a political need for the government to allay both domestic and 
international concerns about its refusal to ratify the Protocol. But its domestic legal 
and policy response largely continued the light-handed approach of the Keating 
government. Other than a Mandatory Renewable Energy Target of 10 per cent, the 
government placed its faith in voluntary programs.121 These policies did put Australia 
on track to meet its Kyoto goal – made easy by the 108 per cent target and the 
Australia clause – but longer-term emissions were predicted to rise to 127 per cent of 
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1990 levels by 2020.122 Under considerable public pressure, the government belatedly 
announced prior to the 2007 federal election that it would introduce an ETS, as well as 
a 15 per cent Clean Energy Target.123 However, with its electoral loss, the Howard 
government's apparent change of heart was never put to the test, leaving it with a 
poor overall record as an international citizen on climate change. 
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CHAPTER 3. AUSTRALIA'S RECOMMITMENT TO GIC AND ACTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE UNDER KEVIN RUDD 
 
'Together we are custodians of the planet. Together we are custodians of the planet’s future. 
That is why climate change is a top priority of the new Australian Government.' Prime Minister 
Kevin Rudd, September 2009.1 
 
This chapter introduces the general political statements of the Australian Labor Party 
(ALP), under Kevin Rudd's leadership, on good international citizenship (GIC) and 
climate change. The purpose of doing so is to outline the basic philosophical approach 
of the Rudd Government to foreign policy and climate change. Later chapters then 
examine the government's specific policy positions on climate change mitigation in 
more detail. 
A The Rudd Government's Foreign Policy Discourse 
The Labor Opposition, led by Rudd, indicated prior to its 2007 election victory that GIC 
remained an important aspiration of the party.2 As Opposition leader, Rudd personally 
committed Labor to returning Australia to its 'role as a good global citizen and as a 
creative and active middle power'.3 The ALP's view of the Howard government's 
approach to foreign policy was perhaps best articulated by Rudd's then Shadow 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Robert McClelland. In a speech entitled Time to Repair Our 
Reputation: The Rise and Fall of Australia as a Good International Citizen (March 2007), 
McClelland argued that Australia's international reputation had been 'tarnished' by a 
number of policy failures of the Howard government, among them its involvement in 
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the United States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.4 Coming under particular criticism was 
the Howard government's nationalistic approach to international climate negotiations, 
including its failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.5  
 
Interestingly, the ALP's 2007 National Platform and Constitution neglected to use the 
term GIC. However, the document's statements on foreign policy were essentially 
consistent with the GIC agenda earlier espoused by Gareth Evans. The Platform, for 
example, committed Labor to 'activism in international affairs'; diplomacy 'in favour of 
our own interests' but also 'the common good';6 and recognised the need for 
multilateralism and the value of international institutions, especially the United 
Nations (UN).7 Notably, the Platform identified the avoidance of climate change as a 
'vital foreign policy objective' for Australia8 and expressed Labor's determination to 
'rebuild Australia's reputation as a world leader on international environmental 
issues.'9 
 
Once in government, new Foreign Minister Stephen Smith quickly committed Labor to 
acting as a GIC in a key 2008 foreign policy speech, A New Era of Engagement with the 
World.10 Smith declared that '[t]he new Australian government came to office intent 
on making a difference as a good international citizen'.11 The government had a 'strong 
wish to see Australia speak and act on the world stage as a good international 
citizen.'12 According to Smith, Labor was 'determined to embark on a foreign policy 
both shaped by and reflecting our democratic values, and our respect for the rule of 
law, domestic and international, our tolerance, and our deep-seated belief in a fair go 
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for others.'13 A 2009 government budget document, Australia's International 
Development Assistance Program: A Good International Citizen, further stated that 
Australia's desire to be a GIC reflected 'a key Australian characteristic: a commitment 
to help people less fortunate than ourselves, a belief in a fair go for all'.14  
 
Smith and other government representatives also employed the concept when 
speaking about a range of global and domestic issues, for example, in:  
 committing to increase official development assistance from 0.3 of gross 
national income to 0.5 per cent by 2015-16 and providing development 
assistance to Pacific nations;15  
 providing humanitarian assistance;16  
 announcing that Australia would sign or ratify a range of international 
agreements including the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(which the Howard government had refused to support), the Optional Protocol 
to the UN Convention Against Torture, the UN Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities;17 
  extending an open invitation for UN officials to visit Australia to monitor 
human rights;18  
 diplomatic efforts to clarify and consolidate the authority of the 'responsibility 
to protect' principle (a principle relating to humanitarian intervention);19 and 
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 delivering a national apology to Australia's Stolen Generation of indigenous 
peoples.20  
 
Members of the government also used related terms to GIC to describe the sort of 
behaviour Labor aspired to, such as 'effective international citizenship'21 and 'good 
international environmental citizenship'.22 
 
Beyond the specific use of the term GIC (often used interchangeably with 'good global 
citizen'), various statements by Labor and Prime Minister Rudd made clear that the 
government's philosophical approach to foreign policy and climate change was broadly 
consistent with that earlier championed by Evans. Notably, the government committed 
to UN engagement as a fundamental pillar of its general foreign policy approach.23 In 
Rudd's first address to the UN General assembly in September 2008, delivered in the 
midst of the 2008 global financial crisis, Rudd remarked that 'we live in a world where 
our interdependence is now greater than at any time before. An interdependence that 
therefore demands our international cooperation now, more than at any time 
before.'24 Of particular relevance to this thesis, Rudd suggested that the globalisation 
of the environment was now clear with the recognition that 'carbon emissions from 
one part of the planet affects all parts of the planet – and therefore radically affects 
the future of the planet itself'. For Rudd, 'interdependence' – in security, economic and 
environmental terms – no longer represented 'sentimental idealism', but 'the new 
realism of the 21st century'.  
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Also in this speech, Rudd mounted a passionate defence of the multilateral system. 
While acknowledging its imperfections, Rudd argued that it represented 'a necessary 
democracy of states' that had been let down by a failure of 'political will' rather than 
the institution itself. Rudd also highlighted his government's renewed commitment to 
multilateral activism, demonstrated by Australia's new International Commission on 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (a joint initiative with Japan), its candidacy 
for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2013-14; and Australia's new 
Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute (a project to drive the demonstration and 
commercialisation of 'clean coal' technology – see further chapter 7).  
 
Also consistent with Evans' statements on GIC, Rudd called upon states to adopt a less 
nationalistic approach to international affairs, arguing that 'our national interests are 
invariably best served by the simultaneous prosecution of the international interest. 
That the purposes of our common humanity should prevail over the narrow interests 
of the few.' Rudd called upon delegates to 'summon the political faith – and to exercise 
the political will necessary – to act for the common purposes of the planet we share.' 
In a separate speech, Rudd re-committed Australia to 'an active, creative middle power 
diplomacy in partnership with the community of nations', indicating that his 
government wanted Australia to be 'a greater force for good in the world'.25  
 
While the Rudd government's public statements displayed a greater enthusiasm for 
promoting the global good, the strength of Labor's commitment to GIC should not be 
overstated. Indeed, the term GIC only received one explicit mention in Labor's 2009 
National Platform and Constitution.26 As with the Hawke-Keating era, national security 
and economic interests were still stated to be primary.27  
 
Scholars and other commentators quickly identified that the Rudd government's 
foreign policy approach had picked up where previous Labor governments left off. 
                                                     
 
25 Rudd, 'Advancing Australia's Global and Regional Economic Interests', above n 21. 
26 Australian Labor Party, National Platform and Constitution 2009 (2009) 38. 
27 See ibid 119. 
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Elliott described its approach as 'highly reminiscent of past Labor governments',28 
while Sheridan saw Rudd as belonging to the tradition of 'Labor giants' Evatt and 
Evans.29 Elliott also noted the return of GIC, activism in international affairs, middle 
power diplomacy, multilateralism and support for the UN, to the government's 
vocabulary.30 Meanwhile, Gyngell saw Rudd's approach as an attempt to reconcile 
'interest-driven realism and values-driven liberal internationalism'.31 
B The Rudd Government's Climate Change Discourse 
A commitment to adopt strong action on climate change was a 'totemic part' of the 
Rudd Labor government's successful 2007 election campaign.32 Once in government, 
Labor quickly sought to paint itself as a GIC on the international stage. Shortly after his 
election victory, Rudd personally attended the UN Bali Climate Change Conference in 
December 2007 (the 13th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change),33 to present Australia's instrument of ratification to 
Kyoto.34 This was undoubtedly an act of GIC, recommitting Australia to action on 
climate change through the international climate change law regime. Rudd used the 
forum – which adopted the Bali Roadmap to guide the post-2012 climate negotiations 
– to distance his government from the overtly nationalistic approach of Australia under 
Prime Minister Howard. According to Rudd, climate change was 'one of the greatest 
moral, economic and environmental challenges of our age'; 'the defining challenge of 
                                                     
 
28 Lorraine Elliott, 'Introduction' in Lorraine Elliott et al, Australian Foreign Policy Futures: Making 
Middle-Power Leadership Work? (Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 
2008) 1. 
29 Greg Sheridan, 'Rudd's Grand Ambition' The Australian (online), 5 April 2008 
<http://blogs.theaustralian.news.com.au/gregsheridan/index.php/theaustralian/comments/rudds_gran
d_ambition/>. 
30 Elliott, 'Introduction', above n 28, 3. See also Allan Gyngell, 'Ambition: The Emerging Foreign Policy of 
the Rudd Government' (Research Paper, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2008) 12-13. On the 
Rudd government and middle power statecraft see also, eg, Gwilym Crouch, 'Australia as a Creative 
Middle Power, Again?' on Australian Policy Online (4 May 2009) 
<http://apo.org.au/commentary/australia-creative-middle-power-again>. 
31 Gyngell, above n 30, 5. Similarly, Sheridan suggests that Rudd sought to 'fuse hard-headed realism 
with liberal idealism, without doing much to damage either concept': Sheridan, above n 29. 
32ABC, 'ETS Postponed by Rudd Government', The 7.30 Report, 27 April 2010 (Chris Uhlmann) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2010/s2884108.htm>. 
33 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1771 
UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994). 
34 Ratified 3 December 2007. 
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our generation' on which delegates' choices would 'impact all future generations.'35 
The 'community of nations' were 'custodians of the planet' and its future and Australia 
would be putting its 'shoulder to the wheel'. Developed and developing nations alike 
were called upon to move forward as a 'truly "United Nations"', with all contributing 
their 'fair share'. 
 
In the Prime Minister's second address to the UN General Assembly, in September 
2009, Rudd further called on all nations to 'reach beyond their self interests and 
instead fashion a 'Grand Bargain' between the developed and developing countries of 
the world.'36 Domestically, the government also adopted '[h]elping to shape a global 
solution' as one of the three pillars of its climate change policy, along with reducing 
Australia's carbon pollution and adapting to 'unavoidable climate change'.37  It also 
committed to a range of new domestic laws and policies on climate change to reduce 
Australia's greenhouse gas emissions, including an emissions trading scheme (see 
chapter 7). Rudd's desire to be a key player in the climate negotiations was rewarded 
by Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen who enlisted Rudd as a 'Friend of the 
Chair' in the lead up to the crucial round of climate negotiations in Copenhagen 
(December 2009).38 
 
The Rudd government also accepted, to a much greater degree than the Howard 
government, that acting both domestically and internationally on climate change was 
actually in Australia's national interest. The government unequivocally accepted that 
climate change posed 'a substantial threat to Australia's economy and our way of 
life.'39 As a hot and dry country, the government stated that Australia had 'more to 
lose than any other developed nation'.40  The government accepted that if significant 
                                                     
 
35 Kevin Rudd (Speech delivered at the High Level Segment of the 13th Conference of the Parties, United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bali, 12 December 2007) 
<http://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/browse.php?did=15704>. 
36 Kevin Rudd (Speech delivered at the 64th session of the United Nations General Assembly), above n 1.  
37 Australian Government, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia's Low Pollution Future (White 
Paper, vol 1) (2008) xv.  
38 Along with UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, and Mexican President Felipe Calderon: Michelle 
Grattan and Tom Arup, 'Rudd Offered Key Copenhagen Role' The Age (online), 28 October 2009 
<http://www.theage.com.au/national/rudd-offered-key-copenhagen-role-20091027-hj1g.html>. 
39 Australian Government, above n 37, iii. 
40 Ibid. 
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global temperature rise occurred Australia's coastal properties would be threatened by 
rising sea levels and tidal surges; food production would be reduced as droughts 
became longer, more frequent and more intense; and 'national treasures' such as the 
Great Barrier Reef and Kakadu wetlands would be under threat, as well as associated 
tourism industries.41  Simply, Australia needed to act to 'protect our way of life and the 
Australian economy.'42  In addition, the government recognised that the effects of 
climate change were already being experienced in Australia's Pacific neighbourhood 
and across the globe.43 
 
It can be seen then that the Rudd government, unlike its Liberal National predecessor, 
appeared to have a genuine desire to act as a GIC, both generally and on climate 
change, and politically committed to doing so.  
 
 
                                                     
 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Rudd (Speech delivered at the High Level Segment of the 13th Conference of the Parties), above n 35. 
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CHAPTER 4. LEGAL BACKGROUND TO THE POST-2012 CLIMATE 
NEGOTIATIONS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSESSING GIC 
 
'The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments … is to achieve … 
stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.' United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, article 2.1  
  
'Warming of the climate system is [now] unequivocal'. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, 2007.2 
 
This chapter examines the basic features and history of the international climate 
change law (ICCL) regime, as well as limited aspects of general international law that 
were potentially relevant to assessing good international citizenship (GIC) in the 
context of the post-2012 climate negotiations. Following this, the chapter explains the 
general approach this thesis will adopt in assessing whether the Rudd government's 
engagement with the negotiations met the standard of GIC.  
A The UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the international community adopted the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the Rio Conference on 
Environment and Development (or 'Earth Summit') in 1992.3 The UNFCCC provides the 
foundation stone of the ICCL regime. Initially signed by 154 states, including Australia 
under the Keating government, the Convention now has 195 Parties (194 states and 
                                                     
 
1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1771 
UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994) ('UNFCCC'). 
2 Core Writing Team, Rajendra K Pachauri and Andy Reisinger (eds), Climate Change 2007: Synthesis 
Report (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2008) 30. 
3 For detailed accounts of the UNFCCC's history, see, eg, UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change: Handbook (UNFCCC, 2006); Daniel Bodansky, 'The History of the Global Climate 
Change Regime' in Urs Luterbacher and Detlef F Sprinz (eds), International Relations and Global Climate 
Change (MIT Press, 2001) 23. 
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one regional economic integration organisation, the European Community/European 
Union (EU)).4  
 
The UNFCCC was adopted by the international community in response to growing 
scientific and political concern regarding the potential ramifications of climate change. 
The issue of climate change was first placed on the international agenda at the first 
World Climate Conference in 1979. Sponsored by the World Meteorological 
Organization, this scientific Conference issued a declaration calling upon the 
international community 'to foresee and to prevent potential man-made changes in 
climate that might be adverse to the well-being of humanity.'5 Several significant 
developments then took place, culminating in the adoption of the Convention. Among 
these were the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) in 1988, the main advisory body to the international community on climate 
science.6 The IPCC's First Assessment Report7 then provided the main scientific basis 
for negotiations on a climate change treaty beginning in late 1990.8 These negotiations 
were held under the auspices of the United Nations General Assembly, which 
established the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a framework 
convention on climate change to negotiate the terms of the treaty.9  
1 UNFCCC: Key Provisions 
The UNFCCC has a number of noteworthy features. To begin with, it formally accepts 
the reality of human-induced climate change in the Preamble to the Convention. 
Recognising that climate change is a 'common concern of humankind', the Preamble 
                                                     
 
4 UNFCCC, Status of Ratification (2013) 
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php>. Both 
states and 'regional economic integration organisations' may become Parties to the UNFCCC: UNFCCC 
arts 22, 1.6.  
5 UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook, above n 3, 17. 
6 The IPCC was set up by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment 
Programme to provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge on 
climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impact: see IPCC, History 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml#.UHvGNW_Mg4I>; IPCC, Organization 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.UiV4bzbI18E>. 
7 IPCC, First Assessment Report (Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
8 UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook, above n 3, 18. 
9 Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, GA Res 45/212, 71st plen 
mtg, UN Doc A/RES/45/212 (21 December 1990) [1]. 
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expresses concern that human activities have 'substantially' increased atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) – enhancing Earth's natural greenhouse 
effect –10 which will result in additional warming of the Earth's surface and 
atmosphere, potentially having adverse impacts for natural ecosystems and 
humankind.11 While accepting the danger presented by global warming, the Preamble 
also acknowledges the uncertainties in scientific predictions of climate change, 
particularly with regard to 'timing, magnitude and regional patterns'. 
 
Article 2 importantly establishes the 'ultimate objective' of the Convention and any 
related legal instruments that the Parties may adopt, namely: to achieve 'stabilisation 
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic [human-induced] interference with the climate system'.12 
This is commonly referred to as the objective of avoiding 'dangerous climate change'.13  
 
Article 3 of the Convention is particularly important to understanding the post-2012 
climate negotiations. This sets out the basic 'principles' of the Convention by which 
Parties 'shall be guided' in their actions to achieve the Convention's objective and to 
implement its provisions. The main principles include that: 
 Parties should act 'on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities';14  
 accordingly, developed Parties 'should take the lead in combating climate 
change and the adverse effects thereof';15 
                                                     
 
10 The Earth's climate is largely controlled by the flows of heat – caused by the Sun – entering and 
leaving the planet and the storage of heat in compartments of the Earth System – ocean, land and 
atmosphere. A very small amount of this heat is stored in the atmosphere.  GHGs in the Earth's 
atmosphere, such as water vapour, carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide, absorb heat leaving the 
Earth's surface, helping to control the surface temperature. The amount of GHGs in the atmosphere 
alters the magnitude of the greenhouse effect and the amount of heat retained in the atmosphere. 
Human activities have most direct impact on the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, as well 
as methane and nitrous oxide: Katherine Richardson et al, Synthesis Report from Climate Change: Global 
Risk, Challenges and Decisions (2nd ed, University of Copenhagen, 2009) 7, 10. 
11 UNFCCC preamble.  
12 Ibid art 1.3. 
13 'Climate change' is defined by the UNFCCC as a 'change of climate which is attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in 
addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods': ibid art 1.2. 
14 Ibid art 3.1. 
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 Parties should 'protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind' (the principle of 'intergenerational equity');16 
 the specific needs and special circumstances of developing Parties should be 
given full consideration, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change, or those Parties that would bear a 
'disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention';17 
 Parties should take 'precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise 
the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.' Further, 'where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures' (the 
'precautionary principle'), although policies and measures should be 'cost-
effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost';18 and 
 Parties 'have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development' (the 
principle of 'sustainable development').19 
 
Article 3 indicates that the principles are limited to 'guiding' the Parties' activities 
under the Convention. Thus, Parties are not legally obliged to give effect to these 
treaty principles.20 This is made clearer still by the use of the word 'should' in the 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
15 Ibid. 'Adverse effects' are defined as: 'changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from 
climate change which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity 
of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health 
and welfare': art 1.1. 
16 Ibid art 3.1. See generally on this principle in international law: Dinah Shelton, 'Intergenerational 
Equity' in Rudige Wolfrum and Chie Kojima (eds), Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law 
123. 
17 UNFCCC art 3.2. 
18 Ibid art 3.3. This principle has been widely adopted by international environmental law instruments, 
see, eg, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in UN, Report of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (12 August 1992) annex I, 
principle 15 ('Rio Declaration'). 
19 UNFCCC art 3.4. The term 'sustainable development' is not defined by the UNFCCC. The most 
commonly cited definition is provided by the 1987 Brundtland Report which described it as 
'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs': World Commission on Environment and Development, Our 
Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (United Nations, 
1987) ch 2, [1]. 
20 The US sought to have article 3 deleted from the Convention during its negotiation, being concerned 
that it could be subject to the Convention's dispute settlement provisions. This push was unsuccessful, 
but Parties did agree to insert the term 'guided' to limit article 3 to informing Parties' actions: see 
Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
233-34. 
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article 3 principles themselves (such as 'should take the lead'; 'should take 
precautionary measures'). Nonetheless, the use of the word 'shall' prior to 'guided', as 
well as Parties' re-endorsement of the principles in subsequent legal instruments (such 
as the Kyoto Protocol21 and Bali Action Plan (BAP)),22 highlights that the principles are 
intended to have an important normative effect on Parties' activities under the 
Convention.23 That is to say, while such principles may not be legally binding on 
Parties, they do establish a clear set of legal expectations. Notwithstanding their non-
binding or 'soft law' status, this thesis argues that a GIC would generally need to 
respect its commitment to be guided by these principles (unless there were compelling 
reasons not to do so) in order to meet the higher standard of behaviour expected of a 
GIC (see further discussion below). 
 
Emphasising their role in influencing Parties' negotiating positions, Parties themselves 
frequently refer to the article 3 principles in their official submissions and 
statements.24 It should be noted, however, that it is often difficult to identify the 
practical ramifications of these principles for state practice, given their general nature. 
In common with other legal principles, the article 3 principles do not dictate specific 
actions to be taken by Parties. As explained by Bodansky, 'principles embody legal 
standards, but the standards they contain are more general than commitments and do 
not specify particular actions.'25 
  
                                                     
 
21 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 
16 March 1998, 2303 UNTS 148 (entered into force 16 February 2005) preamble ('Kyoto Protocol').  
22 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008), decision 1/CP.13, chapeau ('COP 13 Report'). 
23 Several of the article 3 principles are also referred to in the Preamble and the operative provisions of 
the Convention. See, eg, reference to the leadership principle in UNFCCC art 4.2(a). 
24 See, eg, statements by the the G77 and China: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(344) (4 December 2008) 1. Evidence of this is also seen in subsequent 
chapters outlining Party positions on key issues. 
25 Daniel Bodansky, 'The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary' 
(1993) 18 Yale Journal of International Law 451, 501. Another explanation is given by Dworkin who 
states that both legal principles and legal rules 'point to particular decisions about legal obligations in 
particular circumstances but they differ in the character of the direction they give. Rules are applicable 
in an all-or-nothing fashion … [A principle] states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not 
necessitate a particular decision': Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 
1997) 24, 26. 
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In addition to the formal 'principles' section, other provisions of the Convention also 
refer to a number of other ethical considerations or factors which were similarly 
relevant to the post-2012 climate negotiations. Essentially, these elaborate upon the 
Parties' understanding of equity in the context of addressing climate change. The 
Preamble recognises that 'the largest share of historical and current global emissions 
of greenhouse gases … originated in developed countries' and that the 'per capita 
emissions in developing countries are still relatively low'.26 To some extent, the 
recognition of historical responsibility reflects the 'polluter-pays' principle – which 
stipulates that the costs of pollution should be borne by those responsible for causing 
it –27 however, the Convention does not go so far as to actually endorse it. It should 
also be noted that the principles referred to in the Convention's Preamble appear to 
have diminished normative status vis-a-vis the article 3 principles, as these were 
deliberately not included in the operative part of the Convention.28 
 
In the Preamble, Parties also accept that developing countries' emissions 'will grow to 
meet their social and development needs', with these nations having 'legitimate 
priority needs' for the 'achievement of sustained economic growth and the eradication 
of poverty'.29 This is reiterated by article 4.7 which states that 'economic and social 
development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities' of 
developing countries.  
 
As noted, article 3 recognises that some countries are 'particularly vulnerable' to 
climate change.30 Article 4 and the Preamble further specify who these vulnerable 
countries are, namely: the 'developing countries', as well as subgroups including the 
                                                     
 
26 UNFCCC preamble. 
27 The polluter pays principle is a principle of international environmental law and is also found in 
domestic environmental law instruments in many states: see, eg, Sands, above n 20, 279, 280-81. One 
formulation of the polluter pays principle is found in the Rio Declaration, principle 16: 'National 
authorities should endeavour to promote the internalisation of environmental costs and the use of 
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the 
cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and 
investment'. 
28 See Bodansky, 'The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary', above 
n 25, 451. 
29 UNFCCC preamble. 
30 Ibid art 3.2.   
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'least developed countries' (LDCs) and the 'low-lying small island countries', among 
others.31  
 
Article 4 of the Convention contains the general legal commitments of the Parties. 
Notably, the Convention adopts a two-tier system, with the most onerous obligations 
reserved for developed countries, giving effect to the principles of equity, common but 
differentiated responsibility and leadership. Under article 4.2, developed country 
Parties and other Parties listed in Annex I of the Convention (the so-called 'Annex I 
Parties')32 have more stringent mitigation obligations than 'non-Annex I Parties' 
(essentially the developing countries). The key commitment of Annex I Parties, albeit a 
non-binding one, is the collective 'aim' of reducing Annex I Party GHG emissions to 
1990 levels by the year 2000.33  
 
In addition to establishing emission reduction requirements (and related aspects such 
as implementing national inventories of GHGs), article 4 further establishes obligations 
to provide finance to developing countries, as well as technology transfer and 
cooperation, for both mitigation and adaptation.34 These obligations chiefly fall to the 
'Annex II Parties' (the wealthiest Annex I Parties).35 This again helps to realise the 
                                                     
 
31 See, eg, ibid arts 4.9, 4.8 and preamble. 
32 Annex I of the Convention includes developed countries that were members of the OECD in 1992, the 
European Economic Community (now represented by the EU), former Soviet Union countries with 
economies in transition to a market economy (EITs), as well as countries which subsequently joined 
Annex I. Annex I Parties currently include: Australia; Austria; Belarus*; Belgium; Bulgaria*; Canada; 
Czechoslovakia*; Denmark; European Economic Community; Estonia*; Finland; France; Germany; 
Greece; Hungary*; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Latvia*; Lithuania*; Luxembourg; Netherlands; New 
Zealand; Norway; Poland*; Portugal; Romania*; Russian Federation*; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; 
Turkey; Ukraine*; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States. *= EITs. 
33 UNFCCC arts 4.2(a)(b). The commitments of the Parties are established in relation to carbon dioxide 
emissions and other GHGs not controlled by the Montréal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, opened for signature 16 September 1987, 1522 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 
1989). The Montreal Protocol regulates GHGs that contribute to the depletion of the ozone layer such as 
chlorofluorocarbons. 
34 For example, article 4.3 requires developed countries to provide 'new and additional financial 
resources' to enable developing countries to meet their (more limited) obligations under articles 12.1 
and 4.1. See also articles 4.5, 4.9. 
35 Annex II includes developed countries that were members of the OECD in 1992: UNFCCC, United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook, above n 3, 46. Annex II Parties currently 
include: Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; European Economic Community; Finland; France; 
Germany; Greece; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Luxembourg; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; 
Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
United States. 
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principle of equity referred to by article 3. A Financial Mechanism was also established 
by article 11 to help coordinate the transfer of financial resources,36 administered by 
the Global Environment Facility.37 
2 Kyoto Protocol: Key Features 
Article 4.2(d) UNFCCC required the Parties to review, and consider amending, the 
adequacy of developed country commitments under articles 4.2(a) and (b) at its first 
'Conference of the Parties' (COP).38 As noted in chapter 1, in the years following the 
Earth Summit, the EU and developing countries pushed for the adoption of a stronger 
agreement than the UNFCCC, this time establishing binding mitigation targets for 
developed countries.39 Such measures were not agreed to at COP 1 (March-April 
1995), being opposed by the JUSCANZ countries (Japan, US, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand).40 However, the 'Berlin Mandate' established a formal process to guide 
further negotiations on this issue.41 Again giving effect to the principles of equity and 
common but differentiated responsibility, the Mandate provided that only Annex I 
Parties would have new mitigation commitments.42 Taking its cue from the IPCC's 
Second Assessment Report, which provided stronger warnings of the risk posed by 
increasing GHG emissions,43 Parties agreed to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol at COP 3 
(December 1997).44 Most importantly, the Protocol established, for the first time, a 
binding commitment by Annex I Parties to collectively reduce their GHG emissions – 
specifically, by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels during the treaty's 'first 
                                                     
 
36 UNFCCC art 11. 
37 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Second Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1 (29 October 1996), decision 12/CP.2; UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the 
Parties on its Third Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 (25 March 1998), 
decision 12/CP.3. 
38 Parties must review these commitments at regular intervals 'until the objective of the Convention is 
met': UNFCCC art 4.2(d). 
39 See Dave Cox, 'The Road from Rio: Multilateral Cooperation Gives Way to National Interest' in Richard 
Leaver and Dave Cox (eds), Middling, Meddling, Muddling: Issues in Australian Foreign Policy (Allen & 
Unwin, 1997) 226-27.  
40 Ibid 226. 
41 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (6 June 1995), decision 1/CP.1. 
42 Ibid [2(b)]. 
43 See IPCC, Second Assessment: Climate Change 1995 (Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
44 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Third Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 (25 March 1998), decision 1/CP.3. 
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commitment period' (2008 – 2012).45 Annex I Parties also agreed for the first time to 
commit to individual mitigation targets, technically known as 'quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments'.46 The detailed rules for the Protocol (such as 
compliance and reporting requirements) were agreed to several years later at COP 7 
(December 2001) – commonly known as the 'Marrakesh Accords'.47  
 
The entry into force of the Protocol was fraught, with the US and Australia (under the 
Howard government) opting not to ratify.48 Russia's ratification in 2004 finally satisfied 
the requirements of article 25.1, bringing the Protocol into force.49 192 Parties have 
since ratified the Protocol, including 36 Annex I Parties.50 The Rudd government 
ratified Kyoto for Australia on 3 December 2007. In 2011, Canada became the first 
country to withdraw from the treaty, concerned that it would fail to meet its 
mitigation target and would need to purchase a significant quantity of Kyoto carbon 
credits to make up the shortfall.51 
 
In addition to establishing binding mitigation targets for Annex I Parties, the Kyoto 
Protocol includes a number of important features. First, article 3.3 allows Annex I 
Parties to account for net changes of GHGs in their land-use change and forestry sector 
in meeting their mitigation targets. As noted in chapter 2, the related 'Australia clause' 
                                                     
 
45  Kyoto Protocol art 3.1. 
46  Ibid annex B. 
47 The Marrakesh Accords include the following decisions: UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the 
Parties on its Seventh Session: Addendum (Part 2, Volume I), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (21 
January 2002), decisions 2-14/CP.7; UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh 
Session: Addendum (Part 2, Volume II), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (21 January 2002) decisions 15-
19/CP.7; UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session: Addendum (Part 2, 
Volume III), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 (21 January 2002) decisions 20-24/CP.7. The Accords were 
adopted by Kyoto Parties in 2005 after the Protocol came into effect. 
48 Article 25.1 Kyoto Protocol specifies that the 'Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after 
the date on which not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I 
which accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the 
Parties included in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession'. 
49 UN News Centre, 'UN's Kyoto Treaty Against Global Warming Comes into Force', UN News Centre 
(online), 16 February 2005 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=13359&Cr=global&Cr1=warm#.UF_Fr7Ige88>. 
50 UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php; UNFCCC, Status of 
Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/5524.php>. 
51 'Canada Pulls Out of Kyoto Protocol' The Guardian (online), 13 December 2011 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/13/canada-pulls-out-kyoto-protocol>. 
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(article 3.7) also enables land clearing emissions to be included in several Parties' 1990 
baselines, which in particular made Australia's emissions reduction task considerably 
easier in the first commitment period. The Protocol also established so-called 
'flexibility' or 'market mechanisms' to allow Annex I Parties to meet their obligations in 
a more cost-effective manner. Essentially, these mechanisms allow Annex I Parties to 
purchase emission reduction credits from other Parties in which GHG abatement is 
cheaper. The mechanisms include international emissions trading,52 the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM)53 and Joint Implementation54 (see further chapter 7). 
The Protocol also extended the regulation of GHGs beyond carbon dioxide, also 
including methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur 
hexafluoride.55 At COP 13/CMP 3 in Bali (December 2007), Kyoto Parties also officially 
launched an Adaptation Fund, funded by a 2 per cent levy on the CDM, to help fund 
adaptation in developing countries.56  
3 UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol: Institutions and Processes 
It is helpful to briefly outline the basic institutions and processes under which the 
climate negotiations are conducted. A number of institutions, bodies and processes 
were created by or under the UNFCCC and later the Kyoto Protocol.57 Together, these 
create a procedural framework for Parties to conduct their work in relation to the 
treaties, including the negotiation of new agreements. Most importantly, these include 
the COP under the UNFCCC,58 and the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting 
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP).59 These function as the supreme decision-
making bodies of the Convention and Protocol, respectively.  
                                                     
 
52 Kyoto Protocol art 17. 
53 Ibid art 12. 
54 Ibid art 6. 
55 Ibid annex A. 
56 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol on its Third Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1 (14 March 2008), 
decision 1/CMP.3. The Fund was first agreed to in 2001: UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties 
on its Seventh Session: Addendum (Part 2, Volume I), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (21 January 2002) 
decision 10/CP.7.  
57 See generally UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook, above n 
3, ch 2. See also Environment Canada and University of Joensuu, Multilateral Environmental Agreement 
Negotiator's Handbook (2nd ed, 2007). 
58 UNFCCC art 7. 
59 Kyoto Protocol art 13. The CMP is also commonly abbreviated as COP/MOP. 
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COPs and CMPs are held annually60 and provide the focal point for the Parties' 
negotiations under the Convention and Protocol. Parties to the Convention that are 
not Parties to the Protocol (notably the US) may participate as observers in the CMP, 
but cannot participate in decision-making.61 The Rudd government was involved in 
three COPs/CMPs during the period of review, namely: COP 1/CMP 3 (the Bali Climate 
Change Conference, December 2007); COP 14/CMP 4 (the Poznan Climate Change 
Conference, December 2008); and COP 15/CMP 5 (the Copenhagen Climate Change 
Conference, December 2009). The emphasis of this thesis is on the Rudd government's 
engagement with the negotiations from the post-Bali period to Copenhagen, the major 
period of activity for the government. Although negotiations continued post-
Copenhagen, Rudd was deposed as Prime Minister in June 2010 by Julia Gillard, and 
little progress was made in the negotiations after Copenhagen until COP 16/CMP 6 in 
Cancun (December 2010). 
 
An important function of the COP and CMP is to make 'decisions' necessary for the 
UNFCCC and Protocols' effective implementation.62 These decisions are highly 
important to the ICCL regime. The Marrakesh Accords, for example, established the 
detailed implementation rules for the Protocol, while the BAP established the 
negotiating terms to guide discussions on the post-2012 agreement. The UNFCCC 
Secretariat regards decisions as being binding upon the Parties,63 however, the precise 
legal status of decisions is in fact uncertain under international law.64 The UNFCCC 
itself does not explicitly authorise binding law-making by the COP.65 Rather, the 
establishment of new substantive obligations requires an amendment to the 
                                                     
 
60 UNFCCC art 7.4; UNFCCC, Draft Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the Parties and its Subsidiary 
Bodies, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1996/2 (22 May 1996) rule 4.2; Kyoto Protocol art 13.6. 
61 Kyoto Protocol art 13.2. 
62 UNFCCC art 7.2; Kyoto Protocol art 13.4. 
63 See, eg, UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook, above n 3, 28. 
64 See Jutta Brunnée, 'COPing with Consent: Law-Making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements' 
(2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 1, 32-33; Lavanya Rajamani, 'The Copenhagen Agreed 
Outcome: Form, Shape and Influence' (Policy Brief, Centre for Policy Research, 2009) 5. Professor 
Rajamani suggests that the precise legal status of a decision depends on the enabling clause, the 
language and content of the decision, and Parties' behaviour and legal expectations: 5. 
65 The Kyoto Protocol does, however, authorise binding law-making in limited areas, namely, in relation 
to reporting and accounting obligations under articles 7.1 and 7.4: Rajamani, 'The Copenhagen Agreed 
Outcome: Form, Shape and Influence', above n 64, 5; Brunnée, above n 64, 32. 
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Convention or the adoption of a protocol.66 Notwithstanding this, the COP often 
adopts prescriptive language in its decisions ('shall'), and Parties themselves generally 
appear to treat decisions as binding.67  
 
Regardless of their precise legal status, decisions appear to carry significant normative 
weight for the Parties. Parties are, for example, expected to comply with the legal 
mandates established by decisions such as the BAP.68 The terms of the BAP and other 
COP or CMP decisions are thus also part of the ICCL framework which a GIC would 
generally be expected to respect (regardless of whether they technically represent 
'hard' or 'soft' law). It should be noted that decision-making by the COP is highly 
cumbersome, usually requiring the agreement of all Parties69 (or at least the absence 
of a formal objection),70 except on simple matters of procedure.71 
 
The COP also produces other outcomes such as political declarations, conclusions, or 
resolutions which are not intended to be binding.72 The main outcome of COP 15, the 
                                                     
 
66 UNFCCC arts 15, 17. 
67 Rajamani, 'The Copenhagen Agreed Outcome: Form, Shape and Influence', above n 64, 5; Brunnée, 
above n 64, 32.  
68 See, eg, statements by the G77 and China: International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(358) (1 April 2008) 1. 
69 Article 7.3 UNFCCC required the COP to establish its own rules of procedure, which could include 
specified majorities for the adoption of particular decisions. However, Parties could not agree upon 
draft rule 42 concerning voting (which included a proposal for decisions to be taken by a two-thirds 
majority if consensus could not be reached): see UNFCCC, Draft Rules of Procedure of the Conference of 
the Parties and its Subsidiary Bodies, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1996/2 (22 May 1996). The rules of procedure 
have thus never been formally adopted. Instead, Parties apply the draft rules at each session, with the 
exception of rule 42. 
70 An exception occurred to this at COP 16/CMP 6, with Parties adopting COP decisions despite Bolivia's 
formal objection: see International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 
vol 12(498) (29 November – 11 December 2010) 2. While this may mean that the decisions were not 
formally adopted in a valid manner, in practice Parties (other than Bolivia) have acted on the basis that 
the decisions were validly adopted: see, Climate Focus, 'CP16/CMP6: The Cancun Agreements' (Briefing 
Note, January 2011) 2-3 
<http://climatefocus.com/documents/files/Cancun%20Briefing%20Jan%202011%20v.1.0.pdf>.  
71 UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook, above n 3, 41. A 
simple majority is sufficient for matters of procedure. 
72 Ibid 28. 
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Copenhagen Accord, for example, was not formally adopted by the Parties and thus 
only enjoyed the status of a political declaration.73  
 
The COP and CMP are assisted by several subsidiary, expert and ad hoc bodies. The 
two major technical bodies are the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice (SBSTA)74 and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI).75 Important bodies 
under the Protocol include the CDM Executive Board,76 the Article 6 Supervisory 
Committee77  and the Compliance Committee.78  
 
The COP and CMP also establish other ad hoc bodies as necessary.79 Much of the post-
2012 negotiations took place in two ad hoc working groups, namely the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) 
and the Ad Hoc Working Group to Consider Further Commitments for Annex I Parties 
under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) (see below). While climate negotiations often 
occur in these formal settings (such as COP 'plenary' sessions, and 'contact groups'), 
much of the negotiations take place in 'informals' behind closed doors.80 
                                                     
 
73 See, eg, Lavanya Rajamani, 'The Making and Unmaking of the Copenhagen Accord' (2010) 59 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 824, 828-29; UNFCCC, 'Notification to Parties: Clarification 
Relating to the Notification of 18 January 2010' (25 January 2010) 
<http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/notifications/application/pdf/100125_noti_clarification.
pdf>. For details of the Copenhagen Accord see discussion in later chapters.  
74 UNFCCC art 9. 
75 Ibid art 10. See further UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: 
Handbook, above n 3, 33. 
76 Kyoto Protocol art 12.4; UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session: 
Addendum (Part 2, Volume II), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (21 January 2002), decision 17/CP.7.  
77 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session: Addendum (Part 2, Volume II), 
UN Doc FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (21 January 2002), decision 16/CP.7.  
78 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session: Addendum (Part 2, Volume III), 
UN Doc FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 (21 January 2002), decision 24/CP.7. 
79 For example, contact groups, drafting groups and Committees of the Whole: UNFCCC, United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook, above n 3, 37. The COP has also established 
several specialist bodies or 'expert groups' to undertake technical work on specific topics, including the 
Expert Group on Technology Transfer (decision 4/CP.7); the Consultative Group of Experts on National 
Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (decision 8/CP.5); and the Least 
Developed Countries Expert Group (decision 29/CP.7). 
80 See, eg, Greg Picker and Fergus Green, 'Comprehending Copenhagen: A Guide to the International 
Climate Change Negotiations' (Policy Report, Lowy Institute for International Policy, November 2009) 23. 
At times, these informal discussions take place in meetings of 'Friends of the Chair' (for example, of the 
Chair of the AWG-LCA) or 'Friends of the President' (President of the COP). Friends of the Chair or 
President groups will involve a representative group of nations brought together by the Chair of an AWG 
to try to resolve disputed issues between the Parties: 24. 
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Finally, it should be noted that while the UNFCCC provides the focal point for the 
international community's effort to regulate GHGs, climate negotiations and activities 
take place within a broader global political, legal and institutional context.81 The 
COP/CMP and subsidiary bodies cooperate with a range of international organisations 
such as the United Nations; IPCC; other multilateral environmental treaty regimes such 
as the Convention on Biological Diversity;82 the World Bank and regional development 
banks; the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime 
Organization, among others.83 Negotiations also occur in other forums that can feed 
into the official climate negotiations. For example, in the lead up to COP 15/CMP 5, 
informal negotiations regarding a post-2012 agreement were held, inter alia, by the 
Greenland Dialogue, and various global bodies such as the Major Economies' Forum on 
Energy and Climate Change (originally the Major Emitters Forum), the Group of Eight, 
the Group of Twenty, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders' Meeting and the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.84 While these meetings can provide 
important input to the UNFCCC process,85 this thesis is focused on the official climate 
negotiations, which are necessarily the focal point of negotiations for the ICCL regime. 
4 Party Groupings 
It is important to recognise that UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol Parties often belong, 
either formally or informally, to particular groups which share common interests and 
negotiate for similar treaty outcomes. The UNFCCC, in various articles, recognises 
certain distinctions between Parties, the largest of which is the broad category of 
'developed' and 'developing' countries. Broadly, although not absolutely, the 
                                                     
 
81 Keohane and Victor describe the complex array of regulatory regimes for climate change as a 'regime 
complex': see Robert O Keohane and David G Victor, 'The Regime Complex for Climate Change' 
(Discussion Paper No 10-33, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, 2010) 2. 
82 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into 
force 29 December 1993). 
83 See UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook, above n 3, 52. 
84 See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(425) (13 
August 2009) 3; Alina Averchenkova, The Outcomes of Copenhagen: The Negotiations and the Accord 
(UNDP, 2010) 3. 
85 The G8 forum, for example, was important in establishing the agreement of the major emitters to a 
2°C long-term target: G8, Leaders Declaration: Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future, G8 
Summit, L'Aquila, 8 July 2009, [65] 
<http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/G8_Declaration_08_07_09_final%2c0.pdf>. See 
discussion of the 2°C target in chapter 5. 
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developed and developing country groups correlate to the Annex I and non-Annex I 
Party groups.86 Within the Annex I group, the former Soviet Union 'Economies in 
Transition' are granted a 'certain degree of flexibility' in meeting their mitigation 
commitments under article 4.2.87 Only the richest developed countries (those listed in 
Annex II) have financial obligations to non-Annex I Parties.88 As noted, the UNFCCC also 
differentiates between developing countries, chiefly by recognising that some 
developing countries are particularly vulnerable, such as the low-lying island 
countries89 and the LDCs.90  
 
Parties have also established informal political groups or blocs to better advance their 
common interests.91 Essentially all Parties to the climate negotiations seek to increase 
their influence by joining negotiating coalitions, some more formal than others. During 
the post-2012 negotiations, Australia was a member of the Umbrella Group, which 
evolved from the JUSSCANNZ group (Japan, the US, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, 
Norway and New Zealand). The Group discusses issues together, but members 
negotiate independently.92 At COP 15, the Umbrella Group's membership included 
Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, Ukraine, and the 
                                                     
 
86 Note that some non-Annex I Parties are regarded by other Parties to be 'developed' and thus have 
been pressured to join Annex I: see chapter 6. 
87 UNFCCC art 4.6. See list of Annex I Parties and EITs, above n 32.  
88 See list of Annex II Parties, above n 35. 
89 UNFCCC art 4.8. Parties considered to be particularly vulnerable are: small island countries; countries 
with low-lying coastal areas; countries with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and areas liable to 
forest decay; countries with areas prone to natural disasters, drought and desertification; countries with 
areas of high urban atmospheric pollution; countries with fragile ecosystems, including mountainous 
ecosystems; countries with economies highly dependent on income generated from fossil fuel industries 
and associated energy-intensive industries (also recognised by art 4.10); and land-locked and transit 
countries. 
90 UNFCCC art 4.9.  
91 These groups operate according to their own rules, but generally speaking will meet to exchange 
information, share information on common issues, or develop common negotiating positions: UNFCCC, 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook, above n 3, 49. See also UNEP, 
Guide for Negotiators of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (Environment Canada and University of 
Joensuu, 2007) 24-28. 
92 Picker and Green, 'Comprehending Copenhagen: A Guide to the International Climate Change 
Negotiations', above n 80, A-i. 
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US.93 The largest developed country group is the EU-27, which negotiates as a single 
entity. 
 
The main developing country bloc has long been the 'Group of 77 and China' (G77 and 
China), presently comprising 132 developing countries,94 representing the global 
'South'. As developing country interests do not always align, it is common for 
developing countries to belong to more than one political group. Other key groups 
include the LDCs (48 members),95 the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)96 (39 
members, most of which are Small Island Developing States)97 and the African Group 
(53 members).98 Members of these groups are typically highly vulnerable to climate 
change. BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) is the most recently established 
group, being instigated by China in the lead up to COP 15. The group, which 
coordinated their position closely during COP 15, represents four of the most 
influential major emerging economies which all have rapidly growing GHG levels.99 
Active non-Annex I country groups also include ALBA (the Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Peoples of our Americas, a group of Latin American countries);100 the Rainforest 
Coalition (40 developing countries primarily from the Amazon, Congo Basin and 
Southeast Asia);101 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC, 12 oil 
producing countries);102 and Central Asia, Caucasus, Albania and Moldova (CACAM, 
several non-G77 Asian, Central and Eastern European non-Annex I countries).103 
                                                     
 
93 See Australia, 'Opening Statement by Australia on Behalf of the Umbrella Group' (Statement delivered 
at UNFCCC COP 15/CMP 5, Copenhagen, 7 December 2007) 
<http://210.193.178.189/copenhagen/news-index/opening-statement.aspx>. 
94 G77, The Member States of the Group of 77 <http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html>. 
95 UN-OHRLLS, About LDCs <http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/>. 
96 AOSIS, About AOSIS <http://aosis.org/about-aosis/>. 
97 See SIDSnet, Climate Change and Sea Level Rise <http://www.sidsnet.org/climate-change-and-sea-
level-rise>. 
98 See UN, Members of the General Assembly are Arranged in Current Regional Groups 
<http://www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/gmun/shared/documents/GA_regionalgrps_Web.pdf>. 
99 Antto Vihma, 'Elephant in the Room: The New G77 Eastern and China Dynamics in Climate Talks' 
(Briefing Paper 6, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 26 May 2010) 6. 
100 Of the eight members, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Cuba and Nicaragua coordinate their climate 
change positions: ibid 4. 
101 See Coalition for Rainforest Nations, About the Coalition 
<http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/AboutTheCoalition.aspx>.  
102 UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook, above n 3, 50. 
103 Ibid 50-51. See also Catherine Potvin and Andrew Bovarnick, 'Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries: Key Actors, Negotiations and Actions' (2008) 3 Carbon 
and Climate Law Review 264, 265. 
 101 
Uniquely, the Environmental Integrity Group comprises both an Annex I country 
(Switzerland) and non-Annex I countries (the Republic of Korea and Mexico).104 
B The 'Bali Roadmap': The Negotiating Process for a Post-2012 
Agreement 
Parties to the Convention and Kyoto Protocol agreed at COP 13/CMP 3 in Bali 
(December 2007), to launch the 'Bali Roadmap', a two-track negotiating process to 
establish new mitigation commitments for developed countries, and importantly, this 
time also developing countries.105 The objective was to complete negotiations by COP 
15/CMP 5 at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (December 2009).106 Parties 
were unable to meet this deadline, with UNFCCC Parties only agreeing to the non-
binding Copenhagen Accord.107 Nonetheless, it will be seen in later chapters that the 
period from COP 13 to COP 15 was highly significant for the evolution of the ICCL 
regime with the Accord representing a major stepping stone on the path to a more 
comprehensive, binding agreement. 
 
The first track of the negotiations mandated by the Bali Roadmap, the 'Bali Action Plan' 
(BAP), established a new ad hoc body, the AWG-LCA, to conduct negotiations to better 
implement the Convention, officially: 'to enable the full, effective and sustained 
implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to 
and beyond 2012.'108 In the BAP, Parties recognised the findings of the IPCC's Fourth 
                                                     
 
104 Picker and Green, above n 80, A-i. Korea and Mexico are members of the OECD and are thus ineligible 
for the G77. 
105 For background on the Bali Roadmap, see, eg, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(459) (7-19 December 2009); Chad Carpenter, The Bali Road Map: Key 
Issues under Negotiation (UNDP, 2008). 
106 UNFCCC, Bali Climate Change Conference – December 2007 
<http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php>; COP 13 Report, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 
decision 1/CP.13, [1];  UNFCCC, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex 
I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol on its Resumed Fourth Session, UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5 (5 
February 2008) annex I ('Report of AWG-KP 4 (Resumed Session)'). 
107 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010), decision 2/CP.15. 
108 COP 13 Report, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, decision 1/CP.13, [1]. The BAP evolved from the 
earlier Convention 'Dialogue' launched at COP 11/CMP 1, Montreal, 2005, co-facilitated by Australia and 
South Africa:  see UNFCCC, Report on the Dialogue on Long-Term Cooperative Action to Address Climate 
Change by Enhancing Implementation of the Convention, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/4 (19 October 2007).  
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Assessment Report,109 that warming of the climate system was now 'unequivocal', and 
that any delay in reducing emissions would significantly constrain opportunities to 
achieve lower GHG stabilisation levels while increasing the risk of more severe climate 
change impacts.110 Parties also recognised that 'deep cuts' in global emissions were 
required to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention and emphasised the 
'urgency' of addressing climate change.111 Notably, the BAP did not prejudge the legal 
outcome of the negotiations, only calling for an 'agreed outcome'.112 Therefore, it was 
possible that the agreed outcome could take the form of a COP/CMP decision, a new 
Protocol, an extension of Kyoto, or some other form or combination thereof.  
 
The Parties agreed to address several important topics in their negotiations. These 
included, among others: 
 A 'shared vision for long-term cooperative action, including a long-term global 
goal for emission reductions, to achieve the ultimate objective of the 
Convention';113 
 'Enhanced national/international action on mitigation of climate change',114 
including consideration of: 
o 'nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions' by 
developed countries;115  
o 'nationally appropriate mitigation actions' by developing countries;116 
o 'policy approaches and positive incentives to support reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing 
countries' (so called 'REDD'), as well as  'conservation, sustainable 
management of forests, and enhancement of carbon stocks' (so called 
'REDD+');117 
                                                     
 
109 IPCC,  Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007 (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
110 COP 13 Report, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, decision 1/CP.13, chapeau. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid [1]. 
113 Ibid [1(a)]. 
114 Ibid [1(b)]. 
115 Ibid [1(b)(i)]. 
116 Ibid [1(b)(ii)]. 
117 Ibid [1(b)(iii)]. 
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o 'enhanced action on adaptation';118 
o 'enhanced action on technology development and transfer to support 
mitigation and adaptation';119 and 
o 'enhanced action on the provision of financial resources and investment 
to support mitigation, adaptation and technology cooperation'.120 
 
The second track of the Bali Roadmap, under the AWG-KP, involved a continuation of 
negotiations first initiated at CMP 1, Montreal, to consider further mitigation 
commitments by Annex I Parties to the Protocol beyond the first commitment 
period.121 The AWG-KP's 'conclusions' outlined a detailed program of work leading up 
to CMP 5 in Copenhagen, primarily including consideration of the issues outlined at 
AWG-KP 2 in Nairobi (2006). These included, among others:  
 analysis of the mitigation potentials and range of emission reduction objectives 
of Annex I Parties; 
 analysis of the possible means to achieve mitigation objectives, such as 
emissions trading, the CDM, LULUCF; and 
 consideration of further commitments by Annex I Parties, including the scale of 
emission reductions to be achieved in aggregate and individually.122 
 
As explained in the introduction to this thesis, the focus of this study is on the 
mitigation aspect of the Parties' negotiating mandate. 
 
 
                                                     
 
118 Ibid [1(c)]. 
119 Ibid [1(d)]. 
120 Ibid [1(e)]. 
121 Report of AWG-KP 4 (Resumed Session), UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5, annex I. Parties agreed at 
CMP 1, 2005, to initiate a process to consider further commitments for Annex I Parties beyond 2012 in 
accordance with article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol: UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties 
Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session: Addendum (Part 2, Vol I), 
UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (30 March 2006), decision 1/CMP.1. The AWG-KP was originally 
referred to as the 'AWG'. The AWG agreed to aim to complete its work 'as early as possible' and in time 
to ensure that there was no gap between the first and second commitment periods: [3]. 
122 Report of AWG-KP 4 (Resumed Session), UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5, [19]; UNFCCC, Report of the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol on its 
Second Session, UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2006/4 (14 December 2006) [17]. 
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As of October 2013, several key developments had occurred since COP 15, including 
the adoption of a second commitment period for the Protocol by Kyoto Parties.123 
UNFCCC Parties had yet to adopt a broader post-2012 agreement as envisaged by the 
Bali Roadmap, although UNFCCC Parties had agreed to the new aim of establishing 
such an agreement, with binding commitments for both developed and developing 
countries, by 2015.124 
C GIC and Broader International Law  
It should be noted that the ICCL regime is not the only potential source of legal 
obligation or guidance for UNFCCC and Kyoto Parties when conducting climate 
negotiations. Generally speaking, international law grants states very broad treaty-
making powers, as does Australia's Constitution in respect of Australia's national 
government.125 The capacity to enter into treaties is a basic right of sovereign states,126 
and states have been reluctant to impose rules that might restrict their treaty-making 
powers.127 However, treaty-making powers are not absolute. A number of legal 
requirements establish broad parameters for treaty making. These are only mentioned 
here in brief, as the research for this thesis did not find any evidence that compliance 
with them was at issue. 
                                                     
 
123 Kyoto Parties agreed at CMP 8, Doha, December 2012, to the Doha Amendment, establishing a 
second commitment period for the Protocol from 2013-2020. Under the Amendment, Annex I Parties 
agreed to reduce their collective GHG emissions by at least 18 per cent below 1990 levels during this 
period, as well as to new individual targets:  UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as 
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its Eighth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1 (28 February 2012), decision 1/CMP.8, [1, 4], annex I. As of October 2013, 
the amendment was yet to enter into force: UNFCCC, Doha Amendment 
<http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php>. The decision to adopt a second 
commitment period was made earlier at CMP 7, Durban: UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its Seventh Session: Addendum 
(Part 2), UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1 (15 March 2012), decision 1/CMP.7, [1, 3]. 
124 This commitment was made at COP 17, Durban, December 2011: UNFCCC, Report of the Conference 
of the Parties on its Seventeenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (15 March 
2012), decision 1/CP.17, [4]. 
125 Australian Constitution s 61. The Australian Executive's power to enter into treaties is considered to 
be absolute: Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 303 (Dawson J). See generally, George 
Winterton, 'Limits to the Use of the "Treaty Power"' in Philip Alston and Madeline Chiam (eds), Treaty-
Making and Australia: Globalisation Versus Sovereignty (Federation Press, 1995) 29. 
126 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
(entered into force 27 January 1980) art 6 ('VCLT').  
127 Indeed, states consistently reinforce the importance of sovereignty in treaty-making, as evidenced, 
for example, by the UNFCCC preamble, which refers to 'the principle of sovereignty of [s]tates in 
international cooperation to address climate change'. 
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First, a treaty negotiated in a fraudulent, corrupt or coercive fashion would be invalid, 
as clearly recognised by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).128 
Second, a treaty which conflicts with a norm of jus cogens, that is, a fundamental or 
peremptory norm of international law, will be void.129 Third, limitations may arise if a 
treaty permits the making of reservations as reservations may not, for example, 
conflict with a treaty's object and purpose.130 This latter issue is yet to arise in the 
climate context as the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol both disallow the making of 
reservations.131  
 
Fourth, international law may impose a general duty to cooperate on states.132 The 
duty of cooperation is regarded by many scholars as a binding principle of customary 
international law on environmental matters, although its exact requirements are 
unclear.133 This appears to be a fairly minimal obligation, however, which, as will be 
seen, was easily exceeded by the Rudd government's active and generally cooperative 
approach to the climate negotiations.  
 
                                                     
 
128 VCLT arts 49, 50, 51, 52. 
129 Ibid art 53. A treaty will also become void if a new peremptory norm emerges to which that treaty is 
in conflict: art 64. Of relevance to this thesis, the International Law Commission's  Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility (1980) – which some commentators believe list the major jus cogens norms – refers to 'a 
serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and 
preservation of the human environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere 
or of the seas': art 19(3)(d). However, the jus cogens status of a such a norm, generally prohibiting or 
preventing environmental damage that threatens the international community as a whole, is yet to be 
widely accepted: see, eg, International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law:  
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ILC, 58th Session, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006) 188-89 ('Fragmentation of International Law'). See also Eva M Kornicker 
Uhlmann, 'State Community Interests, Jus Cogens and Protection of the Global Environment: Developing 
Criteria for Peremptory Norms' (1998) 11 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 101, 
135.   
130 VCLT art 19.  
131 UNFCCC art 24; Kyoto Protocol art 26. 
132 See generally Alan E Boyle, ‘Principle of Cooperation: The Environment’ in Vaughan Lowe and Colin 
Warbrick (eds), United Nations and the Principles of International Law (Routledge, London 1994) 120. 
The 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration proclaims the existence of a general duty to cooperate under 
the UN Charter 'in the various spheres of international relations' to, inter alia, 'promote the general 
welfare of nations': Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2625 (XXV), UN 
GAOR, 25th Session, Supp 28, UN Doc A/RES/2625(XXV) (24 October 1970) annex, 123. 
133 See, eg, Sands, above n 20, 232, 242-43, 249, 250, 251; Donald K Anton et al, International 
Environmental Law: Cases, Materials, Problems (LexisNexis, 2007) 686; David Hunter, James Salzman 
and Durwood Zaelke, International Environmental Law and Policy (3rd ed, Foundation Press, 2007) 525. 
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Fifth, Parties to a treaty may have overlapping and coexisting legal obligations under a 
variety of treaty regimes, the implications of which can be quite complex. Rather than 
developing one unified body of international law, states have developed a range of 
'self-contained regimes',134 for example, climate change and international human 
rights law. States have not made clear how obligations under different regimes 
interact.135 However, states should be mindful that the subject matter of a new treaty 
should be consistent with other international norms, unless the new regime is seeking 
to supersede rules under another regime.136 Notably the UNFCCC Preamble itself 
refers to a range of legal principles and instruments which the Parties regard as 
relevant to that treaty.137 
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine whether the Rudd government's 
negotiating positions were consistent with all relevant aspects of international law, for 
example, its general obligation to protect human rights under various treaties,138 or 
emerging areas of law such as the 'right to a healthy environment'139 and the rights of 
                                                     
 
134 See Fragmentation of International Law, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), 65.  
135 According to the rule of pacta sunt servanda, treaties are binding on states Parties and must be 
performed in good faith: VCLT art 26. This means that prima facie a state must comply with its 
obligations under all treaties. Although see discussion of lex specialis in Fragmentation of International 
Law, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), 34-64. 
136 The rule of lex specialis suggests that specific rules will displace more general obligations: see 
Fragmentation of International Law, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), 34-35. 
137 The Preamble 'recalls' a range of customary law norms, treaties and soft law instruments that are 
relevant to the climate change issue including, for example, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of 
the Ozone Layer; the Montréal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; the 1972 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment ('Stockholm Declaration'); the 
Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference; and several UN General Assembly 
resolutions. 
138 For example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 
1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force in 3 
January 1976). See, eg, Alan E Boyle, 'The Role of International Human Rights Law in the Protection of 
the Environment' in Alan E Boyle and Michael R Anderson (eds), Human Rights Approaches to 
Environmental Protection (Clarendon Press, 1996) 43; Siobhan McInerney-Lankford, 'Climate Change 
and Human Rights: An Introduction to Legal Issues' (2009) 33 Harvard Environmental Law Review 431; 
UN OHCHR, Report of the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/10/61 (15 January 2009); 
Owen Cordes-Holland, 'The Sinking of the Strait: The Implications of Climate Change for Torres Strait 
Islanders' Human Rights Protected by the ICCPR' (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of International Law 405. 
139 See, eg, Sumudu Atapattu, 'The Right to a Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted? The Emergence of 
a Human Right to a Healthy Environment under International Law' (2002) 16 Tulane Environmental Law 
Journal 67; Fatma Ksentini, Human Rights and the Environment: Final Report, UN ESCOR, 46th sess, UN 
Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (6 July 1994).  
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other species.140 However, some overlapping areas of international law were directly 
raised by the Parties and thus are commented upon in later chapters (see chapters 5 
and 8). 
  
Finally, it should be noted that in conducting their negotiations, Parties ought to 
interpret their existing obligations under the UNFCCC and subsequent agreements 
consistently with standard approaches to treaty interpretation, the chief principles of 
which are outlined by the VCLT. The primary rule of interpretation is that: 'a treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose'.141 
D Implications for GIC 
Chapter 1 highlighted that there are many characteristics or attributes of state 
behaviour that have been associated with GIC, both by the main proponent of the 
concept, Gareth Evans, and various scholars. This thesis accepts the broad relevance of 
the attributes highlighted in chapter 1 and that many are potentially useful when 
assessing the performance of a state in relation to the development of new 
international law (the primary focus of this thesis). For example, whether a state has 
displayed attributes such as activism, restraint on the pursuit of narrow self-interest, 
and a commitment to 'purposes beyond ourselves', all appear to be reasonable, and 
ethically appealing, means of distinguishing 'good' from lesser forms of conduct in an 
international treaty negotiation.  
 
However, while these general attributes of GIC receive consideration in subsequent 
chapters, the thesis emphasises that assessing GIC is always ultimately context 
dependent. This thesis argues that given that a clear legal framework existed to guide 
the post-2012 climate negotiations, in this context, the dominant duty of an aspiring 
GIC was to act consistently with this framework. For example, a GIC would be expected 
to put forward or support proposals that were guided by principles such as common 
                                                     
 
140 See, eg, Alexander Gillespie, International Environmental Law, Policy, and Ethics (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) ch 11. 
141 VCLT art 31.1. See further arts 31.2(a)(b), 31.3(a)-(c) and 32(a)(b)). 
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but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities or the precautionary 
principle, as relevant to the issue. 
 
There may be instances where acting consistently with an existing legal framework in 
negotiating a new treaty would not necessarily be a useful means of assessing GIC. This 
may be because established rules or principles may not enjoy widespread support 
among the international community, either because they are regarded as unethical, 
unfit for purpose, outdated or inadequate in some other way. Similarly, if Parties are 
negotiating a treaty on an emerging area of law, established law is unlikely to 
incorporate the types of ethical concerns that are relevant to that field. Existing law 
may also be of a more technical nature, and thus provide little guidance regarding 
what constitutes ethical conduct. 
 
In this instance, however, there are strong reasons to argue that in negotiating the 
post-2012 agreement, complying with or respecting the established principles and 
provisions of ICCL (especially the UNFCCC) was essential for states who wished to 
distinguish themselves as GICs. This is because the international community largely 
settled which ethical principles ought to guide its activities on climate change in the 
terms of the UNFCCC – stipulating, for example, that Parties should act consistently 
with the notion of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities. Further, the terms of the UNFCCC, including those which reflect ethical 
concerns, still enjoy the widespread support of the international community, with the 
treaty being ratified by over 190 Parties and being re-endorsed on a regular basis in 
subsequent instruments such as the Kyoto Protocol and BAP. While the ethical 
principles that ought to govern behaviour on climate change are always open to 
debate, and indeed, continue to evolve (as will be seen in the later examination of 
Parties' key negotiating positions) the ICCL regime clearly provided a solid ethical (and 
legal) guide as to how 'good' states would behave in negotiating a post-2012 
agreement.  
 
This thesis also focuses on compliance with the existing legal framework when 
assessing the Rudd government's engagement with the post-2012 negotiations, as it 
was seen in chapter 1 that compliance with international law is generally seen to be an 
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essential quality of GIC. Of course, the expectation that international law will be 
complied with is stronger where such law has a binding character. Yet it is clear that 
unless Parties who have endorsed the UNFCCC (and related instruments) respect the 
terms of their agreements – even those elements which are non-binding – then the 
legitimacy of the ICCL regime, and its ability to help address climate change, will be 
diminished. This in turn can only serve to erode the value and moral authority of 
international law, and its role in helping to address global problems. Moreover, it 
should be remembered that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates 
that all treaties are binding upon states Parties and must be performed in good faith 
(the rule of pacta sunt servanda).142 This rule logically only applies to the elements of 
treaties which establish hard rather than soft obligations. Nonetheless, it highlights 
that even non-binding principles and provisions contained in treaties possess some 
kind of legal character, and arguably a particular moral authority, precisely because 
they are included in a treaty. Similarly, non-binding principles and provisions contained 
in 'decisions' such as the BAP possess a type of legal character, and arguably a 
particular moral authority, precisely because they are made under a treaty. 
 
Some may of course regard a state's failure to implement its soft law commitments as 
a relatively minor 'breach' of international law (or not a breach at all) and one that 
should not disqualify a state from being regarded as a GIC (a view implied in Pert's 
proposition that minor or technical violations of international law may not suffice to 
diminish a state's standing as a GIC – see chapter 1).143 However, for reasons explained 
above, this thesis would reject such a view, at least in relation to the more crucial soft 
law elements of the ICCL regime, such as the article 3 UNFCCC principles. Notably, the 
notion of leadership (a key attribute of GIC according to Evans), also suggests that a 
GIC would generally seek to adhere to all the terms of its treaty commitments (and 
related instruments such as decisions), even those that are technically non-binding. 
                                                     
 
142 VCLT art 26. 
143 Notwithstanding that many of the legal provisions described in this chapter, and later in the thesis, 
are included in a treaty (a binding instrument of international law), much of the UNFCCC's content 
clearly has a non-binding or 'soft' rather than 'hard' character. As noted by Shelton, the line between 
hard law and soft law (or 'law' and 'non-law') in international law is often blurred, with many treaty 
mechanisms, especially in fields such as international environmental law, including 'soft' obligations: see 
Dinah Shelton, Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal 
System (Oxford University Press, 2003) 10-11. 
 110 
Finally it should be noted that this thesis prefers to focus on the Rudd government's 
compliance with the relevant legal framework in negotiating a new agreement, rather 
than the general attributes of GIC associated with Evans, as it regards the principles 
and provisions of the ICCL regime (and broader international law, where relevant) as 
possessing greater moral authority or importance than principles or norms which have 
not been similarly endorsed by the international community in instruments of 
international law. This means, for example, that this thesis places more emphasis on 
whether or not a Party has acted in accordance with its common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities in reducing GHG emissions, than whether it 
has acted consistently with non-legal principles associated with GIC such as 'purposes 
beyond ourselves'. 
 
Interestingly, the notion of leadership (which was strongly associated with GIC by 
Evans) is specifically endorsed by the UNFCCC in relation to the activities of developed 
countries. This means that the notion of leadership is both a general attribute of GIC 
and a legal principle. For this author its express inclusion in the UNFCCC means that it 
has a higher importance, in the context of the ICCL regime, than other general GIC 
attributes which are not explicitly referred to by the UNFCCC or related instruments.  
 
At this point it should be noted that while this thesis may appear to be chiefly 
concerned with whether the Rudd government made a positive contribution to the 
development of new ICCL (the first phase of the international legal process identified 
in chapter 1), it can be seen from the above discussion that its primary concern is in 
fact whether it engaged in this phase in a manner that was consistent with the 
established legal principles and provisions of the ICCL regime (and thus heavily 
concerns the third phase of the international legal process – compliance – described in 
chapter 1). However, given that much of this legal framework did not represent 
binding law, it would be inaccurate to suggest that this thesis generally aims to assess 
whether the government complied with its legal obligations in developing new ICCL. 
Rather, its focus is generally on whether Australia complied with various legal 
expectations (although on a small number of occasions, questions regarding the 
government's compliance with binding, or potentially binding, norms of international 
law, also arise). 
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Note also that chapter 7, which chiefly concerns the Rudd government's attempt to 
legislate an emissions trading scheme, is conceptually more concerned with the 
compliance, rather than development, phase of international law. However, in this 
case, the government's policy approach also had ramifications for the shape of a post-
2012 agreement, and thus also conceptually relates to the development phase. 
 
While choosing to focus on the legal aspects of the Rudd government's engagement 
with the climate negotiations, this thesis recognises that GIC is a multi-faceted concept 
and considers that it would be overly narrow to ignore the numerous general 
attributes associated with GIC by Evans in its analysis. Therefore, while subsequent 
chapters of the thesis primarily examine the Rudd government's performance as an 
international citizen through the lens of the relevant legal framework, each chapter 
also comments on other GIC attributes highlighted in chapter 1 (that is, in addition to 
the attributes of compliance with international law and leadership). This ensures that 
the thesis provides a holistic analysis of the GIC question. Because of the large number 
of attributes associated with GIC, individual chapters do not mechanically assess the 
Rudd government's activities against every GIC characteristic identified in chapter 1, 
instead restricting comment to those that appeared to be particularly relevant to the 
subject matter. However, the conclusion to the thesis also comments more broadly on 
the relevance of the various GIC attributes highlighted in chapter 1, to ensure that 
these receive due consideration. 
 
To conclude this chapter, this thesis contends that the primary obligation of a GIC in 
negotiating the post-2012 agreement was to comply with or respect the legal 
framework provided by the ICCL regime (and, as relevant, broader international law), 
notwithstanding the fact that much of this framework possessed a non-binding 
character. Because of the varied nature of issues assessed by this thesis, each chapter 
adopts a slightly different structure in assessing whether the Rudd government met 
the standard of GIC, especially chapter 7 due to its focus on domestic emission 
reduction measures. However, in broad terms, each chapter takes the following 
approach. 
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First, each chapter outlines the basic legal and (where necessary) policy background to 
the issue. Second, the negotiating positions of Australia and other Parties are 
examined and the evidence supporting their approaches assessed. This helps to 
elucidate the issues that Parties saw as important, the legal principles and provisions 
that were particularly important for a GIC to respect, and the broader factual matrix 
that was relevant to assessing whether the Rudd government acted consistently with 
the range of GIC attributes articulated by Evans. Third, each chapter considers the 
implications of the Rudd government's approach for its credentials as a GIC, primarily 
by assessing its compliance with the relevant legal framework. This is supplemented by 
discussion of whether its activities were consistent with other GIC attributes identified 
to have relevance to the issue, based on the subject matter of each chapter. Comment 
on whether the government's approach made a positive contribution to the 
development of ICCL (which chapter 1 identified as an overarching concern in relation 
to the development phase of international law) is deferred until the conclusion to the 
thesis, allowing the government's activities to be considered as a whole in answering 
this question.  
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CHAPTER 5. ESTABLISHING A LONG-TERM TARGET TO AVOID 
DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE 
  
'Ambitious global emission goals are in Australia's national interest'. Australia, Submission to 
the UNFCCC, 2009. 1  
 
This thesis now turns to examining the Rudd government's engagement with five key 
topics in the post-2012 climate negotiations relating to mitigation. The topics selected 
were all judged to be particularly crucial to assessing the Rudd government's 
performance as a 'good international citizen' (GIC) on the mitigation issue. This chapter 
assesses the first of these topics, namely, the Rudd government's position on a long-
term goal for reducing global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  
 
As explained in chapter 4, this thesis argues that in order for the Rudd government to 
meet the standard of GIC in its engagement with the post-2012 climate negotiations, it 
was particularly important that it put forward or support proposals that complied with 
or respected relevant terms of the international climate change law (ICCL) regime (and 
where applicable, broader international law). This chapter therefore begins its analysis 
with a brief overview of the key ÌCCL principles and provisions underpinning the 
negotiations on this issue. It then provides a detailed examination of Australia and 
other Parties' negotiating positions (including the legal and ethical norms and 
principles they believed were relevant to this issue), as well as the evidence supporting 
their preferred approaches. The chapter then provides an assessment of the 
government's GIC credentials. The analysis is primarily concerned with whether the 
Rudd government's position was consistent with the relevant legal framework, 
especially as outlined by the ICCL regime. However, consideration is also given to 
whether the government's approach was consistent with a range of broader GIC 
                                                     
 
1 Australia, 'Australia's National Ambition' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in 
Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 3, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.1/Add.3 (26 March 
2009) 3, 3. 
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attributes (identified in chapter 1) which appeared to have particular relevance to this 
issue. 
A Legal Background 
As outlined in chapter 4, the post-2012 climate negotiations were conducted under 
two negotiating 'tracks', namely, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) and the Ad Hoc Working Group to Consider 
Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). 
Although relevant to both AWGs, negotiating a long-term mitigation goal for a post-
2012 agreement was primarily the task of the AWG-LCA, as mandated by the Bali 
Action Plan (BAP).2  
 
The BAP, an important part of the legal framework underpinning the negotiations, 
called for Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)3 to consider a long-term global mitigation goal as part of their discussions on 
a 'shared vision for long-term cooperative action'.4 Specifically, the BAP called upon 
Parties to address 'a long-term global goal for emission reductions, to achieve the 
ultimate objective of the Convention, in accordance with the provisions and principles 
of the Convention'.5  
 
The 'ultimate objective' of the UNFCCC, to which the BAP referred, is provided in 
article 2 UNFCCC, namely: the 'stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system'.6 This is often simply referred to as the objective of avoiding 
'dangerous climate change'. The Convention does not quantitatively establish what 
constitutes 'dangerous' – as opposed to 'safe' or 'moderate' – interference with the 
climate system. The only guidance provided is that the atmospheric stabilisation of 
                                                     
 
2 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008), decision 1/CP.13, [1(a)] ('COP 13 Report'). 
3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1771 
UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994) ('UNFCCC'). 
4 COP 13 Report, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008), decision 1/CP.13, [1(a)]. 
5 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
6 The 'climate system' is defined as 'the totality of the atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere and 
geosphere and their interactions': ibid art 1.3. 
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GHGs 'should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt 
naturally to climate change'7 and to 'ensure that food production is not threatened' 
(article 2). A potential qualifier is that any timeframe should 'enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner'.  
 
It is evident from the above that the central obligation of a GIC regarding these 
negotiations was to put forward or support proposals that would enable Parties to 
achieve the objective of avoiding dangerous climate change. Additionally, in proposing 
targets, a GIC needed to take into account other relevant provisions and principles of 
the Convention. These are outlined in the overview of Parties' negotiating positions 
below, rather than in this section, as the relevant provisions and principles were all 
highlighted in Parties' official submissions on this issue. 
B Key Negotiating Positions: Content and Evidence  
Negotiations on a long-term mitigation goal were initially influenced by the findings of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC AR4), 
released in 2007 in the lead up to the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP 13) in Bali, 
December 2007.8 The IPCC did not specifically recommend what was necessary to 
prevent dangerous climate change (and thus achieve the ultimate objective of the 
UNFCCC), this being beyond its ambit as a non-prescriptive advisory body.9 However, 
the GHG stabilisation scenarios it outlined provided an influential starting point for the 
post-2012 negotiations. The most ambitious scenario modelled by the IPCC indicated 
that if global warming was to be limited to 2 to 2.4°C above pre-industrial levels, 
                                                     
 
7 'Climate change' is defined by the UNFCCC as a 'change of climate which is attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in 
addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods': ibid art 1.2. 
8 See Core Writing Team, Rajendra K Pachauri and Andy Reisinger (eds), Climate Change 2007: Synthesis 
Report (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2008); COP 13 Report, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, decision 1/CP.13, chapeau. Parties including the EU sought to directly refer to 
the AR4's long-term stabilisation scenarios in the BAP but this was opposed by others including the US, 
Canada, Japan and Russia (arguing that this would be overly prescriptive regarding the final post-2012 
outcome). As a compromise, the IPCC's work on stabilisation scenarios was referred to in a footnote: see 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(354) (3-15 
December 2008) 15. Parties to the Kyoto Protocol referenced the AR4's work more directly in its 
'conclusions' at CMP 3 with the strong support of the Rudd government: see UNFCCC, Report of the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol on its 
Resumed Fourth Session, UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5 (5 February 2008) 5. 
9 See IPCC, History <http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml#.UHvGNW_Mg4I>. 
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atmospheric emissions would need to be stabilised at 445-490 parts per million carbon 
dioxide-equivalent (ppm CO2-e).10 Achieving this scenario would likely require global 
CO2 emissions to peak by 2015 and be reduced by 50 to 85 per cent by 2050 (below 
2000 emission levels).11  
 
Parties widely recognised the importance of establishing a long-term mitigation goal. 
This included the Rudd government who emphasised that it was central to 'guiding our 
collective efforts'.12 The negotiations on a long-term mitigation goal chiefly addressed 
the four metrics adopted by the IPCC, namely: a threshold for global average 
temperature rise; a GHG stabilisation level; a 2050 emission reduction target; and a 
peak year for global emissions. The Copenhagen Accord, the key outcome of COP 15,13 
only reached agreement on the first of these metrics.  
1 What is a 'Safe' Threshold for Global Temperature Rise  
a) Party Views 
By the time of COP 15/CMP 5 in Copenhagen (December 2009), more than 100 
countries had backed the goal of limiting global temperature rise to no more than 
2°C,14 the target ultimately endorsed by the Copenhagen Accord.15 This included the 
world's major GHG emitters and most influential nations, both in the developed and 
developing world, among them, the United States (US), the European Union (EU), the 
                                                     
 
10 Sujata Gupta et al, 'Policies, Instruments and Co-operative Arrangements' in B Metz et al (eds), 
Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change (Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth 
Assessment Report) (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 776. Equivalent to 350-400 ppm CO2 only and 
assuming a temporary 'overshoot' of emissions. Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 were 379 ppm in 
2005. CO2-e levels (including aerosols) were 375 ppm: Core Writing Team, Pachauri and Reisinger, 
above n 8, 67. GHGs differ in their influence on global warming. CO2-e measures the amount of CO2 
emissions that would cause the same degree of warming as a given mix of CO2 and other GHGs: 36. 
11  Core Writing Team, Pachauri and Reisinger, above n 8, 67. These estimates do not fully account for 
the potential for carbon feedbacks, or contributions to sea level rise from factors other than thermal 
expansion – namely, melting ice sheets, glaciers and ice caps.  
12 Australia, 'Initial Views on a Long-Term Global Goal for Emission Reductions' in UNFCCC, Views 
Regarding the Work Programme of the AWG-LCA: Addendum 2, UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.1/Add.2 (18 March 2008) 5, 7. 
13 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010), decision 2/CP.15 ('COP 15 Report'). 
14 Malte Meinshausen et al, 'Greenhouse-Gas Emission Targets for Limiting Global Warming to 2°C' 
(2009) 458 Nature 1158, 1158.  
15 COP 15 Report, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010), decision 2/CP.15, [1, 2]. 
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BASIC developing countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), as well as the 
Umbrella Group of countries – including Australia.16 
 
The EU, the major proponent of the 2°C goal, first advocated this target as far back as 
1996.17 The EU's view was that a 2°C goal was consistent with article 2 of the 
Convention in that it would avoid 'dangerous climate change while allowing for 
sustained economic welfare, safeguarding the environment, ensuring that food 
production is not threatened and strengthening climate resilience'.18 It further argued 
that the 2°C goal was consistent with 'the science' – which most Parties accepted was 
crucial to decision-making in this area – and the aim of avoiding 'dangerous climate 
change impacts in particular for the most vulnerable countries, regions, and people.'19 
The Rudd government and its Umbrella Group partners held a similar view, also 
suggesting that the 2°C goal was consistent with 'the scientific view'.20  
 
Notwithstanding the broad level of support for the 2°C goal, it was controversial with 
many smaller developing countries who considered themselves to be particularly 
                                                     
 
16 See MEF, Declaration of the Leaders of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, First 
Leaders Meeting, L'Aquila, 9 July 2009 <http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/past-meetings/the-first-
leaders-meeting.html>; G8, Leaders Declaration: Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future, G8 
Summit, L'Aquila, 8 July 2009, [65] 
<http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/G8_Declaration_08_07_09_final%2c0.pdf>; 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(449) (8 
December 2009) 2; Australian High Commission Ottawa, 'Copenhagen Climate Summit – Umbrella 
Group Statement' (Media Release, 16 December 2009) 
<http://www.canada.embassy.gov.au/otwa/MR09DEC16.html>; European Community, 'A Shared Vision 
for Long-Term Cooperative Action' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 
1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 1, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.1 (14 November 2008) 
4, 4. 
17 European Community, Climate Change: Council Conclusions 8518/96 (1996). For an overview of how 
the 2°C target emerged see, eg, Carlo Jaeger and Julia Jaeger, 'Three Views of Two Degrees' (2011) 11 
Regional Environmental Change 16. 
18 European Community, 'A Shared Vision for Long-Term Cooperative Action', above n 16, 4. 
19 Ibid 4, 6.  
20 See Australian High Commission Ottawa, above n 16.  
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vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.21 In particular, this included members of 
the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)22 and the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs).23 AOSIS argued as early as COP 13 in Bali that the 2°C goal was insufficient to 
protect its members.24 It suggested that a range of objectives and principles (both legal 
and non-legal) ought to guide Parties' considerations, among them, several of the 
UNFCCC's article 3 'principles'; various norms and principles of general international 
law and international environmental law; and various ethical or harm-based 
considerations.  
 
Specifically, AOSIS argued that any long-term goal needed to: 
 reflect 'the best available scientific assessment';25  
 respect the precautionary principle (article 3.3 UNFCCC);26 
                                                     
 
21 Note that early on some major emitting developing countries also rejected the 2°C target for a variety 
of reasons. China, for example, initially opposed any discussion of a long-term goal until Annex I 
countries had first agreed to a new collective mitigation target under the Kyoto Protocol: see China, 
'China's Views on Enabling the Full, Effective and Sustained Implementation of the Convention through 
Long-Term Cooperative Action Now, Up to and Beyond 2012' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on 
Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan, UN Doc  FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5 (28 
September 2008) 33, 33; International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, vol 12(394) (12 December 2008) 2.  
22 Member states: Antigua and Barbuda; Bahamas; Barbados; Belize; Cape Verde; Comoros; Cook 
Islands; Cuba; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Fiji; Federated States of Micronesia; Grenada; Guinea-
Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Jamaica; Kiribati; Maldives; Marshall Islands; Mauritius; Nauru; Niue; Palau; Papua 
New Guinea; Samoa; Singapore; Seychelles; Sao Tome and Principe; Solomon Islands; St. Kitts and Nevis; 
St. Lucia; St Vincent and the Grenadines; Suriname; Timor-Leste; Tonga; Trinidad and Tobago; Tuvalu; 
Vanuatu. Observer states: American Samoa; Netherlands Antilles; Guam; US Virgin Islands: AOSIS, 
Members <http://aosis.org/members/>.  
23 These include: Africa (Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, 
São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Zambia; Asia and the Pacific (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Kiribati, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, 
Vanuatu, Yemen; Latin America and the Caribbean (Haiti): UN-OHRLLS, About LDCs 
<http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/>.  
24 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(344) (4 
December 2008) 1. 
25 AOSIS, 'Shared Vision' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the 
Bali Action Plan: Addendum 2 (Part 1), UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.2 (Part 1) (2 December 
2008) 40, 46.  
26 Ibid. Article 3.3 UNFCCC states that 'Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent 
or minimise the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing such measures.' However, policies and measures should also be 'cost-effective so as to 
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost'. This principle is widely adopted within international 
environmental legal instruments, see, eg, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in UN, 
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 respect the principle of prevention;27  
 ensure developing countries' sustainable development (article 3.4 UNFCCC);28  
 respect the principle of intergenerational equity – the need to protect the 
global climate for both present and future generations (art 3.1 UNFCCC);29 
 respect the principle of state responsibility – that states have the responsibility 
not to cause trans-boundary environmental harm;30  
 respect the sovereignty and 'right to survival' of all countries31 (or the 'right to 
existence');32 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 
(Vol. I) (12 August 1992) annex I, principle 15 ('Rio Declaration').  
27 AOSIS, Declaration on Climate Change, New York, 21 September 2009, 
<http://www.forumsec.org.fj/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/AOSIS%20Political%20Declar
ation,%2021%20September%202009.pdf>. The principle of prevention provides that states should take 
action to prevent damage to the environment and reduce, limit or control activities which might cause 
or risk such damage: see Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 246-47. The principle is reflected, directly or indirectly, in a range of 
international instruments: see, eg, Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, in UN, Report of 
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN Doc A/CONF.48/14 (1972) 3-5 
('Stockholm Declaration'); Rio Declaration, annex I. 
28 AOSIS, 'Shared Vision', above n 25, 42. Article 3.4 UNFCCC provides that Parties 'have a right to, and 
should, promote sustainable development'. The term 'sustainable development' is not defined by the 
UNFCCC. The most commonly cited definition is that of the 1987 'Brundtland Report', namely: 
'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs': World Commission on Environment and Development, Our 
Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) ch 2, [1] 
<http://conspect.nl/pdf/Our_Common_Future-Brundtland_Report_1987.pdf>. 
29 AOSIS, 'Shared Vision', above n 25, 43. 
30 Ibid 42-43. This principle is reflected in the UNFCCC Preamble which recognises that states have 'the 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental 
policies' but also 'the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction'. 
The principle is also stated in principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and principle 2 of the Rio 
Declaration. The principle (sometimes described as a norm or rule) is regarded as a binding obligation 
under customary international law: Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) 
[1996] ICJ Rep 226; Sands, above n 27, 232.  
31 AOSIS, 'Shared Vision', above n 25, 47. 
32 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(399) (31 
March 2009) 1. 
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 ensure that critical physical, environmental, social and economic thresholds for 
small island developing states (SIDS)33 and other vulnerable countries were not 
breached;34 and 
 avoid further negative climate change impacts on SIDS.35  
 
AOSIS argued strongly that the 2°C target failed to address these criteria. It stated that 
2°C warming would have 'devastating consequences' for SIDS due to various projected 
impacts including 'sea level rise, coral bleaching, coastal erosion, changing 
precipitation patterns, increased incidence and re-emergence of climate related 
diseases and the impacts of increasingly frequent and severe weather events.'36 It 
regarded these climate-related impacts as 'urgent social, economic and survival 
threats' to AOSIS countries, threatening their 'sustainable development, territorial 
integrity and continued existence as viable dynamic communities.'37  
 
The Maldives (an AOSIS member, SIDS and LDC) similarly argued that their 'survival' 
was 'non-negotiable' and insisted that 'no poor or vulnerable community … be left 
behind'.38 The Maldives regarded climate change as 'an existential threat' to it and 
other SIDS and 'to the wellbeing of vulnerable communities worldwide'.39 It thus urged 
                                                     
 
33 SIDS include: Antigua and Barbuda; Bahamas; Bahrain; Barbados; Belize; Cape Verde; Comoros*; 
Cuba; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Fiji; Grenada; Guinea-Bissau *; Guyana; Haiti*; Jamaica; Kiribati*; 
Maldives*; Marshall Islands; Mauritius; Federated States of Micronesia; Nauru; Palau; Papua New 
Guinea; Samoa*; São Tomé and Príncipe*; St Kitts and Nevis; St Lucia; St Vincent and the Grenadines; 
Seychelles; Singapore; Solomon Islands*; Suriname; Timor-Leste*; Tonga; Trinidad and Tobago; Tuvalu*; 
Vanuatu*. SIDS also include 14 UN members/Associate Members of the Regional Commissions: 
American Samoa; Anguilla; Aruba; Bitish Virgin Islands; Commonwealth of Northern Marianas; Cook 
Islands; French Polynesia; Guam; Montserrat; Netherlands Antilles; New Caledonia; Niue; Puerto Rico; 
US Virgin Islands. *Also LDCs: UN-OHRLLS, Small Island Developing States: Country Profiles 
<http://www.unohrlls.org/en/sids/44/>. 
34 AOSIS, 'Shared Vision', above n 25, 46. 
35 Ibid 41, 48. See also, eg, Philippines, 'Proposed Mitigation Actions' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on 
Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 2, UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.1/Add.2 (20 March 2009) 11, 11. 
36 AOSIS, 'Shared Vision', above n 25, 46. 
37 Ibid 41. 
38 Maldives, 'A Shared Vision and Global Goal' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in 
Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Part 2, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part 2) (23 April 2009) 
11, 11. 
39 Ibid. 
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Parties to ensure that the post-2012 agreement guaranteed 'the territorial integrity, 
habitability and ultimately the existence of all States'.40 
 
Rejecting the 2°C target, AOSIS called for Parties to limit temperature rise to 'well 
below' 1.5°C,41 adopting the mantra of '1.5 to stay alive'.42 This more ambitious target 
was supported by the LDCs,43 as well as several developing Central and South 
American countries.44 
 
In supporting a 1.5°C goal, the Maldives also argued that the Parties had a legal 
obligation to reduce emissions to levels 'consistent with the full enjoyment of human 
rights'.45 It strongly urged that the post-2012 outcome not 'adversely impact upon 
human rights.'46 In making this case, the Maldives referred to several resolutions of the 
UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) that were issued during the COP 13 – COP 15 
negotiating period.47 In resolution 7/23 (2008), the UNHRC recognised that 'climate 
change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to people and communities 
around the world and has implications for the full enjoyment of human rights',48 and 
requested that the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights conduct a study on the 
                                                     
 
40 Ibid. 
41 AOSIS, 'Shared Vision', above n 25, 46. 
42 AOSIS, 'Small Island States Welcome Growing Support for 1.5°C Climate Target' (Media Release, 11 
September 2009) 
43 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(394) (12 
December 2008) 1. 
44 See Uruguay, 'Shared Vision' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of 
the Bali Action Plan: Part 2, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part 2) (24 April 2009) 117, 117; Costa 
Rica and Panama, 'Draft Negotiating Text on Shared Vision' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements 
Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Part 1, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part 1) 
(23 April 2009) 81, 81; Ecuador, 'Fulfilment of the Bali Action Plan and Components of the Agreed 
Outcome' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: 
Part 1, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part 1) (25 April 2009) 94, 94; Panama, Paraguay and El 
Salvador, 'Proposing Text for Six Different Sections: Preamble, Shared Vision, Mitigation, Adaptation, 
Technology, Finance, REDD' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of 
the Bali Action Plan: Part 2, FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part 2) (28 April 2009) 60, 60.  
45 Maldives, 'A Shared Vision and Global Goal', above n 38, 11. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 UN Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Climate Change, HRC Res 7/23, 7th sess, 41st mtg, UN 
Doc A/HRC/RES/7/23 (28 March 2008) chapeau.  
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relationship between climate change and human rights.49 Based on the findings of this 
report,50 a further UNHRC resolution (10/4, 2009) recognised that: 
climate change-related impacts have a range of implications, both direct and indirect, 
for the effective enjoyment of human rights including, inter alia, the right to life, the 
right to adequate food, the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the right 
to adequate housing, the right to self-determination and human rights obligations 
related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation.51  
It also recalled that 'in no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence'.52 
 
While most Parties' concerns regarding the temperature target were expressed in 
anthropocentric terms – focusing on the deleterious impacts of climate change for 
human welfare – Bolivia also drew attention to the negative implications of 2°C 
warming for non-human species. Concerned about the likely impact of even 1.5°C 
warming, Bolivia proposed the most ambitious goal of limiting warming to no more 
than 1°C,53 as well as a Universal Declaration of Mother Earth's Rights – to be included 
in the BAP's 'shared vision' – that would acknowledge 'the rights of Mother Earth and 
all of its beings'.54  
 b) 2°C and the Negotiation of the Copenhagen Accord 
As noted in chapter 4, Parties to the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol originally intended to 
complete their negotiations under the Bali Roadmap at COP 15/CMP 5 in 
                                                     
 
49 Ibid.  
50 See UN OHCHR, Report of the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/10/61 (15 January 2009) [20, 
21-42]. The report found that global warming potentially had implications for the full range of human 
rights protected under various human rights treaties and declarations including the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities; the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women; the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Declaration on the Right to Development. 
51 UN Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Climate Change, HRC Res 10/4, 10th sess, 41st mtg, UN 
Doc A/HRC/RES/10/4 (25 March 2009) chapeau. 
52 Ibid. 
53 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(459) (7-19 
December 2009) 16. 
54 Bolivia, 'Shared Vision and for COP Decision [Number 1]' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements 
Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.6 (11 September 
2009) 10, 10.  
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Copenhagen.55 At this point it is necessary to outline the basics of the 'Copenhagen 
Accord',56 the key outcome of the Copenhagen conference. Parties were under 
significant global pressure to 'seal the deal' at Copenhagen, which was given the 
unofficial title of 'Hopenhagen' by its Danish hosts. 115 world leaders attended the 
joint COP/CMP high-level segment from 16-18 December 2009, while more than 40 
000 people from government, non-governmental organisations, inter-governmental 
organisations, media, and other organisations applied for accreditation at the 
Conference.57  
 
Despite intense negotiations taking place both prior to and at Copenhagen, Parties 
failed to deliver the binding legal outcome desired by many Parties. With major 
differences still dividing Parties on key issues, the lengthy draft decisions presented by 
the AWG-LCA to the COP on 16 December were too incomplete to provide the basis of 
a new agreement.58 As a result, informal negotiations took place in a select 28 member 
group of Parties – including Australia, the major economies and representatives of 
regional groups –59 who negotiated the Copenhagen Accord. The Accord was then 
presented to COP 15's closing plenary, with the intention that it would be adopted as a 
COP decision, most likely as a step toward a more comprehensive legal outcome (such 
as a Protocol). The agreement was strongly opposed, however, by several Parties 
                                                     
 
55 UNFCCC, Bali Climate Change Conference – December 2007 
<http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php>; COP 13 Report, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 
decision 1/CP.13, [1]; UNFCCC, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex 
I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol on its Resumed Fourth Session, FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5 (5 February 
2008) annex I. 
56 COP 15 Report, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010), decision 2/CP.15. 
57 See generally International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 
12(459) (7-19 December 2009) 1. For background on the negotiation of the Accord see, eg, Alina 
Averchenkova, The Outcomes of Copenhagen: the Negotiations and the Accord (UNDP, 2010); Daniel 
Bodansky, 'The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem' (2010) 104 American Journal of 
International Law 230. Note that the author of this thesis was an accredited observer at COP 15/CMP 5. 
58 See UNFCCC, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention on its Eighth Session, FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/17 (5 February 2010); UNFCCC, Work Undertaken 
by the Conference of the Parties at its Fifteenth Session on the Basis of the Report of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, FCCC/CP/2010/2 (11 February 2010).  
59 Parties reportedly included Algeria, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Colombia, Denmark, Ethiopia 
(on behalf of the African Union), the EU (represented by Sweden), France, Gabon, Germany, Grenada 
(on behalf of AOSIS), India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Lesotho (for the LDCs), Maldives, 
Mexico, Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia (for the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries), South 
Africa, Spain, Sudan (for the G77), the United Kingdom, and the US: Bodansky, above n 57, 234; Lavanya 
Rajamani, 'The Making and Unmaking of the Copenhagen Accord' (2010) 59 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 824, 825. 
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including Bolivia, Sudan, Venezuela and Nicaragua, both due to its substance and the 
unorthodox manner in which it had been negotiated.60  
 
To break the deadlock, a compromise was brokered, with the COP agreeing to 'take 
note' of the Copenhagen Accord and establish a procedure by which Parties could 
register their support for it.61 This meant that the Accord had no official status under 
the Convention and thus only represented a political agreement.62 While not officially 
adopted by the Parties, the Accord nonetheless represented a significant step in the 
post-2012 negotiations, with Parties reaching a political consensus on important 
elements of a post-2012 agreement. 114 Parties signed the Accord at COP 15, 
including Australia,63 a figure which subsequently rose to 141 Parties.64 Highlighting 
the importance of the Accord, many of its features were later endorsed by the Parties 
(with the exception of Bolivia) in a formal decision at COP 16 in Cancun (December 
2010), as part of the 'Cancun Agreements'.65 Of most relevance to this chapter, the 
                                                     
 
60 See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(459) (7-19 
December 2009) 28-29. Typically, negotiations are open to all Parties. 
61 Ibid; COP 15 Report, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010), decision 2/CP.15. 
62 See, eg, Rajamani, 'The Making and Unmaking of the Copenhagen Accord', above n 59, 828-29; 
UNFCCC, 'Notification to Parties: Clarification Relating to the Notification of 18 January 2010' (25 
January 2010) 
<http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/notifications/application/pdf/100125_noti_clarification.
pdf>. 
63 COP 15 Report, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010), decision 2/CP.15. The following 
114 Parties were listed as agreeing to the Accord at COP 15: Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Austria, 
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, 
Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, European Union, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, 
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Lao, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, San 
Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Swaziland, Switzerland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of 
Tanzania, US, Uruguay and Zambia.  
64 A further 26 Parties agreed to the Accord after COP 15: Afghanistan, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Barbados, Belize, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Comores, Gambia, Guinea-
Bissau, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Saint Lucia, Tajikistan, 
Timor-Leste, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine and Viet Nam: UNFCCC, Copenhagen Accord 
<http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/items/5262.php>. 
65 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (15 March 2011), decision 1/CP.16, [4] ('COP 16 Report'). 
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Copenhagen Accord endorsed the 2°C target. Specifically, it recognised 'the scientific 
view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius' in 
order to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention.66  
 
During COP 15's closing plenary, Sudan condemned the Accord, stating that it 
threatened the lives and livelihoods of millions of people in developing countries, 
including the African continent,67 and labelled it 'a suicide note for Africa'.68 Many 
nations who opposed the 2°C goal, however, ultimately signed the Accord, including 
AOSIS members and LDCs. Indeed, during the closing plenary of COP 15, 
representatives of AOSIS, the LDCs, the African Group and the African Group all urged 
other Parties to adopt the Accord.69 This may suggest that the 2°C target ultimately 
enjoyed the widespread support of the Parties. This was far from being the case, 
however, with the Accord's endorsement of the 2°C goal reflecting a range of factors.  
 
First, Parties backing the 1.5°C target, with the strong support of France, won a 
concession in the Accord to consider strengthening the long-term goal, potentially to 
1.5°C, as part of a future review process of the Accord's implementation.70 Thus, the 
LDCs saw the Accord as a document that could be improved in the future.71 Second, 
the Accord included a substantial commitment by developed countries to help finance 
developing countries' climate change-related needs (such as urgent adaptation 
assistance), namely, US$30 billion by 2010-12 and US$100 billion by 2020.72 Tuvalu, 
who refused to sign the Accord, regarded this financing offer as a bribe, stating that 
'our future is not for sale'.73 Other developing countries, however, appeared to judge 
                                                     
 
66 COP 15 Report, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010), decision 2/CP.15, [1]. 
67 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(459) (7-19 
December 2009) 8. 
68 Ibid 28. 
69 Ibid 8, 28-29. 
70 To be completed by 2015: COP 15 Report, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010), decision 
2/CP.15, [12]; International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 
12(459) (7-19 December 2009) 8. This commitment was later reaffirmed in the Cancun agreements: COP 
16 Report, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (15 March 2011), decision 1/CP.16, [4]. 
71 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(459) (7-19 
December 2009) 8. 
72 COP 15 Report, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010), decision 2/CP.15, [8]. 
73 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(459) (7-19 
December 2009) 8. 
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that this offer of substantial financing was too good to refuse. Third, the endorsement 
of the 2°C target by many vulnerable countries simply reflected these Parties' lack of 
political clout vis-a-vis the developed countries and the major developing economies. 
In other words, they had little choice but to compromise on the issue. 
  
At this point the Rudd government's diplomatic efforts regarding the 2°C goal should 
be briefly highlighted. During the critical closing days of COP 15, Australian negotiators 
reportedly pressured many small nations, particularly in the Pacific, to drop the 1.5°C 
goal. According to Tuvalu's Prime Minister, Apisai Ielemia, Australia encouraged SIDS 
to drop the 1.5°C target in return for adaptation funding.74 Ielemia stated that he 
personally received calls from the Australian delegation, including Prime Minister 
Rudd's advisers, urging him to drop the 1.5°C target, to which Ielemia responded, 'I 
won't move anywhere else … I'm going to keep up the fight.'75 For its efforts, Australia 
received the Climate Action Network International's infamous 'fossil of the day award' 
on 17 December 2009.76  
c) Assessing the Evidence  
Assessing whether the 2°C target was consistent with the objective of avoiding 
dangerous climate change is not a straightforward task. As highlighted by the IPCC 
AR4, determining what constitutes 'dangerous' climate change in relation to article 2 
UNFCCC ultimately requires 'value judgments' to be made.77 While a large amount of 
science (the most objective means of resolving this question) has been conducted on 
this issue, the Rudd government noted in its submissions that science could, as yet, 
'provide no single reference point at which a rise in the average global temperature 
would cross a boundary between safe and dangerous.'78 These caveats aside, this 
section examines whether the 2°C target was backed by the science, as the 
government claimed. In highlighting this evidence, it is worth noting that the UNFCCC 
                                                     
 
74 Simon Butler, 'Australia's Dirty Role at Copenhagen', Green Left, 16 January 2010 
<http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/43033>. 
75 ABC, 'Rudd Leans on Tuvalu over Warming Limit' ABC (online), 17 December 2009 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/12/17/2774571.htm?site=news>. 
76 See Climate Action Network Australia, The Lowdown: Copenhagen COP 15 <http://cana.net.au/public-
access/lowdown-copenhagen-cop-15>. 
77 Core Writing Team, Pachauri and Reisinger, above n 8, 64. 
78 Australia, 'Initial Views on a Long-Term Global Goal for Emission Reductions', above n 12, 5. 
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emphasises the importance of science to decision-making on climate change. The 
Preamble, for example, recognises that the 'steps required to understand and address 
climate change will be … most effective if they are based on relevant scientific, 
technical and economic considerations'. Similarly, article 4.2(d) UNFCCC stipulates that 
in reviewing the adequacy of the Annex I Parties' voluntary mitigation commitment 
under articles 4.2(a)(b), Parties 'shall' consider the 'best available scientific information 
and assessment on climate change and its impacts' (as well as relevant technical, social 
and economic information). As such, the Convention establishes a clear legal 
expectation that Parties will be guided by the science, including in determining what 
represents dangerous climate change, and what is necessary to avoid it. The 
government's claim that its preferred long-term goals were consistent with the science 
also indicated that it accepted the importance of science in answering these questions. 
i) The IPCC's 'Reasons for Concern' 
To help inform the question of what constitutes dangerous climate change, the IPCC 
identified 'key vulnerabilities' for human and environmental systems that are sensitive 
to climate change. These include food supply, infrastructure, health, water resources, 
coastal systems, ecosystems, global biogeochemical cycles, ice sheets and modes of 
oceanic and atmospheric circulation.79 The IPCC's Third Assessment Report (AR3) 
synthesised this information on climate risks and key vulnerabilities, in order to 
identify the major 'reasons for concern'. These were determined to include: 
 risks to unique and threatened systems – such as coral reefs, tropical glaciers, 
endangered species, unique ecosystems, biodiversity hotspots, and small island 
states;  
 the risk of extreme weather events – such as an increase in the frequency, 
intensity, or consequences of heat waves, floods, droughts, wildfires and 
tropical cyclones; 
 the distribution of impacts – with some regions, countries, and populations 
(and subgroups such as the poor or elderly) likely to face greater harm from 
climate change than others (while some may actually benefit). The most 
vulnerable regions were identified as the Arctic, Africa (home to many LDCs), 
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small islands states (which includes many AOSIS nations), and the Asian and 
African mega-deltas; 
 the aggregate impacts of climate change – such as monetary damages, lives 
affected, lives lost from impacts such as coastal flooding, increased 
malnutrition and health impacts; and 
 the risk of large-scale discontinuities or 'tipping points' – such as the partial or 
complete loss of the Greenland ice sheet, the breakup of the West Antarctic Ice 
Sheet, or the reduction or collapse of the North Atlantic Meridional 
Overturning Circulation. The occurrence of such events could be accompanied 
by very large and effectively irreversible impacts.80 
 
The AR3's 'burning embers' diagram highlighted the IPCC's reasons for concern in 
graphic form. An updated version of this graph was published by its authors, Smith et 
al, in 2009 (see Figure 1).81  
 
 
                                                     
 
80 As summarised in ibid 64-65. 
81 See Joel Smith et al, 'Assessing Dangerous Climate Change through an Update of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) "Reasons for Concern"' (2009) 106 PNAS 4133.  
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Figure 1.  IPCC Third Assessment Report 'Reasons for Concern' and Update. The green line 
represents 2°C warming above pre-industrial levels. Global temperature was about 0.6°C above 
pre-industrial levels in 1990.  
 
White regions indicate neutral to low impacts or risks; yellow regions indicate negative impacts 
for some systems or more significant risks; and red regions indicate substantial negative 
impacts or risks that are more widespread and/or severe. The assessment did not account for 
proactive adaptation measures that may reduce vulnerability.82 
 
The most serious reasons for concern were the risk to unique and threatened systems 
and the risk of extreme weather events. Increased risks were expected with 
temperature rise of between 1.6 to 2.6°C.83 In March 2009, the International Alliance 
of Research Universities (IARU) held a conference in Copenhagen, attended by about 
2500 researchers, to provide an authoritative update of climate science to inform the 
climate negotiations.84 Based on the findings by Smith et al, the IARU report made a 
blunt assessment of the '2°C guardrail', stating that it was 'now inadequate to avoid 
                                                     
 
82 Ibid 4135. 
83 Ibid. Figures are converted from 1990 levels. 
84 See Katherine Richardson et al, Synthesis Report from Climate Change: Global Risk, Challenges and 
Decisions (2nd ed, University of Copenhagen, 2009). 
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serious risks to many unique and threatened ecosystems, and to avoid a large increase 
in the risks associated with extreme weather events'.85 The risk of tipping points 
occurring were now also considered to be 'moderate' with 2°C of warming,86 with a 
major concern being the possibility of 4 to 6 metres of sea level rise due to the melting 
of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets.87 Overall, the IARU's view was that the 
2°C target carried 'significant risks of deleterious impacts for society and the 
environment'.88 A 2009 report funded by Australia's Department of Climate Change 
similarly interpreted Smith et al's findings as showing that 'smaller increases in global 
mean temperature lead to significant potential impacts on human well-being, 
effectively lowering the temperature level for what might be considered dangerous 
climate change.'89  
 
A number of reports have made more specific findings in relation to several of the 
IPCC's reasons for concern. These are briefly highlighted below. 
ii) The Risk to Unique and Threatened Systems: Biodiversity and Ecosystems 
Several reports have highlighted the risk to biodiversity and ecosystems globally with 
warming at or below 2°C. According to the 2009 report of the Second Ad Hoc Technical 
Expert Group on Biodiversity and Climate Change (the 'Expert Group on Biodiversity 
and Climate Change'), commissioned by Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD),90 some species and ecosystems were already experiencing negative 
impacts as a result of climate change.91 6 to 8 per cent of species assessed to date 
were estimated to be at higher risk of extinction from current temperature rise (about 
0.8°C), and a further 5 to 7 per cent from the additional 0.5°C of temperature rise 
                                                     
 
85 Ibid 16. 
86 Ibid. 
87 See Smith, above n 81, 4136. Scientists had 'medium confidence' that temperature rise of between 
1.6 to 4°C could cause at least partial deglaciation of the Greenland ice sheet, and possibly the West 
Antarctic ice sheet, over a period ranging from centuries to millennia, causing associated sea level rise. 
Other risks included the disappearance of Arctic summer sea ice, drying of the Asian monsoon, and loss 
of water storage capacity in Himalayan glaciers. 
88 Richardson, above n 84, 16.  
89 Will Steffen, Climate Change 2009: Faster Change and More Serious Risks (Department of Climate 
Change, 2009) 31. 
90 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into 
force 29 December 1993) ('CBD'). 
91 CBD Secretariat, Connecting Biodiversity and Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation: Report of the 
Second Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Biodiversity and Climate Change (2009) 18. 
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expected as a result of GHGs already released into the atmosphere.92 The risk of 
extinction was much higher above 2°C warming (potentially affecting 20 to 30 per cent 
of species),93 but as noted by the IARU, capping warming at 2°C would only lessen the 
magnitude of biodiversity extinction due to climate change, not eliminate it.94 A 2009 
report commissioned by the Australian government similarly concluded that a 1.5°C to 
2°C temperature rise would 'likely lead to a massive loss of biodiversity worldwide'.95  
 
Negative impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems were also expected within Australia. 
The Garnaut Climate Change Review (Garnaut Review – commissioned by the Rudd 
Labor Opposition and the Australian states in 2007) reported that about 7 per cent of 
species in Australia would be at risk of extinction with 2°C warming.96 A particular 
concern was the likely impact of global warming on the World Heritage listed Great 
Barrier Reef which had already experienced a 14 per cent decline of coral calcification 
since 1990 due to increased CO2 levels and ocean warming.97 According to the Garnaut 
Review, mass bleaching of the reef could become twice as likely with 2°C temperature 
rise.98  
 
The Expert Group on Biodiversity and Climate Change further reported that 
biodiversity loss would likely have a range of impacts globally for human communities 
such as livelihood impacts for coastal communities dependent on coral reefs and 
marine and freshwater species.99 Certain population groups were likely to be more 
significantly affected than others including the poor – especially in developing 
                                                     
 
92 Ibid 20. 
93 Smith, above n 81, 4135; Core Writing Team, Pachauri and Reisinger, above n 8, 65. 
94 Richardson, above n 84, 13.  
95 Will Steffen et al, Australia's Biodiversity and Climate Change: A Strategic Assessment of the 
Vulnerability of Australia's Biodiversity to Climate Change (Summary for Policy Makers) (Department of 
Climate Change, 2009) 12. 
96 Ross Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
87, 102. The Garnaut Review was commissioned to provide independent advice to government on the 
implications of climate change for Australia and on appropriate policy responses. See further discussion 
of its recommendations below and in subsequent chapters, especially chapter 7.  
97 See Steffen, Climate Change 2009: Faster Change and More Serious Risks, above n 89, 23. Oceans are 
becoming increasingly acidic due to increasing CO2 levels in the oceans which impacts calcifying 
organisms such as corals, sea urchins, oysters, mussels, crustaceans and some forms of plankton: Smith, 
above n 81, 4136. 
98 Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report, above n 96, 127-128.  
99 CBD Secretariat, above n 91, 21.  
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countries – due to their greater reliance on biodiversity and ecosystem goods and 
services to meet their basic needs (food, fibre, energy, clean water, healthy soils, 
pollinators, natural medicine, etc).100 Indigenous peoples were also likely to be more 
acutely affected for the above reasons, as well as due to the importance of biodiversity 
for traditional knowledge and cultural life.101 Among states, SIDS and LDCs were the 
most likely to be negatively impacted.102  
iii) Extreme Weather Events 
As noted, the risk of more frequent extreme weather events occurring was a key 
concern of AOSIS and the LDCs. A number of reports expressed serious concerns about 
the ability of the 2°C target to limit this risk. In 2009, Smith et al reported that it was 
'more likely than not' that anthropogenic GHGs were already contributing to global 
increases in heat waves, intense precipitation events, and the intensity of tropical 
cyclones.103 The IARU also reported that current temperature rise was already causing 
an increasing number of extreme weather events, resulting in a growing toll of deaths 
and injuries from climate-related natural disasters.104 Droughts and drying attributable 
to climate change were also leading to social instability, food insecurity and long-term 
health problems in some regions as peoples' livelihoods were damaged or 
destroyed.105 At only 1.6°C of warming, Smith et al reported that increased droughts, 
heat waves, and floods were projected in many regions with consequent impacts such 
as increased water stress, wildfire frequency, flood risk, and negative health effects.106 
The IPCC AR4 also reported that warming of less than 2°C could have impacts such as 
reduced crop productivity at lower latitudes, increasing the risk of hunger.107 
Reductions in water supplies could also impact up to 1.7 billion people with less than 
1.6°C warming.108  
                                                     
 
100 Ibid 22, 64. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid 22.  
103 Smith, above n 81, 4135. 
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106 Smith, above n 81, 4136. 
107 Core Writing Team, Pachauri and Reisinger, above n 8, 48. Although global food production overall 
was projected to increase with local average temperature rises of 1.5 to 3.5°C. 
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iv) The Uneven Distribution of Impacts 
Regarding the distribution of impacts, the EU Climate Change Expert Group reported in 
2008 that 'serious regional impacts' were already occurring as a result of climate 
change in highly vulnerable areas such as parts of Africa, Asia and SIDS in the Pacific 
and the Caribbean,109 appearing to confirm the concerns expressed by AOSIS and the 
LDCs.  SIDS, in particular, were expected to be increasingly impacted by the direct and 
indirect effects of sea-level rise, even with warming below 2°C.110 A key concern for 
SIDS was the AR4's finding that 2°C warming could lead to sea level rise of 0.4 to 1.4 
metres and that this could be much higher as a result of poorly understood factors 
such as 'carbon feedbacks'.111 This was a significant issue for low-lying nations such as 
Tuvalu which could become uninhabitable with only 20 to 40 cm of sea level rise.112 
Commenting on the regional impacts for Australia, the Garnaut Review also 
highlighted that 2°C warming could see the displacement of people in the South 
Pacific,113 who would likely turn to Australia for assistance with resettlement. The 
UNHRC also reported that while the implications of climate change were global, the 
effects would be felt most acutely by those segments of the population that were 
already in vulnerable situations owing to factors such as geography, poverty, gender, 
age, indigenous or minority status and disability.114 
d) Was the 2°C Target Consistent with the Scientific View?  
The evidence reviewed above needs to be interpreted with caution, as predictions 
about what climate impacts may occur with certain levels of warming are not 
foolproof. Well before COP 15, however, much expert opinion appeared to have 
turned against the view that 2°C represented a 'safe' level of warming. IPCC Chair, 
Rajendra Pachauri, for example, urged Parties at COP 14 in Poznan (December 2008), 
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to consider whether limiting temperature rise to 2°C was sufficient.115 One of the 
world's most respected climate scientists, James Hansen, of the NASA Goddard Space 
Institute, also concluded as early as 2005 that more than 1.7°C warming 'would likely' 
constitute dangerous interference with the climate.116 Hansen strengthened this view 
in 2009 stating that even 1.7°C warming represented a 'disaster scenario'.117 By the 
time of COP 15 many leading scientists (such as those contributing to the IARU science 
update) had explicitly cast doubt on whether 2°C represented a safe target, despite its 
popularity with many Parties.118 Notably, the Rudd government itself acknowledged 
that 2°C warming could cause 'widespread global impacts that would alter in severity 
from region to region.'119 The government also accepted that negative impacts of 
climate change were 'already evident' as a result of existing temperature rise and that 
projections indicated that impacts would 'become increasingly severe' as the global 
average temperature rose.120 The key proponent of the 2°C goal, the EU, also accepted 
that negative impacts of climate change were 'already evident and widespread, in 
particular in vulnerable regions of the world, and … [were] increasingly posing a risk to 
ecosystems, food production, the attainment of sustainable development and of the 
Millennium Development Goals as well as to human health and security.'121  
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While it seems clear that some impacts associated with climate change are 
unavoidable, and may not be significant enough to warrant being classified as 
'dangerous', it is highly questionable whether the 2°C goal was supported by the 
science as claimed by the Rudd government. In particular, the associated risk of more 
frequent extreme weather events and sea level rise suggests that this level of warming 
could indeed constitute a dangerous level of climate change for the most vulnerable 
countries. Further analysis of whether the 2°C goal was consistent with the objective of 
avoiding dangerous climate is provided at section C, after first examining the other 
long-term metrics considered by the Parties. 
2 GHG Concentration Goal 
a) Party Views 
The second key metric discussed in relation to a long-term goal was that of an 
atmospheric GHG stabilisation goal. This metric was the key focus of the Rudd 
government who argued that GHGs ought to be stabilised at 450 ppm CO2-e or lower. 
Indicating the strength of the government's desire to see this target adopted, this was 
the only long-term metric included by the government in its proposed post-2012 
framework agreement,122 and was included in the domestic Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme Bill, the government's major legislation to reduce Australian 
emissions.123 The upper end of the government's 5 to 25 per cent national emission 
reduction commitment was also made conditional upon a post-2012 outcome being 
consistent with a 450 ppm CO2-e or lower agreement.124 The government stated that 
the 450 ppm CO2-e goal 'would reduce the risks associated with severe climate 
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change' and be 'consistent' with the aim of keeping warming below 2°C.125 In adopting 
this target, the government was influenced by the Garnaut Review, stating that it 
accepted its recommendation that a 'fair and effective agreement' aimed at stabilising 
GHG concentrations at around 450 ppm CO2-e or lower 'would be in Australia's 
interests.'126  
 
A number of Parties supporting the 2°C threshold also expressed support for the 450 
ppm CO2-e goal, among them New Zealand,127 Indonesia128 and the EU.129 However, 
several Central American Parties (Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama), as 
well as the Caribbean nation of the Dominican Republic, stated that a more ambitious 
400ppm CO2-e target was necessary to achieve the 2°C goal.130 Meanwhile AOSIS 
argued that a 450 ppm CO2-e target would see all AOSIS countries 'challenged to 
survive and provide a livelihood for their population.'131 AOSIS instead called for 
atmospheric emissions to be stabilised 'well below' 350 ppm CO2-e in order to achieve 
its preferred temperature threshold of 1.5°C or below.132 This position was supported 
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by the LDCs,133 as well as Uruguay,134 Panama and Costa Rica,135 Ecuador,136 Paraguay 
and El Salvador.137 
b) Assessing the Evidence 
During the pre-industrial era, atmospheric concentrations of CO2 were about 280 
ppm.138 Primarily due to the burning of fossil fuels by human societies in order to 
produce energy, atmospheric CO2 levels – the most significant GHG for global warming 
–139 rose to about 386 ppm in 2009140 and continue to rise by about 2 ppm each 
year.141 As of 2009, the concentration of all atmospheric GHGs was approximately 465 
ppm CO2-e,142 already above Australia's preferred goal. Adjusted to account for the 
temporary cooling effect of aerosols, however, CO2-e concentrations were 
approximately 396 ppm.143 
  
As noted, the Rudd government referred to the Garnaut Review when justifying its 
preferred 450 ppm CO2-e goal which had concluded that this target was in Australia's 
'long-term interests.144 Critically, however, the Review acknowledged that the 450 goal 
only offered a 50 per cent chance of actually keeping warming below 2°C,145 a finding 
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later confirmed in the 2009 IARU report.146 The study by Hare and Meinshausen, from 
which this figure was derived, found that a more ambitious stabilisation target was 
actually needed to provide good odds of limiting warming to 2°C. The 400 ppm CO2-e 
target, called for by Nicaragua and others, reduced the odds of exceeding 2°C to about 
25 per cent (or 'unlikely').147 Meanwhile, the 350 ppm CO2-e target, promoted by 
AOSIS and the LDCs, reduced the risk of exceeding 2°C to less than 10 per cent.148 In 
Meinshausen and Hares' view, a 400 ppm CO2-e stabilisation target provided 
'reasonable certainty' that global warming would be restricted to 2°C,149 however, only 
the 350 ppm CO2-e target provided a 'high probability' of doing so (90 per cent).150 In a 
separate study, Meinshausen reported that the 350 ppm CO2-e target was also 'very 
likely' (greater than 90 per cent) to keep warming below 1.5°C in the long-term, while 
the 400 ppm CO2-e target provided a 'medium likelihood' (33 to 66 per cent) of doing 
so.151 Notably, then IPCC chair, Pachauri, expressed his personal conviction that the 
world needed to move towards a 350 target.152 
 
There is much uncertainty in this type of climate modelling, particularly due a lack of 
precise understanding of how sensitive the Earth's temperature is to increasing GHG 
concentrations.153 Given such uncertainty, Meinhausen and Hare called for a 
precautionary approach to be adopted, consistent with the precautionary principle, a 
key principle of the UNFCCC (article 3.3).154 As will be discussed further in section C, 
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this thesis argues that respecting the legal principles and provisions of the Convention 
(including the precautionary principle) was particularly important to the Rudd 
government's credentials as a GIC. While the government stated that a 450 ppm CO2-e 
goal was consistent with the aim of limiting warming to 2°C,  Parties such as Micronesia 
justifiably argued that this claim was inaccurate.155 Of course, while the precautionary 
principle does not dictate precisely what would constitute a precautionary approach – 
for example, adopting a target with 66, 75 or 90 per cent odds of achieving the desired 
temperature threshold – logic clearly indicates that a target would need to provide 
more than a fifty-fifty chance. A common analogy adopted to illustrate this point is 
that a person would be unlikely to fly in an aeroplane if he or she knew that it had 
even odds of crashing. 
 
The Rudd government's preferred stabilisation target of 450 ppm CO2-e thus appeared 
to be at odds with the precautionary principle, simply on the basis that it did not enjoy 
even reasonable odds of achieving its intended aim. Furthermore, this target only 
aimed to limit warming to 2°C, which as found above, did not appear to represent a 
safe level of global warming for the most vulnerable countries.  
3 2050 Emission Reduction Target and Peak Year for Global Emissions 
The other metrics considered by Parties for inclusion in a post-2012 agreement were a 
2050 global GHG emission reduction target and a peak year for global emissions, 
neither of which were ultimately agreed to by the Copenhagen Accord. The only 
statement made by the Accord in this regard was that Parties should cooperate to 
achieve a peak in their 'national emissions as soon as possible',156 although the time 
frame for developing countries would be longer due to equity considerations.157 
a) 2050 Target 
Most Parties supporting the 2°C temperature threshold proposed that global GHG 
emissions should be at least halved by 2050. Confusing the matter, however, Parties 
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expressed this aim with various base years or no base year, impacting its stringency. 
Proposed base years (from most to least stringent) included 1990 (the EU and 
Madagascar); 158 2000 (Australia);159 and 2005 (Canada).160 The G8 countries backed 
the goal of halving emissions by 2050 but failed to nominate a base year.161 Stronger 
emission cuts to achieve the 2°C goal were proposed by Nicaragua, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Panama and the Dominican Republic (71 to 81 per cent below 1990 
levels)162 and Norway (more than 85 per cent below 1990 levels).163 AOSIS also 
supported an 85 per cent reduction below 1990 levels in order to achieve its preferred 
1.5°C/350 ppm CO2-e goal.164  
 
As highlighted earlier, the IPCC AR4 reported that in order to achieve a 445-490 ppm 
CO2-e stabilisation scenario, global CO2 emissions would need to be reduced by 50 to 
85 per cent by 2050 (below 2000 levels).165 The Rudd government's goal of reducing 
emissions by 50 per cent (below 2000 levels), which had again been proposed by the 
Garnaut Review,166 was thus broadly consistent with the IPCC scenario, albeit sitting at 
the bottom end. Several later reports issued in 2008 and 2009, however, found that a 
50 per cent reduction needed to occur in relation to a 1990 base year, not 2000.167 This 
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implied that Australia's target was insufficient – as greater cuts from 2000 levels would 
be required to achieve an equivalent reduction from 1990 levels.168 The EU Climate 
Change Expert Group also reported that a 50 per cent reduction target from 1990 
levels only provided a 50 per cent chance of achieving the 2°C target (as with the 450 
ppm CO2-e goal).169 According to a 2009 study by Schaeffer and Hare, emissions would 
need to be reduced by at least 80 per cent by 2050 (from 1990 levels) to provide a 75 
per cent or greater chance of limiting warming to below 2°C.170 As with the GHG 
stabilisation models, these estimates need to be treated with care, as they depended 
on various assumptions and uncertainties, such as the speed at which emissions could 
be reduced post-2050. Notwithstanding this, the above studies clearly indicate that the 
Rudd government's preferred 2050 target was, again, inconsistent with a 
precautionary approach. A further weakness was that its preferred 2050 emission 
target only aimed to limit warming to 2°C. 
b) Proposed Year for Global Emissions to Peak 
Various peak years for global GHG emissions were proposed by the Parties. In relation 
to a 2°C goal, preferred years included: 2013 (Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Panama and the Dominican Republic);171 2015 (Norway);172 2020 (Australia,173 the 
EU,174 Canada,175 and Madagascar);176 and 2025 (Japan).177 The US argued that there 
were 'multiple emission pathways' to reach 450 ppm CO2-e,178 indicating a reluctance 
to support any specific year. Believing that the 'window of opportunity for preventing 
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runaway climate change' was small, AOSIS argued that emissions needed to peak by 
2015 in order to achieve its preferred 1.5°C goal.179  
 
The IPCC AR4 referred to a 2015 peak year in relation to a 445-490 ppm CO2-e 
stabilisation scenario.180 Thus, on its face, the Rudd government's proposed peak year 
of 2020 appeared to be inconsistent with the science. However, the IARU and EU 
Climate Change Expert Group reports both indicated that 2020 was the absolute latest 
that emissions could peak if ambitious climate goals were to remain within reach.181 
Thus, while Australia's proposed 2020 peak year lay at the outer bounds of what the 
science suggested was necessary, it was not without a scientific basis. It was, however, 
clearly less consistent with the precautionary principle. The target assumed that 
emissions could be reduced by 5 per cent or more per annum after 2020 – as against 
historic GHG growth rates of 2 per cent – in order to retain a reasonable chance of 
achieving the 2°C182 or 1.5°C goal.183 This rate of emissions reduction represented the 
absolute limit, however, of what was regarded as feasible from an economic and 
technological perspective.184 Given the significant turnaround required from historic 
growth rates, arguably a 2015 peak year represented the more sensible, precautionary 
target, allowing Parties to reduce emissions at slightly less optimistic rates. 
4 Broader Considerations: Technological, Economic and Political Feasibility  
Judged from an ideal or optimum standpoint, the Rudd government's preferred long-
term goals appeared to fall short of what was necessary to avoid dangerous climate 
change for all Parties. A major flaw was that the government's preferred targets were 
not sufficiently precautionary, being rather optimistic about their chances of achieving 
their intended aims. Having said this, it needs to be appreciated that the government's 
thinking on a long-term goal, while informed by the science,185 needed to factor in 
other considerations. Specifically, the government referred to the importance of 
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'[s]ocial and economic conditions' and 'the availability of affordable low emissions 
technologies.'186 These were valid considerations as the long-term goal clearly needed 
to be technically, economically and politically achievable if it was to serve more than 
just a symbolic purpose. As noted earlier, the UNFCCC specifically acknowledges that 
technical and economic considerations are relevant concerns for Parties (conversely, 
no mention is made of political considerations). 
a) Technical Feasibility 
The IPCC was confident that the stabilisation scenarios it assessed (445 ppm CO2-e and 
higher) were technically attainable with the deployment of a portfolio of technologies 
that were currently available or were expected to be commercialised in the coming 
decades.187 This was dependent upon governments providing significant incentives for 
the development, acquisition, deployment and diffusion of technologies, and 
addressing various other barriers to commercialisation.188 Achieving more ambitious 
stabilisation goals (such as 350 ppm CO2-e or 400 ppm CO2-e) would of course be even 
more technically challenging. 
 
Regarding a temperature threshold, the IARU reported that  limiting temperature rise 
to lower than 2°C would be 'very difficult' due to the fact that temperature rise was 
already about 0.8°C above pre-industrial levels, and GHGs were still increasing.189 As a 
result of GHGs already emitted into the atmosphere (and the inertia of the climate 
system), global temperature rise of about 1.4°C above pre-industrial levels was already 
inevitable.190  
 
Highlighting the immensity of the challenge, studies have shown that achieving 
ambitious emission reduction scenarios will likely require emissions to be reduced to 
near zero in the long-term and negative emissions growth may even be necessary.191 
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From a technical perspective, this appears to be possible if a range of strategies are 
employed such as reforestation, direct CO2 capture from the air, and the use of 
bioenergy and carbon capture and storage in power plants.192 If technical and 
social/economic barriers are too great, geo-engineering of the climate may also be 
possible – in which humanity would deliberately manipulate global-scale climate 
processes to achieve planetary cooling –193 although this is undoubtedly an option of 
last resort.194  
 
A further technical problem is that the more ambitious stabilisation scenarios, even 
Australia's preferred 450 CO2-e goal, assume that emissions can temporarily and safely 
'overshoot' their eventual level.195 It is not certain, however, that overshooting 
approaches will actually be effective196 although Meinhausen and others assume that 
due to the inertia of the climate system (the time lag between the output of emissions 
into the atmosphere and when temperature levels rise), such strategies are technically 
feasible.197 
b) Economic Feasibility 
The next question is whether ambitious long-term targets are economically feasible. 
This is a subjective question, as the notion of feasibility depends upon the level of 
economic cost individual societies and the global community as a whole are prepared 
to accept in order to avoid dangerous climate change. Economic studies, however, 
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have tended to show that the costs would not be unrealistically high, especially with 
policies in place such as global and domestic emission trading systems (ETS).  
 
By way of example, the Garnaut Review modelled the cost to the Australian economy 
of imposing mitigation policy (chiefly through an ETS), as well as the economic benefits 
of avoiding climate change. The lowest scenario modelled was 450 ppm CO2-e/2.1°C. 
'Standard', 'enhanced' (more rapid technological progress) and 'backstop' 
(atmospheric sequestration or recycling of CO2) technology pathways were 
modelled.198 The Review estimated gross costs of mitigation for Australia of about 2.5 
per cent of GDP by 2050. The net mitigation costs by 2100 (economic costs minus the 
measurable market benefits of avoided climate change) were estimated at 4 per cent 
of GDP. 199 While this figure may sound large, the annual cost to GDP would average 
just 0.05 percent. Garnaut did not assess the costs of lower stabilisation scenarios, but 
the very minor cost associated with the 450 ppm CO2-e target suggests that more 
ambitious mitigation scenarios were also likely to be economically feasible. 
 
Various studies have modelled the global costs of mitigation, although again generally 
at less ambitious levels than sought by AOSIS and the LDCs. The IPCC AR4 reported that 
445-535 ppm CO2-e stabilisation scenarios would involve global average 
macroeconomic costs of about 3 per cent of global GDP by 2030 and up to 5.5 per cent 
by 2050. This meant slowing average annual global GDP by just 0.12 per cent through 
to 2050.200 As AOSIS pointed out, this minor reduction in global growth would occur in 
the context of continuing average global growth of 3 per cent.201 Health co-benefits 
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from reduced air pollution, which were not factored in by the IPCC, could also offset a 
substantial fraction of mitigation costs.202  
 
In 2009, the Grantham Institute on Climate Change and the Environment reviewed a 
range of modelling efforts, also reporting that mitigation costs were expected to be 
low. While 2°C/450 CO2-e and lower scenarios were expected to be demanding, these 
were judged to be economically feasible with well-designed policies applied 
consistently across countries, industries and GHGs.203 The studies estimated a range of 
costs, but overall indicated that mitigation costs need not be more than a few 
percentage points of GDP. Furthermore, the benefits of avoiding climate change 
impacts were likely to be much greater, making the investment worthwhile.204 Co-
benefits would also result from mitigation efforts, for example, in the form of reduced 
local pollution and increased energy security.205 The highest cost estimate was 5 per 
cent of GDP, but this was in the context of continued global economic growth.206 Other 
studies have found that achieving a 400 ppm CO2-e target could cost as little as 2.5 per 
cent of GDP aggregated to 2100.207 Notably, mitigation costs are likely to be less than 
current global spending by governments on fossil fuel subsidies.208 
 
It has been seen that the precise cost of achieving ambitious mitigation scenarios is 
difficult to ascertain. However, while costs will certainly be involved – and these will be 
higher the more ambitious the stabilisation scenario – the evidence appears to indicate 
that an ambitious 2050 mitigation goal in the range sought by AOSIS and the LDCs is 
not infeasible. 
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c) Political Feasibility 
A further consideration for the Rudd government was the political feasibility of any 
long-term goal. It needs to be appreciated that the more ambitious the goal, the 
greater the mitigation that would be expected of Australia – and thus the greater the 
economic cost. While costs would be involved, however, the Garnaut Review's findings 
above demonstrated that these would be low for Australia under a 450 ppm CO2-e 
scenario (see further discussion of Australian mitigation costs in chapter 6). This 
suggests that greater ambition by Australia was also possible in the context of a 
stronger global agreement, although the Rudd government would certainly have faced 
domestic political difficulties if it had sought to increase its upper target for 2020 
above 25 per cent (see further discussion of the politics of Australia's 5 to 25 per cent 
target in chapter 6).  
 
At the global level, the ambitious scenarios promoted by AOSIS and the LDCs were 
clearly not politically feasible leading up to COP 15, lacking the support of the major 
developed countries, including the US and EU, and the major developing countries 
including BASIC members. Indeed, the Garnaut Review advised the Rudd government 
that only a 550 CO2-e goal was likely to be politically feasible for Copenhagen.209 This 
pessimism proved to be warranted with Parties not agreeing to any C02-e target, and 
the mitigation pledges made in the Copenhagen Accord likely to result in 2 to 5°C 
warming by the end of the century, notwithstanding Parties' commitment to a 2°C 
threshold.210 This arguably gave some credence to the Rudd government's preferred 
targets, as they were at least in the realm of political possibility at COP 15, unlike those 
put forward by AOSIS and the LDCs. The government did not, however, justify its 
position on pragmatic grounds. Rather, its clearly stated view was that its preferred 
long-term goals were in Australia's national interest and consistent with the scientific 
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evidence. Publicly, the government also appeared to express little sympathy for the 
targets put forward by AOSIS and the LDCs.211  
C Implications for GIC 
As noted above, the Convention and the BAP provided broad legal guidance to Parties 
regarding the type of long-term mitigation target that would be necessary in a post-
2012 climate agreement. Although the Convention and BAP did not of course specify 
what the numeric target should be, they made clear that a long-term goal needed to 
be directed toward avoiding dangerous climate change, and also be consistent with 
other provisions and principles of the Convention. As stated earlier, this chapter 
suggests that the key test of the government's credentials as a GIC was whether or not 
it put forward or backed proposals that complied with this legal framework. 
 
While assessing what constitutes dangerous climate change is a complex, value-laden 
question, the Convention provides some guidance. Most directly, article 2 indicates 
that the ultimate objective of the Convention should be achieved in 'a time-frame 
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change' and 'to ensure that 
food production is not threatened' (while also allowing 'economic development to 
proceed in a sustainable manner'). Also relevant are several article 3 principles (as 
highlighted by AOSIS), which make clear that any long-term goal should: 
 give 'full consideration' to 'the specific needs and special circumstances of 
developing country Parties', 'especially those that are particularly vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of climate change', or those that would bear a 
'disproportionate or abnormal burden' (article 3.2);  
 respect all Parties' right to sustainable development (article 3.4); and 
 protect the global climate for both present and future generations (article 3.4). 
 
The precautionary principle (article 3.3), also indicates that Parties should 'take 
precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate 
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change and mitigate its adverse effects' where there are 'threats of serious or 
irreversible damage' and that 'lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing such measures'.  
 
The evidence reviewed by this chapter strongly suggests that Australia's preferred 
long-term targets did not give sufficient consideration to the above provisions of the 
UNFCCC. As compared to the more ambitious targets proposed by AOSIS and the LDCs, 
Australia's targets were likely to result in some ecosystems being unable to naturally 
adapt to climate change, resulting in higher rates of species extinction. Food 
production was also more likely to be threatened, especially in the most vulnerable 
countries. The specific needs of the most vulnerable developing countries also 
appeared to be given insufficient consideration by the Rudd government, with AOSIS 
members and LDCs predicted to experience more frequent and extreme weather 
events and rising sea levels under the targets it backed. Similarly, Australia's preferred 
targets seemed less likely than those proposed by AOSIS and the LDCs to ensure that 
vulnerable developing countries could realise their right to sustainable development – 
with their ongoing economic development likely to be adversely affected by climate 
impacts – or to protect the global climate for future generations. 
 
A particularly obvious deficiency of the Rudd government's preferred targets is that 
they did not appear to be consistent with the precautionary principle. Several 
reputable scientific studies and reports indicated that the 2°C threshold was no longer 
considered capable of preventing many negative climate impacts, for example, 
biodiversity loss and extreme weather events, and of preventing major climate tipping 
points from being crossed. Most problematically, the 450 ppm CO2-e goal and 50 per 
cent reduction target for 2050 only enjoyed a 50 per cent chance of actually limiting 
warming to Australia's favoured 2°C threshold. Similarly, Australia's proposed 2020 
peak year for global emissions appeared to adopt a less than precautionary view about 
the rate at which nations were likely to be able to reduce their emissions in future 
years. By contrast, the targets supported by AOSIS and/or the LDCs (a 1.5°C threshold, 
350 ppm CO2-e stabilisation target, 85 per cent reduction target for 2050 and a 2015 
peak year for emissions) appeared to offer much better odds of avoiding dangerous 
climate impacts for all UNFCCC Parties. 
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It should also be pointed out that, as a developed country, Australia was expected to 
show leadership in addressing climate change, as required by article 3.1 UNFCCC.212 As 
explained in chapters 1 and 4, leadership is also a key general quality associated with 
GIC, however, arguably has even greater moral weight in the context of the ICCL 
regime, due its inclusion in the UNFCCC. Given the insufficient ambition in the targets 
proposed by the Rudd government, it would be difficult to characterise Australia as a 
leader on this issue. While Australia's preferred targets were backed by other nations – 
especially the 2°C goal which enjoyed widespread support – Australia arguably needed 
to lend its weight to the targets proposed by AOSIS and the LDCs in order to show 
genuine leadership by a developed country on this issue. Far from doing so, the Rudd 
government actually pressured AOSIS nations to drop their preferred long-term goals 
in return for adaptation funding. 
 
Leaving aside the specific terms of the UNFCCC, Australia's position also arguably failed 
to properly acknowledge many of the legal considerations highlighted by AOSIS, the 
LDCs, and the Maldives. It is difficult to argue, for example, against the proposition 
that any long-term mitigation goal must respect the right of all sovereign countries to 
survival as well as all countries' legal responsibility under international environmental 
law not to cause trans-boundary environmental harm to other states or to the global 
commons. A further legitimate consideration was the need to prevent climate impacts 
from adversely affecting individuals' enjoyment of human rights protected by 
international law, which appeared to be a greater concern under Australia's targets 
than those proposed by AOSIS and the LDCs. It should be highlighted that – to its 
detriment – the Rudd government actually opposed the LDCs' proposal to recognise 
that climate change would likely have adverse impacts on various human rights (such 
as the right to life, and the right to health) in the official negotiating text.213 This was 
despite Australia being a Party to the major international human rights conventions.214  
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Turning to the broader attributes of GIC identified in chapter 1, the Rudd government's 
approach also appeared to be inconsistent with various attributes articulated by 
Gareth Evans. Aside from the issue of leadership (discussed above), it would be 
difficult to argue that Australia's position was consistent with the notions of promoting 
'purposes beyond ourselves', pursuing Australia's 'enlightened self-interest', or that of 
being a 'good neighbour'. While the Rudd government's behaviour was nowhere near 
as blatantly nationalistic as the earlier Howard government in the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations, the Rudd government's preferred targets clearly fell short of altruistically 
promoting the interests of the most vulnerable countries. Similarly, the government's 
approach arguably did not go far enough in advancing Australia's 'enlightened' self-
interest given that its 450 ppm CO2-e stabilisation target did not actually provide 
strong odds of preventing dangerous climate change for Australia, let alone other 
more vulnerable nations. Instead, the government appeared to preference Australia's 
narrow self-interest, namely a desire to protect Australia's economy in the near-term, 
which could be harmed by more ambitious targets (see further discussion in chapter 
6). Given that AOSIS represented the interests of a number of Australia's regional 
neighbours (Papua New Guinea, East Timor, Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Solomon Islands, 
among others – many of which are LDCs), the government's position also appeared to 
be inconsistent with the notion of acting as a good neighbour, which would imply 
promoting the broader interests of the region, not just those of Australia. 
 
The major defence for the Rudd government's preferred targets, from a GIC 
perspective, was that they undoubtedly reflected a more pragmatic or realistic 
understanding of the level of ambition that was politically feasible at COP 15. Its 
preferred targets were also likely to be more feasible from a technological and 
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economic perspective. Thus it could be argued that the government adopted a 
reasonable balance between what Evans referred to as idealism (namely, achieving an 
optimal climate outcome) and realism (what was likely to be possible). This is in 
contrast to AOSIS and the LDCs' preferred targets which, while better reflecting what 
was necessary to avoid dangerous climate change, would be even more challenging to 
implement from a technological and economic perspective, and politically, were never 
likely to be adopted at Copenhagen (not being supported by the most influential 
nations). Indeed, in one sense it could be argued that the Rudd government's efforts to 
have the 1.5°C goal dropped by some of its proponents was actually a positive move in 
that it helped to ensure consensus around the 2°C target ultimately adopted by the 
Copenhagen Accord. While not ideal, this was surely preferable to a situation in which 
Parties did not agree to any numeric target at all.  
 
In relation to other relevant GIC attributes identified in chapter 1, it is clear that the 
Rudd government took an internationalist, activist and multilateral approach. Its active 
contribution to the negotiations also demonstrated a general willingness to 'pitch in' to 
global efforts to address climate change. In a broad sense, the government's active 
engagement with the negotiations also demonstrated that it was committed to 
international law as the best mechanism for addressing global climate change, as well 
as to the UNFCCC as the international institution with primary responsibility for 
addressing this issue (the UNFCCC is both a treaty and a treaty body). These were all 
positives for the government from a GIC perspective, although this chapter (and the 
thesis in general) does not give the above attributes significant weight – being fairly 
minimal obligations, they clearly did not go to the heart of what distinguished 'good' 
from lesser forms of international conduct on this issue. 
 
Overall, this chapter argues that the failure of the Rudd government to promote 
numeric targets that were clearly consistent with achieving the ultimate objective of 
the Convention makes it difficult to classify it as a GIC on this issue. This was plainly the 
dominant consideration in assessing whether its activities displayed the 'higher' or 
'better' standard of conduct associated with GIC, as the adoption of an inadequate 
long-term target in a post-2012 agreement would undermine the central purpose of 
the ICCL regime. The government's approach also failed to give proper effect to several 
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key principles of the Convention including the precautionary principle (undoubtedly an 
important guiding principle on this issue) and the need for developed country 
leadership. It would be unfair to categorise the government's behaviour as 'poor' on 
this issue, a description best reserved for Parties such as Saudi Arabia who, for 
example, argued against adopting any numerical target.215 However, for this author, 
the evidence suggests that Australia could at best be described as an 'average' 
international citizen in relation to its efforts to establish a long-term mitigation goal 
under a post-2012 climate agreement. 
 
                                                     
 
215 Saudi Arabia, 'Input to the Negotiating Text on Fulfilment of the Bali Action Plan' in UNFCCC, Ideas 
and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Part 2,  UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part 2) (21 April 2009) 81, 81.  
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CHAPTER 6. THE RUDD GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL MITIGATION 
TARGET 
 
'The legitimacy of Australia's role and its reputation as a principled good international citizen 
will ultimately depend on what it does not just what it says or how it says it.' Lorraine Elliot, 
Australian Foreign Policy Futures, 2008.1 
 
'Well, the bottom line is this. … Australia will do no more and no less than what the rest of the 
world does.' Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, December 2009.2 
 
This chapter examines the national emission reduction target range committed to by 
the Rudd government during the post-2012 climate negotiations: 5 to 25 per cent 
below 2000 levels by 2020. This was perhaps the most significant policy decision of the 
government during the negotiations and the most important issue in terms of 
assessing its credentials as a 'good international citizen' (GIC). This is because more 
than any other issue in the negotiations, the mitigation target offered by each Party 
represented what it was prepared to do in practice to help avoid dangerous climate 
change. Given the significance and complexity of this issue, this chapter is the most 
detailed of the thesis. 
 
The chapter examines the merits of the Rudd government's mitigation target, and its 
implications for its GIC credentials, in the following manner. First, the basic legal 
background to the issue is outlined. For reasons explained in previous chapters, this 
chapter argues that in order for the Rudd government to meet the standard of GIC in 
its engagement with the post-2012 climate negotiations, it was particularly important 
that it put forward a mitigation target that complied with the legal expectations 
established of it by the international climate change law (ICCL) regime (and broader 
international law, where relevant). Second, the chapter outlines the specifics of the 
                                                     
 
1 Lorraine Elliott, 'Introduction' in Lorraine Elliott et al, Australian Foreign Policy Futures: Making Middle-
Power Leadership Work? (Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 2008) 1. 
2 ABC, 'Rudd Says Abbott Wrong Again', AM, 14 December 2009 (Prime Minister Kevin Rudd) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2009/s2770394.htm>. 
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Rudd government's target, including its associated conditions. Third, the chapter 
considers the sufficiency of the government's 25 per cent target, its 'headline' emission 
reduction figure, vis-à-vis other Parties. Fourth, the chapter comments on the merits of 
the government adopting a conditional target range. Sixth and seventh, the chapter 
considers the appropriateness of the conditions attached to the 25 per cent target and 
whether these conditions were satisfied. The chapter concludes with a detailed 
assessment of the government's performance as an international citizen on this issue. 
The chapter primarily judges the government's behaviour by examining whether it 
complied with or respected the relevant legal framework, but also comments on the 
broader range of GIC attributes identified in chapter 1. 
A Legal Background 
1 The UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
As outlined in chapters 2 and 4, the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC)3 was the first international agreement to establish 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction commitments for the international 
community. Under articles 4.2(a)(b) of the Convention, Annex I Parties (essentially, the 
developed countries)4 agreed to adopt national mitigation policies and measures with 
the non-binding 'aim' of reducing their GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2000, while 
developing countries made more general mitigation commitments without specifying 
particular targets.5 The fact that only developed countries adopted a quantified 
mitigation target reflected a number of principles established in article 3 UNFCCC, 
namely that the Parties should act 'on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' (CBDR&RC) and 
                                                     
 
3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1771 
UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994) ('UNFCCC'). 
4 Annex I Parties include developed countries that were members of the OECD in 1992, the European 
Economic Community (now represented by the EU), former Soviet Union countries with economies in 
transition to a market economy (EITs), as well as countries which have later voluntarily joined Annex I. 
Annex I currently includes: Australia; Austria; Belarus*; Belgium; Bulgaria*; Canada; Czechoslovakia*; 
Denmark; European Economic Community; Estonia*; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary*; 
Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Latvia*; Lithuania*; Luxembourg; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; 
Poland*; Portugal; Romania*; Russian Federation*; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; Ukraine*; 
United Kingdom and the United States.* = EITs. 
5 UNFCCC art 4.1.  
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that, accordingly, developed countries 'should take the lead in combating climate 
change and the adverse effects thereof'.6  
 
While significant for the development of ICCL, the Annex I Parties' target was weak, 
only having an aspirational character. The later 1997 Kyoto Protocol was thus more 
significant as it established a binding commitment by Annex I Parties to collectively 
reduce their GHG emissions, specifically, by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels 
during the treaty's first commitment period (2008 – 2012).7 Kyoto Annex I Parties also 
committed to individual mitigation targets (listed in Annex B), technically known as 
'quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments'.8  
 
Under Kyoto, the Annex I Parties (also referred to as Annex B Parties) adopted 
individual commitments that varied significantly in percentage terms. Most 
ambitiously, the European Union (EU) agreed to reduce emissions by 8 per cent (below 
1990 levels).9 This was followed by the United States (US) with 7 per cent10 – although 
the US subsequently refused to ratify the agreement. Least ambitiously, Iceland won 
the right to increase its emissions by 10 per cent, which was followed closely by 
Australia (+8 per cent).11 As outlined in chapter 2, the Howard government argued that 
an emissions increase was warranted for Australia due to its national circumstances, 
especially the importance of fossil fuels to Australia's export and domestic energy 
sectors, both of which were crucial for the economy and jobs.12 
2 The Bali Roadmap 
National mitigation targets were discussed under both negotiating tracks of the post-
2012 climate negotiations, namely, the Ad Hoc Working Group to Consider Further 
                                                     
 
6 Ibid art 3.1. 
7 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 
16 March 1998, 2303 UNTS 148 (entered into force 16 February 2005) art 3.1 ('Kyoto Protocol'). 
8 Kyoto Protocol art 3, annex B.  
9 Ibid annex B. The EU is officially a Party as the 'European Community'.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Lorraine Elliott, 'Australia in World Environmental Affairs' in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds), 
The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996-2000 (Oxford University Press, 
2001) 235, 250. 
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Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol and the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention.  
a) Negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol 
Kyoto Parties instigated their negotiations on mitigation targets for a second 
commitment period of the Protocol at the first Conference of the Parties serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 1, December 2005).13 These 
discussions had yet to be resolved at the time of the 2007 Bali Climate Change 
Conference, resulting in an agreement to continue these negotiations under the Bali 
Roadmap. Kyoto Parties' conclusions outlined a detailed program of work leading up to 
CMP 5 in Copenhagen (December 2009). Relevantly, this included analysis of the 
mitigation potentials and range of emission reduction objectives of Annex I Parties and 
the consideration of further commitments by Annex I Parties, including the scale of 
emission reductions to be achieved in aggregate and individually.14 
b) Negotiations under the UNFCCC and Bali Action Plan 
Parties to the UNFCCC also discussed national mitigation targets under the terms of 
the Bali Action Plan (BAP). This was the more important negotiating forum as the BAP 
specifically authorised discussion of mitigation targets by both developed and 
developing countries, including non-Kyoto Parties (namely, the US). This was significant 
as many developed countries, including Australia, were unwilling to commit to 
ambitious – or any – mitigation targets in the absence of an agreement that included 
both developing countries and the US.15  
 
                                                     
 
13 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol on its First Session: Addendum (Part 2, Vol 1), UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (30 March 
2006), Decision 1/CMP.1. The AWG agreed to aim to complete its work 'as early as possible' and in time 
to ensure that there was no gap between the first and second commitment periods: [3]. 
14 UNFCCC, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the 
Kyoto Protocol on its Resumed Fourth Session, UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5 (5 February 2008) [19]. 
This program drew on the earlier conclusions of the CMP: UNFCCC, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol on its Second Session, UN Doc 
FCCC/KP/AWG/2006/4 (14 December 2006) [17]. 
15 See section B and table 3 in this chapter.  
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Respecting the principles of CBDR&RC and developed country leadership, the BAP 
established differentiated expectations for developed and developing countries. Under 
paragraph 1(b)(i) developed countries agreed to consider: 
Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments 
or actions, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, while 
ensuring the comparability of efforts among them, taking into account differences in 
their national circumstances.16  
 
Meanwhile, under paragraph 1(b)(ii), developing countries agreed to consider: 
Nationally appropriate mitigation actions … in the context of sustainable development, 
supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a 
measurable, reportable and verifiable manner.17 
 
The BAP left open the possibility that developed countries could adopt 'actions' (the 
legal status of which was uncertain) as opposed to legally binding, economy-wide 
'commitments' (as under Kyoto). However, most Parties, including Australia,18 
expected developed countries to adopt legally binding commitments.19 The terms of 
the BAP also left open the legal form that developing countries' 'nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions' (NAMAs) could take, although most developing countries strongly 
argued that these should be non-binding.20 
 
The BAP's recognition that developing countries needed to adopt stronger mitigation 
measures under a post-2012 agreement reflected the generally accepted scientific 
view that achieving the Convention's objective – namely, avoiding 'dangerous 
                                                     
 
16 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008), decision 1/CP.13, [1(b)(i)] ('COP 13 Report'). 
17 Ibid [1(b)(ii)]. 
18 Australia, 'Legal Architecture for a Post-2012 Outcome' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements 
Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 2, UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4/Add.2 (28 May 2009) 3, 7. 
19 See, eg, G77 and China, 'Shared Vision' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in 
Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 2 (Part 2), UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.2 
(Part 2) (6 December 2008) 50, 50; European Community, 'Enhanced Action on Mitigation' in UNFCCC, 
Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 4, 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.1/Add.4 (30 March 2009) 10, 10.  
20 See, eg, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(371) 
(10 June 2008) 2. 
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anthropogenic interference with the climate system'21 – was no longer possible 
without developing countries finally joining Annex I Parties in abating emissions, 
especially the major developing economies.22 Indeed, the absence of mitigation targets 
for the major developing country emitters under Kyoto (as well as the US), meant that 
this agreement only accounted for about 30 per cent of global emissions.23 Going 
forward, the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment 
Report (IPCC AR4) estimated that GHG emissions would rise by 25 to 90 per cent 
between 2000 and 2030 in the absence of global mitigation measures.24 Two thirds to 
three quarters of this increase was expected to occur in developing countries.25  
 
It is evident from the above that in order to be consistent with the established legal 
framework, Australia's target needed to respect a range of ICCL principles including 
CBDR&RC, developed country leadership and comparability of effort (a conceptually 
similar principle to CBDR&RC). It was also clear that the government's mitigation target 
needed to be consistent with the Convention's ultimate objective, that of avoiding 
dangerous climate change.  
B Specifics of the Rudd Government's Target 
1 Principles and Factors Reflected in the Target 
The Rudd government outlined a range of principles or considerations that would 
influence Australia's final post-2012 mitigation target. At a general level, the 
                                                     
 
21 UNFCCC art 2. 
22 See, eg, D P van Vuuren, A F Hof and M G J den Elzen, Meeting the 2°C Target: From Climate Objective 
to Emission Reduction Measures (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, December 2009) 67. 
23 Japan, 'Views on How the Issues Specified in Decision 4/CMP.3, Paragraph 6, Should be Addressed in 
the Second Review of the Kyoto Protocol Pursuant to its Article 9' in UNFCCC, Views on How the Issues 
Specified in Decision 4/CMP.3, Paragraph 6, Should Be Addressed in the Second Review of the Kyoto 
Protocol Pursuant to its Article 9: Addendum 1, UN Doc FCCC/SBI/2008/MISC.2/Add.1 (28 March 2008) 
3, 3.  
24 IPCC, Working Group III Contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth 
Assessment Report: Summary for Policymakers (2007) 4. 
25 Ibid 4. 
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government committed to making a 'full' and 'fair' contribution to the global mitigation 
effort,26 as well as adopting a target that was 'fully cognisant of the science'.27 
 
The government also proposed a range of principles that it believed should guide all 
Parties' approaches to setting their targets.28 These included several of the UNFCCC's 
article 3 principles, namely, CBDR&RC and developed country leadership.29 The 
government elaborated upon its understanding of the CBDR&RC principle, as well as 
that of 'comparability of effort' (referred to in the BAP), stating that:  
 all Parties should 'aim to undertake a similar level of effort to others at a similar 
level of development and with similar national circumstances'; 
 'Parties whose national circumstances reflect greater responsibility or capability 
should make a greater contribution to the global effort'; and 
 'Parties whose national circumstances reflect the least capability should be 
prioritised for support in their efforts to mitigate climate change'.30  
 
While the government referred to the principle of leadership, its major aim was to 
make a proportionate or 'fair', rather than leading, contribution to the global 
mitigation effort. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd made this clear in the lead up to COP 15, 
stating that Australia was prepared to do 'no more and no less than … the rest of the 
world'.31 
2 Targets and Conditions  
The Rudd government put forward a conditional target range in the negotiations, 
rather than a single target, reflecting its belief that Parties should act in accordance 
with the principles of CBDR&RC and comparability of effort. Australia's initial offer, 
                                                     
 
26 Australia, 'Australia's National Ambition' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in 
Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 3, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.1/Add.3 (26 March 
2009) 3, 3; Explanatory Memorandum, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 2009 (Cth) 18 
('Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill'). 
27 Kevin Rudd (Speech delivered at the High Level Segment of the 13th Conference of the Parties, United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bali, 12 December 2007) 
<http://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/browse.php?did=15704>.  
28 Australia, 'Legal Architecture for a Post-2012 Outcome', above n 18, 3. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid. 
31 ABC, 'Rudd Says Abbott Wrong Again', above n 2. 
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announced in March 2009, was to reduce its GHG emissions by 5 to 15 per cent below 
2000 levels by 2020 (or 4 to 14 per cent when measured against Kyoto's 1990 base 
year).32 The upper target was subsequently increased, in May 2009, to 25 per cent 
below 2000 levels (24 per cent below 1990 levels).33 According to the government, this 
higher offer was made due to its belief that an ambitious global agreement was 'closer 
now than ever', with the major emitting countries providing 'encouraging signs' 
regarding the mitigation pledges that they were prepared to adopt.34 It hoped that 
Australia's increased pledge would encourage 'more ambitious commitments from 
others'35 and called for other Parties to adopt similarly ambitious targets.36  The 
increased target was likely also influenced by pressure from both Australian 
environmental groups and developing countries, who viewed the original upper target 
as being too weak.37 
 
The specifics of the Rudd government's target range were set out in several 
international submissions to the post-2012 negotiations, as well as in its domestic 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 2009 (CPRS Bill) and Explanatory 
Memorandum.38 At minimum, the government made an unconditional commitment to 
reduce Australia's GHG emissions by 5 per cent by 2020 (below 2000 levels).39 The 15 
per cent target would then be adopted if two broad conditions were met in the post-
2012 agreement, namely: 
1. 'commitments by all major economies, including key developing countries, to 
substantially restrain emissions'; and  
                                                     
 
32 Australia, 'Australia's National Ambition', above n 26, 3. 
33 Australia, 'Strengthening Australia's National Ambition for 2020' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on 
Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 3, 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4/Add.3 (1 June 2009) 3, 3. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid 4. 
36 Ibid 3, 4.  
37 See Australian Government, FOI Repositioning Q & A (2009) 
<http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/articles/publications/foi-original-documents-regarding-australian-
emission-reduction-targets.html/section/478> 1; Peter Wilson, 'Rudd Has Surrendered on Carbon, Says 
Climate Chief', The Australian (online), 18 December 2008 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/rudd-accused-of-carbon-cop-out/story-e6frg6so-
1111118350611>. 
38 Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 2009 (Cth) cl 3(4) ('CPRS Bill'); Explanatory Memorandum, 
CPRS Bill 15-16. The broad features of the CPRS Bill are discussed in greater detail in chapter 7.  
39 Australia, 'Australia's National Ambition', above n 26, 3. 
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2. commitments 'by all developed countries to take on comparable emissions 
reduction targets' to Australia.40  
 
The circumstances in which these two broad conditions would be satisfied were later 
expanded by the CPRS Bill Explanatory Memorandum. These included:  
1. global action to put Parties on track to stabilise emissions between 510-
540 parts per million carbon dioxide-equivalent (ppm CO2-e); 
2. an aggregate emission reduction by advanced economies of 15 to 25 per cent 
(below 1990 levels);  
3. substantive measurable, reportable and verifiable commitments and actions by 
major developing economies, in the context of a strong international financing 
and technology cooperation framework, but which may not deliver significant 
emissions reductions until after 2020; 
4. progress toward inclusion of forests (reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD)) and the land sector; 
and 
5. deeper and broader carbon markets and low carbon development pathways.41  
 
Most ambitiously, the Rudd government committed Australia to reducing its emissions 
by 25 per cent by 2020 if the global agreement met a number of conditions, namely: 
1. commitments by all economies sufficient to deliver long-term stabilisation of 
GHGs at 450 ppm CO2-e or lower; 
2. a peak year for global emissions of no later than 2020; 
                                                     
 
40 Ibid. The government's CPRS Bill Explanatory Memorandum adopted slightly different language, 
indicating that the 15 per cent target was conditional upon a 'global agreement under which all major 
developing economies commit to substantially restrain emissions and advanced economies take on 
reductions comparable to Australia': Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill 17.  
41 Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill 17-18. Records from the Department of Climate Change further 
indicated that the commitment was conditional on an agreement retaining: the Kyoto Protocol rules 
that allowed Parties to include land clearing emissions in their base year (article 3.7); voluntary activities 
under article 3.4; no restriction on the use of LULUCF sinks; and unrestricted access to flexibility 
mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism (article 12): Australian Government, FOI 
Australia's Target Conditions – Where Do We Stand? (2009) 2 
<http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/articles/publications/foi-original-documents-regarding-australian-
emission-reduction-targets.html/section/478>. 
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3. aggregate advanced economy reductions of at least 25 per cent below 1990 
levels by 2020; 
4. major developing economy commitments to slow growth and then reduce 
absolute emissions over time; 
5. a collective reduction by major developing economies of at least 20 per cent 
below business-as-usual (BAU) by 2020; 
6. a nomination of an emissions peak year for individual major developing 
economies; 
7. global action to mobilise greater financial resources, including from major 
developing economies; 
8. comprehensive coverage of gases, sources and sectors, with inclusion of forests 
(eg REDD) and the land sector (including soil carbon initiatives (eg biochar) if 
scientifically demonstrated); and 
9. fully functional global carbon markets.42 
 
The government indicated that up to 5 percentage points of this target could be met 
by purchasing international emission credits under the Kyoto Protocol.43  
 
Longer-term, the Rudd government also committed to reducing Australia's emissions 
by 60 per cent by 2050 (below 2000 levels).44 The focus of this chapter is on assessing 
Australia's 2020 mitigation target, as the Rudd government had little realistic influence 
over whether a 2050 target would be met. Briefly, however, it should be noted that 
the 2050 target was undoubtedly too weak (see table 2 below for a comparison to 
other developed country targets).45 The government, however, indicated that it was 
open to increasing its 2050 target in future if this was necessary to play Australia's 'full 
and fair part'.46   
                                                     
 
42 Australia, 'Strengthening Australia's National Ambition for 2020', above n 33, 3. Note that the 
government presented these as five conditions. These have been separated and reordered to assist with 
their analysis.  
43 Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill 83. See discussion of this issue in chapter 7. 
44 Australia, 'Australia's National Ambition', above n 26, 3. 
45 See generally, Peter Christoff, 'Aiming High: On Australia's Emissions Reductions Targets' (2008) 31 
UNSWLJ 861. 
46 Australia, 'Australia's National Ambition', above n 26, 3. See also Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill 
18.  
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C Sufficiency of the 25 Per Cent Target 
This section now examines the sufficiency of the Rudd government's upper 2020 target 
in percentage terms. By 'sufficiency', this chapter is referring to whether the target 
would made an adequate contribution to a global agreement aiming to avoid 
dangerous climate change, and was consistent with relevant principles of the UNFCCC 
and BAP, especially CBDR&RC, leadership and comparability of effort. This is followed 
by an analysis of the appropriateness of setting a conditional target range and the 
various conditions attached to the target, as well as whether those conditions were 
satisfied, at sections D, E and F. An informed analysis of the GIC issue, drawing upon 
this legal and factual matrix, is then provided at section G. 
1 Burden-sharing Between Developed and Developing Country Groups 
The first issue for many Parties, particularly the developing countries, concerned the 
quantum of emission reductions that would represent an equitable or comparable 
contribution by developed countries to the global mitigation effort. 
 
As noted, the Kyoto Protocol saw Annex I Parties adopt a collective target of reducing 
their GHG emissions by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels during the first 
commitment period (2008-12). Developing countries called upon Annex I Parties to 
again set a collective target under a new agreement (see details below). Individual 
targets could then be allocated according to an agreed formula, or through political 
negotiations. These discussions had an important bearing on the sufficiency of the 
Rudd government's mitigation target. This is because the higher the collective level of 
mitigation deemed necessary for the Annex I group, the higher the individual targets of 
developed countries needed to be. 
a) The IPCC AR4 
Negotiations regarding 'burden-sharing' were initially influenced by the IPCC AR4. 
According to the IPCC, if global emissions were to be stabilised at 450 ppm CO2-e (the 
lowest scenario it assessed), Annex I Parties would need to collectively reduce their 
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GHG emissions by 25 to 40 per cent by 2020 (below 1990 levels).47 This would need to 
be accompanied by a '[s]ubstantial deviation' in non-Annex I Party emissions as against 
a BAU scenario, specifically in the higher emitting regions.48 Longer-term, Annex I 
Parties would need to collectively reduce their emissions by 80 to 95 per cent by 2050, 
while non-Annex I Party emissions would need to substantially deviate from BAU levels 
in all regions.49 In 2008, the authors' of the original IPCC advice reported that a 
'substantial deviation' in non-Annex I Party emissions for 2020 equated to a 15 to 30 
per cent reduction below BAU.50 
b) Party Views 
Parties to the UNFCCC referred to the findings of the IPCC in a footnote to the BAP,51 
while Kyoto Parties' referred to them in their Bali conclusions.52 While this provided 
some endorsement of the IPCC's view, Parties ultimately expressed a diverse range of 
opinions regarding the level of burden-sharing that was necessary between developed 
and developing countries. Many Parties questioned the merits of the IPCC figure, with 
India and Brazil, for example, emphasising the need to examine the assumptions 
underlying the studies on which the IPCC work was based.53 China and Micronesia also 
emphasised that burden-sharing was a political issue for the Parties, not the 
responsibility of the IPCC.54  
 
                                                     
 
47 Sujata Gupta et al, 'Policies, Instruments and Co-operative Arrangements' in B Metz et al (eds), 
Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change (Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth 
Assessment Report) (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 745, 776. 
48 Namely, Latin America, the Middle East, East Asia and Centrally-Planned Asia: ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Michel den Elzen and Niklas Höhne, 'Reductions of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Annex I and Non-
Annex I Countries for Meeting Concentration Stabilisation Targets: An Editorial Comment' (2008) 91 
Climatic Change 249, 271. 
51 COP 13 Report, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, decision 1/CP.13, chapeau, footnote 1. 
52 UNFCCC, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the 
Kyoto Protocol on its Resumed Fourth Session, UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5 (5 February 2008) [16]. 
53 See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(407) (29 
March – 8 April 2009) 4; International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, vol 12(412) (3 June 2009) 4.  
54 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(407) (29 
March – 8 April 2009) 8; Micronesia, 'Ideas and Proposals on Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan' in 
UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 2 
(Part 2), UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.2 (Part 2) (6 December 2008) 29, 34. 
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Developing countries proposed a range of collective mid-term targets for the Annex I 
group. These were all at the top-end or higher than those proposed by the IPCC. 
Proposed targets (below 1990 levels) included, inter alia: 
 at least 40 per cent by 2020: BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and 
China) et al55 and the African group;56  
 at least 45 per cent by 2020: Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)57 and the 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs);58 and  
 at least 49 per cent by 2013-2017: Bolivia, Malaysia, Paraguay and Venezuela.59 
 
Some developing countries also argued that these targets should be even higher if 
developed countries used international offsetting mechanisms like the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) to help achieve their national targets, as this would 
require less domestic mitigation effort.60 
                                                     
 
55 UNFCCC, Proposal from Algeria, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, China, Congo, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Gambia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, 
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56 African Group, 'Key Elements of LCA Negotiating Text' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements 
Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Part 1, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part 1) 
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38, 38. 
57 AOSIS, Declaration on Climate Change, New York, 21 September 2009 
<http://www.forumsec.org.fj/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/AOSIS%20Political%20Declar
ation,%2021%20September%202009.pdf>. 
58 Least Developed Countries, 'Fulfilment of the Bali Action Plan and the Components of the Agreed 
Outcome to be Adopted by the Conference of the Parties at its Fifteenth Session' in UNFCCC, Ideas and 
Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Part 2, UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part 2) (30 April 2009) 5, 6. Also supported by Colombia, 'Elements of a 
Negotiating Text on the Bali Action Plan' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in 
Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Part 1, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part 1) (25 April 2009) 
69, 69; Costa Rica and Panama, 'Draft Negotiating Text on Shared Vision' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals 
on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Part 1, UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part 1) (23 April 2009) 81, 81; Uruguay, 'Shared Vision' in UNFCCC, Ideas 
and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Part 2, UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part 2) (24 April 2009) 117, 117. 
59 Bolivia et al, 'Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change' in UNFCCC, Proposal from the Plurinational State of Bolivia on behalf of Malaysia 
Paraguay and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for an Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, UN Doc 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/12 (17 June 2009) 4, 4. 
60 See, eg, China, 'Emissions Trading and Project Based Mechanisms under AWG-KP' in UNFCCC, Views 
on Possible Improvements to Emissions Trading and the Project-Based Mechanisms, UN Doc 
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Several developed countries also proposed a new collective target for the Annex I 
group, with the main proponents being the EU and Norway. These Parties both 
favoured setting a 30 per cent Annex I reduction target for 2020 (below 1990 levels).61 
Other developed countries, however, rejected the 'top-down' approach of Kyoto 
altogether, preferring that the aggregate reduction of developed countries simply 
reflect their national mitigation pledges (a 'bottom-up' approach).62 For its part, the 
Rudd government stated that it was 'desirable' for developed countries to agree on a 
mid-term ambition, of which an 'integral part' should be a collective target for 
developed countries.63 However, overall the government did not appear overly 
concerned as to whether or not a specific target was actually established in a new 
agreement.64  
 
Parties also suggested a range of targets for 2050 which they believed were necessary 
for the Annex I group. Developing countries proposed the following goals (below 1990 
levels): 
 more than 80 per cent: Cuba; 65 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/MISC.9 (8 May 2009) 12, 12; International Institute for Sustainable Development, 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(389) (5 December 2008) 1 (Brazil); International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(435) (6 October 2009) 3 (South Africa). 
61 European Community, 'A Shared Vision for Long-Term Cooperative Action' in UNFCCC, Ideas and 
Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 1, UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.1 (14 November 2008) 4, 6; Norway, 'Analysis of Mitigation Potentials 
and Identification of Ranges of Emission Reduction Objectives of Annex I Parties' in UNFCCC, Information 
and Data Related to Paragraph 17 (a)(i) and (ii) of Document FCCC/KP/AWG/2006/4..., UN Doc 
FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/MISC.4 (15 September 2008) 52, 52. 
62 See, eg, Russia, 'Ideas and Proposals on the Elements of Paragraph 1 of the Decision 1/CP.13 (Bali 
Action Plan)' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action 
Plan, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5 (30 September 2008) 84, 84-85. 
63 Australia, 'Mitigation' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the 
Bali Action Plan:  Addendum 2 (Part 1), UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.2 (Part 1) (24 
November 2008) 73, 73. 
64 See Evidence to Senate Select Committee on Climate Policy, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 20 May 
2009, 3 (Blair Comley, Deputy Secretary, Department of Climate Change). Notably, the condition 
attached to the 25 per cent target requiring the advanced economies to collectively reduce their 
emissions by 25 per cent did not need this ambition to be reflected in a formal target. Furthermore, the 
government's own approach of announcing a fixed target range prior to any decision by the Parties on a 
collective Annex I target was more consistent with a bottom-up approach. 
65 Cuba, 'Submission of Views' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of 
the Bali Action Plan, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.1 (5 February 2009) 26, 26. 
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 at least 85 per cent: LDCs,66 Guyana67 and Indonesia;68 
 at least 90 per cent: Nicaragua, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Honduras and 
Panama;69 and 
 at least 95 per cent: AOSIS,70 the African Group,71 Costa Rica and Panama,72 
Uruguay,73 Philippines,74 Colombia,75 Ecuador,76 and Pakistan.77 
 
Micronesia78 and Pakistan79 also suggested that in the longer-term Annex I Party 
emissions may need to fall by more than 100 per cent. 
 
Developed countries also proposed 2050 targets for the Annex I group. These included: 
 at least 80 per cent: the G8 countries (no base year specified);80 and 
 80 to 95 per cent (below 1990 levels): the EU.81  
                                                     
 
66 Least Developed Countries, 'Fulfilment of the Bali Action Plan and the Components of the Agreed 
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Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Part 1, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part 1) 
(25 April 2009) 99, 99. 
68 Indonesia, 'Proposal by the Government of Indonesia on Agreed Outcome of the 15th Conference of 
the Parties of the UNFCCC' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the 
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Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Part 2, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 
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76 Ecuador, 'Fulfilment of the Bali Action Plan and Components of the Agreed Outcome' in UNFCCC, 
Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Part 1, UN Doc 
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77 Pakistan, 'Ideas and Proposals on Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals 
on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 2 (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.2 (Part 2) (6 December 2008) 45, 46. 
78 Micronesia, above n 54, 36. 
79 Pakistan, above n 77, 46. 
80 G8, Leaders Declaration: Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future, G8 Summit, L'Aquila, 8 July 
2009 <http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/G8_Declaration_08_07_09_final%2c0.pdf>. 
81 European Community, 'A Shared Vision for Long-Term Cooperative Action', above n 61, 6. These 
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c) Why Were Developing Countries' Expectations so High?  
The high level of ambition sought by developing countries from the Annex I group 
reflected a number of factors. First, it must be noted that there was a degree of self-
interest in the developing country position. This is because the higher the level of 
mitigation undertaken by Annex I Parties, the less that would be required of 
developing countries. Second, the AOSIS and LDC targets reflected their belief that in 
order to avert dangerous climate change atmospheric emissions needed to be 
stabilised at 350 ppm CO2-e, not 450 ppm CO2-e (on which the IPCC estimates were 
broadly based). In order to achieve this more ambitious global goal, studies indicated 
that Annex I Parties likely needed to reduce their emissions by 45 per cent by 2020, as 
AOSIS and the LDCs proposed.82 Third, non-Annex I countries highlighted that a deep 
Annex I target was necessary to ensure that sufficient demand continued to exist for 
the carbon credits generated by the CDM and any new flexibility mechanisms (such as 
REDD) that may be established under a post-2012 agreement (see further chapters 7 
and 8).83 The fourth and perhaps most dominant factor, was the belief of developing 
countries that an ambitious Annex I target was justified by various international law 
norms or principles, especially those established by the UNFCCC. 
i) UNFCCC Principles: Equity, CBDR&RC and Leadership 
As outlined earlier, article 3.1 of the Convention stipulates that Parties should protect 
the climate system on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities. Accordingly, developed countries are expected to take 
the lead in combating climate change. These principles were cited by both 
developing84 and developed countries (including Australia)85 in their submissions on 
                                                     
 
82 See, eg, Michiel Schaeffer and Bill Hare, How Feasible Is Changing Track? Scenario Analysis of the 
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85 See Australia, 'Legal Architecture for a Post-2012 Outcome', above n 18, 3. 
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burden-sharing, although Parties interpreted their practical implications quite 
differently. 
  
The principles of equity, CBDR&RC and leadership are not defined by the Convention. 
General comments, however, can be made about their meaning. Equity has many 
different uses in domestic and international law.86 Under international law, the term is  
often used as a synonym for 'fairness' or 'justice',87 especially 'distributive justice'.88 
CBDR&RC is essentially an emanation of the general equity principle,89 while the 
principle of developed country leadership is a further emanation of both the equity 
and CBDR&RC principles. The CBDR&RC principle implies three elements, namely that: 
protecting the climate is a common responsibility of all Parties; Parties' responsibilities 
are differentiated (that is, they are not necessarily equal); and Parties possess differing 
capacities to reduce emissions.90 It is accepted that Parties have differentiated 
responsibilities due to the fact that developed countries have greater economic and 
technological capacity to address climate change. It also arises from the greater 
historical responsibility of developed countries for carbon pollution and their higher 
per capita emissions (as accepted in the UNFCCC Preamble). The principles of equity, 
CBDR&RC and developed country leadership are given direct legal effect in the 
Convention and Protocol through establishing commitments of varying stringency for 
developed countries, the former Soviet economies in transition to a market economy, 
and the developing countries.91 
 
The developing countries high expectations of Annex I Parties in large part reflected 
their view on the practical implications of the above principles. Many developing 
                                                     
 
86 See generally Dinah Shelton, 'Equity' in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnee and Ellen Hey (eds), The 
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87 Ibid. 
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89 See ibid 656. 
90 See generally, Lavanya Rajamani, 'The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility and the 
Balance of Commitments under the Climate Regime' (2000) 9 Review of European Community and 
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countries were critical of what they perceived as an ongoing failure of leadership by 
developed countries in reducing emissions. India, for example, highlighted that Annex I 
Parties had still failed to fulfil their non-binding commitment under article 4.2(a)(b) 
UNFCCC to return their emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.92 Some Kyoto 
Parties were also criticised for not being on track to meet their binding national targets 
under that treaty.93  
ii) Other Relevant Norms, Principles and Provisions 
Various other international law norms, principles and treaty provisions were 
highlighted by developing countries to support their position. Under the Convention, 
these included developing countries' right to 'sustainable development' (article 3.4);  
that Parties must 'take fully into account that economic and social development and 
poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country 
Parties' (article 4.7);94 and that developing countries have 'legitimate priorities of 
sustainable development and poverty eradication' (preamble).95 In this regard, Brazil 
argued that while developed countries had 'the essential needs of their societies fully 
satisfied', developing countries did not and therefore faced 'the challenge and extra 
burden of combining economic growth and mitigation actions.'96 
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In addition to citing the right to 'sustainable development' the G77 and China also 
insisted on their broader 'right to development'97 (without the sustainability qualifier). 
China regarded this as a 'basic human right' that was 'undeprivable'98 and insisted that 
developing countries be allowed adequate 'carbon space' for their industrialisation and 
urbanisation.99 Argentina similarly stated that 'developing countries should not have to 
compromise their growth and development as a result of climate change.'100 India also 
stated that 'rapid development' was 'not only an economic and social imperative' for 
poorer countries but 'an essential requirement' for building adaptation capacity to 
climate impacts,101 as well as the 'Right to Life and basic issues of survival.'102  
 
These developing country statements, especially that of Argentina, reflected a belief 
that developing countries essentially had an unfettered right to development. 
Regarding this point, it should be noted that an unfettered right to development is not 
supported by the terms of the UNFCCC,103 which limits the right to development to 
that which is 'sustainable'.104 While the notion of sustainable development is open to 
interpretation, at the very least it can be assumed that the Convention only supports 
Parties' right to development to the extent that it is compatible with achieving the 
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treaty's ultimate objective. This would rule out unconstrained development, as 
dangerous climate change cannot be avoided unless developing countries also restrain 
their emissions.105 
 
Developing countries further argued that their proposed Annex I targets were justified 
by the principle of historical responsibility. The G77 and China and AOSIS, among 
others, insisted that Annex I countries reduce their emissions consistent with their 
'level of historical responsibility for climate change' since industrialisation.106 China 
argued that developed countries had occupied more than their fair share of the 
'atmospheric space', an 'injustice' that must be remedied.107 Bolivia similarly suggested 
that developed countries had accrued a 'historical … emissions debt' that must be 
repaid.108 It accused developed countries of contributing 'disproportionately to the 
causes of climate change' and seeking 'to appropriate a disproportionate share of the 
Earth's remaining environmental space.'109 Developing countries also highlighted the 
historic inequity in the per capita emissions of the developed and developing world.110  
 
Some developing country groups further linked the principle of historical responsibility 
to broader legal principles under international environmental law. AOSIS, for example, 
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linked historical responsibility to the 'polluter pays' principle,111 as well as the principle 
of state responsibility, that is, that states have the responsibility to prevent harm to 
the environment of other states and to the global commons.112 
 
The Preamble to the Convention notes the factual situation that 'the largest share of 
historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases … originated in developed 
countries'.113 Developed countries continued their past practice,114 however, of 
rejecting historical responsibility as a basis for apportioning responsibility for future 
emissions abatement.115 This included the Rudd government who in part rejected the 
principle of historical responsibility on the basis that 'large uncertainties' existed in the 
data on historical emissions, especially due to patchy information on land use, land-use 
change and forestry (LULUCF) emissions.116 A further complication with this principle is 
that Parties have only been properly aware of the consequences of emitting GHGs 
since the late 1980s. Thus it is not clear that is fair or equitable to apportion legal or 
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moral culpability for emissions prior to 1990, given the international community's lack 
of knowledge regarding the ramifications of burning fossil fuels.117  
d) Quantifying Responsibility: Approaches in the Literature  
The various legal principles highlighted by developing countries, notwithstanding the 
contentious nature of some, meant that it was well accepted that the greater 
responsibility for emission reductions belonged to developed countries, a view shared 
by the Rudd government. It was controversial, however, how to translate these 
principles into a quantitative Annex I target (and for that matter, individual Annex I 
targets). A range of studies prior to COP 15 sought to do so by drawing upon various 
metrics or criteria that were thought to enable future emission entitlements to be 
allocated with a degree of fairness or objectivity. Among the metrics proposed were:  
 equal percentage reduction below a base year (for example, 1990) or BAU 
emissions;  
 equal marginal abatement costs – the cost of reducing emissions per tonne of 
CO2; 
 abatement costs as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) or gross 
domestic product (GDP);  
 the contraction and convergence of per capita emissions – equalising per capita 
emissions by a specific year such as 2050;  
 GHG emission intensity targets – for example, emissions intensity per GDP; 
 a triptych approach – allocating reductions based on converging technological 
standards or targets in specific sectors; 
 a multi-criteria approach – applying a combination of various metrics; and 
 historical responsibility – since 1900, 1990 or other base year.118 
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40; Niklas Höhne, Dian Phylipsen and Sara Moltmann, Factors Underpinning Future Action: 2007 Update 
(Ecofys, 7 May 2007) 31-33; Daniel Bodansky, Sophie Chou and Christie Jorge-Tresolini, International 
Climate Efforts Beyond 2012: A Survey of Approaches (PEW Centre on Global Climate Change, December 
2004) 19-62; German Advisory Council on Global Change, Solving the Climate Dilemma: The Budget 
Approach (German Advisory Council on Global Change, 2009) 21-25; Jeffrey Frankel, 'An Elaborated 
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While each approach has its pros and cons, the broad array of metrics proposed in the 
literature highlights that it is difficult to determine that one approach is fairer than 
another. As such, the IPCC's suggested 25 to 40 per cent target range represented an 
average of the mitigation reductions proposed by the various studies.119 Notably, the 
authors' of the IPCC figure reassessed the 25 to 40 per cent figure in 2008 and 
confirmed that it remained the best available estimate of what was needed by Annex I 
Parties in relation to a 450 ppm CO2-e stabilisation goal.120  
e) Implications for Australia's 25 per cent Target 
The above material was set out in detail because it has a bearing on whether the 
individual targets proposed by Annex I Parties were sufficient. As noted, the Rudd 
government premised its 25 per cent target on a minimum 25 per cent reduction by 
the advanced economies.121 The Rudd government was not entirely clear on which 
countries it regarded as 'advanced'. But for present purposes it is sufficient to assume 
that this included the industrialised countries plus several other more advanced non-
Annex I Parties (see further discussion at section E).  
 
Many environmental and other civil society groups backed the developing countries' 
call for an Annex I target of 40 per cent or higher,122 or at the very least, the EU's 
proposal for a 30 per cent reduction.123 The above discussion makes clear, however, 
that it is ultimately a matter of judgement as to whether or not the Rudd government 
ought to have premised its upper national target on an advanced economy reduction 
of 25 per cent, or whether it should have instead increased its upper target – accepting 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
Proposal for Global Climate Policy Architecture: Specific Formulas and Emission Targets for All Countries 
in All Decades' (Discussion Paper 08-08, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, October 
2008) 9-15; Bernd Brouns, Hermann E Ott and Kathrin Joester, Taking the Lead: Post-2012 Climate 
Targets for the North (Wuppertal Institute, 2005) 17-27. 
119 Gupta, above n 47, 776. See further den Elzen and Höhne, above n 50. 
120 den Elzen and Höhne, above n 50, 270. 
121 The advanced economy group is slightly broader than the Annex I group (see discussion below) but 
essentially includes the Annex I Parties. 
122 See, eg, Wolfgang Sterk et al, 'Towards an Effective and Equitable Climate Change Agreement: A 
Wuppertal Proposal for Copenhagen' (Proposal, Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and 
Energy, October 2009) 20; 'A Copenhagen Climate Treaty Version 1.0: A Proposal for a Copenhagen 
Agreement by Members of the NGO Community' (Proposal, David Suzuki Foundation et al, June 2009) 
18. 
123 See, eg, The Climate Institute, Adequacy of Current Target Pledges and Emission Reduction Actions 
(2009) 1.  
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that a higher collective level of ambition was required of Annex I Parties. Several points 
are worth mentioning in this regard. 
 
First, the collective economic cost of mitigation for the Annex I group was not 
prohibitive, even at the higher ranges sought by developing countries. A 2008 study by 
the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (NEAA), for example, projected the 
following costs for a collective 2020 Annex I reduction target (below 1990 levels, with 
approximately 20 per cent achieved using flexibility mechanisms): 
 20 per cent: 0.22 per cent of GDP; 
 30 per cent: 0.54 per cent of GDP; and 
 40 per cent: 1.47 per cent of GDP.124  
 
These aggregated costs could appear large, but are small when viewed on a yearly 
basis (approximately 0.03, 0.07 and 0.18 per cent of GDP, respectively). In 2009, the 
NEAA revised down its estimated cost range for a 30 per cent reduction target to 0.15 
to 0.54 per cent of GDP.125 Other credible studies published following COP 15 also 
suggested that the costs of a 30 and 40 per cent collective Annex I reduction were 
likely to be lower again.126   
 
Second, it must be appreciated that the suggested IPCC target range (25 to 40 per 
cent) related to a 450 ppm CO2-e long-term stabilisation target. As discussed in 
chapter 5, this goal appeared to be insufficient to prevent dangerous climate change 
for all Parties. Thus, even if it was reasonable to premise Australia's upper target on a 
collective 25 per cent reduction by the advanced economies, this was only the case 
under a 450 ppm CO2-e scenario. As such, there is clearly an argument that the Rudd 
government's upper national target was premised on an aggregate reduction by 
                                                     
 
124 Den Elzen, Exploring Comparable Post-2012 Reduction Efforts for Annex I Countries, above n 118, 52.  
125 M G J den Elzen et al, Sharing Developed Countries' Post-2012 Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions 
Based on Comparable Efforts (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, December 2009) 36, 37. 
The band reflected which economic model was used and whether or not flexibility mechanisms could be 
used. 
126 Joachim Schleich, Vicki Duscha and Everett B Peterson, 'Environmental and Economic Effects of the 
Copenhagen Pledges and More Ambitious Emission Reduction Targets: Interim Report' (Interim Report, 
German Federal Environment Agency, May 2010) 23. The study estimated costs of 0.2 per cent of GDP 
for a 30 per cent Annex I target and 0.4 per cent for a 40 per cent Annex I target. 
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advanced economies that was too weak. See further discussion of the implications of 
this for the government's credentials as a GIC at section G. 
2 Burden-sharing Between Developed Countries: Assessing Comparability of 
Effort 
The previous section examined the issue of burden-sharing between developed and 
developing country groups. This section now turns to addressing whether the Rudd 
government's upper target involved a sufficient level of effort, relative to other 
developed countries. The focus here is on Australia and other Parties' 'headline' 
targets, with these reflecting the highest degree of ambition each Party was prepared 
to adopt. 
a) Developed Country Pledges: Comparison of Percentage Targets 
In the lead up to COP 15/CMP 5, Copenhagen, Annex I countries pledged a range of 
national mitigation targets. These are set out below (in approximate order of 
stringency as a percentage from 1990). 
 
Party Official Pledge  Conversion to 1990 Base 
Year  
Canada 17 per cent below 2005 
levels 
0 per cent (no change from 
1990 levels)  
US 17 per cent below 2005 
levels 
3 per cent above 1990 
levels 
Belarus 5 to 10 per cent below 
1990 levels 
 
New Zealand  
 
10 to 20 per cent below 
1990 levels 
 
Ukraine 20 per cent below 1990 
levels 
 
Australia 5 to 15 to 25 per cent 
below 2000 levels 
4 to 14 to 24 per cent 
below 1990 levels 
Russia 15 to 25 per cent below 
1990 levels 
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Japan 25 per cent below 1990 
levels 
 
EU,  
Switzerland, Lichtenstein 
20 to 30 per cent below 
1990 levels 
 
Iceland, Monaco 30 per cent below 1990 
levels 
 
Norway 30 to 40 per cent below 
1990 levels 
 
Table 1. Annex I Parties' 2020 pledges to the Copenhagen Accord.127 
 
Developed countries also announced a range of 2050 national mitigation targets (and 
in some cases 2030 targets).  
 
Party Official Pledge 
Australia 60 per cent below 2000 levels by 2050 
Canada  60 to 70 per cent below 2006 levels by 2050 
Japan 60 to 80 per cent below current emissions by 2050  
US 42 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030 and 83 per cent 
by 2050 
EU 80 to 95 per cent below 1990 levels by 2050 
Iceland Carbon neutrality by 2050 
Norway Carbon neutrality by 2030 
Table 2. Annex I Parties' 2050 or 2030 pledges announced prior to COP 15.128 
                                                     
 
127 Targets compiled from: UNFCCC, Appendix I – Quantified Economy-wide Emissions Targets for 2020 
<http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/items/5264.php>; Australian Government, 
FOI Supplementary Brief: Comparability of Effort (2009) 3 
<http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/articles/publications/foi-original-documents-regarding-australian-
emission-reduction-targets.html/section/478>; Frank Jotzo, 'Comparing the Copenhagen Emissions 
Targets' (CCEP Working Paper 1.10, ANU Crawford School of Economics and Government, October 2010) 
30; Climate Action Tracker, All Countries <http://www.climateactiontracker.org/countries>. Several EU 
members pledged particularly noteworthy contributions to the overall EU target, among them Germany 
(40 per cent below), the UK (34 per cent) and the Netherlands (30 per cent): Senate Select Committee 
on Climate Policy, Parliament of Australia, Select Committee on Climate Policy Report (2009) 17. 
128 See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(371) (10 
June 2008) 1; International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 
12(394) (12 December 2008) 2; International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, vol 12(399) (31 March 2009) 2; International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth 
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In basic percentage terms, it can be seen that the Rudd government's 2020 target was 
comparatively weak, average or relatively strong, depending on the final target 
Australia and other Parties with conditional target ranges ultimately adopted. As 
stated by the Rudd government, however, a straight comparison of the Parties' 
percentage targets was 'not necessarily informative about the degree of effort 
required' to achieve those targets.129 Indeed, under the terms of the BAP, developed 
countries were not expected to adopt uniform percentage targets. Rather, the 
expectation was that individual targets would reflect a 'comparability of effort' 
(relative to other developed countries), 'taking into account differences in their 
national circumstances.'130 
b) The Rudd Government's Preferred Metrics 
Developed countries highlighted a range of criteria or metrics in order to demonstrate 
why their particular targets involved a comparable level of effort. The Rudd 
government justified Australia's target range chiefly on the basis of 'aggregate 
mitigation costs', 'per capita effort', and reductions from Kyoto's first commitment 
period (2008-12).131 
i) Aggregate Mitigation Costs 
The Rudd government emphasised that Australia faced higher aggregate mitigation 
costs than most other developed countries.132 Mitigation costs varied across countries 
'due to differences in national circumstances, including industry profile, resource 
endowment and mitigation potential.'133 The 'mitigation potential' of each country 
varied according to factors such as total GHG emissions and trends; GDP and GDP 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(443) (3 November 2009) 2; International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(449) (8 December 2009) 3; Canada, 'Ideas and 
Proposals on Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained 
in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 2 (Part 1), UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.2 
(Part 1) (6 December 2008) 109, 109. 
129 Australia, 'Economic Cost as an Indicator for Comparable Effort' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on 
Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 3, UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.1/Add.3 (26 March 2009) 20, 22. 
130 COP 13 Report, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, decision 1/CP.13, [1(b)(i)]. 
131 Australia, 'Mitigation', above n 63, 77; Australian Government, FOI Supplementary Brief: 
Comparability of Effort, above n 127, 1. 
132 Australia, 'Economic Cost as an Indicator for Comparable Effort', above n 129, 22. 
133 Ibid 21. 
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growth; population and population growth; the production of energy; and relative 
natural resource endowments.134 Australia's relatively high aggregate mitigation costs 
were chiefly due to its large share of emission and energy-intensive industries and the 
dominance of low-cost coal in electricity generation.135 Given Australia's relatively high 
cost of mitigation, the government believed that its target range involved a level of 
mitigation effort that was 'realistically attainable in Australia in the current 
circumstances while maintaining economic growth, job creation [and] improved 
standards of living'.136 
 
The government backed its view with the results of economic modelling undertaken by 
the Australian Treasury in its report, Australia's Low Pollution Future: The Economics of 
Climate Change Mitigation.137 Treasury estimated the following aggregate economic 
costs for the 5 to 25 per cent target (cumulative to 2020): 
 2.1 per cent of GNP (25 per cent reduction target); 
 1.6 per cent of GNP (15 per cent target); 
 1.1 per cent of GNP (5 per cent target).138 
                                                     
 
134 Australia, 'Views on the Means to Achieve Mitigation Objectives of Annex Parties for the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol' in UNFCCC, 
Views and Information on the Means to Achieve Mitigation Objectives of Annex I Parties: Addendum 2, 
UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/MISC.1/Add.2 (March 2008) 2, 5. 
135 Australia, 'Economic Cost as an Indicator for Comparable Effort', above n 129, 22. Australia's 
abundance of cheap domestic thermal coal and its lack of nuclear power were the main drivers behind 
the high carbon intensity of Australia's power sector, which was on par with China, ranked in the top five 
worldwide, and was much higher than other developed nations such as Germany, the US and UK: see 
ClimateWorks Australia, Low Carbon Growth Plan for Australia (March 2010) 35. 
136 Senate Select Committee on Climate Policy, above n 127, 193. 
137 Treasury, Australia's Low Pollution Future: The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation (2008). 
138 Ibid 110. Applying the CPRS-5, CPRS-15 and Garnaut-25 scenarios. GTEM model. Note that Treasury 
did not factor in the economic cost of climate change impacts, or the economic benefits of reducing 
climate change risks. Mitigation costs vary across economies, both in terms of aggregate economic costs 
(as a share of GNP) and the marginal cost of abatement for each tonne of emissions. Both aggregate and 
marginal costs in Australia were found to be relatively high: Treasury, Australia's Low Pollution Future: 
The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation (Summary) (2008) 24. Several studies have suggested that 
Treasury may have overestimated the cost of Australian abatement. This is because Treasury assumed 
that the existing LULUCF rules would apply; however, these were still under negotiation and several rule 
changes proposed in the negotiations had the potential to allow Australia to increase its LULUCF 
abatement (from the projected 6 per cent of total emissions), which was a less expensive mitigation 
option than reducing fossil fuel-based emissions: see Andrew Macintosh, LULUCF Offsets and Australia's 
2020 Abatement Task (ANU Centre for Climate Law and Policy, 2011) 4-5, 27. See also den Elzen, Sharing 
Developed Countries' Post-2012 Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions Based on Comparable Efforts, 
above n 125, 11, 24, 35. However, the LULUCF rules ultimately adopted by Kyoto Parties were generally 
not expected to significantly increase Australia's LULUCF abatement potential (although there was some 
risk that it could earn 'windfall' credits from activities like forest management: see further chapter 9).  
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These costs were relatively higher than most developed nations which generally faced 
lower aggregate economic costs even with higher emission reduction targets, for 
example:  
 Japan: 0.4 per cent of GNP (41 per cent target); 
 EU-25: 0.4 per cent of GNP (30 per cent target); and 
 US:  0.6 per cent of GNP (28 per cent target).139 
 
Canada was projected to have similar costs to Australia's 25 per cent target only with a 
much higher target of 45 per cent (2.3 per cent of GNP).140 However, Russia and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States faced much higher costs even with a low target 
of 8 per cent (6 per cent of GNP).141  
ii) Per Capita Effort 
The Rudd government also believed that targets should involve comparable reductions 
on a per capita basis. Its target range (5, 15 or 25 per cent) represented a 34, 41 or 48 
per cent reduction in per capita terms.142 This matched or was higher than the per 
capita effort implied by most other developed nations' pledges.143 Only Norway's 
upper target was higher in this regard (at 51 per cent).144   
iii) Effort Relative to 2008-12 
Parties' targets are often compared by examining the percentage reduction from 
Kyoto's base year (1990). The Rudd government, however, was keen to highlight that 
its target range represented a 'very strong reduction' relative to Kyoto's first 
commitment period (2008-12);145 namely, 12, 22 or 32 per cent.146 Only Iceland and 
Norway's upper targets involved a larger percentage reduction from 2008-12 (40 and 
                                                     
 
139 Treasury, Australia's Low Pollution Future: The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation, above n 137, 
93, 110. Reductions from a 2001 base year. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Measured from 1990 to 2020: Australian Government, FOI Supplementary Brief: Comparability of 
Effort, above n 127, 3.  
143 Ibid: Japan (25 per cent); Canada (27 per cent); US (29 per cent); EU-27 (24 to 34 per cent); New 
Zealand (35 to 42 per cent); UK and Iceland (41 per cent) and Norway (43 to 51 per cent). 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid 1. 
146 Ibid. 
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41 per cent respectively).147 By comparison, the EU's upper 30 per cent reduction 
target only represented a 22 per cent reduction from 2008-12.148 
 
Based on the above metrics, the Rudd government's upper target appeared to make a 
strong and broadly comparable contribution to the developed countries' mitigation 
effort. It should be pointed out, however, that Australia's preferred metrics tended to 
put its target in a positive light. Per capita emission reductions, for example, appear 
larger in countries with growing populations, which was the case in Australia, whereas 
Parties such as the EU and Japan had relatively stable populations.149 Moreover, the 
population growth anticipated for Australia was due to government policies favouring 
high levels of immigration, meaning that the Rudd government had options available 
to it to reduce Australia's per capita mitigation effort.150 Further, while Australia's 
target appeared ambitious when measured against Kyoto's first commitment period, 
this argument implied that Parties should have a 'clean slate' in a post-2012 
agreement. Early movers like the EU – which led the mitigation effort under Kyoto's 
first commitment period – argued that they, rather than laggards like Australia, ought 
to be rewarded in a future agreement for their past mitigation efforts.151 
c) Other Proposed Metrics  
Parties proposed a range of other metrics or considerations relevant to assessing 
comparability of effort. Developing countries suggested criteria such as: economic and 
technological capacity,152 historical responsibility,153 per capita emission levels (both  
historic and current),154 equity,155 sustainable development156 and the demands of 
science157 (not all of which were easily quantifiable). It was also highlighted that 
                                                     
 
147 Ibid 3: Canada (+6 per cent) and the US targets (+4 per cent) represented an increase from 2008-12. 
Others, like Australia, would decrease: Japan (19 per cent); New Zealand (10 to 20 per cent); EU-27 (12 
to 22 per cent); UK (26 per cent); Iceland (40 per cent) and Norway (31 to 41 per cent).  
148 Ibid. 
149 Kelly Levin and Rob Bradley, 'Comparability of Annex I Emission Reduction Pledges' (Working Paper, 
World Resources Institute, February 2010) 10. 
150 See John C V Pezzey, Salim Mazouz and Frank Jotzo, 'The Logic of Collective Action and Australia's 
Climate Policy' (Research Report No 24, ANU Crawford School of Economics and Government, May 
2009) 10; Senate Select Committee on Climate Policy, above n 127, 229. 
151 See European Community, 'Enhanced Action on Mitigation', above n 19, 11.  
152 G77 and China, 'Mitigation and Means of Implementation', above n 95, 48. 
153 Ibid; India, 'Long-Term Co-Operative Action', above n 94, 31; Brazil, 'Views and Proposals on 
Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan' (30 September 2008), above n 96, 26. 
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targets should be legally comparable in terms of form (that is, they should be legally 
binding and use the same base year).158 The G77 and China also urged Annex I Parties 
to define their national targets based on objective criteria rather than political 
negotiation.159  
  
Developed countries referred to a large range of metrics in justifying their proposed 
targets. The EU, for example, put forward a multi-criteria approach involving GDP per 
capita; GHG emissions per unit of GDP; reward for early action in reducing emissions 
since 1990; population trends/growth; and total GHG emissions.160 Other metrics 
proposed by developed countries included, inter alia, reductions from BAU (US)161 and 
sectoral energy efficiency (Japan).162 Russia also proposed less economically orthodox 
metrics such as population-weighted heating degree days and average distance 
between ten major cities.163 As with Australia, the variety of metrics being proposed 
reflected the fact that each measure of comparability had different characteristics 
making them more, or less, attractive to particular countries (in terms of highlighting 
the level of effort required in their proposed targets).164 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
154 India, 'Long-Term Co-Operative Action', above n 94, 31; Bolivia, above n 108, 44. 
155 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(400) (1 April 
2009) 2.  
156 Ibid.  
157 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(418) (10 June 
2009) 1.  
158 AOSIS, 'Enhanced Action on Mitigation On Climate Change', above n 70, 33; South Africa, 'Elements of 
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162 See, eg, Japan, 'Application of Sectoral Approaches' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements 
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163 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(388) (4 
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164 See den Elzen, Exploring Comparable Post-2012 Reduction Efforts for Annex I Countries, above n 118, 
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Rejecting the wishes of developing countries, Australia, the US, EU and others, 
ultimately refused to set their national targets according to a negotiated formula, 
stating that this needed to be a national decision.165 While there is an argument that 
Australia and others ought to have set their targets according to an objective, 
internationally agreed formula, this did not appear to be a realistic option for many, 
particularly with countries like the US and Australia facing stiff domestic political 
opposition to introducing carbon reduction measures.166 Indeed, the Rudd government 
cautioned that imposing targets according to a top-down formula could jeopardise the 
participation of some Parties.167 A further problem with a top-down approach was that 
Parties could not agree on which criteria best measured CBDR&RC and comparability 
of effort, with all Parties putting forward their own preferences.168 The Rudd 
government thus saw the role of metrics as helping to inform the Parties' target-
setting, rather than defining the outcome.169   
d) Party Views of Australia's Target 
Several proposals regarding individual developed country targets were made in the 
negotiations. Under the EU's proposed burden-sharing formula, Australia was 
expected to cut its emissions by 24 per cent (below 1990 levels, excluding LULUCF), or 
27 per cent (including LULUCF) (in the context of a 30 per cent EU and Annex I group 
reduction).170 In late 2008, China also called for all developed nations to reduce their 
emissions by a minimum of 25 per cent (the bottom end of the IPCC's proposed Annex 
                                                     
 
165 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(418) (10 June 
2009) 1; International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(431) (1 
October) 1; Australia, 'Mitigation', above n 63, 77. 
166 Haroon Siddique, 'US Senate Drops Bill to Cap Carbon Emissions', The Guardian (online), 23 July 2010 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jul/23/us-senate-climate-change-bill>. See discussion 
of the Rudd government's domestic political difficulties later in this chapter and in chapter 7.  
167 See Australian Government, FOI OECD Roundtable on Sustainable Development (2009) 4. 
168 Evidence to Senate Select Committee on Climate Policy, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 20 May 
2009, 3 (Blair Comley, Deputy Secretary, Department of Climate Change). 
169 Ibid. 
170 See Australian Government, FOI Supplementary Briefing: EC Communication's Approach to Targets 
and Comparability of Effort (2009) 4; ClientEarth, 'Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
Legislation: International Comparative Analysis (Segment 2)' (Legal Policy Advice to the Australian 
Greens, ClientEarth, 23 September 2009) 32. 
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I range),171 while South Africa called for all developed countries to submit targets 
within the 25 to 40 per cent IPCC range.172 Meanwhile, AOSIS called for all Annex I 
Parties to pledge targets consistent with those of Norway (30 to 40 per cent).173  
 
During 2009, South Africa also submitted a more detailed proposal that allocated 
targets among Annex I countries according to the criteria of 'responsibility and 
capability'. This proposal allocated Australia a target of roughly 31 per cent by 2020 
(below 1990 levels), excluding the use of offsetting mechanisms like the CDM, and in 
the context of a 40 per cent Annex I reduction.174 A proposal by the Philippines went 
even further, allocating Australia a 41 per cent reduction target by 2020 (in the context 
of a 42 per cent Annex I reduction).175 A further submission by a large group of 
developing countries including the BASIC group, allocated targets according to 
historical responsibility only (since 1850 – roughly reflecting responsibility for 
                                                     
 
171 Adam Morton, 'Time to Act on Emissions Cuts, Rich Nations Told', The Age (online), 6 December 2008 
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172 Lenore Taylor, 'International Pressure on Rudd to Cut Emissions by 25pc', The Australian (online), 4 
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175 Philippines, 'A Negotiating Text for Consideration at AWG-LCA 6', above n 74, 64; International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(420) (12 June 2009) 2. The 
proposal referred to 2013-2017 and 2018-2022 commitment periods. Conversion to 2020 figures have 
been made by the author. 
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emissions since industrialisation).176 Under this approach, Australia was allocated a 
much smaller 11 per cent reduction target by 2020.177 
e) Evidence from the Literature 
Leading up to, and in the aftermath of Copenhagen, numerous studies attempted to 
assess the percentage targets that would reflect a comparable level of effort by 
developed countries. The 2008 Garnaut Climate Change Review (Garnaut Review), 
commissioned by the Rudd Labor Opposition and Australian state governments in 
2007, provided the most detailed independent assessment of this issue from an 
Australian perspective.178 The Garnaut Review allocated emission entitlements 
according to a relatively simple per capita contraction and convergence approach, 
believing that a per capita-based approach – with the aim of moving towards equal 
entitlements of per capita emissions by 2050 – had the most potential to be perceived 
as fair.179 The Review noted that Australia was a poor performer from a per capita 
perspective, with its per capita emissions the highest in the OECD and the sixth highest 
in the world, largely due to its heavy reliance on coal for electricity.180 Specifically, 
Australia's per capita emissions – roughly 28.1 tonnes of CO2-e per person (including 
LULUCF) – were approximately twice the OECD average, and four times the global 
average.181  
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The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation, above n 137, 91-93. CPRS-5 modelled a 550 ppm CO2-e 
scenario and CPRS-15 a 510 CO2-e scenario. 
179 Ross Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
202. Developed and developing countries were allocated emission entitlements that were initially equal 
to current levels. Over time, per capita entitlements decreased for countries above the global average, 
and increased for countries below the global average, although middle income developing countries like 
China were given temporary headroom to increase their emissions. Emissions entitlements were also 
tradable, increasing flexibility: 203, 207-08. 
180 Ibid 159. Five non-Annex I Parties had higher per capita emissions: Bahrain, Bolivia, Brunei, Kuwait 
and Qatar. 
181 Ibid 153. As of 2006. 
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Under Garnaut's contraction and convergence model Australia was allocated a 25 per 
cent reduction target (below 2000 levels) under a 450 ppm CO2-e global agreement – 
the upper target ultimately adopted by the Rudd government.182 This was below the 
developed country average of 31 per cent183 and lower than the targets proposed for 
many other developed countries (for example, Canada – 45 per cent; Japan – 41 per 
cent; EU – 30 per cent and US – 28 per cent). However, Garnaut believed that a 25 per 
cent target was justified when measured against the criteria of per capita effort184 and 
effort relative to 2008-2012.185  
 
Various international studies applied a much broader range of metrics (with a stronger 
emphasis on relative economic costs) to allocating targets.186 The wide range of 
metrics applied (see details in the footnotes), highlights that there is no agreement on 
precisely which metrics best assess fairness or comparability of effort. As such, many 
studies address this question by examining a range of metrics, and thus suggest a 
target range, rather than a single target. Briefly, targets allocated to Australia (below 
1990 levels) included:  
                                                     
 
182 Ibid 209. Under weaker GHG stabilisation scenarios, Garnaut proposed less ambitious reduction 
targets for Australia ranging from 0 per cent (no global agreement); 5 per cent (a successor agreement 
to Kyoto for Annex I countries and some actions by developing countries); to 10 per cent (550 ppm CO2-
e global agreement): 209, 282, 285 
183 Ibid 209.  
184 Ibid 209-210. In per capita terms, the 25 per cent target implied a 40 per cent reduction relative to 
both 2000 and 2012 levels – above the developed country average of 37 per cent from 2000, and 34 per 
cent from 2012. From a 2000 base year, the target was less than Canada (54), but above EU-25 (33) and 
equal to the US and Canada (40). From a 2012 base year, the target was above Canada (36), EU-25 (32), 
Japan (30) and the US (37).  
185 Ibid 209. In absolute terms measured from 2012, the 25 per cent target (32 per cent below 2000 
levels) equalled the developed country average, and individual nations including Japan and the US. It 
was slightly above Canada (30) and EU-25 (31). 
186 The analysis here concentrates on pre-COP 15 studies. For later studies, see, eg: Levin and Bradley, 
'Comparability of Annex I Emission Reduction Pledges', above n 149; Warwick J McKibbin, Adele Morris 
and Peter J Wilcoxen, 'Comparing Climate Commitments: A Model-based Analysis of the Copenhagen 
Accord' (Discussion Paper, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, June 2010); Jotzo, 
above n 127; M G J den Elzen et al, Evaluation of the Copenhagen Accord: Chances and Risks for the 2°C 
Climate Goal (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, May 2010) 17. 
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 Ecofys 2007: 22 to 29 per cent (in the context of a 30 per cent Annex I group 
target/450 ppm CO2-e global mitigation scenario);187 
 NEAA 2008: +9 (an emissions increase) to 25 per cent (30 per cent Annex I 
target/450 ppm CO2-e).188 This did not account for LULUCF. The Climate 
Institute calculated that including LULUCF would increase the bottom end of 
this range from +9 to 20 per cent;189  
 NEAA 2009: +15 (an emissions increase) to 18 per cent (30 per cent Annex I 
target/450 ppm CO2-e);190  
 Energy Research Centre 2009: 18 or 24 per cent (25 and 30 per cent Annex I 
targets, respectively);191 and 
 Climate Action Tracker 2009: rated Australia's 25 per cent target 'medium', 
falling short of the 'sufficient' and 'role model' categories (2°C temperature 
threshold scenario).192  
 
While the above studies varied considerably in their assessment of what was ethically 
required of Australia, overall they broadly confirmed that the Rudd government's 25 
per cent target (24 per cent from 1990 levels) was at least within an appropriate 
                                                     
 
187 Höhne, Phylipsen and Moltmann, above n 118, 207. The range of targets reflected the application of 
different metrics. Metrics applied: equal percentage reduction of CO2-e emissions; GHG intensity 
targets (equal percentage reduction of emissions per GDP); convergence of CO2-e emissions per capita 
by 2050; convergence of CO2-e emissions per GDP by 2050; the Brazilian historical responsibility 
proposal (historical emissions since 1900 – proposed by Brazil during the Kyoto negotiations in 1997, 
excluding LULUCF); triptych; and sectoral targets: ii, 31-33.  
188 This target was for 'Oceania' (Australia and New Zealand, of which Australia was the predominant 
emitter): den Elzen, Exploring Comparable Post-2012 Reduction Efforts for Annex I Countries, above n 
118, 62, 15, 48. Metrics: equal percentage reduction below BAU emissions; equal marginal abatement 
costs; equal abatement costs as a percentage of GNP and GDP (excluding the use of flexibility 
mechanisms); equal per capita emissions by 2050; triptych approach (allocation based on converging 
technological standards or targets at the sectoral level). 
189 The Climate Institute, 'Australian Climate Policy and its Role in the Global Climate Agreement' 
(Briefing, May 2009) 3. 
190 Den Elzen, Sharing Developed Countries' Post-2012 Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions Based on 
Comparable Efforts, above n 125, 34. Metrics: equal reduction from baseline; equal MAC; equal costs 
(excluding flexibility mechanisms); equal costs (including international emissions trading and CDM); 
converging per-capita emissions; EU Commission principles (GDP per capita, GHG emissions per GDP, 
percentage change in emissions 1990 to 2006, and population growth 2006 to 2020); EU Council 
principles; and equal marginal cost plus GDP per capita. LULUCF included in Kyoto base year. 
191 Winkler, Marquard and Letete, above n 174, 6, 7, 13. The study applied various burden-sharing 
approaches developed in the literature or by Parties, namely, the Greenhouse Development Rights 
framework; the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy proposal; the European 
Commission approach; and its own method. 
192 See Climate Action Tracker, above n 127. The other rating was 'inadequate'. 
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ballpark for Australia. Notably, several of these studies premised their allocations on a 
collective 30 per cent reduction by Annex I Parties while the Rudd government 
indicated that it was prepared to adopt its upper target if the advanced economies 
reduced their collective emissions by only 25 per cent. As such, the Rudd government's 
target actually went slightly further than what several studies suggested was necessary 
from Australia. Having said this, it needs to be remembered that the above allocations 
were only premised on a 450 ppm CO2-e or 2°C scenario (and a maximum 30 per cent 
Annex I reduction). Several studies allocated targets under more ambitious 
atmospheric stabilisation and Annex I scenarios. These allocated Australia the 
following targets: 
 NEAA 2008: 2 to 35 per cent (40 per cent Annex I target/400 ppm CO2-e global 
scenario).193 According to the Climate Institute, this equated to 25 to 30 per 
cent including LULUCF;194 and 
 ERC 2009: 29 to 42 per cent (40 per cent Annex I target).195 
 
These studies, although limited, demonstrated that while the 25 per cent target may 
have broadly represented a comparable level of effort by Australia under a 450 ppm 
CO2-e/2°C scenario and a 30 per cent Annex I reduction, it likely needed to be 
increased to make a sufficient contribution to the more ambitious mitigation scenarios 
called for by AOSIS and the LDCs (350 ppm CO2-e/1.5°C target with a 45 per cent 
Annex I reduction). See further discussion of this issue at section G. 
D Appropriateness of Setting a Conditional Target Range 
The Rudd government's upper mitigation target appeared to make a broadly sufficient, 
if not leading, contribution to a 450 ppm CO2-e long-term goal, however, the 
government itself accepted that the lower 5 and 15 per cent reduction targets were 
not scientifically credible. Rather, these lower targets were only offered in the event 
that Copenhagen delivered a sub-optimal climate agreement.  It needs to be 
questioned whether this was an appropriate policy approach.  
                                                     
 
193 Den Elzen, Exploring Comparable Post-2012 Reduction Efforts for Annex I Countries, above n 118, 68.  
194 The Climate Institute, 'Australian Climate Policy and Its Role in the Global Climate Agreement', above 
n 189, 3. 
195 Winkler, Marquard and Letete, above n 174, 9, 11, 14, 28.  
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1 The Government's Rationale 
According to the Department of Climate Change (DCC), there were three major factors 
behind the government's decision to set a conditional target range. First, was the 
belief that emission reductions by Australia would have little global impact unless 
comparable action was taken by other Parties. As stated by the DCC, 'Given that 
Australia emits around 1 ½ per cent of global emissions, if we act unilaterally and no-
one else does anything, then there is very little impact on the prospects for a sound 
environmental outcome.'196 The department's view, which was reflected in the 
conditions attached to the 25 and 15 per cent targets, was that a global agreement 
needed to involve at least 'the key major emitters that make up most of the emissions' 
in order to be effective.197  
 
Second, the conditional approach was viewed as an important negotiating tactic, what 
the DCC labelled 'the negotiating dynamic of having a quid pro quo'.198 In other words, 
Australia would do more, if others did more.199 Thus the conditional target range was 
designed to leverage greater action by other Parties, as well as to bring other Parties 
'to the [negotiating] table.'200  
 
The third, and likely dominant concern, related to the potential economic impact of 
undertaking higher levels of mitigation than Australia's key economic competitors.201 
In particular, the DCC highlighted the potential commercial impact on Australia's trade-
exposed emissions-intensive industries (EITEs)202 – the same argument once made by 
the Howard government in securing a weak mitigation target for Australia under Kyoto 
and in refusing to ratify that agreement. The DCC noted that if Australia adopted a 
comparable target to its major competitors, this would lessen any competitiveness 
                                                     
 
196 Evidence to Senate Select Committee on Climate Policy, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 20 May 
2009, 11 (Blair Comley, Deputy Secretary, Department of Climate Change). 
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ibid. 
201 See ibid. 
202 Ibid. 
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issues that would otherwise arise.203 While competitiveness issues could be addressed 
by other means such as financially compensating trade-exposed industries, this was 
economically inefficient as it would simply shift a larger emission reduction burden to 
other sectors of the economy.204 
 
The CPRS Bill Explanatory Memorandum further explained that while the government's 
25 per cent target was conditional upon a 450 ppm CO2-e climate agreement being 
adopted, it accepted the Garnaut Review's finding that it was better to adopt some, 
rather than no mitigation, in the event that an optimal agreement was not reached.205 
This would still reduce the risk of dangerous climate change occurring while building 
'confidence that deep cuts in emissions [were] … compatible with continuing economic 
growth and improved living standards.'206 Even a commitment to a lower target could 
help to bring about 'stronger global reductions in emissions over time'207 and would 
position Australia 'to make deeper and more rapid reductions in emissions' if global 
momentum grew after 2020.208 
2 Approaches of Other Parties 
Developing countries such as the Philippines called for all developed countries to 
commit to unconditional targets.209 Many Annex I Parties, however, preferred to put 
forward conditional target ranges. This included the EU, Belarus, Liechtenstein, New 
Zealand, Norway, Russia and Switzerland. Others offered single pledges, though still 
with conditions attached, including Canada, Croatia, Iceland, Japan, Monaco, Ukraine 
and the US (see examples in table below).  
 
 
                                                     
 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill 17.  
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid 15. Treasury similarly stated that adopting even sub-optimal mitigation targets was 
advantageous to Australia as economies that deferred mitigation in the short-term were likely to face 
higher long-term costs, as more emission-intensive infrastructure was locked in place and global 
investment was redirected to early movers: Treasury, Australia's Low Pollution Future: The Economics of 
Climate Change Mitigation, above n 137, 89.  
209 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(431) (1 
October) 4. 
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Party Target or Target 
Range 
Conditions 
EU 20 to 30 per cent 
below 1990 levels 
20 per cent: unilateral 
30 per cent: 
- as part of a global and comprehensive agreement 
for the period beyond 2012 
- provided that other developed countries commit 
themselves to comparable emission reductions and 
that developing countries contribute adequately 
according to their responsibilities and respective 
capabilities 
Japan 25 per cent below 
1990 levels 
Conditional on the establishment of a fair and 
effective international framework in which all major 
economies participate and on agreement by those 
economies on ambitious targets 
New Zealand 10 to 20 per cent 
below 1990 levels 
Adopt a target within this range if there is a 
comprehensive global agreement. This means:  
- the global agreement sets the world on a pathway 
to limit temperature rise to no more than 2°C 
- developed countries make comparable efforts to 
those of New Zealand 
- advanced and major emitting developing countries 
take action fully commensurate with their respective 
capabilities 
- there is an effective set of rules for LULUCF 
- there is full recourse to a broad and efficient 
international carbon market 
Norway 30 to 40 per cent 
below 1990 levels 
- 30 per cent: unilateral 
40 per cent:  
- as part of a global and comprehensive agreement 
for the period beyond 2012 where major emitting 
Parties agree on emissions reductions in line with 
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Table 3. Select Annex I Party targets and conditions pledged under the Copenhagen Accord. 210 
 
The above table illustrates that Australia's general approach was consistent with that 
of many other developed countries. It will be seen below that many developing 
countries also offered conditional target ranges. However, while the focus of this 
chapter is not on assessing the comparability of Australia's sub-optimal targets to 
other developed countries, it should be highlighted that Australia's unilateral target 
was far less ambitious than the leading nation in this regard, Norway, who made a 
unilateral commitment to reduce emissions by 30 per cent by 2020.211  
3 The Economics and Politics of Unilateral Versus Collective Action 
It was noted above that the main driver of Australia's conditional approach was likely 
the government's concern about the domestic economic (and related political) 
consequences of adopting mitigation targets that were out of step with Australia's 
                                                     
 
210 See UNFCCC, Appendix I – Quantified Economy-wide Emissions Targets for 2020, above n 127. 
211 As well as being less ambitious than Norway's unilateral target in percentage terms, Australia's target 
was also lower according to the government's preferred metrics of per capita effort and effort from 
Kyoto's  first commitment period: see Australian Government, FOI Supplementary Brief: Comparability 
of Effort, above n 127, 3.  
  the 2°C target 
- the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol or its basic 
elements, in particular the flexible mechanisms 
Russian 
Federation 
15 to 25 below 
1990 levels 
Range dependent on: 
- appropriate accounting of the potential of Russia's 
forestry in meeting its emission reduction 
obligations 
- legally binding obligations by all major emitters to 
reduce anthropogenic GHG emissions 
US 17 per cent below 
2005 levels 
To be adopted in conformity with anticipated US 
energy and climate legislation, recognising that the 
final target will be reported to the Secretariat in light 
of enacted legislation 
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competitors. The two major policy inputs to the Rudd government's climate change 
policy, Treasury's Low Pollution Future Report and the Garnaut Review, both advised 
the government to adopt proportional, rather than leading mitigation targets. Similar 
to what was stated by the DCC, Treasury saw unified global action as 'more attractive 
because of its environmental and economic benefits.'212 Coordinated global action 
would minimise competitiveness distortions.213 Without unified global action, 
however, the international competitiveness of Australia's EITE sectors would be 
impacted by a relatively higher domestic carbon price.214 Treasury warned that as well 
as losing Australian industries and jobs, associated emissions would simply shift to 
other countries which had lower or non-existent carbon prices, potentially increasing 
global emissions where industries moved to more carbon-intensive economies (a 
process called 'carbon leakage').215 In light of these concerns, Treasury recommended 
that Australia adopt a 5 per cent target by 2020 under a 550 ppm CO2-e agreement, 
and 15 per cent under a 510 ppm CO2-e agreement.216  
 
The Garnaut Review similarly advised that '[s]trong Australian mitigation outside an 
effective international agreement' was 'deeply problematic'.217 According to Garnaut, 
one of the key benefits of acting collectively was that an international agreement 
would allow Parties to trade in emissions entitlements, helping to equalise costs across 
countries and remove distortions associated with EITE industries (such as the shielding 
of these industries from carbon pricing by national governments).218 Under a strong 
global framework, Australia could maintain its comparative advantage in EITE 
industries by purchasing emission entitlements to allow these industries to continue to 
expand.219 For similar reasons to Treasury, Garnaut recommended that the Rudd 
                                                     
 
212 Treasury, Australia's Low Pollution Future: The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation, above n 137, 
103. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid 167. On carbon pricing, see chapter 7. 
215 Ibid 169. 
216 Treasury, Australia's Low Pollution Future: The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation (Summary), 
above n 138, 8. 
217 Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report, above n 179, 281. 
218 Ibid 285-86. Many other studies have reached similar conclusions regarding the economic benefits of 
collective action: see, eg, The Climate Group, Breaking the Climate Deadlock: Cutting the Cost (The 
Economic Benefits of Collaborative Climate Action) (2009). 
219 Ibid 286. 
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government put forward a conditional target range, in this case: a minimum 5 per cent 
target in the absence of a comprehensive agreement, 10 per cent under a 550 ppm 
CO2-e agreement and 25 per cent under a 450 ppm CO2-e agreement.220  
 
Not all economists shared the view, however, that Australia's economic interests were 
best served by adopting a proportional response. Pezzey, Mazouz and Jotzo, for 
example – the latter author being a key contributor to the Garnaut Review – argued 
that a strong unilateral target was actually in Australia's long-term self-interest. The 
authors' argued that because stringent emission reduction measures were 'likely 
inevitable' in the long-term, early movers would ultimately benefit by avoiding the 
lock-in of carbon-intensive industries.221 Furthermore, the longer significant mitigation 
action was delayed, the higher the ultimate economic cost of decarbonising Australia's 
economy.222  
 
While not all economists thus shared the mainstream economic view that it was better 
to act in step with other nations, the government also faced domestic political 
realities, namely, that it was under considerable pressure by many in the influential 
business sector not to act ahead of other nations.  Industries that would be most 
affected by carbon pricing strongly argued that it was environmentally ineffective for 
Australia to unilaterally reduce its emissions,223 and warned of job losses if Australia's 
competitors did not face similar carbon costs.224 One mainstream business advocate, 
the Australian Industry Group, supported the government's 25 per cent target (bearing 
in mind the strong conditions attached), but was opposed to even a 5 per cent target 
in the absence of comparable action by other economies.225 Many large businesses 
and industry groups also highlighted the potential consequences for the economy and 
                                                     
 
220 Ibid 277.  
221 Pezzey, Mazouz and Jotzo, above n 150, 10. 
222 Ibid 11. 
223 See, eg, Senate Select Committee on Fuel and Energy, Parliament of Australia, The CPRS: Economic 
Cost without Environmental Benefit: Interim Report (2009) 13 (ExxonMobil Australia and BP Australia). 
224 Ibid 28-29 (Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Western Australia). See further regarding industry 
concerns about the potential loss of jobs: Senate Select Committee on Climate Policy, above n 127, 104-
07. 
225 Evidence to Senate Select Committee on Climate Policy, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 20 May 
2009, 60 (Peter Burn, Australian Industry Group).  
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jobs of adopting even the 5 per cent target. The Cement Industry Federation, for 
example, warned that Australia would 'see [cement] plants progressively shutting 
down … in Australia'.226 Similarly, Woodside Energy argued that the competitiveness of 
Australia's liquefied natural gas industry would be threatened,227 while Rio Tinto stated 
that half of its open-cut coalmines could close by 2020.228 The above statements 
provide just a snapshot of the significant political pressure the government was under 
from the carbon-intensive business sector to adopt a proportional mitigation target – if 
any. As noted by Pezzey, Mazouz and Jotzo, these types of arguments were regularly 
repeated by the 'carbon lobby', weakening public support for any given level of cuts.229   
 
A further political reality for the government was that it did not have sufficient votes in 
the federal Parliament to legislate targets that were not viewed as being proportional 
to Australia's competitors. The Rudd government possessed the constitutional 
authority to adopt mitigation targets at the international level (as part of the executive 
government's treaty making power),230 but any policy measures to allow Australia to 
achieve its targets, such as an emissions trading scheme, needed to be legislated. 
While the minority Australian Greens party called for the adoption of an unconditional 
25 per cent target or higher, and 40 per cent in the context of a global treaty,231 the 
government needed the support of the Liberal National Opposition in the Senate to 
pass its legislation. The Coalition offered bipartisan support for Australia's target 
range,232 but held even stronger views than Labor that Australia's mitigation targets 
                                                     
 
226 Senate Select Committee on Climate Policy, above n 127, 22. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Pezzey, Mazouz and Jotzo, above n 150, 11. On the strong influence of the carbon lobby over 
Australian climate policy, see generally, Andrew Macintosh, 'Domestic Influences on the Howard 
Government's Climate Policy: Using the past As a Guide to the Future' (2008) 11 Asia Pacific Journal of 
Environmental Law 51; Guy Pearse, High & Dry (Penguin, 2007). 
230 Australian Constitution s 61. The Australian Executive's power to enter into treaties (for practical 
purposes the relevant Ministers and Cabinet) is considered to be absolute: Commonwealth v Tasmania 
(1983) 158 CLR 1, 303 (Dawson J). See generally, George Winterton, 'Limits to the Use of the "Treaty 
Power"' in Philip Alston and Madeline Chiam (eds), Treaty-Making and Australia: Globalisation Versus 
Sovereignty (Federation Press, 1995) 29. 
231 Senate Select Committee on Climate Policy, above n 127, 229. 
232 This was offered under two successive Opposition leaders, Malcolm Turnbull and then Tony Abbott: 
Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
Bill 2009 and Related Bills (2009) 54, 71; James Grubel, 'Australia Carbon Laws in Doubt, Election 
Possible', The Guardian (online), 1 December 2009 <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/12/01/uk-
australia-carbon-idUKTRE5B00JX20091201>. 
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and associated legislation needed to align with Australia's major competitors (see 
further discussion of the politics of legislating the CPRS Bill in chapter 7).233 Reflecting 
the concerns of carbon-intensive industries, Opposition leader, Tony Abbott, insisted 
that acting ahead of the international community would 'damage the Australian 
economy' and put Australia at a 'competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the rest of the 
world'.234 As such, there were clearly strong political barriers to the Rudd government 
adopting an ambitious unilateral target in the post-2012 negotiations. See further 
discussion of this political reality for the government at section G. 
E Were the Rudd Government's 25 Per Cent Target Conditions 
Appropriate? 
This chapter now turns to examining the conditions attached by the Rudd government 
to the 25 per cent target. The Rudd government regarded these conditions as 'the 
sorts of conditions that would have to be met in order to be on the path to a 450 parts 
per million agreement.'235  The implications of these conditions from a GIC perspective 
are considered fully at section G. Broadly speaking, however, this chapter suggests that 
in order to be acceptable from a GIC perspective, these conditions needed to be 
reasonable and proportionate, in the sense that they did not establish unrealistic 
expectations of other Parties or be so stringent as to make the upper target illusory. 
They also needed to be consistent with the relevant legal framework (where this was 
relevant). 
1 Commitments by all economies sufficient to deliver long-term stabilisation of 
greenhouse gases at 450 ppm CO2-e or lower 
This was certainly a reasonable condition for the 25 per cent target. Given that 
Australia's upper target represented a broadly proportionate contribution to a 450 
ppm CO2-e agreement, it was reasonable to condition this target on other Parties 
similarly adopting mitigation commitments that were consistent with a 450 ppm CO2-e 
scenario. 
                                                     
 
233 See, eg, Senate Economics Legislation Committee, above n 232, 71. 
234 Tony Abbott and Julie Bishop, 'Transcript of Joint Doorstop Interview' (Canberra, 2 December 2009). 
235 Evidence to Senate Select Committee on Climate Policy, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 20 May 
2009, 5 (Blair Comley, Deputy Secretary, Department of Climate Change). 
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2 A peak year for global emissions of no later than 2020 
This was also a reasonable expectation. As explained in chapter 5, the literature 
indicated that it would be extremely difficult, both economically and technologically, 
for Parties to achieve the 450 ppm CO2-e goal if global emissions did not peak by 2020 
at the latest.  
3 Aggregate advanced economy reductions of at least 25 per cent below 1990 
levels by 2020  
As outlined above, the IPCC AR4 estimated that in order to achieve a 450 ppm CO2-e 
target developed countries would need to collectively reduce their emissions by 25 to 
40 per cent by 2020 (below 1990 levels). On its face, therefore, this condition also 
appeared to be reasonable. Indeed, as seen above, the Rudd government could have 
conditioned its upper target on a 30 per cent Annex I reduction and still have been 
regarded as acting reasonably. Assessing the merits of this condition, however, was 
complicated by the fact that the government tied the upper target to a 25 per cent 
aggregate reduction by the 'advanced economies', rather than the Annex I group. The 
government indicated that its reference to the 'advanced economies' included the 
Annex I Parties but also 'at least some other high/middle income economies'.236 This 
raised the question as to whether it was appropriate to condition Australia's 25 per 
cent target on a specific reduction by the advanced economies, rather than just the 
Annex I group. 
a) The Issue of Differentiation 
This condition reflected a broader debate taking place within the post-2012 
negotiations on how best to differentiate between treaty Parties. As noted earlier, only 
Annex I Parties agreed to adopt policies and measures to reduce their GHG emissions 
under the UNFCCC, reflecting the article 3 principles of equity, CBDR&RC and 
developed country leadership. This situation was repeated under the Kyoto Protocol, 
with only Annex I Parties agreeing to binding emission reduction commitments. This 
was despite arguments by Australia – under both the Keating and Howard 
                                                     
 
236 Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill 16. The World Bank categorises countries as low, middle and 
high income: see World Bank, Country and Lending Groups <http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifications/country-and-lending-groups>. 
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governments – as well as other JUSCANZ nations, that some developing countries also 
needed to adopt emission reduction commitments (see chapter 2). 
 
The debate regarding which Parties ought to adopt binding mitigation targets raised its 
head again in the post-2012 negotiations. The Rudd government's position was that all 
advanced economies – a category not defined by the UNFCCC or Protocol – should 
adopt legally binding, economy-wide mitigation targets (under paragraph 1(b)(i) of the 
BAP) or at least a blend of actions under paragraphs 1(b)(i) and (ii).237 It also called 
upon advanced economies which had not yet joined Annex I to do so.238 Believing that 
the existing membership of Annex I no longer reflected 'current realities',239 the Rudd 
government proposed the adoption of an 'objective basis' to graduate non-Annex I 
Parties to the Annex I group, replacing the current voluntary system, so that all 
advanced economies adopted comparable mitigation commitments under a post-2012 
agreement.240 This was a view generally shared by other developed countries such as 
the US and Russia.241  
 
Annex I Parties proposed a range of metrics to assist in determining which Parties were 
in a position to graduate to Annex I, or at least adopt legally comparable targets to 
non-Annex I Parties. The Rudd government highlighted the metrics of GDP per capita 
and the UN Human Development Index (HDI) (a more holistic assessment of human 
well-being than GDP).242 It noted that as of 2007, 44 non-Annex I Parties had a higher 
                                                     
 
237 Australia, 'Mitigation', above n 63, 74. 
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240 Australia, 'Views on the Means to Achieve Mitigation Objectives of Annex Parties for the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol', above n 134, 5. 
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GDP per capita than the Ukraine (an Annex I country),243 and as of 2005, 43 non-Annex 
I Parties had a greater HDI ranking than Turkey (an Annex I Party under the UNFCCC 
but not an Annex B Party under the Protocol).244  
 
Several Parties were singled out by the Rudd government as being especially good 
candidates to join Annex I, namely, Singapore, South Korea and Malta245 (the latter 
subsequently joined both Annex I of the UNFCCC and Annex B of the Protocol for its 
second commitment period).246 These countries were regarded as advanced 
economies under the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) classification system, 
probably the most accepted list of advanced economies.247 Notably, however, the 
government's proposal also referred to many countries (among them Brazil, China and 
South Africa) who were still generally regarded as emerging or developing economies. 
The government's list even included several LDCs (Equatorial Guinea, the Maldives and 
Samoa).248  
 
Other developed countries also made proposals to broaden the Annex I group, but the 
EU, for example, limited its suggestions to countries that were more widely accepted 
as being advanced, namely: existing Annex I Parties; EU member states; EU candidate 
                                                     
 
243 Australia, 'Mitigation', above n 63, 78. Namely: Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Bahamas; Bahrain; 
Barbados; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Chile; China; Colombia; Costa 
Rica; Cyprus; Dominican Republic; Equatorial Guinea; Grenada; Iran; Israel; Kazakhstan; Korea; Kuwait; 
Libya; Malaysia; Maldives; Malta; Mauritius; Mexico; Namibia; Oman; Panama; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; 
Seychelles;  Singapore; South Africa; St Kitts and Nevis; St Vincent and the Grenadines; Thailand; 
Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkmenistan;  United Arab Emirates; Uruguay.  
244 Ibid 78-79. Namely: Albania; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Bahamas; Bahrain; Barbados; Belize; 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Chile; China; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cyprus; 
Dominica; Dominican Republic; Grenada; Israel; Kazakhstan; Korea; Libya; Macedonia FYR; Malaysia; 
Malta; Mauritius; Mexico; Oman; Panama; Qatar; Samoa; Saudi Arabia; Seychelles; Singapore; St Kitts 
and Nevis; St Vincent and the Grenadines; Tonga; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; United Arab Emirates; 
Uruguay; Venezuela. 
245 Ibid 74. 
246 See UNFCCC, Appendix I – Quantified Economy-wide Emissions Targets for 2020, above n 127; 
UNFCCC, Doha Amendment <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php>. 
247 See International Monetary Fund, Country Composition of WEO Groups (October 2012) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/groups.htm#ae>. Namely: Australia; 
Austria; Belgium; Canada; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; 
Hong Kong SAR; Iceland; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Korea; Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands; New 
Zealand; Norway; Portugal; San Marino; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; 
Switzerland; Taiwan Province of China; United Kingdom; United States.  
248 See UN-OHRLLS, About LDCs <http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/>.  
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countries and potential candidate countries; OECD member countries and candidate 
countries.249  
 
Non-Annex I Parties, however, were generally opposed to expanding the membership 
of Annex I, other than on a voluntary basis.250 The G77 and China, among others, firmly 
rejected all proposals to more precisely differentiate between non-Annex I Parties.251 
Brazil insisted that the UNFCCC defined developed countries as 'Annex I Parties' and 
developing countries as 'non-Annex I Parties', and that the BAP did not authorise 
Parties to renegotiate these categories, nor the 'graduation' of Parties from one 
category to another.252  
b) Implications for Australia's Condition 
The Rudd government's desire to encourage newly advanced economies such as South 
Korea and Singapore to adopt Annex I-level commitments was perfectly legitimate, as 
these countries were widely regarded to be developed economies. However, while the 
government's focus was on graduating these Parties to Annex I, it was certainly 
questionable why it thought it appropriate to include poorer developing countries, 
especially the LDCs, on its lists of those who could potentially join Annex I. Under the 
Convention principles of equity, CBDR&RC and developed country leadership, poorer 
                                                     
 
249 European Community, 'Enhanced Action on Mitigation', above n 19, 10. OECD countries include: 
Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Chile; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; 
Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Korea; Luxembourg; Mexico; Netherlands; New 
Zealand; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; 
United Kingdom; United States: OECD, Members and Partners 
<http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/>. For a more expansive proposal see, eg, Japan, 
'Japan's Proposal for AWG-LCA: For Preparation of Chairs document for COP 14' in UNFCCC, Ideas and 
Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan, UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5 (30 September 2008) 40, 41. See further Katia Karousakis et al, 
Differentiating Countries in Terms of Mitigation Commitments, Actions and Support (2008) (OECD). 
250 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(395) (1-12 
December 2008) 18; G77 and China, 'Mitigation and Means of Implementation', above n 95, 48; 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(381) (21 August 
2008) 1 (African Group). Cf Madagascar, 'Shared Vision' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements 
Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 2 (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.2 (Part 2) (6 December 2008) 26, 27. 
251 G77 and China, 'Mitigation and Means of Implementation', above n 95, 48. 
252 Brazil, 'Views and Proposals on Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals 
on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.1 (6 
February 2009) 17, 17.  
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countries like the LDCs were certainly not expected to adopt equivalent mitigation 
targets to developed countries. 
 
Given the controversy regarding which countries ought to adopt the most stringent 
form of mitigation commitments under the ICCL regime, it is certainly doubtful 
whether it was appropriate to condition Australia's 25 per cent target on a collective 
reduction by the advanced economies. In doing so, the government provided itself 
considerable discretion to determine whether this condition was fulfilled given that it 
was not settled which countries were actually advanced. Ultimately, very few of the 
Parties which Australia identified on its target lists agreed to adopt Annex I-style 
commitments, with most (including Singapore and Korea) only pledging voluntary 
actions to reduce their emissions below BAU.253 While the government's approach on 
this issue was understandable (at least as far as countries like Singapore and South 
Korea were concerned), it certainly would have been more consistent with the terms 
of the Convention to have made the 25 per cent target conditional upon a collective 
reduction by the Annex I group; a well-established group under the Convention. 
4 Major developing economy commitments to slow growth and reduce absolute 
emissions over time 
The Rudd government attached several conditions to its upper target relating to the 
major developing economies (see also conditions 5 and 6 below). In contrast to its 
position on the advanced economies, the government was more specific on who these 
conditions related to. Specifically, the  government indicated that the 'major 
developing economies' referred to the non-Annex I members of the Major Economies 
Forum; that is, China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico and South Africa254 
(several of which it also believed could be categorised as advanced economies). The 
                                                     
 
253 See UNFCCC, Appendix II – Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions of Developing Country Parties 
<http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/items/5265.php>; UNFCCC, Compilation of 
Information on Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions to be Implemented by Parties not included in 
Annex I to the Convention, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/Inf.1 (18 March 2011) 42; Climate Action 
Tracker, above n 127. Singapore, for example, agreed to reduce its emissions by 7 to 16 per cent below 
BAU by 2020 and Korea 30 per cent below BAU by 2020. Countries such as Cyprus and Malta (as part of 
the EU commitment) and Kazakhstan did, however, pledge binding, economy-wide targets as part of the 
Copenhagen Accord:  UNFCCC, Appendix I – Quantified Economy-wide Emissions Targets for 2020, above 
n 127. 
254 Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill 16. 
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significance of this group was that it represented the seven largest emerging 
economies who were all in the top 20 group of global GHG emitters.255 Most notable in 
the group was China, the world's largest CO2 emitter since 2006.256  
 
The requirement that the major developing economies slow their growth and reduce 
absolute emissions over time was a very general expectation; one that was likely to be 
easily satisfied given that all major developing countries had indicated a willingness to 
adopt mitigation actions under paragraph (ii) of the BAP. The more controversial 
aspect of condition 4 was that it called for the major developing economies to adopt 
'commitments' as opposed to 'actions' under a new agreement. Similar to condition 3, 
this condition needs to be interpreted in the context of a broader debate in the 
negotiations, this time regarding the legal form that new developing country 
mitigation measures ought to adopt. 
a) The Issue of 'Commitments' Versus 'Actions'  
As noted earlier, under the BAP, developed countries were expected to adopt either 
mitigation 'commitments' or 'actions' (paragraph 1(b)(i)), while developing countries 
were only called upon to adopt 'nationally appropriate mitigation actions' (NAMAs, 
paragraph 1(b)(ii)). The BAP was unclear on the nature of the legal distinction between 
'commitments' and NAMAs, but the developing countries,257 and most Annex I 
countries258 including Australia,259 expected the developed countries to again adopt 
legally binding, economy-wide targets as per the Kyoto Protocol. 
                                                     
 
255 Den Ezlen, Evaluation of the Copenhagen Accord: Chances and Risks for the 2°C Climate Goal, above n 
186, 20; Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report, above n 179, 54. 
256 Ibid. 
257 See, eg, G77 and China, 'Shared Vision', above n 19, 50; AOSIS, 'Enhanced Action on Mitigation on 
Climate Change', above n 70, 33. Least Developed Countries, 'Fulfilment of the Bali Action Plan and the 
Components of the Agreed Outcome to be Adopted by the Conference of the Parties its Fifteenth 
Session', above n 58, 6. 
258 See, eg, European Community, 'Enhanced Action on Mitigation', above n 19, 10; Japan, 'Japan's 
Proposal for AWG-LCA: For Preparation of Chairs Document for COP 14', above n 249, 41; International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(426) (14 August 2009) 2 (US).  
Cf Russia, 'Ideas and Proposals on the Elements of Paragraph 1 of the Decision 1/CP.13 (Bali Action 
Plan)', above n 62, 85. 
259 Australia, 'Schedules in a Post-2012 Treaty' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in 
Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Part 1, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part 1) (24 April 2009) 
22, 22; Australia, 'Views on the Means to Achieve Mitigation Objectives of Annex Parties for the Ad Hoc 
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As noted, the legal nature of NAMAs was also unclear in the BAP. The Rudd 
government's position was that whether or not the developing countries' mitigation 
measures were ultimately called 'commitments' or NAMAs, these needed to be legally 
binding.260 This view was shared by various developed countries, among them, 
Russia,261 Canada262 and the US.263 Recognising that adopting binding, economy-wide 
targets was a challenging proposition for developing countries, Australia and Japan 
both suggested that the major developing economies could adopt sectoral targets as a 
first step (which would only apply to specific sectors of the economy such as energy 
production).264  
 
Related to this discussion, the Rudd government proposed a unified format for 
developed and developing countries to register their commitments and NAMAs in a 
post-2012 agreement, which it referred to as 'national schedules'. The schedules 
would be legally binding, with developed countries outlining their economy-wide 
commitments.265 Meanwhile developing countries would list their NAMAs or in some 
cases commitments (whether economy-wide or sectoral).266 
 
The developed country position was controversial with most developing countries, 
who generally rejected the need for developing countries to adopt legally binding 
commitments, or even binding actions. Brazil, for example, insisted that developing 
countries would only adopt voluntary actions under paragraph 1(b)(ii) of the BAP, 
which it interpreted as possessing a different intensity and legal nature than measures 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol', above n 134, 4. 
Note that Australia referred to these Parties as 'advanced economies'. 
260 Australia, 'Mitigation', above n 63, 74. 
261 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(411) (2 June 
2009) 1. 
262 Canada, 'Ideas and Proposals on Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan', above n 128, 109. 
263 United States, 'Submission on the AWG-LCA Chair's Assembly Document' in UNFCCC, Ideas and 
Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 2 (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.2 (Part 2) (6 December 2008) 71, 71. 
264 Australia, 'Legal Architecture for a Post-2012 Outcome', above n 18, 7; Japan, 'Paragraph 1(b)(i) and 
1(b) (i) of the Bali Action Plan' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of 
the Bali Action Plan: Part 1, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part 1) (7 April 2009) 129, 130. 
265 Australia, 'Schedules in a Post-2012 Treaty', above n 259, 22. 
266 Ibid. See further The Climate Institute, 'Appraisal of Australia's 'Schedules Model' for the Post-2012 
Climate Agreement' (Briefing, 2009). 
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under paragraph 1(b)(i).267 This view was shared by India268 and China,269 among 
others.270 Developing countries also rejected proposals by Australia and other 
developed countries to register their commitments and actions in a common 
framework, with the G77 and China believing that this would blur the legal distinction 
between developed country commitments and developing country NAMAs.271  
ii) Was the Condition Appropriate?  
There are several considerations relevant to this issue. First, the Rudd government's 
call for the major developing economies to adopt commitments as opposed to NAMAs 
was undoubtedly inconsistent with the terms of the BAP. Moreover, the evolution of 
the ICCL framework tended to support the developing country position. As outlined 
earlier, the first step taken by developed countries to mitigate their GHG emissions 
under the UNFCCC only involved a non-binding aim, namely, to reduce emissions to 
1990 levels by 2000.272 It took developed countries a further seven years to finally 
adopt binding mitigation commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Even then, the US 
failed to ratify this agreement, meaning that the largest developed country emitter has 
never adopted a binding legal commitment to reduce its emissions. Given the 
precedent set by developed countries, it is understandable why the major developing 
economies believed that they were entitled to only adopt non-binding NAMAs. Indeed, 
given the previous focus of the ICCL regime on abatement by developed countries 
(giving effect to the principles of equity, CBDR&RC and developed country leadership), 
                                                     
 
267 Brazil, 'Views and Proposals on Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan' (6 February 2009), above n 252, 
17. 
268 India, 'Mitigation Actions of Developing Countries under the Bali Action Plan (Paragraph 1 (b)(ii))' in 
UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 2 
(Part 1), UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.2 (Part 1) (4 December 2008) 155, 156.  
269 China, 'China's Views on Enabling the Full, Effective and Sustained Implementation of the Convention 
through Long-Term Cooperative Action Now, Up to and Beyond 2012' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals 
on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5 (28 
September 2008) 33, 34. 
270 See, eg. International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(416) 
(8 June 2009) 2 (Mexico); African Group, above n 56, 12.  Cf Madagascar, who highlighted the 
uncertainty of voluntary actions: International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(392) (10 December 2008) 2. 
271 See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(424) (12 
August 2009) 1. 
272 UNFCCC arts 4.2(a) and (b). 
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it was a significant step for developing countries to agree to any mitigation targets at 
the international level, voluntary or otherwise. 
 
As noted earlier, however, it was well accepted by the time of the post-2012 
negotiations that from a scientific perspective, the emissions of the major emitting 
developing economies needed to be constrained if the world was to avoid dangerous 
climate change, especially with China being the world's largest emitter. Furthermore, it 
goes without saying that all Parties to the UNFCCC are expected to act in a manner 
consistent with achieving the Convention's key objective, as well as relevant principles 
such as CBDR&RC, the precautionary principle (article 3.3), the need to protect the 
climate system for future generations (article 3.1) and the needs of the most 
vulnerable countries (article 3.2). While it could not be guaranteed that Parties would 
respect their commitments simply because they were legally binding at the 
international level,273 Parties clearly viewed legally binding commitments as a more 
serious obligation than those which were voluntary. A further advantage of the major 
developing economies adopting binding commitments was that it would allow these 
Parties to more fully participate in international emissions trading, helping to reduce 
global mitigation costs.274  
 
As such, it is certainly understandable why the Rudd government expected the major 
developing economies to adopt binding commitments, even if only at the sectoral 
level. Indeed, given that a post-2012 agreement would be ineffective unless both 
developed countries and the major developing economies adopted binding 
commitments, the government's condition was both sensible and reasonable.  
Ultimately, however, no developing country agreed to adopt binding commitments 
under the Copenhagen Accord, with all non-Annex I Parties announcing voluntary 
NAMAs (see table 4 below). 
                                                     
 
273 Canada, for example, withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011 once it became clear that it could 
not meet its mitigation commitment: 'Canada Pulls Out of Kyoto Protocol' The Guardian (online), 13 
December 2011 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/13/canada-pulls-out-kyoto-
protocol>. 
274 See Ross Garnaut, The Garnaut Review 2011: Australia in the Global Response to Climate Change 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011) 39. 
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5 A collective reduction by major developing economies of at least 20 per cent 
below business-as-usual by 2020 
a) Party Views 
As noted above, the IPCC recommended that under a 450 ppm CO2-e agreement the 
emissions of the major emitting developing regions would need to 'substantially 
deviate' by 2020 (adding to the 25 to 40 per cent reduction required of Annex I 
Parties). As also stated, the authors' of this recommendation later clarified that a 
'substantial deviation' equated to a 15 to 30 per cent reduction below BAU emission 
levels by 2020.275  
 
Developed countries generally shared Australia's view that the major developing 
economies needed to significantly reduce their emissions from BAU levels as part of 
the post-2012 agreement.276 The EU also proposed a specific figure, backing the 15 to 
30 per cent range.277 Not surprisingly, the issue was controversial with many non-
Annex I Parties.278 However, the most vulnerable developing countries also pressured 
the major developing economies to take on a larger mitigation role. AOSIS, for 
example, endorsed the need for these Parties' emissions to significantly deviate from 
BAU levels,279 while Madagascar specifically backed the 15 to 30 per cent reduction 
range.280 
 
                                                     
 
275 Den Elzen and Höhne, above n 50, 271. 
276 See, eg, United States, 'Copenhagen Agreed Outcome' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements 
Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Part 2, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part 2) (4 
May 2009) 106, 107; Canada, 'Ideas and Proposals on Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan', above n 128, 
109; Norway, 'Shared Vision for Long-Term Cooperative Action Including a Long-Term Goal for Emission 
Reductions' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action 
Plan, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5 (1 October 2008) 70, 70. 
277 European Community, 'Mitigation, Including Technology and Finance', UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals 
on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.2, 4, 5. 
This suggestion specifically applied to 'advanced developing countries and major emerging economies'. 
278 See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(395) (13 
December 2008) 18. Note that early on this issue was controversial partly for procedural reasons, with 
developing countries insisting that developed countries be the first to put ambitious mitigation targets 
on the table. 
279 AOSIS, 'Shared Vision', above n 111, 43; AOSIS, 'Enhanced Action on Mitigation on Climate Change', 
above n 70, 33. 
280 Madagascar, 'Shared Vision', above n 250, 26. 
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The initial reluctance of many developing countries to adopt mitigation targets (in the 
form of non-binding NAMAs) weakened overtime, particularly as developed countries 
began announcing their firm mitigation pledges. This was illustrated in June 2009 when 
the MEF countries (which as noted, includes the major developing economies as 
member states) agreed that these countries needed to undertake mid-term actions 
that represented a 'meaningful deviation' from BAU.281  
b) Major Developing Economy Pledges 
All of the major developing economies, as well as many other non-Annex I Parties, 
ultimately indicated that that they were prepared to adopt voluntary mitigation 
targets under a post-2012 agreement. These were expressed in a variety of ways, 
including pledges to reduce GHG intensity as well as emissions from BAU.282 Many of 
these had conditions attached. Some were 'conditional on support' by developed 
countries (as was envisaged by the BAP and article 4.7 UNFCCC), however China, 
Indonesia and South Korea offered unilateral targets, either in full or in part. 
 
Party NAMA/Target Base Year Conditions 
China Reduce CO2 
intensity per unit of 
GDP by 40 to 45 per 
cent by 2020 
2005 - voluntary 
- to be implemented in 
accordance with the provisions 
and principles of the UNFCCC, 
especially article 4.7 
- unilateral (not conditional on 
international support) 
Brazil 36.1 to 38.9 per cent 
reduction in BAU 
emissions by 2020 
 Not 
stated 
- voluntary 
- to be implemented in 
accordance with the principles 
                                                     
 
281 MEF, Declaration of the Leaders of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, First Leaders 
Meeting, L'Aquila, 9 July 2009 <http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/past-meetings/the-first-leaders-
meeting.html>. This was stated to be in the context of sustainable development, supported by financing, 
technology, and capacity-building (as envisaged by paragraph 1(b)(ii) of the BAP). 
282 BAU targets require emissions to be reduced below a BAU emission baseline. The veracity of BAU 
targets depends heavily on the accuracy of projected emission levels. See further den Elzen, above n 
124, 28. 
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and provisions of the UNFCCC, 
especially articles 4.1, 4.7, 
12.1(b), 12.4 and 10.2(a) 
- conditional on international 
finance 
India Reduce emissions 
intensity of GDP by 
20 to 25 per cent by 
2020 (excluding 
agriculture) 
2005 - voluntary,  
- to be implemented in 
accordance with national 
legislation and policies and the 
principles of the UNFCCC, 
especially art 4.7 
Indonesia Reduce emissions by 
26 per cent by 2020 
from BAU levels; or  
 Not 
stated 
- voluntary 
- unilateral 
  Reduce emissions 
by  41 per cent from 
BAU levels  
  Conditional on international 
support  
Mexico Up to 30 per cent 
reduction in GHG 
emissions below 
BAU by 2020 
Not 
stated 
Actions beyond 2012 conditional 
on international finance and 
technological support 
South Africa  Reduce GHG 
emissions by 34 per 
cent by 2020 and 42 
per cent by 2025 
below BAU 
 Not 
stated 
- to be undertaken in 
accordance with UNFCCC art 
4.7 
- conditional on international 
finance, technology and 
capacity-building support 
- conditional on an ambitious, 
fair, effective and binding 
multilateral agreement under 
the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol 
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South Korea Reduce emissions by 
30 per cent below 
BAU by 2020 
 Not 
stated 
- voluntary 
- unilateral 
Table 4. Major developing economy pledges to the Copenhagen Accord.283 
c) Was the Condition Appropriate? 
In light of the above discussion, it is clear that it was reasonable for Australia to expect 
the major developing economies to adopt significant mitigation measures under a 
post-2012 agreement. It is less obvious, however, whether it was appropriate to 
condition the 25 per cent target on a 20 per cent BAU reduction. Notably, while the 
Rudd government was prepared to accept a reduction by the advanced economies at 
the bottom end of the IPCC's range, it expected the major developing economies to 
collectively mitigate their emissions at a level above the minimum suggested in the 
scientific literature. 
 
Examining the individual pledges of the major developing economies helps to shed 
further light on this issue. The pledges of Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and 
South Korea were all above the target suggested by Australia. This in itself suggests 
that Australia's condition was not unreasonable.284 China and India's targets were not 
stated in BAU terms, however, and therefore are more difficult to assess.285 Studies 
have estimated that China's target equated to a BAU reduction of as little as 0 per 
cent286 or 6 per cent ,287 but as high as 27 per cent.288 Estimates of India's target as a 
                                                     
 
283 See UNFCCC, Appendix II – Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions of Developing Country Parties 
above n 253; UNFCCC, Compilation of Information on Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions to be 
Implemented by Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention, above n 53; Climate Action Tracker, 
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284 Note that measuring BAU emission reductions is far more complex than measuring absolute 
emissions reductions from a given base year (as per Annex I Party targets), relying on the quality of 
estimates regarding projected emissions. Thus the Parties' stated BAU targets would not necessarily 
translate into these exact BAU reductions in practice: see Jotzo, above n 127, 29. 
285 See ibid 17. 
286 J Qui, 'China's Climate Target: Is it Achievable' (2009) 462 Nature 550, 550-551; Climate Action 
Tracker, above n 127. 
287 Den Ezlen, Evaluation of the Copenhagen Accord: Chances and Risks for the 2°C Climate Goal, above n 
186, 21. 
288 Jotzo, above n 127, 18. 
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BAU reduction have also varied from approximately 0,289 3,290 9,291 and +7 per cent (an 
increase from BAU).292  
 
Studies have also estimated what the major developing country pledges represented 
as an aggregate BAU reduction. These have varied from 11 to 14 per cent;293 5 to 20 
per cent;294 22 to 27 per cent;295 and 25 per cent (including LUCF) or 21 per cent 
without LUCF (both excluding Indonesia).296 
 
The collective reduction implied by the major developing economies pledges is thus 
not easy to determine. The individual ambition shown by most major developing 
economies, however, arguably suggests that Australia's condition, while stringent, was 
not unreasonable. This is particularly the case when it is remembered that most of 
these Parties made their targets conditional on international support being provided 
by developed countries, as they were entitled to do under the terms of the BAP, 
significantly reducing the cost for these countries of meeting their mitigation 
targets.297 
6 Nomination of a peak year for individual major developing economies 
The final condition directly concerning the major developing economies required these 
Parties to nominate an individual peak year for their emissions. This issue received 
                                                     
 
289 David I Stern and Frank Jotzo, 'How Ambitious are China and India's Emissions Intensity Targets?' 
(Research Report No 51, ANU Crawford School of Economics and Government, March 2010) 23. 
290 Den Ezlen, Evaluation of the Copenhagen Accord: Chances and Risks for the 2°C Climate Goal, above n 
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291 Sara Moltmann et al, Quantifying Emission Reduction Contributions of Emerging Economies (Report 
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Climate Institute, January 2010) 9. 
295 Jotzo, above n 127, 33. 
296 Moltmann, above n 291, 182. 
297 See, eg, den Ezlen, Evaluation of the Copenhagen Accord: Chances and Risks for the 2°C Climate Goal, 
above n 186, 11. This study estimated the abatement costs for the seven major developing economies at 
about 0.15 to 0.2 per cent of GDP for the low and high pledge scenarios respectively. This assumed that 
about 50 per cent of the abatement costs for South Africa, South Korea, Indonesia, Brazil and Mexico 
would be financed by Annex I countries. Costs are expected to be particularly low in China and India: 27 
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very little attention in the submissions of the Parties. Only South Africa nominated a 
peak year for its emissions (2020 to 2025).298 
 
While the Rudd government's wish to see the major developing economies nominate a 
peak year for their emissions was understandable, in hindsight this condition appears 
to have been overly stringent, with only one major developing economy being 
prepared to make such an announcement. 
7 Global action to mobilise greater financial resources, including from major 
developing economies 
This condition tied the Rudd government's 25 per cent target to the broader outcome 
on climate financing in a post-2012 agreement. The chief issue raised by this condition 
was whether or not it was appropriate to make the 25 per cent target contingent upon 
the major developing economies contributing to climate financing, which has 
historically only been a responsibility of developed countries.299  
a) Legal Background 
Under the UNFCCC, the wealthiest Annex I Parties (the members of the OECD) agreed 
to provide finances to support the climate-related activities of developing countries 
under the Convention. Parties which adopted financing responsibilities were listed in 
Annex II.300 This approach again helped to implement the Convention's principles of 
equity, CBDR&RC and developed country leadership.  
 
                                                     
 
298 This was conditional upon international support: UNFCCC, Appendix II – Nationally Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions of Developing Country Parties, above n 253.  
299 Financing was a significant issue in its own right in the post-2012 negotiations with Parties needing to 
resolve many complex issues. Discussion here is limited to those issues raised by the Rudd government's 
target condition. For general analysis of the broader financing issue, see, eg, Eric Haites, 'Negotiations 
on Additional Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change in Developing Countries' in 
Chad Carpenter, The Bali Road Map: Key Issues under Negotiation (UNDP, 2008) 161; Jennifer Frankel-
Reed, Financing under the Bali Road Map: Designing, Governing, and Delivering Funds (UNDP, July 
2009); UNFCCC, Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change: An Update, UN Doc 
FCCC/TP/2008/7 (2008).  
300 Current Annex II members include: Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; European 
Economic Community (EU); Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Japan; 
Luxembourg; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; UK; and US. 
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The major obligations of Annex II Parties are listed in article 4 UNFCCC. Under article 
4.3, Annex II Parties are required to: 
 provide 'new and additional' financial resources, including for the transfer of 
technology, to meet the agreed 'full incremental costs' of developing countries 
(minimal) mitigation obligations (such as establishing GHG inventories);301 
 provide the agreed 'full costs' incurred by developing countries in providing 
their national communications (as required by article 12.1);302 and to 
 'take into account the need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds' 
as well as 'the importance of appropriate burden sharing among the developed 
country Parties.'  
 
Article 4.4 further requires Annex II Parties to assist the particularly vulnerable 
developing countries to meet their adaptation costs. Article 4.5 also outlines 
obligations in relation to the financing and transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies and know-how.  
 
Perhaps most significantly, article 4.7 provides that the 'extent to which' developing 
countries 'effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend 
on the effective implementation' by developed countries of their financing and 
technology commitments. Similar obligations were later accepted by Annex II Parties 
under article 11 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Parties to the Convention and Kyoto Protocol established a range of institutional 
arrangements to govern climate financing. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
                                                     
 
301 UNFCCC art 4.3. The term 'incremental' costs refers to the additional costs of a project designed to 
reduce GHG emissions (for example, installing a more costly renewable energy plant over cheaper 
conventional sources of energy). While developing countries did not adopt specific mitigation 
commitments under the UNFCCC, all Parties have common mitigation-related obligations under article 
4.1, although subject to the principle of CBDR&RC. Common obligations include, for example, 
establishing national inventories of anthropogenic emissions and promoting and cooperating in the 
development, application, diffusion and transfer of clean technologies. 
302 Article 12.1 requires all Parties to communicate information to the COP regarding implementation of 
their obligations under the UNFCCC. 
 216 
operates as the main financial entity under article 11 of the UNFCCC,303 and also 
administers the Special Climate Change Fund and the Least Developed Countries 
Fund.304 Importantly, Annex II Parties only provide voluntary donations to the GEF. 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol further established the Adaptation Fund,305 which is 
financed by a share of proceeds from the CDM.306 
 
Existing financial arrangements under the Convention and Protocol have been widely 
recognised to be insufficient, especially with respect to the quantum of finances 
available. Prior to Bali, only US$3.3 billion had been allocated by the GEF from 
voluntary developed country contributions, although this helped to leverage a further 
US$14 billion in co-financing.307 Adaptation funding under the UNFCCC was even less, 
only representing hundreds of millions of dollars.308 This was also the case with the 
Kyoto Protocol's Adaptation Fund.309 
 
Recognising the deficiencies of existing financial arrangements, paragraph 1(e) of the 
BAP agreed that Parties to the UNFCCC would consider '[e]nhanced action on the 
provision of financial resources and investment to support action on mitigation and 
adaptation and technology cooperation', with the focus being on providing finances for 
developing countries.310 Notably, the BAP did not specify which Parties would provide 
                                                     
 
303 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Second Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1 (29 October 1996), decision 12/CP.2; UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the 
Parties on its Third Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 (25 March 1998), 
decision 12/CP.3. 
304 See UNFCCC, Finance 
<http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/items/2807.php>. Parties later also 
established the Green Climate Fund at COP 16, Cancun 2010, as part of the post-2012 negotiations. 
305 See UNFCCC, Adaptation Fund, 
<http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/adaptation_fund/items/3659.php>.  
306  Specifically, 2 per cent of issued Certified Emission Reductions: UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of 
the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its Third Session: Addendum 
(Part 2), UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1 (14 March 2008), decision 1/CMP.3. The Fund was first 
established in 2001.  
307 UNFCCC, Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change (2007) 7. 
308 Ibid 8. 
309 Ibid 8, 9. Tens of billions of dollars were also generated by the Kyoto Protocol's CDM, but the 
emissions reductions achieved by these projects contribute to Annex I Parties' GHG accounts, not those 
of host developing countries, and thus do not directly contribute to mitigation by developing countries.  
310 COP 13 Report, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, decision 1/CP.13. 
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this funding under a post-2012 agreement, for example, only Annex II Parties, all 
Annex I Parties, or both developed and developing countries.  
b) The Rudd Government and other Developed Country Views on Financing 
Responsibility 
The Rudd government recognised that developed countries had 'a responsibility to 
show leadership by providing substantially scaled-up public funding up to and beyond 
2012.'311 However, the government also argued that 'future climate finance 
arrangements should be responsive to future changes in the global economy'.312 The 
government expected that under new financing arrangements '[d]eveloping countries 
would … be expected to mobilise domestic resources to help to finance their own 
effort, subject to their respective capabilities.'313 Australia also argued that any new 
financial mechanism should contain objective criteria to guide financial contributions 
from Parties, reflecting their 'relative capabilities and national circumstances.'314 It also 
believed that one major developing economy, South Korea, ought to join Annex II.315  
 
Other developed countries shared Australia's view that it was necessary for developing 
countries, especially the major developing economies, to mobilise domestic climate 
finance (with the exception of the LDCs), among them the UK and Norway,316 the 
US,317 Canada318 and the EU.319  
                                                     
 
311 Australian Government, Finance (2009) Department of Climate Change (Australia at Copenhagen) 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/copenhagen/australias-position/finance.aspx>. 
312 See Australia, UK, Mexico and Norway, Climate Finance: Proposals on Governance (11 December 
2009) Department of Climate Change <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/copenhagen/news-
index/climate-finance.aspx>. See also UNFCCC, Notes on Sources for FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/INF.1 (Part 2) 
(2009) 158. 
313 Australia, UK, Mexico and Norway, above n 312. 
314 Australia, 'Enhanced Action on Financial Resources and Investment' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals 
on the Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 1, UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.2/Add.1 (21 August 2008) 21, 21.  
315 Ibid. The government noted that 15 countries now had a higher GDP per capita than Portugal, which 
had set the benchmark for inclusion in Annex II in 1992. Other than South Korea, these countries 
included: Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Israel, Kuwait, Malta, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Slovenia, Singapore, Bahamas, and United Arab Emirates. 
316 Australia, UK, Mexico and Norway, above n 312. 
317 United States, 'Copenhagen Agreed Outcome', above n 276, 109; United States, 'Finance and 
Technology' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action 
Plan, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5 (30 September 2008) 105, 105. 
318 UNFCCC, Notes on Sources for FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/INF.1 (Part 2), above n 312, 154. 
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c) Developing Country Views 
The G77 and China strongly rejected the push to extend financing obligations to 
developing countries, instead calling for only Annex I Parties to provide funding under 
a new agreement.320 The G77 and China strongly criticised what they perceived as an 
emphasis by developed countries on shifting financing responsibilities to developing 
countries.321 Other major groups, including the LDCs and AOSIS, also regarded 
financing as chiefly a developed country responsibility,322 although these latter groups 
saw a role for voluntary contributions by developing countries.  
 
A number of principles and provisions of the UNFCCC were cited by these groups to 
support their view. Among these were the principles of equity, CBDR&RC and historical 
responsibility, and the developed countries' existing financing commitments under 
article 4.323 The developing countries also referred to broader international legal 
principles or norms such as the polluter pays principle and the responsibility not to 
cause damage to the environment of other states. Believing that such principles and 
norms had been breached, the LDCs and AOSIS framed climate finance as a form of 
reparation for climate change damage.324 Similarly, Bolivia regarded climate finance as 
payment for 'the debt owed to us by developed countries' as a result of 'threatening 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
319 Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions (15265/09, Brussels, 30 October 2009); 
European Community, 'Mitigation, Including Technology and Finance', above n 277, 7. 
320 G77 and China, 'Financial Mechanism for Meeting Financial Commitments under the Convention' in 
UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on the Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: 
Addendum 1, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.2/Add.1 (25 August 2008) 35, 36. 
321 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(429) (29 
September 2009) 1. 
322 See Least Developed Countries, 'Fulfilment of the Bali Action Plan and the Components of the Agreed 
Outcome to be Adopted by the Conference of the Parties at its Fifteenth Session', above n 58, 9; AOSIS, 
'Multi-Window Mechanism to Address Loss and Damage from Climate Change Impacts' in UNFCCC, 
Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 2 (Part 1), 
UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.2 (Part 1) (2 December 2008) 24, 24.  
323 See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(437) (8 
October 2009) 2 (G77 and China); UNFCCC, Notes on Sources for FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/INF.1 (Part 2), 
above n 312, 147; Least Developed Countries, 'Fulfilment of the Bali Action Plan  and the Components of 
the Agreed Outcome to be Adopted by the Conference of the Parties at its Fifteenth Session', above n 
58, 9; AOSIS, 'Multi-Window Mechanism to Address Loss and Damage from Climate Change Impacts', 
above n 322, 24, 24.  
324 See Least Developed Countries, 'Fulfilment of the Bali Action Plan and the Components of the Agreed 
Outcome to be Adopted by the Conference of the Parties at its Fifteenth Session', above n 58, 9; 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(432) (2 October 
2009) 2 (LDCs): AOSIS, 'Multi-Window Mechanism to Address Loss and Damage from Climate Change 
Impacts', above n 322, 24.  
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the integrity of the Earth's climate system, for over-consuming a shared resource … 
and for maintaining lifestyles that continue to threaten the lives and livelihoods of the 
poor'.325  
 
While most non-Annex I Parties regarded financing as chiefly a developed country 
responsibility, many also envisaged a more limited role for developing countries. The 
influential Mexican proposal for a World Climate Change Fund (or Green Fund), for 
example, envisaged contributions being made by all Parties in accordance with the 
principle of CBDR&RC, although developing countries' participation would be voluntary 
and LDCs would not be expected to contribute.326 Mexico noted that other multilateral 
institutions such as the UN, World Bank and IMF, already determined member 
contributions according to their capacity to pay.327   
d) How Much Financing Was Needed? 
Significant finances were likely required to support developing countries' future 
mitigation and adaptation needs, which helps to explain why Parties such as Australia 
did not accept that financing should only be a developed country responsibility. 
Estimates regarding the required quantum of finances varied widely, but were vast by 
previous standards. In 2007, the UNFCCC Secretariat estimated that an additional 
US$200-210 billion of investment and financial flows would be needed per annum by 
                                                     
 
325 Bolivia, above n 108, 47. 
326 See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(434) (5 
October 2009) 1; Mexico, 'Enhanced Action on the Provision of Financial Resources and Investment to 
Support Action on Mitigation and Adaptation and Technology Cooperation' in UNFCCC, Ideas and 
Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan, UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.2 (13 August 2008) 40, 41-42. Mexico proposed that several criteria could be 
applied to differentiate financing responsibilities, including: polluter pays; equity (total emissions and 
per capita emissions); efficiency (carbon intensity/emissions per unit of GDP); and payment capacity 
(GDP per capita). 
327 Mexico, 'Enhanced Action on the Provision of Financial Resources and Investment to Support Action 
on Mitigation and Adaptation and Technology Cooperation', above n 326, 42. See also AOSIS, 'Enhanced 
Action on the Provision of Financial Resources and Investment to Support Action on Mitigation and 
Adaptation and Technology Cooperation', above n 70, 18; Least Developed Countries, 'International Air 
Passenger Adaptation Levy' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of 
the Bali Action Plan, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.1 (13 December 2008) 59, 59, 60 (proposing an 
international air levy on aircraft passengers in all countries); Tuvalu, 'Copenhagen Protocol to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements 
Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 1, UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4/Add.1, 9, 17 (proposing that all Parties contribute according to their 
capacity to pay and historical emissions). 
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2020 for mitigation alone, of which approximately 46 per cent would go to non-Annex I 
Parties (about US$92-$97 billion).328 In 2008 the UNFCCC Secretariat estimated that 
this figure was likely 170 per cent higher.329 Significant finances would also be needed 
for adaptation, with about US$28-67 billion needed for non-Annex I Parties.330 Other 
studies produced differing estimates of mitigation and adaption costs, but generally 
estimated higher costs than the UNFCCC. The World Bank, for example, estimated that 
developing countries' mitigation costs could be as high as US$565 billion per year by 
2030,331 while the IEED and Grantham Institute for Climate Change estimated that 
developing countries' adaption costs were likely 2 to 3 times higher than suggested by 
the UNFCCC.332 In GDP terms, the various estimates represented about 0.3 to 2 per 
cent of global GDP and about 1.1 to 5 per cent of global investment.333 A key problem 
during the negotiating period was also the onset of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC), which put significant pressure on developed countries' domestic budgets (many 
of which had significant debts) and weakened their economic and political capacity to 
raise finance for less immediate concerns like climate change.334 
                                                     
 
328 UNFCCC, Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change (2007), above n 307, 7, 22. This 
was in order to achieve a goal of returning global GHG emissions to 2004 levels by 2030. 'Investment 
flow' refers to the initial (capital) spending required for a physical asset. 'Financial flow' refers to 
ongoing expenditure related to mitigation or adaptation that does not involve investment in physical 
assets: 22, 34. 
329 UNFCCC, Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change: An Update (2008), above n 299, 
7. 
330 UNFCCC, Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change (2007), above n 307, 8. This was 
for areas such as agriculture, forestry and fisheries; water supply infrastructure; treatment of diseases, 
malnutrition and malaria; infrastructure etc. 
331 See UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic and Social Survey 2009: 
Promoting Development, Saving the Planet', UN Doc E/2009/50/Rev.1 (2009) 157. 
332 Martin Parry et al, Assessing the Costs of Adaptation to Climate Change: A Review of UNFCCC and 
Other Recent Estimates (International Institute for Environment and Development and the Grantham 
Institute for Climate Change, August 2009) 14. See also Project Catalyst, 'Scaling up Climate Finance' 
(Briefing Paper, September 2009) 10); Oxfam International, 'Adapting to Climate Change: What's 
Needed in Poor Countries, and Who Should Pay' (Briefing Paper, Oxfam International, May 2007) 3; Asa 
Persson et al, 'Adaptation Finance under a Copenhagen Agreed Outcome' (Research Report, Stockholm 
Environment Institute, October 2009) 43; World Bank, 'Making the Most of Public Finance for Climate 
Action' (Issues Brief No 2, May 2010) 2. 
333 UNFCCC, Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change (2007), above n 307, 5; UN 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, above n 331, 157. 
334 See Secretary General's High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, Report of the 
Secretary-General's High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (UN, 5 November 2010) 10. 
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e) Party Proposals 
The Parties themselves made a number of proposals regarding the magnitude of 
financing that was needed under a post-2012 agreement. The G77 and China, for 
example, called for developed countries to provide 0.5 to 1 per cent of their GNP to 
support both mitigation and adaptation in developing countries – roughly US$150-300 
billion per year,335 while the African Group called for US$200 billion annually by 2020 
(0.5 per cent of Annex II Parties' GDP) and at least $67 billion per year for 
adaptation.336  
 
The Rudd government did not publically suggest any particular sum for climate finance 
leading up to COP 15.337 Other Annex I Parties, however, did propose specific figures, 
namely:  
 €90 billion per annum by 2020 for mitigation, and €24-54 billion per year for 
adaptation by 2030 (EU);338 and 
 US$100 billion for all climate change financing by 2020 (UK).339 
f) Was the Condition Reasonable? 
It should be noted that while the Rudd government clearly wished all developing 
countries, except the LDCs, to contribute to raising climate finance,340 the major 
expectation was that the major developing economies would contribute to funding 
their own domestic mitigation actions. Ultimately, the Copenhagen Accord saw only 
the developed countries agree to provide '[s]caled up, new and additional, predictable 
and adequate funding' to developing countries for action on mitigation, adaptation, 
                                                     
 
335 G77 and China, 'Financial Mechanism for Meeting Financial Commitments under the Convention', 
above n 320, 36; Frankel-Reed, Financing under the Bali Road Map: Designing, Governing, and Delivering 
Funds, above n 299, 7-8. 
336 African Group, above n 56, 12-13. 
337 Australian Government, Finance, above n 311. 
338 See Frankel-Reed, above n 299, 9. 
339 Ibid. Note that Parties made various proposals on where new finance could be sourced from such as 
auctioning Annex I Parties' AAUs, or a global CO2-e levy. For overviews see, eg, ibid 7-8.   
340 See Australian Government, FOI Australia's Target Conditions – Where Do We Stand?, above n 41, 2. 
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technology development and transfer and capacity-building.341 The specific 
commitment was to provide new and additional resources 'approaching' US$30 billion 
from 2010 to 2012 (so-called 'fast start finance')342 and US$100 billion dollars per 
annum by 2020.343 The latter figure would be sourced from a range of sources, both 
public and private (especially the carbon market),344 as per the wishes of Australia and 
other developed countries.345 
 
The Accord's financing outcome, later formally endorsed in the Cancun Agreements at 
COP 16 in 2010,346 was a victory for developing countries who had opposed attempts 
to formally extend financing obligations to developing countries. However, this did not 
tell the whole story on the issue. Most of the major developing economies indicated 
that their targets would be fully or partly self-funded, including China, India, Indonesia, 
Mexico (up to 2012) and South Korea.347 China and others also indicated that they 
would not seek a share of the fast-start finance believing that this was best reserved 
for the LDCs.348  
 
                                                     
 
341 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010), decision 2/CP.15, [8]. In June 2010, Australia committed $599 
million over three years for fast-start finance: see Australian Government, Fast Start Finance 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/international/actions/australias-contribution/international-climate-
finance/fast-start-finance>. 
342 Ibid. 
343 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010), decision 2/CP.15, [8]. 
344 The Accord agreed that climate finance could come from a variety of sources including public, 
private, bilateral, multilateral and alternative sources: ibid. 
345 The G77 and China insisted that the 'major source' of funds come from public resources: G77 and 
China, 'Financial Mechanism for Meeting Financial Commitments under the Convention', above n 320, 
36. However, Australia and other Parties equally insisted that the private sector play a large part in 
climate financing, for mitigation if not adaptation. This is because the private sector constitutes the 
largest share of investment and financial flows in the global economy (86 per cent): UNFCCC, Investment 
and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change, above n 307, 28. See, eg, Australia, 'Enhanced Action on 
Financial Resources and Investment', above n 314, 58-59; Australia, UK, Mexico and Norway, above n 
312; United States, 'Copenhagen Agreed Outcome', above n 276, 109; European Community, 'Enhanced 
Action on the Provision of Financial Resources and Investment to Support Action on Mitigation and 
Adaptation and Technology Cooperation' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in 
Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 2 (Part 1), UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.2 
(Part 1) (21 November 2008) 120, 121.  
346 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (15 March 2011), decision 1/CP.16, [95-109]. 
347 See Climate Action Tracker, above n 127. 
348 Project Catalyst, 'Making Fast Start Finance Work' (Briefing Paper, 7 June 2010) 4. 
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That some major developing economies agreed to fully or partly self-fund their 
domestic mitigation action tends to indicate that the Rudd government's condition 
was perfectly reasonable. What needs to be appreciated is that the major developing 
economies had over the past decade already begun investing domestic resources in 
mitigation activities such as clean energy projects. China, India and Brazil, for example, 
had become major producers of renewable energy equipment and products 
(photovoltaic cells/solar power, wind turbines, and ethanol, respectively).349 Many of 
the more advanced developing countries had invested in large-scale mitigation efforts 
simply for their non-climate-change benefits: for example, energy savings, improved 
energy security, and reduced local pollution.350 The leader in this regard, China, 
invested US$3.1 billion in the renewable energy sector in 2008, and US$46.9 billion in 
clean energy technology, energy efficiency and grid infrastructure development in 
2009, as a form of economic stimulus during the GFC.351 Furthermore, through the 
government owned China Development Bank, China had already invested in clean 
energy projects in other developing countries, such as REDD+ projects in Guyana.352 
The fact that many major developing economies were already investing in abatement-
related activities further suggests that the Rudd government's condition, requiring 
major developing economies to financially contribute to their own mitigation efforts, 
was entirely reasonable. 
 
8 Comprehensive coverage of gases, sources and sectors, with inclusion of 
forests (eg Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD)) and the land sector (including soil carbon initiatives (eg biochar) if 
scientifically demonstrated) 
 
                                                     
 
349 UNFCCC, Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change (2007), above n 307, 42. 
350 Project Catalyst, 'Scaling up Climate Finance', above n 332, 11. China, for example, has heavily 
invested in nuclear, wind, and energy efficiency.  
351 Global Climate Network, 'Investing in Clean Energy: How Can Developed Countries Best Help 
Developing Countries Finance Climate-Friendly Energy Investments?' (Discussion Paper No 4, Global 
Climate Network, November 2010) 15-16. Other major developing economies have also invested in 
mitigation, although at much lower levels: 17. 
352 Secretary General's High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, above n 334, 53-54.  
 224 
The first aspect of this condition – requiring the comprehensive coverage of gases, 
sources and sectors – was very general and not particularly controversial. The two 
important aspects concerned the requirement that both forests (namely, a REDD 
mechanism) and the land sector be included in a new climate agreement. The Rudd 
government's broader negotiations on these issues are discussed at length in chapters 
8 and 9, respectively. As such, the analysis here is kept brief. 
a) Inclusion of Forests 
This requirement related to the negotiations on the possible inclusion of a new REDD 
mechanism in the post-2012 agreement. In broad terms, it appeared reasonable for 
the government to condition the 25 per cent target on the inclusion of REDD. This is 
because forestry-sector emissions in developing countries, especially from 
deforestation, were known to be a major cause of global CO2 emissions and it was 
widely accepted that the inclusion of some form of REDD mechanism was an essential 
component of a post-2012 outcome.353  
 
Although this was not mentioned in the main condition's official wording, DCC records 
indicated that the government specifically required the inclusion of a market-based 
REDD mechanism.354 Similar to the CDM, this type of REDD mechanism would generate 
certified carbon credits which could then be purchased by developed countries to 
assist them in meeting their post-2012 mitigation targets. A market-based mechanism 
was opposed by some Parties for several reasons including that it was not clear that 
REDD could actually generate credible emissions abatement.355 However, the 
significant amount of finances required for REDD meant that it was a practical 
necessity for Parties to seek to design a mechanism that was at least partly funded by 
the market.356 Notably, the market-linked model was supported by many of the 
                                                     
 
353 See, eg, Johan Eliasch, Climate Change: Financing Global Forests (Eliasch Review) (UK Office of 
Climate Change, 2008) xi-xii, xvi. See further chapter 9. 
354 See Australian Government, FOI Australia's Target Conditions – Where Do We Stand?, above n 41, 2. 
355 See, eg, AOSIS, 'Enhanced Action on Mitigation on Climate Change', above n 70, 36. 
356 See, eg, Eliasch, above n 353, xviii. 
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developing countries that were anticipating hosting such projects357 (see further 
discussion of these issues in chapter 8). As such, while tying Australia's target to the 
inclusion of a market-based REDD mechanism was somewhat controversial, it was not 
an unreasonable demand. 
b) Inclusion of the Land Sector  
In broad terms, the requirement that the land sector, or LULUCF, be included in a post-
2012 agreement was also reasonable. The Kyoto Protocol authorised Annex I Parties to 
account for both emissions and removals in the land sector, enabling mitigation efforts 
in this sector to contribute toward meeting their mitigation targets (articles 3.3, 3.4 
and 3.7). It was legitimate for the Rudd government to expect this situation to 
continue given that the land sector represents a genuine source of emissions and has 
relatively inexpensive abatement opportunities (see further chapter 9). The 
government's call for soil carbon initiatives such as biochar to be included was also 
reasonable, especially as it only called for this activity to be included if it could be 
scientifically demonstrated.358 
 
DCC records indicated that the Rudd government's general condition on the land 
sector was supplemented by several more specific demands. In order to adopt the 25 
per cent target, the government indicated that it required:  
 adequate treatment of natural disturbances in LULUCF accounting;  
 the continuation of the voluntary article 3.4 activities;  
 the continuation of the rule allowing land clearing emissions to be included in 
Australia's base year (article 3.7); and 
 no restrictions on the use of LULUCF sinks.359  
 
                                                     
 
357 See, eg, Belize, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Honduras, Ghana, Guyana, Kenya, Madagascar, Nepal, Nicaraguan, 
Panama, PNG, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, Vanuatu and Vietnam, 
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358 For the Rudd government's views on this issue see Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF)' in UNFCCC, Further Elaboration of the Options, Elements and Issues Contained in 
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359 See Australian Government, FOI Australia's Target Conditions – Where Do We Stand?, above n 41, 2. 
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As will be seen in chapter 9, the requirement for improved treatment of natural 
disturbances in accounting was an essential reform if Parties like Australia (which 
experience significant emissions from major natural causes such as wildfires) were to 
begin accounting for several voluntary LULUCF activities, especially forest 
management. It was also reasonable that the voluntary LULUCF activities continued to 
be available to Annex I Parties as an abatement option. 
 
The requirement that article 3.7 continue, commonly referred to as the 'Australia 
clause', was more controversial but also a broadly reasonable expectation. As noted in 
chapter 2, this clause allowed the Howard government to unfairly inflate Australia's 
1990 baseline emissions figure, effectively converting Australia's already generous 
Kyoto target of 108 per cent of 1990 levels by 2008-12 to 142 per cent.360 While the 
Howard government's motives for negotiating this clause were certainly unethical, it 
would be demonstrably unfair to Australia to retrospectively alter how its baseline 
emissions figure is calculated many years after Kyoto was agreed to. Having said this, 
the government could certainly have demonstrated leadership by voluntarily agreeing 
to forego the windfall gain the Howard government earned for Australia by virtue of 
this article (see discussion at section G). 
 
The requirement that there be no restriction on the use of LULUCF sinks was the most 
problematic of the above LULUCF conditions. Because of the potential for developed 
countries to make windfall gains from LULUCF activities, especially forest 
management, Parties included a restriction on the use of this activity in Kyoto's first 
commitment period.361 While Australia wished to remove LULUCF caps so it could 
increase its level of abatement in this sector, doing so had the potential to undermine 
the environmental effectiveness of LULUCF abatement if the new accounting methods 
being discussed for forest management in the post-2012 negotiations did not prove to 
                                                     
 
360 Andrew Macintosh, LULUCF Offsets and Australia's 2020 Abatement Task (ANU Centre for Climate 
Law and Policy, 2011) 2. 
361 The cap applied to Parties for whom article 3.3 activities represented a net source of emissions. Both 
general and individual caps were set: see UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session: Addendum 3 (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (30 March 2006), decision 16/CMP.1, annex [10, 11], appendix. See further 
chapter 9. 
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be reliable. Thus it was clearly not a responsible position to tie Australia's 25 per cent 
target to the unrestricted use of LULUCF sinks (see further discussion of LULUCF issues 
in chapter 9). 
9 The Requirement for 'fully functional global carbon markets' 
The Rudd government's desire to have full access to the global carbon market, 
reducing Australia's mitigation costs, is discussed fully in chapter 7. Thus, discussion of 
this issue here is also kept brief. 
 
As will be seen in chapter 7, it was broadly reasonable for the government to condition 
the 25 per cent target on having access to some kind of global carbon market, given 
that there were significant economic and technological barriers to Australia achieving 
such a target from domestic abatement alone. There were, however, a number of 
problematic aspects to the government's condition. 
 
First, the condition provided the Rudd government with significant discretion to 
determine whether a post-2012 agreement actually established a 'fully functional' 
carbon market (similar criticisms could be made of several of the other more vague 
conditions examined above). In the Senate Select Committee on Climate Policy in May 
2009, then Deputy Leader of the Australian Greens, Senator Milne, rightly questioned 
whether the condition was realistic given that '[w]e are nowhere near a global carbon 
market now'.362 The DCC indicated, however, that the condition was not necessarily as 
onerous as it appeared on paper. According to the Department, the condition meant 
that Australia would need access 'to a broad range of international trading 
mechanisms.'363 This needn't require the participation of every country so long as 'a 
deep and liquid market [was] available.'364 Although it was not clear at what point the 
government would regard the global carbon market as being 'fully functional', the 
condition would not be met where the existing global carbon markets or 'the expected 
growth of those [markets] disappeared' so that 'all abatement had to occur 
                                                     
 
362 Evidence to Senate Select Committee on Climate Policy, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 20 May 
2009, 4 (Blair Comley, Deputy Secretary, Department of Climate Change). 
363 Ibid. 
364 Ibid. 
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domestically'.365 The Department's statements on the condition thus indicated that the 
government's major concern was not that an optimal global carbon market existed, 
but simply one that provided a sufficient quantity of permits to meet Australia's needs 
and at a reasonable price. As such, this appeared to be a fairly reasonable condition for 
the 25 per cent target. 
 
Departmental records indicated that the government also attached more specific 
elements to the general condition. These included:  
 having unrestricted access to the Kyoto market mechanisms like the CDM;  
 an agreement to develop new mechanisms, broad coverage (sector and 
technologies); and 
 links between a new post-2012 agreement and the Kyoto flexibility 
mechanisms.366  
 
As will be seen in chapter 7, the requirement for unrestricted access to the Kyoto 
mechanisms was clearly not a reasonable request, being inconsistent with the 
Protocol's principle of 'supplementarity' which provides that the Parties' use of 
international offsets should only be supplemental to domestic abatement367 (ensuring 
that Annex I Parties do not outsource all of their emissions reduction responsibilities to 
developing countries through mechanisms like the CDM).  
 
The expectation that new mechanisms be developed, and to have broad coverage of 
sectors and technologies, also appeared quite stringent, especially as there was no 
clear agreement among Parties on whether to establish new flexibility mechanisms 
under a post-2012 agreement (see discussion of sectoral crediting and trading 
mechanisms in chapter 7). However, while strict, it will be seen in chapter 8 that 
Parties did broadly agree on the need to establish a new REDD flexibility mechanism, 
meaning that at least one new market mechanism was likely to be established in the 
post-2012 agreement. As such, depending on how strictly or generously the 
                                                     
 
365 Ibid. See also Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme Bill 2009 and Related Bills [Provisions] (2009) 11. 
366 Australian Government, FOI Australia's Target Conditions – Where Do We Stand?, above n 41, 2. 
367 Kyoto Protocol arts 6.1(d), 17. 
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government ultimately interpreted this condition, it was not necessarily an 
unreasonable expectation.  
 
It was also reasonable for the government to condition its 25 per cent target on links 
being established between a post-2012 agreement and the Kyoto flexibility 
mechanisms, this being necessary to ensure that the existing Kyoto mechanisms could 
continue to be used by Annex I Parties in meeting their future mitigation obligations 
under a broader post-2012 outcome.  
F Were the Conditions for the 25 Per Cent or 15 Per Cent Targets 
Satisfied? 
Ultimately, none of the headline conditions attached to the 25 per cent target 
appeared to be fulfilled by the Copenhagen Accord.368 Of particular interest for both 
Australia and the Parties generally was the level of ambition adopted by developed 
countries (condition 3). Some estimates suggested that the developed country pledges 
added up to a reduction of 17 to 26 per cent by 2020 (excluding LULUCF) or 16 to 24 
per cent (including LULUCF);369 potentially exceeding or being close to satisfying 
Australia's 25 per cent reduction requirement for advanced economies. However, 
other studies estimated the developed country ambition to be as low as 13 to 20 per 
cent.370 Moreover, given the discrepancy in emission estimates, there was clearly 
insufficient clarity on this issue for the government to regard this condition as being 
fulfilled. 
 
                                                     
 
368 Note that to its credit, the Rudd government made a policy commitment to establish a transparent 
process to determine whether the government's target conditions were met, including analysis by an 
independent Ratification Review panel, which would table its response to Parliament: Explanatory 
Memorandum, CPRS Bill 16-17, 78-79. Note also that while developing countries' collective ambition 
may have exceeded Australia's target (although estimates varied on this) these were stated to be non-
binding actions, rather than legally binding commitments as required by Australia. 
369 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(421) (1-12 
June 2009) 12.  
370 Schaeffer and Hare, above n 82, 2. Estimates were difficult as some Parties, including Australia, 
submitted target ranges rather than single targets. The exact stringency of individual targets were also 
dependent on the final rules on LULUCF and the use of surplus emission units in future commitment 
periods: see further Michel den Elzen et al, The Emissions Report: Are the Copenhagen Accord Pledges 
Sufficient to Limit Global Warming to 2°C or 1.5°C? (UNEP, November 2010) 10, 14. 
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Post-Copenhagen, the Rudd government announced that based on the Accord, 
Australia would stick with its minimum 5 per cent target.371 It also announced new 
conditions for moving beyond this target, namely that: 
 'the level of global ambition becomes sufficiently clear, including both the 
specific targets of advanced economies and the verifiable emissions reduction 
actions of China and India';  
 'the credibility of those commitments and actions is established, for example, 
by way of a robust global agreement at …. [COP 16], or commitment to 
verifiable domestic action on the part of major emitters including the United 
States, India and China'; and 
 'there was clarity on the assumptions for emissions accounting and access to 
markets'.372  
 
Some commentators argued that the outcome in the Copenhagen Accord was at least 
sufficient to trigger the 15 per cent target.373 While it was correct that more of the 
conditions to the 15 per cent target could be regarded as being fulfilled, or close to 
fulfilled, at face value, it must be remembered that the Accord only represented a 
political agreement with no formal status under the Convention. In the absence of a 
legally binding post-2012 outcome, it was understandable that the Rudd government 
was not prepared to move beyond the 5 per cent target until the Parties' 
commitments were sufficiently clear and formalised at the international level. 
G Implications for GIC 
As explained previously, this thesis argues that if the Rudd government was to qualify 
as a GIC in its engagement with the post-2012 climate negotiations, it was particularly 
important that it put forward or support proposals that were compliant with the legal 
framework provided by ICCL, and broader international law, where relevant. In this 
case, the BAP made clear that developed countries were to consider adopting 
nationally appropriate mitigation targets that ensured 'the comparability of efforts 
                                                     
 
371 Penny Wong, 'Australia's Submission to Copenhagen Accord' (Media Release, 27 January 2010). 
372 Ibid. The rules on emissions accounting and carbon markets are discussed in chapters 6 and 9. 
373 The Climate Institute, 'Australia's 2020 Carbon Pollution and Productivity Target', above n 294, 8-9. 
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among them', while taking into account differences in their national circumstances. 
Also of particular relevance were several of the article 3 UNFCCC principles, especially 
that Parties should act on the basis of equity and CBDR&RC and that developed 
countries should take the lead in combating climate change.  
 
As noted, the Rudd government accepted the importance of the above principles to 
the issue of target-setting, specifically highlighting these in its international 
submissions. The basic approach of the Rudd government toward target-setting was 
that it wished to make a fair or proportionate contribution to the global mitigation 
effort. Thus its general intention was essentially to act consistently with the notions of 
equity, CBDR&RC and comparability of effort. Based on Australia's higher aggregate 
mitigation costs, and the metrics of per capita effort and effort relative to 2008-12, the 
government believed that its 25 per cent target would make a fair or proportional 
contribution to a 450 ppm CO2-e agreement.  
 
As the UNFCCC Party with the 13th highest GHG emissions (about 1.5 per cent of global 
emissions),374 and one of the largest per capita emissions, there was clearly a need for 
Australia to adopt a strong target if it was to make an equitable or comparable 
contribution to a new global agreement.375 It was seen above, however, that Parties 
could not agree on precisely which metrics were best suited to determining whether 
developed countries' targets represented a fair or comparable level of effort. 
Numerous metrics were also applied in the literature. As such, it was difficult to assess 
whether Australia's target represented a proportionate response with any level of 
precision. However, the various studies, which applied a range of metrics, generally 
indicated that Australia's 25 per cent target was within the ballpark of what was 
                                                     
 
374 Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report, above n 179, 54, 65. 
375 Note that only domestic emissions are accounted for under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
accounting framework. A criticism often expressed is that because of its large coal exports, Australia's 
emissions would be much higher (6th) if it was required to account for emissions generated overseas 
from burning Australian coal: see Michael Bachelard, 'Old King Coal', The Sydney Morning Herald 
(online), 8 November 2009 <http://www.smh.com.au/national/old-king-coal-20091107-i2w7.html>. 
Note, however, that other Parties' emissions would also be much higher if they needed to factor in the 
emissions caused by their exports; for example, if China needed to account for the life-time emissions of 
the consumer electronic goods it manufactures and exports to other countries. Therefore, this thesis 
assesses the government's behaviour in relation to the agreed accounting framework. 
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required of Australia under a 450 ppm CO2-e agreement (if Annex I Parties reduced 
their collective emissions by about 30 per cent). To this extent, the government's 
approach to target-setting could be commended as the 25 per cent target did appear 
to make a broadly proportionate contribution to a 450 ppm CO2-e agreement, as it 
intended, thus respecting the comparability of effort principle. 
 
It does not necessarily follow, however, that the 25 per cent target was consistent with 
the behaviour expected of a GIC. This is for several reasons. First, the 25 per cent 
target only represented a broadly sufficient contribution to a 450 ppm CO2-e 
agreement. Yet as argued in chapter 5, the 450 ppm CO2-e goal did not appear to be 
ambitious enough to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention, namely, to 
avoid dangerous climate change, especially for the most vulnerable developing 
countries. Thus the 25 per cent target was premised on a long-term goal that was 
inconsistent with achieving the ultimate objective of the Convention. As such, there is 
a strong argument that the Rudd government needed to put forward a higher upper 
target – one that made a sufficient contribution to a global agreement that was 
genuinely capable of avoiding dangerous climate change (such as the 350 ppm CO2-e 
goal advocated by AOSIS and the LDCs). Indeed, by only being prepared to pledge a 
target that was consistent with a 450 ppm CO2-e goal, the government arguably failed 
to respect a number of UNFCCC principles, among them the precautionary principle;376 
the developing countries' right to sustainable development; the need to protect the 
climate system for future generations; and the needs of the most vulnerable countries. 
Because the 25 per cent target was premised on a 450 ppm CO2-e agreement, it also 
failed to properly give effect to the principles of equity and CBDR&RC, which needed to 
be interpreted in light of the Convention's ultimate objective.  
 
Second, the 25 per cent target only made a broadly sufficient contribution to a 450 
ppm CO2-e agreement in which Annex I Parties collectively reduced their emissions by 
about 30 per cent. As detailed in this chapter, developing countries were strongly of 
                                                     
 
376 Article 3.3 UNFCCC states that 'Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or 
minimise the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing such measures.' 
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the view that this did not represent a sufficient collective emission reduction by 
developed countries, who argued for a 40 per cent or higher collective reduction by 
this group. This was for several reasons, including to meet more ambitious stabilisation 
goals (such as the 350 ppm CO2-e target) and to ensure that there was sufficient 
demand for carbon credits generated by the CDM and future market mechanisms like 
REDD. Developing countries also believed that a 40 per cent or higher reduction by the 
Annex I Party group was necessary to give effect to various UNFCCC principles 
including equity, CBDR&RC, and developed country leadership, as well as broader 
international legal principles such as the obligation to prevent harm to the 
environment of other states and to the global commons. More controversial principles 
such as historical responsibility, polluter pays and the right to development (which are 
not strictly supported by the Convention) were also said to warrant a 40 per cent or 
higher target. While it is difficult to determine precisely what the collective ambition 
by developed countries ought to have been, there is certainly an argument that a GIC 
would have listened to the demands of developing countries and accepted the 
equitable and scientific basis for a 40 per cent or higher reduction by the Annex I Party 
group.  
 
Third, Australia's target clearly needed to give effect to the principle of leadership, 
which is both an expectation of developed countries under the UNFCCC, and a general 
attribute of GIC. This chapter would suggest that fulfilling the principle of leadership 
was particularly important on this issue, as leadership in the form of ambitious targets 
was desperately needed to encourage similar actions from other Parties and provide 
momentum to the negotiations. Thus the adoption of a higher target by Australia 
would have done much to help distinguish itself as a 'good' rather than 'average' or 
'poor' international citizen. 
 
While the 25 per cent target represented a broadly proportionate contribution to a 
450 ppm CO2-e goal, it certainly did not position Australia as a leader on this issue. 
Indeed, the government never intended it to do so, with Prime Minister Rudd stating 
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that Australia's goal was to 'do no more and no less' than the rest of the world.377 Of 
course, Australia was by no means one of the worst performers on this issue, with 
Parties such as Canada, the US and Russia making pledges that were unquestionably 
too weak.378  Russia's 25 per cent target, for example, was likely to be achieved under 
a BAU scenario (that is, with no additional mitigation effort).379 The EU's upper target 
also only appeared to make a barely adequate contribution to a 450 ppm CO2-e 
mitigation scenario.380 Nonetheless, Australia's target fell short of the leading nations 
on a range of metrics, especially Norway and Iceland.381 While it is difficult to state 
precisely what target would have positioned Australia as a leader on this issue, it is 
clear that it needed to be higher than 25 per cent.  
 
Turning to other GIC attributes (other than leadership, discussed above), it was clear 
that Australia's position (as with many other Parties) was heavily influenced by self-
interest. As explained in chapters 1 and 2, it is inconsistent with GIC for a nation to 
advance its national interests in an overly narrow, or self-interested fashion. It has 
been seen that the Rudd government's approach to target-setting, as with earlier 
Australian governments, was influenced by its desire to minimise impacts on the 
Australian economy and jobs. In this case, the government's actions were far removed 
from the blatantly short-term, nationalistic approach of the Howard government in the 
Kyoto Protocol negotiations. This is because while the government was concerned to 
protect Australia's national economic interests it also displayed a genuine willingness 
to adopt a reasonable mitigation target, so long as other nations were prepared to do 
                                                     
 
377 ABC, 'Rudd Says Abbott Wrong Again', above n 2. This comment was reiterated by Prime Minister 
Rudd and the Minister for Climate Change after COP 15, see, eg, AFP, 'Australia Pledges "No More, No 
Less" on Climate Change', 21 December 2009 
<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i0FVYue_kdlVdQgr2FRIv9RMdU1w>; 
Samantha Maiden and David Nason, 'Kevin Rudd Faces New Emissions Trading Scheme Demand', The 
Australian (online), 22 December 2009 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/kevin-rudd-
faces-new-emissions-trading-scheme-demand/story-e6frg6nf-1225812590079>. 
378 See, eg, den Elzen, Exploring Comparable Post-2012 Reduction Efforts for Annex I Countries, above n 
118, 62; den Elzen, Sharing Developed Countries' Post-2012 Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions Based 
on Comparable Efforts, above n 125, 12, 34; Winkler, Marquard and Letete, above n 174, 9-14; Climate 
Action Tracker, above n 127. 
379 See, eg, den Elzen, Exploring Comparable Post-2012 Reduction Efforts for Annex I Countries, above n 
118, 16, 54.  
380 Ibid 62; den Elzen, Sharing Developed Countries' Post-2012 Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions 
Based on Comparable Efforts, above n 125, 12, 34; Winkler, Marquard and Letete, above n 174, 9-14; 
Climate Action Tracker, above n 127. 
381 Ibid. 
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likewise. However, the Rudd government's failure to pledge an upper mitigation target 
that was consistent with the objective of avoiding dangerous climate change (and 
hence the interests of the most vulnerable developing countries) ultimately indicated 
that it was not prepared to moderate narrow self-interest to the extent that would be 
expected of a GIC. 
 
The weakness of its target was also arguably inconsistent with a range of other general 
GIC attributes. Most clearly, this included the notion of advancing 'purposes beyond 
ourselves'. Similarly, its 25 per cent target undoubtedly failed to give effect to 
Australia's 'enlightened self-interest'. This is because Australia's long-term interest 
undoubtedly lay in avoiding dangerous climate change, not in seeking to protect its 
short-term economic advantages. Given that many of Australia's regional neighbours 
called for a 350 ppm CO2-e agreement to ensure their survival, it was also at odds with 
the notion of good neighbourliness to only pledge a target that was consistent with a 
450 ppm CO2-e agreement.  
 
A potential defence for the Rudd government from a GIC perspective was that the 25 
per cent target likely represented the upper limit of what was politically feasible in 
Australia at the time. In this sense, it balanced what Gareth Evans referred to as 
idealism with realism. As noted earlier, the government was under significant political 
pressure from the carbon-intensive business sector to act in sync with other nations, 
rather than as a leader, due to concerns about the ramifications of acting unilaterally 
for the economy and jobs. The government also lacked Parliamentary backing for 
targets higher than 25 per cent. Given that there was little likelihood of Parties 
adopting a 350 ppm CO2-e agreement at COP 15, or Annex I Parties agreeing to 
collectively reduce their emissions by more than 30 per cent,382 a pledge by the 
government to a target higher than 25 per cent would have been purely symbolic 
(given its conditional approach to target-setting). Thus it could be argued that the 
government struck a defensible balance between setting a reasonable target (albeit 
                                                     
 
382 This would have been clear to the government based on the global mitigation goals backed by the 
majority of Parties (see chapter 5) and the national mitigation targets pledged by developed countries in 
the lead up to COP 15.  
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not a leading one), and a target that reflected both domestic and international 
realities.  
 
Turning to the merits of setting a conditional target range, this chapter accepts that 
the Rudd government had sound policy and political reasons for doing so. The 
dominant consideration for the government was that Australia needed to act in 
concert with other nations, rather than unilaterally, in order to prevent causing 
unnecessary harm to Australia's economy and jobs. Doing otherwise would clearly 
have been politically unpopular at the domestic level. However, while perhaps 
understandable from a domestic perspective, the government's approach appeared to 
be at odds with the principle of leadership. This is because in order to show genuine 
leadership it was arguably incumbent upon the government to put forward a single, 
scientifically credible target, not one which balanced economic and political 
considerations.  
 
Some may regard this as an overly idealistic view of what was politically possible for 
the Rudd government. Indeed, it needs to be remembered that dangerous climate 
change can only be averted through the collective action of the UNFCCC Parties, 
especially the major global emitters. While putting forward a single ambitious target 
would certainly have carried symbolic weight, it was unlikely to have influenced major 
emitters like the US and China whose national targets – like that of Australia – were 
heavily influenced by domestic considerations. Furthermore, it would have had little 
effect on preventing dangerous climate change given the relatively small contribution 
Australia makes to global GHG emissions. The government's approach of setting a 
conditional target range was thus not necessarily unreasonable from a policy 
perspective. But genuine leadership clearly required Australia to adopt a target that 
positioned it as front runner, not a follower.  
  
Regarding the conditions attached to the 25 per cent target, the above analysis found 
that many of these were generally reasonable. However, there were certainly 
problematic aspects to several of the government's conditions – for example, linking 
the upper target to a 25 per cent collective reduction by the 'advanced economies', 
rather than the settled category of Annex I Parties; the requirement that the major 
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developing economies nominate a peak year for their emissions; and especially 
demanding unrestricted access to LULUCF sinks and the international carbon market. 
The fact that most of the 25 per cent target conditions were ultimately not satisfied by 
the Copenhagen Accord, may also suggest that the conditions were overly stringent. 
Some commentators were critical of the 25 per cent target on this basis, with 
Greenpeace, for example, suggesting that it was possibly 'illusory'.383  China also 
criticised the conditions as being unrealistic.384 Yet while certainly stringent, the 
conditions by and large involved reasonable expectations of other Parties regarding 
the elements that were necessary to deliver a 450 ppm CO2-e outcome. This chapter is 
of the view, however, that requiring unlimited access to LULUCF sinks and the 
international carbon market were not consistent with the principle of leadership, in 
light of environmental effectiveness concerns regarding LULUCF accounting and 
carbon credits, which are detailed further in chapters 7, 8 and 9. It is also strongly 
arguable that while most of the conditions had a reasonable policy basis, a genuine 
leader would have adopted less stringent conditions in order to demonstrate that it 
was prepared to take strong action, regardless of the actions of others. 
 
Ultimately, the true test of the Rudd government's conditions would have occurred at 
the point in time in which it was required to fully determine whether they had been 
satisfied. The government could have interpreted these conditions strictly – so as to 
avoid adopting the 25 or 15 per cent targets – or generously, demonstrating leadership 
by not seeking to shirk its commitments.385 The Rudd government was not tested on 
this front, however, with the Copenhagen Accord only delivering a weak, non-binding 
outcome. Indeed, the Accord's status as a non-binding political agreement meant that 
it was entirely appropriate for the government to wait for further legal developments, 
                                                     
 
383 Evidence to Senate Select Committee on Climate Policy, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 20 May 
2009, 20 (John Hepburn, Greenpeace Australia Pacific). See also Fred Pearce, 'Australia's Copenhagen 
Climate Strategy is Smoke and Mirrors', The Guardian (online), 26 November 2009 
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385 Note that the government appeared to have some flexibility in this regard. While some of the 
conditions were indicated to be essential, others only reflected a strong preference: see Australian 
Government, FOI Australia's Target Conditions – Where Do We Stand?, above n 41, 2. 
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such as the adoption of a formal COP decision or new Protocol, before moving beyond 
its unilateral 5 per cent commitment. 
 
More positively for the Rudd government, a number of its actions were consistent with 
other attributes of GIC identified in chapter 1. As with chapter 4, it is clear that 
Australia took an internationalist and activist approach (generally working 
cooperatively with other nations and providing detailed submissions about its targets 
relatively early on in the negotiations) and was generally committed to multilateral 
diplomacy and the relevant international institutions (chiefly the UNFCCC). Its activism 
and upper 25 per cent target also demonstrated a willingness to 'pitch in' (although 
probably not to the extent necessary to genuinely demonstrate GIC). In a broad sense, 
its cooperative engagement with the negotiations also demonstrated its general 
commitment to international law as the key international mechanism for addressing 
climate change (although as concluded above, it could have significantly bolstered this 
commitment by adopting a national target that gave proper effect to the provisions 
and principles of the ICCL regime). As argued in chapter 5, however, the above 
attributes were relatively easy to satisfy, and are not viewed as being decisive for 
distinguishing 'good' from average or poor behaviour in this instance. 
 
Overall, it must be acknowledged that the issue of target-setting was an extremely 
difficult and complex issue, not least because of the economic risks for Australia, and 
political risks for the government, in acting ahead of other nations. Indeed, much of 
the government's approach was perfectly understandable and reasonable in light of 
the various factors it needed to balance. It must be reiterated, however, that GIC 
requires a higher standard of behaviour from governments. For this author, the major 
shortfall in the Rudd government's approach was that it failed to pledge an upper 
target that was genuinely capable of helping to realise the Convention's central 
objective, that of avoiding dangerous climate change for all Parties. Additionally, its 
upper target was demonstrably insufficient to truly show leadership or give effect to 
other UNFCC principles such as equity and CBDR&RC. This chapter thus suggests that 
while Australia met the standard of at least an 'average' international citizen on the 
issue of target-setting, it ultimately needed to pledge a higher conditional target than 
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25 per cent, and additionally relax several of its more onerous conditions, in order to 
qualify as a GIC. 
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CHAPTER 7. IMPLEMENTING THE RUDD GOVERNMENT’S 
MITIGATION TARGET  
 
Australia's mitigation targets will be both 'real' and 'robust'. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, 
December 2007.1 
 
'With Kyoto we were negotiating an environment treaty. Now, we're negotiating a deal about 
the economic structure of the planet.' Erwin Jackson, The Climate Institute.2 
 
The previous two chapters of this thesis examined the goal-setting aspects of the Rudd 
government's approach to mitigation, namely, its preferred long-term global 
mitigation target and its conditional 5 to 25 per cent emission reduction target for 
2020. To some extent these goal-setting aspects represented the easy part of the Rudd 
government's engagement with the post-2012 climate negotiations on the mitigation 
issue. The larger test of the Rudd government's resolve to act on climate change would 
lie in how it approached the challenge of implementing Australia's future international 
emission reduction obligations. 
 
A key commitment of the Rudd Labor Opposition in the lead up to the 2007 federal 
election was to introduce a comprehensive domestic legal and policy framework to 
reduce Australia's growing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. At the heart of Labor's 
approach was its pledge to introduce an emissions trading scheme (ETS).3 This would 
be supplemented by various 'complementary' policies, most notably a mandatory 20 
per cent Renewable Energy Target (RET) for 2020.4 Once in government, Labor sought 
                                                     
 
1 Kevin Rudd (Speech delivered at the High Level Segment of the 13th Conference of the Parties, United 
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<http://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/browse.php?did=15704>. 
2 Adam Morton, 'Stumbling to Copenhagen', The Age (online), 5 September 2009 
<http://www.theage.com.au/environment/stumbling-to-copenhagen-20090904-fbe7.html>. 
3 Kevin Rudd, 'An Action Agenda for Climate Change' (Speech delivered at the Annual Fraser Lecture, 
Canberra, 30 May 2007). 
4 ABC, 'Rudd Announces Mandatory Renewable Energy Target', ABC (online), 31 October 2007 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2007-10-30/rudd-announces-mandatory-renewable-energy-
target/711462>. 
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to legislate its ETS, the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS),5 which was 
spruiked internationally as proof that Australia was serious about delivering on its 
2020 and longer-term mitigation targets.6 Ultimately, however, the government was 
unable to secure parliamentary backing for the Scheme.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to assess whether the Rudd government's approach to 
implementation was consistent with the standard of good international citizenship 
(GIC). It does so in the following manner. First, the major features of the government's 
domestic legal and policy response are outlined, with a focus on the CPRS. Second, an 
overview is provided of the key criticisms of the government's domestic legal and 
policy response, especially the CPRS. As noted in chapter 1, a GIC is generally expected 
to comply with its legal obligations under international law. While Australia had not 
agreed to new international targets at the time the CPRS and other measures were 
proposed, this chapter argues that it is important to assess whether the government's 
approach was legally effective, in that it would likely position Australia to meet its 
post-2012 obligations. Third, the chapter considers the government's contentious 
decision to allow 'liable entities' under the CPRS unlimited access to international 
emission credits, which could not be guaranteed to result in genuine emission 
reductions.7 As will be explained, such an approach was potentially at odds with 
various principles and provisions of the international climate change law (ICCL) regime. 
Fourth, the chapter examines the government's efforts to legislate the CPRS. The 
chapter concludes with a detailed assessment of whether the government's approach 
to implementation met the standard of GIC, drawing upon both a legal analysis of the 
government's approach and consideration of the broader attributes of GIC identified in 
chapter 1. 
                                                     
 
5 Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 2009 (Cth) ('CPRS Bill'); Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 
[No 2] 2009 (Cth) and later the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 2010 (Cth). 
6 See, eg, Australia, 'Strengthening Australia's National Ambition for 2020' in UNFCCC, Ideas and 
Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 3, UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4/Add.3 (1 June 2009) 4, 4. 
7 Note that two particularly complex issues concerning implementation – namely, the use of emission 
permits from a REDD mechanism and Australia's approach to land-based emission accounting – are 
considered separately in chapters 8 and 9, respectively. 
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A The Rudd Government's Domestic Legal and Policy Framework: The 
CPRS and Complementary Measures 
1 Historical Background: The Howard Government's GHG Abatement Laws and 
Policies 
The Rudd government inherited a range of emission reduction laws and policies from 
its predecessor, the Liberal National Howard government, when it won office in 
December 2007. As discussed in chapter 2, the Howard government chose not to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol8 but nonetheless committed to achieving Australia's mitigation 
target of 108 per cent by 2008-12 (above 1990 levels).9 The most notable feature of 
the Howard government's emission reduction policy was its Mandatory Renewable 
Energy Target (MRET) of 9500 gigawatt hours by 2010 (approximately  2 per cent of 
Australia's electricity needs).10  Otherwise, the government largely put its faith in 
voluntary programs to encourage Australian businesses and individuals to reduce their 
emissions and improve efficiency.11 While the Howard government did manage to put 
Australia on track to meet its Kyoto goal, this was considerably aided by the inclusion 
of the so-called 'Australia clause' in the Protocol (providing Australia with a windfall 
gain from reduced land clearing),12 and the fact that Australia's Kyoto target allowed it 
to increase emissions by 8 per cent. Longer-term, Australia's emissions were expected 
to rise by 27 per cent above 1990 levels by 2020,13 meaning that Australia needed a 
                                                     
 
8 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 
16 March 1998, 2303 UNTS 148 (entered into force 16 February 2005) annex B ('Kyoto Protocol'). 
9 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australia’s Climate Change Policy: Our Economy, Our 
Environment, Our Future (2007) 6. 
10 The MRET was established by the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth) and supported by the 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Charge) Act 2000 (Cth) and Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 
2001 (Cth). It came into force on 1 April 2001.  The MRET required electricity generators to surrender 
Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) each year equivalent to their obligations or face a penalty ($40 per 
REC owing if the REC shortfall was 10 per cent or more of its liability). RECs were tradeable, establishing 
a market mechanism. The main concern with the MRET was that it was not expanded or extended by 
the Howard government, as recommended by the Tambling Report, in order to encourage ongoing 
investment in renewable energy beyond 2010: see Grant Tambling, Renewable Opportunities: A Review 
of the Operation of the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Australian Greenhouse Office, 2003) xxi.  
11 See Prime Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading, Report of the Task Group on Emissions Trading 
(2007) 37-43; Rosemary Lyster and Adrian Bradbrook, Energy Law and the Environment (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 85-111.  
12 Kyoto Protocol art 3.7. See previous discussion of the Australia clause in chapter 2 and further 
discussion in chapter 9. 
13 Australian Greenhouse Office, Tracking to the Kyoto Target 2006 (2006) 1. 
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more comprehensive legal and policy response for the post-2012 era. Relenting to 
growing public pressure, in 2007 the Howard government belatedly joined Labor in 
promising to introduce an ETS if re-elected,14 as well as a modified MRET in the form of 
a 15 per cent Clean Energy Target by 2020.15 Neither policy was introduced, however, 
due to its loss at the November 2007 federal election.  
2 The CPRS and Complementary Measures: Overview  
a) Background 
The federal Labor party promised under the leadership of Kim Beazley in 2004 to 
introduce an ETS by no later than 2010.16 This commitment was confirmed by Labor 
under the leadership of Kevin Rudd during the 2007 federal election campaign. 
Demonstrating how seriously Rudd appeared to take the issue, the then Opposition 
leader, aided by the state and territory governments, commissioned the independent 
Garnaut Climate Change Review (Garnaut Review) in April 2007 to advise on the 
implications of climate change for Australia and an appropriate policy response.17 With 
rising public awareness and desire for action on climate change,18 Rudd's commitment 
to introduce an ETS became one of Labor's core promises during its successful election 
campaign.  
 
In office, the Rudd government immediately undertook detailed policy work on the 
possible design of an ETS, including extensive consultations with industry, community 
groups and other stakeholders. This culminated in the release of the Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme Green Paper,19 followed by the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
                                                     
 
14 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, above n 9, 7. The commitment to introduce an ETS was 
influenced by Howard's Prime Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading which concluded that it was 
in Australia's interests to introduce an ETS by 2011 or 2012, even if a post-2012 climate agreement had 
not been reached: see Prime Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading, above n 11, 9, 13.  
15 Australian Government, 'National Clean Energy Target' (Media Release, 23 September 2007).  
16 See Leslie Nielsen et al, Bills Digest: Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 2009, No 165 of 2008-09, 
15 June 2009, 12.  
17 See Ross Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report (Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
18 See, eg, Verity Burgmann and Hans Baer, 'The World's First Climate Change Election' (Paper presented 
at Australian Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Melbourne, 27-29 September 2010) 
<http://apsa2010.com.au/full-papers/pdf/APSA2010_0161.pdf>. 
19 Australian Government, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (Green Paper) (2008). 
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White Paper,20 by the newly created Department of Climate Change. This was 
complemented by Treasury's report, Australia's Low Pollution Future: The Economics of 
Climate Change Mitigation.21 The CPRS was designated as the central mechanism to 
reduce domestic emissions and to position Australia to achieve its international 
obligations under an anticipated post-2012 climate agreement.22 Overall, the 
government's domestic legal and policy response was 'designed to transform ... 
[Australia's] economy, putting it on a low-emissions path', as well as building 
Australia's international credibility and strengthening its ability to influence the post-
2012 climate negotiations.23 
 
An exposure draft of the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill (CPRS Bill) was 
released in March 2009.24 After receiving further comment from stakeholders, and 
taking into account the economic impacts of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the 
government announced a number of changes to the Bill on 4 May 2009, including the 
delay of the scheme by 1 year from 2010 to 2011.25 The CPRS Bill, and other Bills 
necessary to implement the scheme, were then introduced to Parliament on 14 May 
2009.26  
                                                     
 
20 Australian Government, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia's Low Pollution Future (White 
Paper, Vol 1) (2008) and Australian Government, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia's Low 
Pollution Future (White Paper, Vol 2) (2008). 
21 Treasury, Australia's Low Pollution Future: The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation (2008). For an 
overview of the policy development process see, eg, Dennis Woodward, 'How Green Was My Policy? 
The Rudd Government and Climate Change' (Paper presented at Australian Political Studies Association 
Annual Conference, 27 September 2010) <http://apsa2010.com.au/full-
papers/pdf/APSA2010_0069.pdf>. 
22 Explanatory Memorandum, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 2009 [No 2] (Cth) 14 ('Explanatory 
Memorandum, CPRS Bill [No 2]').  
23 Australian Government, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia's Low Pollution Future (White 
Paper, Vol 1), above n 20, 1-7. 
24 See Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Exposure Draft of the 
Legislation to Implement the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (2009). 
25 See Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill [No 2] 11-12. 
26 CPRS Bill; Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2009 (Cth); Australian 
Climate Change Regulatory Authority Bill 2009; Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (Charges — General) 
Bill 2009 (Cth); Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (Charges — Customs) Bill 2009 (Cth); Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme (Charges — Excise) Bill 2009 (Cth); Excise Tariff Amendment (Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme) Bill 2009 (Cth); Customs Tariff Amendment (Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme) Bill 2009 (Cth); Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS Fuel Credits) Bill 2009 (Cth); Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS Fuel Credits) (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2009 (Cth). The 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (Household Assistance) Bill 2009 (Cth) was introduced separately.   
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b) Key Features of the CPRS Bill 
The original CPRS Bill 2009 was intended to establish a national ETS effective from 1 
July 2011.27 The major objects of the Bill included:  
 giving effect to Australia's obligations under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)28 and the Kyoto Protocol;  
 supporting 'the development of an effective global response to climate 
change'; and  
 taking action directed towards meeting Australia's 2020 and/or 2050 
international mitigation targets in a 'flexible and cost-effective way' and in 
accordance with the Kyoto rules or any successor agreement.29 
 
The Scheme, a 'cap and trade' ETS, would aim to reduce emissions by setting a national 
emissions target for 2020 (within the government's 5 to 25 per cent range),30 a 
'scheme emissions cap' as well as national 'gateways' (an emission cap range, with an 
upper and lower figure) which would increase in stringency over time.31 A limited 
number of Australian emissions units – commonly known as emission permits – would 
be issued to 'liable entities' each year, in accordance with the scheme cap.32 As a 
market-based mechanism, these permits would be tradable between liable entities.33  
 
The tradable nature of emission permits under the CPRS was designed to encourage 
emission reductions to be achieved at 'least cost'.34 As explained by the Garnaut 
Review, allowing permits to be traded between liable entities would allow permits to 
be used where they had most economic value, encouraging the least expensive 
abatement options to occur first. As permits were traded, the carbon price would 
                                                     
 
27 CPRS Bill cl 4. 
28 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1771 
UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994) ('UNFCCC'). 
29 CPRS Bill cls 3(1)-(5).  
30 Ibid cl 3. 
31 Scheme caps and gateways were to be set by the responsible Minister with regard to Australia's 
obligations under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol and various other domestic and international factors: 
see ibid cl 14(5). 
32 Ibid pts 3, 4. 
33 Ibid pt 4. 
34 Australian Government, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia's Low Pollution Future (White 
Paper, Vol 1), above n 20, xxviii. 
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come to reflect the balance between the scarcity of permits and options for 
abatement.35 The carbon price established by the CPRS would change the relative 
prices of goods and services, making emissions-intensive goods more expensive, thus 
establishing an incentive for both individuals and businesses to adjust their choices and 
practices in favour of lower emission goods and services.36 
 
Each year, liable entities would compete to purchase the quantity of permits they 
required (equivalent to their expected emissions), either at auction or on the 
secondary carbon trading market, although permits would have a fixed price of $10 in 
the first year.37 Full trading of permits was to commence in 2012-13, although with a 
capped permit price for the first three years, initially set at $40.38 Liable entities were 
to report their emissions under the existing National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting 
Act 2007 (Cth) and surrender permits equal to their liabilities at the end of each 
financial year.39 Penalties would apply for any shortfall (initially $11 per unit) and 
additional units would need to be surrendered in future years to 'make good' any 
shortfall.40  
 
In order to spread the costs of carbon pricing across the economy, the CPRS was 
designed to cover a broad range of emissions sources, namely, stationary energy, 
transport, fugitive emissions, industrial processes and waste sectors, and the six GHGs 
regulated by the Kyoto Protocol.41 The Scheme was to cover approximately 75 per cent 
of Australia's emissions and 1000 of Australia's largest emitting entities.42 Agriculture 
                                                     
 
35 Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report, above n 17, 309. 
36 See Australian Government, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia's Low Pollution Future 
(White Paper, Vol 1), above n 20, xxviii. 
37 CPRS Bill pts 4, 6. See Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill [No 2] 20-21, 104-05. Note that this 
chapter refers to first CPRS Bill, but the second version of the Explanatory Memorandum, as this later 
version contained additional information on the scheme. Dollar references in this chapter are to 
Australian dollars unless indicated otherwise. 
38 CPRS Bill pts 4, 6. See Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill [No 2] 105. 
39 CPRS Bill pt 6. 
40 Ibid cl 133.  
41 See Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill [No 2] 27; National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 
2007 (Cth). The six GHGs were carbon dioxide; methane, nitrous oxide; hydrofluorocarbons; 
perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride. 
42 Australian Government, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia's Low Pollution Future (White 
Paper, Vol 1), above n 20, xxviii. Liable entities were generally restricted to entities emitting or 
responsible for 25 000 tonnes CO2-e or more per year: CPRS Bill pt 3. 
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(approximately 15 per cent of Australia's emissions)43 was initially excluded due to the 
complexity of accurately estimating its emissions and including a sector with more 
than 100 000 small emitters.44 The government wished to include the sector, however, 
by 2015.45 
 
While most liable entities would have been obliged to purchase permits under the 
CPRS, certain high-emitting sectors of the economy were to be provided with free 
permit allocations to shield them from the full impact of the carbon price. Initially, the 
government proposed to provide emissions-intensive trade-exposed (EITE) industries 
with free permits equivalent to either 90 or 60 per cent of their baseline emissions, 
depending on their emissions intensity.46 This assistance would decrease by 1.3 per 
cent each year so that EITE industries were also contributing to carbon abatement.47 
The initial assistance rates were subsequently increased, as part of the May 2009 
modifications, to 94.5 and 66 per cent, respectively. This was to provide a 'global 
recession buffer' for EITE industries in light of the GFC.48 Coal-fired electricity 
generators (CFEGs), Australia's major source of electricity,49 were also to be granted 
130 million free permits, again over a five year period.50 To offset expected increases 
in fuel prices, households and businesses were also to receive 'cent-for-cent' fuel tax 
reductions.51 To cushion the financial impact on low and middle income households, 
these groups were also to receive full or partial compensation for expected increases 
in the cost of living, such as higher power bills.52  
                                                     
 
43 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Australia's Emissions Projections 2010 (2010) 4. 
As of 2009. 
44 Australian Government, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia's Low Pollution Future (White 
Paper, Vol 1), above n 20, 6-44.  
45 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill [No 2] (Cth) 13 
('Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill [No 2]'). 
46 Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill [No 2] 116. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 See section B.3 below. 
50 CPRS Bill pt 9. See Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill [No 2] 143. 
51 Excise Tariff Amendment (Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme) Bill 2009 and Customs Tariff 
Amendment (Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme) Bill 2009; Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS 
Fuel Credits) Bill 2009; Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS Fuel Credits) (Consequential 
Amendments) Bill 2009. 
52 Explanatory Memorandum, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (Household Assistance) Bill 2009 [No 
2] (Cth) 2; Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (Household 
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In addition to Australian emissions units, eligible emission permits under the CPRS 
included approved 'international emissions units' (commonly known as international 
permits).53 Liable entities were to have unlimited access to international permits from 
2012-13, such as those generated by the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development 
Mechanism, which could be purchased to help meet their Scheme liabilities.54 As with 
domestic trading, providing access to the international trade in permits was intended 
to allow liable entities to 'access lower cost abatement opportunities' and Australia's 
national mitigation target 'to be achieved in a flexible and cost-effective way'.55 So-
called 'carbon credits' or 'carbon offsets' could also be generated under the Scheme, 
with emission permits to be awarded for reforestation and synthetic GHG destruction 
activities.56 
c) Coalition Amendments to the CPRS Bill 
The CPRS Bill, and related Bills, were passed with minor amendments by the House of 
Representatives, in which Labor held a majority, on 4 June 2009.57 However, the Bills 
were rejected in the Senate on 13 August 2009, by 42 votes to 30, with the Rudd 
government failing to gain the seven votes it needed from non-Labor Senators.58 The 
CPRS Bill and related Bills were then reintroduced to the Parliament on 22 October, 
2009 (as CPRS Bill 2009 [No 2]). In a renewed attempt to pass the Bill, the government 
agreed to a series of amendments with the Liberal National Opposition, then led by 
Malcolm Turnbull, on November 24.59 This deal almost saw the CPRS Bill approved in 
the Senate and become law. However, Turnbull's personal support for the amended 
CPRS was not shared by many within the Coalition, resulting in a Liberal leadership spill 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
Assistance) Bill 2009 [No 2] (Cth). Increases in the cost of living were estimated at 0.4 per cent in 2011-
12 and 0.8 per cent in 2012-13. Assistance was to be provided as direct cash assistance and tax offsets. 
53 CPRS Bill pt 4. See Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill [No 2] 14.  
54 Ibid. See further discussion at section C.  
55 Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill [No 2] 77-78. 
56 CPRS Bill cls 191, 245. 
57 Amendments related mainly to reforestation activities: see Supplementary Explanatory 
Memorandum, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 2009 (Cth) ch 1. 
58 Parliament of Australia, Journals of the Senate (13 August 2009) 2291. 
59 See Explanatory Memorandum, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 2010 (Cth), 13-14; Malcolm 
Turnbull, 'Coalition Plan to Save Jobs and Reduce Costs' (Media Release, 18 October 2009)  
<http://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/releases/coalition-plan-to-save-jobs-and-reduce-costs/>. 
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before the vote on the amended Bill was taken.60 Under new leader, Tony Abbott, the 
Coalition reneged on its agreement with Labor, voting to defeat the CPRS Bill in the 
Senate for a second time on 2 December 2009.61 The CPRS Bill was introduced for a 
third time on 2 February 2010, but still lacking parliamentary support, Prime Minster 
Rudd announced on 27 April 2010 that the government would defer the 
implementation of the CPRS until 2013 (see further discussion at section D).62 
 
This chapter assesses the Rudd government's approach to implementation on the basis 
of the original CPRS Bill (and identical 'No 2' version), which represented the 
government's preferred Scheme. However, the key Coalition amendments agreed to 
by Labor in November should be briefly highlighted. Notably, these amendments 
significantly expanded the compensation and assistance provided to carbon-intensive 
industries. Among the amendments included:  
 greater assistance to EITE industries – through keeping the global recession 
buffer in place beyond the first five years – and CFEGs – increasing the 
allocation of free permits from 130 million free permits over five years to 270 
million permits over 10 years;63  
 the indefinite exclusion of agriculture;64  
 a Coal Sector Adjustment Scheme to assist operators of pre-CPRS coal mines – 
providing almost 50 million free permits over five years;65  
 additional free permits for liquefied natural gas projects at an ongoing effective 
assistance rate of about 50 per cent – bolstering the free permits these entities  
 
                                                     
 
60 Phillip Coorey, 'Shock Result as Abbott Wins Liberal Leadership by One Vote … ETS Dead', The Sydney 
Morning Herald (online), 1 December 2009 <http://www.smh.com.au/national/shock-result-as-abbott-
wins-liberal-leadership-by-one-vote--ets-dead-20091201-k1uz.html>. 
61 Parliament of Australia, Journals of the Senate No 105 (2 December 2009) 3048. 41 votes to 33. 
62 Australian Government, 'Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme' (Media Release, 5 May 2010). 
63 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill 2009 [No 2] 5, 7; Department of Climate Change, 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Details of Proposed CPRS Changes (2009) 3. 
64 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill [No 2] 13. 
65 Ibid 3, 17. Originally, free permits were not provided to coal mines. Instead, operators were to be 
provided up to $750 million from the Climate Change Action Fund ($500 million in transitional assistance 
to the gassiest mines and $250 million for abatement measures): Australian Government, Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia's Low Pollution Future (White Paper, Vol 2), above n 20, 18-8, 18-
9. The new allocation of permits (worth approximately $1.2 billion) replaced the $500 million of 
transitional assistance: Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill [No 2] 3, 18-19. 
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were already to receive as an EITE sector;66  
 new assistance for the primary food processing sector;67  
 the expansion of carbon crediting to a broader range of abatement projects 
including in the agriculture sector;68  
 a stronger policy commitment to take into account voluntary abatement 
activities by individuals and business when setting the Scheme cap – such as 
the purchase of 'GreenPower';69 and  
 the inclusion of a Transitional Electricity Cost Assistance Program to reduce the 
impact of the CPRS on electricity prices paid by medium and large enterprises.70 
d) Complementary Measures  
In addition to the CPRS, the Rudd government recognised the need for complementary 
measures to assist in reducing Australia's emissions, especially in the short to medium-
term. These would help to address market failures that a carbon price alone could not 
overcome, as well as ameliorating the distributional consequences of the Scheme (in 
terms of cost and impact on jobs).71 These policies were primarily focused on 
expanding the use of renewable energy, improving energy efficiency, and research, 
development and demonstration programs.72 Some of these programs had their 
funding increased, or redirected, in response to the GFC so as to simultaneously 
operate as economic stimulus measures. Among the key complementary measures 
included: 
                                                     
 
66 Department of Climate Change, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Details of Proposed CPRS 
Changes, above n 63, 5.   
67 Ibid 6. Initial priority was to be given to dairy processing, meat processing and malt production 
facilities. 
68 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill [No 2] 3-4. 
69 The original Bill allowed for the government to consider voluntary actions in setting the Scheme cap 
(CPRS Bill cl 14) and the government had a policy commitment to take into account the purchase of 
GreenPower (Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill [No 2] 82). However, in its agreement with the 
Coalition the government made it clear that the 5 to 25 per cent target was exclusive of voluntary 
action: Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill [No 2] 4, 51-52. 
70 Department of Climate Change, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Details of Proposed CPRS 
Changes, above n 63, 16. This was targeted at companies in the manufacturing and mining sectors that 
were not already receiving free permits or other assistance. 
71 Australian Government, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia's Low Pollution Future (White 
Paper, Vol 2), above n 20, 19-3. 
72 Explanatory Memorandum, CPRS Bill 2009 [No 2] (Cth) 7-8. See further Australian Government, 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia's Low Pollution Future (White Paper, Vol 2), above n 20, ch 
19. 
 252 
 a $2.75 billion Climate Change Action Fund – funded by CPRS permit revenue – 
which was to provide assistance to business, community sector organisations, 
workers, regions and communities in the transition to a low carbon economy;73 
 a Renewable Energy Target (RET) of 20 per cent/45 000 gigawatt hours by 2020 
– expanding the Howard government's MRET;74  
 a $4.5 billion Clean Energy Initiative including, inter alia, a $1.5 billion Solar 
Flagships Program to support up to four solar power generation projects; $465 
million for a new body, Renewables Australia, to help bring renewable 
technologies to market at lower cost; and a $2 billion Carbon Capture and 
Storage Flagships Program to assist in bringing industrial scale carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) projects forward in Australia;75 
 a $3.9 billion Energy Efficient Homes Program to improve the energy efficiency 
of Australian homes through the installation of insulation and increased rebates 
for solar and heat pump water systems;76 
 the $300 million Solar Homes and Communities Plan, providing rebates to 
home-owners to install solar photovoltaic energy systems;77  
 the Green Loans Program for low-interest loans to home-owners for solar, 
water and energy efficiency products;78  
 a National Clean Coal Fund of $500 million over seven years to help bring 
forward the commercialisation and deployment of clean coal technologies 
(later re-badged under the Clean Energy Initiative as the National Low 
Emissions Coal Initiative);79 and 
                                                     
 
73 See Australian Government, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia's Low Pollution Future 
(White Paper, Vol 2), above n 20, ch 18. 
74 Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth); Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Charge) Act 2000 (Cth); 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 (Cth). Amended 20 August 2009. See also Australian 
Government, The Renewable Energy Target Scheme, Department of Environment 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/topics/cleaner-environment/clean-air/renewable-energy-target-
scheme>. 
75 Department of Climate Change, Climate Change Budget Overview 2009-10 (2009) iv, 8, 17. Funding for 
the Solar Flagships Program and Renewables Australia was redirected from the $500 million Renewable 
Energy Fund which had been announced in 2008. 
76 Ibid 22. This was both a climate change and national economic stimulus measure in response to the 
GFC. 
77 Ibid 23; Department of Climate Change, Climate Change Budget Overview 2008-09 (2008) 14. 
78 Department of Climate Change, Climate Change Budget Overview 2008-09, above n 77, 13. 
79 Ibid 26; Department of Climate Change, Climate Change Budget Overview 2009-10, above n 75, 17. 
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 a Green Car Innovation Fund of $1.3 billion over ten years to encourage the 
local automotive industry to develop and manufacture low emission cars.80 
B Implementation Part I: Overview of Key Concerns and the Issue of 
Legal Effectiveness 
Unlike other chapters in this thesis which conceptually relate more to the development 
phase of international law (although still involving compliance questions) – 
implementation falls more within the compliance phase of the international legal 
process.81 As discussed in chapter 1, compliance with binding international law is 
generally regarded as a key obligation for a GIC. The Rudd government's primary 
responsibility in this regard during the period of review was to ensure that Australia 
complied with its Kyoto Protocol target for the first commitment period (2008-12).82 
This target became legally binding for Australia as a result of the Protocol being ratified 
by the Rudd government on 3 December 2007. As previously noted, by the time the 
Rudd government came to office, sufficient laws and policies were already in place to 
enable Australia to satisfy its Kyoto obligations.83 As such, there was no major action 
required on the government's behalf to achieve the first commitment period target. It 
is clear, however, that the Rudd government acted as a GIC in relation to Australia's 
2008-12 target, given that it opted to make this commitment binding by ratifying the 
Protocol, and avoided undertaking any measures which may have compromised 
Australia's ability to achieve this goal. This issue is not considered in further detail by 
this chapter, it having little real bearing on the government's GIC credentials in relation 
to the post-2012 period.  
 
                                                     
 
80 Department of Climate Change, Climate Change Budget Overview 2009-10, above n 75, 20. This Fund 
was initially to be given $500 million over five years: Department of Climate Change, Climate Change 
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The concern of this chapter is instead whether the Rudd government's emission 
reduction policies – chiefly the CPRS – would likely have enabled Australia to comply 
with its future international obligations under a post-2012 agreement. That is, was its 
legal and policy response likely to be legally effective? It should be recognised that 
there was no legal requirement as such for the Rudd government to establish new 
emission reduction laws and policies, with the post-2012 agreement yet to be 
established. But to its credit, Labor made this a policy and political priority. In doing so, 
the government made this a key test of its GIC credentials on the implementation 
issue.  
 
A wide-ranging debate was held within Australia on the merits of the CPRS and the 
government's complementary emission reduction laws and policies.84 Numerous 
criticisms were made regarding the design of the CPRS. Several of the more significant 
concerns – those with the most relevance to the question of legal effectiveness – are 
outlined below.85 This is followed by a brief review of the effectiveness of the 
government's complementary measures.  
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1 The Merits of a Cap and Trade ETS 
An initial concern regarding the CPRS was whether the policy instrument it adopted – a 
cap and trade ETS – provided the optimal means of reducing Australia's GHG 
emissions.  Various commentators in Australia called for alternative mechanisms to be 
adopted, among them:  
 a carbon tax – establishing a fixed rather than market price on carbon 
emissions – that would increase over time as determined by the government;86  
 a baseline-and-credit scheme (an alternative form of ETS);87  
 the McKibbin hybrid model (a hybrid cap and trade ETS and carbon tax);88 
 'command and control'-style regulatory approaches – such as a moratorium on 
building coal-fired power stations or a higher renewable energy target; and 
 incentive-based regulatory approaches such as feed-in tariffs which could 
encourage the installation of renewable energy.89 
 
The cap and trade ETS model was the approach adopted by the European Union (EU) 
in January 2005, the first Kyoto Party to establish an ETS.90 Various deficiencies in the 
design and implementation of the EU ETS saw the effectiveness of the EU Scheme, and 
this type of policy mechanism more generally, called into question. In brief, phase I of 
the EU ETS (2005-07) was compromised by a significant over-allocation of emission 
permits (European Union Allowances), caused by the Scheme being implemented 
before reliable emissions data was available for liable entities. This, and the inability of 
emissions permits to be carried over to phase II, caused the carbon price to fall to as 
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low as zero in 2007, muting any incentive for abatement by liable entities.91 While 
phase I was only intended as a pilot phase, similar issues regarding surplus allowances, 
price volatility and a depressed carbon price arose in phase II (2008-12), this time 
caused by a larger than expected drop in emissions as a result of the GFC. This again 
undermined the price signal for businesses to reduce emissions and created ongoing 
problems for the integrity of the Scheme with phase II's large surplus of permits being 
bankable for use in Phase III (2013-2020).92 Another major criticism of the EU ETS was 
that it appeared to deliver 'windfall profits' to electricity generators, who were accused 
of unfairly increasing profits by passing on to consumers the market cost of permits 
which they had received for free.93  
 
Notwithstanding various issues regarding the design and implementation of the EU 
ETS, the Scheme has also had its successes with phase I resulting in a 2 to 5 per cent 
decline in emissions.94 It also needs to be remembered that the EU ETS was the first, 
and most ambitious ETS implemented to date, involving multiple countries. As such, it 
is not surprising that difficulties were experienced in its early years of operation. 
Furthermore, as noted, problems in phase II were largely caused by the GFC, an event 
outside the scope of the usual economic cycle. Importantly, the EU has continued to 
refine the design of the ETS in response to lessons learned during the first two 
phases.95 
 
The various policy mechanisms available to Australia to reduce emissions were 
comprehensively canvassed by the Garnaut Review. All policy options were found to 
have their pros and cons, with a carbon tax, for example, potentially offering a simpler 
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and less volatile means of pricing carbon.96 Garnaut concluded, however, that a well-
designed cap and trade ETS provided the best policy instrument for Australia. This was 
due to a number of benefits including the ability of an ETS to:  
 more reliably constrain emissions within a desired emission reduction objective 
– unlike a tax which would not set an overall cap on emissions;  
 provide for the trade in permits, both domestically and internationally, helping 
to deliver emission reductions at 'least cost'; and 
 best integrate with the international carbon market which under the Kyoto 
Protocol has come to be based on emission reduction targets and tradable 
permits.97  
 
These views appeared to strongly influence the Rudd government, who cited similar 
reasons for adopting the cap and trade model for the CPRS.98 Garnaut and Labor's view 
was also shared by the earlier Prime Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading, 
commissioned by the Howard government in late 2006, who likewise recommended 
adopting a cap and trade ETS.99 Notably, other national and sub-national jurisdictions 
overseas have also preferred the cap and trade approach with the Obama 
administration in the United States (US) attempting, unsuccessfully, to enact a national 
cap and trade scheme in 2008.100 New Zealand adopted the first national ETS outside 
Europe in November 2008, although it lacked a specific cap on emissions.101 Various US 
states and Canadian provinces have also participated, or made plans to participate, in 
regional cap and trade ETSs including the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and the 
Western Climate Initiative.102  
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The above discussion highlights that while various policy mechanisms were available to 
the Rudd government to reduce emissions, the model it selected was undoubtedly a 
legitimate policy choice, being backed by mainstream economic opinion. In general 
terms, therefore, the CPRS appeared to adopt an emission reduction mechanism with 
good potential to be legally effective in assisting Australia to meet its post-2012 
mitigation targets. 
2 Compensation for Australia's Most Emissions-Intensive Industries 
While championing a cap and trade ETS, the Garnaut Review cautioned that this 
instrument only provided a better alternative to a carbon tax (the next best 
alternative) if it was well-designed.103 Probably the biggest controversy relating to the 
design of the CPRS concerned the substantial quantity of free permits it allocated to 
Australia's highest GHG emitters, especially EITE industries104 and CFEGs.105  
a) EITE industries 
Garnaut advised the Rudd government that in principle 'freely allocating permits to 
some emitters but not others' would only serve to safeguard 'the profits of the 
fortunate recipients while imposing even greater adjustment costs on other emitters 
and on the community' thus undermining the economic efficiency of an ETS.106 
Garnaut did, however, recognise that there was a special case for providing some 
compensation to EITE industries due to the risk of 'carbon leakage' – that is, the risk 
that these enterprises would simply relocate offshore if faced with higher emission 
prices in Australia than overseas.107 This could actually result in global emissions 
increasing if such enterprises moved to more emissions-intensive countries.108 While 
thus supporting some assistance for EITE's, Garnaut suggested that a carbon tax 
without exemptions could offer a better policy instrument if the political pressure to 
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provide ad hoc and overly generous assistance to EITE industries could not be 
resisted.109 
 
As foreshadowed by Garnaut, EITE industries heavily lobbied the government for 
generous compensation under the CPRS, warning about the risk of carbon leakage and 
associated job losses.110 In response to this lobbying, as well as the GFC, the assistance 
offered to EITE industries was bolstered several times, with the government's final EITE 
formula projected to allocate free permits worth more than $15 billion over the first 
five years of the Scheme.111 In providing this free allocation, the government indicated 
that it had accepted industry arguments regarding the risk of carbon leakage.112 Its 
stated aim was to provide transitional assistance that would accommodate the growth 
of EITE industries without muting their incentive to reduce emissions.113 The level of 
assistance provided under the CPRS would be reviewed every five years in light of the 
mitigation measures adopted by Australia's competitors.114 
 
The extent of the EITE industry assistance package was heavily criticised by some. The 
Grattan Institute, for example, argued that the allocation of free permits was generally 
far more than was necessary to prevent carbon leakage, and, by protecting these 
companies' profits, would reduce their incentive to abate emissions.115 The Australian 
Greens were also particularly critical, labelling the CPRS a 'pay-the-polluter' scheme – 
not a 'polluter pays' one.116 Garnaut also argued that EITE enterprises should only be 
compensated for the disadvantage they suffered from the absence of comparable 
carbon constraints in other countries and did not support the government's allocation 
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of free permits to achieve this.117 In his view, the government's approach was 
unprincipled, with political bargaining resulting in 'unexpectedly high payments'.118  
 
This view was by no means universal, however. As noted above, the Turnbull-led 
Opposition pushed for and won even higher compensation for the EITE sector in its 
agreement with the government on the CPRS Bill. Both the EU ETS and proposed US 
cap and trade scheme also included up to 100 per cent free allocation of permits to 
EITE industries until 2020 and 2025, respectively, meaning that the CPRS's generous 
compensation of EITE industries was not unusual from an international perspective.119 
b) CFEGs 
As noted, the Rudd government also committed to providing 130 million free permits 
to CFEGs (under the Electricity Sector Adjustment Scheme).120 This had a projected 
cost of $3.8 billion.121 The allocation to CFEGs was subject to a 'windfall gain' test, 
enabling free permits to be withheld in future if these entities were later found to have 
been overcompensated.122 The government's rationale for providing compensation to 
CFEGs, also after intense lobbying by the sector,123 was that the carbon price may 
otherwise cause these businesses 'to lose profitability', with CFEGs being relatively 
emissions-intensive compared to other sources of energy generation such as natural 
gas.124 It believed that any 'extreme losses' attributable to the CPRS (affecting asset 
value) may impact investor confidence in the Australian energy sector and hence 
increase the 'risk premium' or future cost of establishing new energy assets.125 While 
the government accepted that investors who had purchased or constructed CFEGs 
could have foreseen losses in asset value as a result of government policy, it 
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nonetheless opted to 'partially recognise losses of asset value' up until the 
Commonwealth first committed to carbon pricing in June 2007 under the Howard 
government.126 
 
Many commentators were similarly critical of the compensation provided to CFEGs. 
The Total Environment Centre, for example, rejected the government's reasoning 
arguing that if CFEG investors had not factored in the introduction of carbon pricing, 
they had 'simply made a poor subjective risk judgement.'127 The Garnaut Review also 
advised that there was 'no tradition in Australia … [of] compensating capital for losses 
associated with economic reforms of general application (for example, general tariff 
reductions, the floating of the currency or the introduction of the goods and services 
tax)'.128 In Garnaut's view, '[n]ever in the history of Australian public finance ha[d] so 
much been given without public policy purpose, by so many, to so few.'129 
3 The 'Pro-Coal' CPRS 
A further concern with the CPRS was that it did not appear to be aimed at reducing 
Australia's heavy reliance on coal, the most emission-intensive form of fossil fuel.130 In 
addition to financially compensating the coal-fired electricity sector, the government 
supported the coal-mining sector, promising up to $750 million from the Climate 
Change Action Fund to Australia's most emissions-intensive coal mines ($500 million in 
transitional assistance and $250 million for abatement measures).131 
 
The difficulty facing the Rudd government was that coal was central to Australia's 
economy, with the comparatively low cost of coal-fired electricity helping, for many 
years, to support the competitiveness of Australian industry and to provide Australian 
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households with access to affordable power.132 This form of energy generated about 
80 per cent of Australia's electricity and combined with coal mining, about 40 per cent 
of its GHG emissions.133 Australia was also the world's largest exporter of coal, its 
largest commodity export, which contributed some 17 per cent of export income and 
tens of thousands of jobs.134 Australia's status as a major coal exporter saw it likened 
to a 'drug dealer' for 'coal addicts' by one of the world's most respected climate 
change scientists, James Hansen, who argued that coal must be phased out globally, or 
its emissions substantially reduced by CCS technology, if dangerous climate change is 
to be avoided.135 
 
Notwithstanding the high emissions-intensity of coal, the Rudd government believed 
that it had a key role to play for many decades to come as the main source of 
Australia's energy supply, a major contributor to export revenue and a significant 
source of global energy.136 The government argued that this would be compatible with 
GHG reduction objectives due to the expected introduction of CCS technology,137 a 
developing technology which aimed to capture, transport and store emissions from 
electricity generation underground (as well as emissions from gas production and 
other emissions-intensive industrial processes).138 
 
Modelling by Treasury indicated that the CPRS would do little to reduce emissions 
from coal-fired electricity until at least 2020. With the carbon price initially expected to 
be relatively low, domestic emission reductions were projected to be driven by the 20 
per cent RET encouraging investment in renewable energy, not the CPRS.139 It was not 
until 2033 that coal-fired emissions were expected to begin falling significantly. This 
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was projected to occur as CCS technology was deployed on a commercial scale from 
the 2020s and existing CFEGs were retrofitted from 2033.140  
 
Many credible studies, including the Garnaut Review, shared the Rudd government's 
view that CCS was crucial to reducing emissions both in Australia and globally.141 This 
belief was also held by many developed country Parties to the UNFCCC, including G8 
members.142 The risk of emission reduction strategies that relied on CCS, however, was 
that such technology was yet to be proven commercially and it was not certain that 
CCS could ever be retrofitted to existing power stations.143 While a number of CCS 
demonstration activities were planned or in operation both internationally and in 
Australia, no successful full-scale CCS facilities had yet been built.144 A further issue 
with CCS is that stored CO2 could leak into the atmosphere in future, further 
increasing global CO2 levels.145  
 
The Rudd government announced a range of both domestic and international 
measures to help advance CCS technology. Among these were the: 
 Carbon Capture and Storage Flagships Program to invest $2 billion in industrial-
scale CCS projects in Australia;146  
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 the $500 million National Clean Coal Fund to help bring forward the 
commercialisation and deployment of clean coal technologies (later re-badged 
as the National Low Emissions Coal Initiative);147  
 the passing of legislation in 2008 to govern offshore CCS activities;148 and  
 the flagship Global Carbon Capture and Storage Initiative announced in 
September 2008. This included $100 million per annum towards a Global CCS 
Institute which would aim to coordinate and drive the global effort to 
commercialise CCS technology.149  
Somewhat controversially, the government also pushed for CCS to be included as an 
eligible Clean Development mechanism (CDM) project activity under the Kyoto 
Protocol, encouraging investment in CCS technology in developing countries.150 
 
Given the prominence of coal in both Australian and global energy mixes, it was 
understandable that the government sought to advance the development and 
deployment of CCS technology. It needs to be emphasised, however, that CCS was 
then (and remains) an experimental technology with no real guarantees as to its 
effectiveness or affordability. Yet Treasury modelling indicated that significant 
domestic emission reductions in the Australian economy, allowing it reduce its heavy 
reliance on international permits to meet its post-2012 mitigation targets, would only 
occur once CCS was widely deployed in Australia.151 The upshot of the Rudd 
government's faith in CCS technology materialising was that it committed Australia to 
                                                     
 
147 Ibid 17; Department of Climate Change, Climate Change Budget Overview 2008-09, above n 77, 26. 
148 Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Greenhouse Gas Storage) Act 2008 (Cth) amending the Offshore 
Petroleum Act 2006 (Cth). 
149 Australian Government, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia's Low Pollution Future (White 
Paper, Vol 1), above n 20, xli. The Institute was officially launched on 16 April 2009 with 85 foundation 
members including national governments and partners from the private sector. The government also 
supported a range of CCS related projects with international partners, including China, through the Asia-
Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate.  
150 Australia, 'Issues Relevant to the Consideration of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage in Geological 
Formations as Clean Development Mechanism Project Activities' in UNFCCC,  Further Views on Issues 
Relevant to the Consideration of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage in Geological Formations as Project 
Activities under the Clean Development Mechanism, UN Doc FCCC/SBSTA/2009/MISC.11 (November 
2009) 2, 4, 5. This was controversial with Parties such as Brazil who was concerned about the technical 
challenges of CCS projects and argued that Parties should instead invest in renewable resources: Brazil, 
'Brazilian Submission on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage in Geological Formation as Clean 
Development Mechanism Project Activities', above n 145, 6. 
151 Treasury, Australia's Low Pollution Future: the Economics of Climate Change Mitigation (Summary), 
above n 140, 26. 
 265 
a continued reliance on coal, locking in this form of energy for decades to come. This 
would make it difficult to reduce Australia's reliance on international permits to 
achieve its international targets if CCS technology failed to deliver.  
4 The CPRS and Complementary Measures 
A vigorous debate was also held in Australia regarding the role of complementary 
measures. With the introduction of an ETS and a binding cap on emissions, 
complementary measures were not actually intended to generate additional 
abatement; rather, these policies would chiefly impact where emission reductions 
were achieved in the economy.152 According to Garnaut, the major purpose of 
complementary measures were to reduce the effect of market failures that could not 
be overcome by the carbon price alone.153  
 
The most significant of the government's complementary measures was the 20 per 
cent RET for 2020. The RET extended the operation of the Howard government's MRET 
which placed a legal obligation mainly on electricity retailers to surrender a specified 
number of renewable energy certificates each year or face financial penalties. Given 
the introduction of a broad-based ETS, the Productivity Commission and others 
questioned the need for an expanded RET which was expected to reduce emissions at 
greater cost than an ETS.154 Similarly, Garnaut believed that a RET was only necessary if 
an ETS was not designed with the correct parameters to drive investment in renewable 
energy.155 The Rudd government acknowledged that the CPRS was unlikely to bring 
renewable energy technologies to market in the short-term as the carbon price would 
initially be too low.156 As such, it saw the RET as an important interim measure to 
accelerate the use of renewable energy and help ensure that it was rapidly deployed 
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once the carbon price was sufficiently high to make renewable technology price 
competitive with traditional sources.157 
 
In its implementation, the RET suffered from major design flaws early on. First 
legislated by the Parliament on 20 August 2009,158 the RET was amended on 24 June 
2010 (the day Kevin Rudd lost the prime ministership to Julia Gillard). In its second 
incarnation, the RET was split into the Large-Scale Renewable Energy Target (assisting 
large projects such as commercial wind farms and solar) and the Small-Scale 
Renewable Energy Scheme (assisting households, small business and community 
groups with small-scale solar systems).159 These changes were necessary after the 
original design of the RET led to a higher than expected uptake of small-scale systems, 
discouraging investment in large-scale projects.160 Notwithstanding these early 
difficulties, overall the RET appeared to be the most effective of the government's 
complementary measures in reducing emissions.161 
 
Many of the Rudd government's other flagship measures did not fare so well in their 
implementation. The Home Insulation Program (part of the Energy Efficient Homes 
Program) was intended to provide $2.7 billion to install free ceiling installation in 
homes (both to stimulate the economy during the GFC and to reduce emissions in the 
residential sector). Due to poor design and rushed implementation, the program 
tragically contributed to the deaths of four insulation workers as well as 174 house 
fires, leading to the program being prematurely cut.162 The Green Loans Program also 
experienced major problems including budget  blowouts and maladministration,  while 
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 the Solar Homes and Communities Plan was terminated prematurely due to cost 
overruns.163 While expensive programs, these measures achieved little in the way of 
actual emissions abatement.164 After several years of operation, the international 
Global Carbon Capture and Storage Initiative has also been heavily criticised for its lack 
of tangible outcomes.165 
C Implementation Part II: The Use of International Permits and the Issue 
of Environmental Effectiveness  
It should be evident from the above review that the CPRS and complementary 
measures did not represent best practice policy development and implementation. 
Nonetheless, it appears that the CPRS would likely have positioned Australia well to 
achieve its 2020 and later mitigation targets. This is primarily because the CPRS would 
have covered 75 per cent of national emissions and placed a mandatory cap on those 
emissions sources. In that sense, the CPRS appeared likely to be a legally effective 
instrument (although see discussion of supplementarity below).  
 
A further significant concern regarding the design of the CPRS, however, was that 
liable entities were to be allowed unlimited access to eligible international permits to 
assist in meeting their obligations under the Scheme.166 Treasury modelling indicated 
that Australia's domestic emissions would exceed its international emissions allocation 
under its 5 to 25 per cent target range for 2020, meaning that access to international 
permits was crucial to Australia's ability to meet its post-2012 international 
obligations.167 Indeed, under the minimum 5 per cent target Australia's domestic 
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emissions were expected to remain relatively stable until 2033 with emissions only 
falling once CCS technology was widely introduced (see figure 2).168 
 
Figure 2. CPRS-5 emissions scenario.169 
 
The significant reliance of the CPRS on international permits meant that it could be 
regarded as an ineffective instrument for reducing emissions. As discussed above, 
however, one of the major reasons for introducing an ETS, as opposed to a carbon tax, 
was precisely that it would allow Australian businesses to participate in the trade of 
international permits – such as those generated by the CDM – and thus reduce 
Australia's mitigation costs under a post-2012 climate agreement. Thus, subject to 
Australia conforming with the international rules that govern the use of the flexibility 
mechanisms, a heavy reliance by the CPRS on international permits did not actually 
undermine the legal effectiveness of the Scheme. 
 
Australia's expected reliance on international permits did, however, raise significant 
questions regarding the environmental effectiveness of its approach to 
implementation. As a developed country, Australia enjoys a highly robust accounting 
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regime for its GHG emissions, subject to review by the UNFCCC.170 As a general rule, 
this means that the domestic emission reductions claimed by Australia, especially from 
fossil fuel-based sources, can be assumed to involve genuine abatement.171 The same 
assumption cannot be made, however, in relation to the use of international permits. 
It goes without saying that, notwithstanding the domestic economic benefits of 
utilising international permits, a GIC would generally be expected to implement its 
mitigation targets in a manner that involves genuine abatement. This is because doing 
otherwise would be inconsistent with article 2 of the UNFCCC, which states that its 
central purpose is to reduce global emissions so as to avoid 'dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system' (commonly referred to as 'dangerous climate 
change'). The notion that Parties should adopt 'effective' emission reduction measures 
is also emphasised by the UNFCCC Preamble which recognises, for example, that 
Parties should 'enact effective environmental legislation'. This issue is examined in 
detail here as this was the design feature of the CPRS judged to have the most 
significant implications for Australia's performance as an international citizen in 
relation to implementation. 
1 Legal Background: The Kyoto Protocol and the Flexibility Mechanisms 
As briefly outlined in chapter 4, the Kyoto Protocol established three flexibility 
mechanisms to assist Annex I Parties in achieving their binding mitigation targets. 
International emissions trading (article 17) allows Annex I Parties with Kyoto mitigation 
targets (Annex B nations) to trade in several types of emission permits, namely: 
 assigned amount units (AAUs – the level of emissions an Annex B Party can 
emit under its Kyoto target);  
 removal units (RMUs – issued to Annex B Parties for LULUCF removals under 
articles 3.3 and 3.4);  
 emission reduction units (ERUs – generated by Joint Implementation (JI) 
projects under article 6); and  
                                                     
 
170 See National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth); UNFCCC, Existing Requirements for 
Reporting and Review for Annex I Parties under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol 
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171 See chapter 9, however, regarding the greater difficulties in reliably accounting for LULUCF emissions. 
 270 
 Certified Emission Reductions (CERs – generated by CDM projects under article 
12).172 
 
In addition to emissions trading, the Protocol established two 'project-based' 
mechanisms: JI and the CDM. JI allows Annex B Parties to implement emission 
reduction or removals projects in other Annex B Parties, generating ERUs which can be 
counted towards their mitigation targets. This allows an Annex B Party in which 
emissions abatement is relatively expensive, to implement projects in Annex I Parties 
with cheaper abatement options, such as the former Soviet Union economies. JI has 
not been heavily utilised to date, although the number of JI projects has grown rapidly 
in recent years.173 
 
The CDM provides a similar function although with abatement projects taking place in 
developing countries. The CDM has the dual purpose of assisting non-Annex I Parties 
'in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of 
the Convention', and assisting Annex I Parties 'in achieving compliance' with their 
Kyoto targets.174  
 
The flexibility mechanisms were designed to allow developed countries to reduce the 
cost of meeting their Kyoto targets. As with domestic emissions trading, international 
emissions trading encourages abatement to occur first where it is least expensive.175 
Although adopted to allow flexibility in emissions abatement, Kyoto Parties 
acknowledged that it would be undesirable for Annex I Parties to overly rely on 
international permits to achieve their targets at the expense of making domestic 
emission reductions. As such, the Protocol established the principle of 
                                                     
 
172 The various types of units are all equal to one metric tonne of CO2-e: UNFCCC, Report of the 
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'supplementarity'. The emissions trading and JI provisions both provide that trading 
'shall be supplemental to domestic actions' for the purpose of meeting a Party's Kyoto 
target.176 Similarly, the CDM establishes that it may only be used to contribute to 
compliance with 'part' of a Party's target.177 The Marrakesh Accords further provide 
that the use of all three mechanisms 'shall be supplemental to domestic action and 
that domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element of the effort made' by 
each Party in meeting its target.178  
 
The adoption of the flexibility mechanisms led to the development of a multibillion-
dollar carbon market for Kyoto Parties.179 As of 2009, the primary CDM market180 was 
worth US$2.6 billion (representing 211 million tonnes of CO2-e); the trading of AAUs 
US$2 billion (155 Mt CO2-e); and JI ERUs US$354 million (26 Mt CO2-e).181 An 
estimated 1 billion CERs were to be issued by 2012, along with 1.8 billion AAUs and 
200 million ERUs,182 with most demand being provided by the EU.183 As of December 
2012, there were 6556 registered CDM projects, a further 176 in the registration 
process, and 2095 CDM projects which had issued CERs.184  
a) The Post-2012 negotiations: Kyoto Party Conclusions and the Bali Action Plan 
The continuing role and performance of the flexibility mechanisms was a key issue for 
the post-2012 negotiations. Kyoto Parties agreed in their conclusions at the 3rd 
Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties in Bali (December 
2007) to continue their pre-existing discussions on the means by which Annex I Parties 
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could achieve their mitigation objectives including, inter alia, emissions trading, JI and 
the CDM, and how to improve their effectiveness.185 While a creature of the Protocol, 
the use of flexibility mechanisms was also discussed in relation to a broader post-2012 
agreement, with the Bali Action Plan calling for consideration of '[a]pproaches, 
including market approaches, to enhance the cost-effectiveness' of mitigation 
actions.186  
2 The Rudd Government's Position on the Use of International Carbon Credits 
Unsurprisingly given the design of the CPRS, the Rudd government was a major 
proponent of the flexibility mechanisms during the post-2012 negotiations. At the 
international level, the government argued that the 'expansion and improvement of 
the flexibility mechanisms' was a 'critical component of an effective post-2012 
framework'187 as these could help to achieve international and domestic abatement at 
'least cost'.188 As explained by Treasury, 'a broader and deeper international emission 
market' would help to minimise the cost of Australia achieving its mitigation targets 'by 
creating access to lower cost mitigation opportunities in other regions, and minimising 
distortions associated with trade-exposed industries.'189  
 
The government also saw broader benefits in maintaining and expanding the flexibility 
mechanisms such as providing an incentive for the development and diffusion of low 
carbon technologies in developing countries190 and providing a transitional mechanism 
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to engage developing countries in global mitigation activities until they adopted their 
own binding emission reduction commitments.191  
 
As noted above, the CPRS was to provide liable entities with unlimited access to 
eligible international permits generated by the existing or new flexibility 
mechanisms.192 Eligible permits were initially restricted to permanent CERs, ERUs and 
RMUs. Non-permanent CERs generated by afforestation and reforestation CDM 
projects (known as long-term CERs and temporary CERs) were excluded due to their 
extra associated obligations, risks and higher administrative costs.193 AAUs were also 
excluded due to concerns that AAUs generated in some Annex I Parties did not 
represent genuine emissions abatement (see section C.5 below).194 New eligible 
international permits could also be prescribed by regulation195 including permits 
generated by other national Schemes such as the New Zealand ETS.196  
 
At the international level, the Rudd government made it clear that the use of 
international permits was a key plank of Australia's mitigation strategy. As noted in 
chapter 6, the government's upper 25 per cent target was made contingent upon the 
existence of 'fully functional global carbon markets' and the 15 per cent target upon 
progress towards 'deeper and broader carbon markets'.197 If the 25 per cent target was 
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ultimately adopted, the government also indicated that up to 5 percentage points of 
the target (that is, up to 1/5th) could be met through the direct purchase of 
international permits by the government,198 enabling it to top up Australia's emission 
reductions if the CPRS and complementary measures did not deliver sufficient 
abatement on their own. 
 
The bulk of international permits bought by liable entities in the early years of the 
CPRS were likely to be CERs due to the CDM being the most established of the 
mechanisms. The economic benefits of Australia importing CERs, versus undertaking 
domestic abatement, were clearly illustrated by the estimated price of domestic CPRS 
permits versus the average cost of CERs. Treasury estimated a domestic permit price of 
at least $23 per tonne CO2-e at the commencement of the CPRS (under Australia's 
unconditional 5 per cent target).199 This was expected to rise in subsequent years and 
also be significantly higher under more ambitious domestic targets.200 CERs by contrast 
averaged US$12.70 in 2009.201 Notably, a study by McKinsey and Company estimated 
that providing unlimited access to CERs under an ambitious global agreement could 
reduce the cost of Australia's 2020 abatement task by almost 80 per cent.202 
 
This chapter now turns to examining the credibility of the international permits 
generated by the CDM in order to help understand the environmental implications of 
the CPRS providing unlimited access to eligible international permits. 
3 The CDM: Legal Overview 
As noted, the CDM is a project-based mechanism in which 'project activities' in non-
Annex I Parties can generate CERs which may be purchased by Annex B Parties (either 
by national governments or authorised private or public entities) to assist in complying 
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with their Kyoto targets.203 The CDM includes several broad project types: small-scale, 
large-scale, afforestation and reforestation (both small-scale and large-scale), and 
programmes of emissions reduction activities.204  
 
The CDM has detailed requirements aimed at ensuring that CERs (often referred to as 
carbon credits) represent like-for-like abatement with emission reductions that would 
otherwise be achieved domestically within a developed country. To be certified, article 
12 of the Protocol stipulates that emission reductions from a CDM project must result 
in 'real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate 
change'.205 Further, reductions must be 'additional to any that would occur in the 
absence' of the project.206 CDM project proponents must provide a project design 
document addressing these and other issues.207 Proposed activities are then validated 
or rejected by Designated Operational Entities (DOEs),208 before approved projects are 
forwarded to the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB) for registration.209 Emission 
reductions attributed to the project are then verified and certified by a DOE before 
CERs are issued by the CDM EB.210 These credits can then be sold by the project 
proponent to entities authorised by Annex I Parties, which is tracked by the 
international transaction log.211  
a) Additionality and the Baseline Scenario 
The CDM adopted two basic tests to help determine whether claimed emission 
reductions are genuine: 'additionality' and the 'baseline scenario'. A CDM project is 
regarded as additional if anthropogenic GHG emissions 'are reduced below those that 
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would have occurred in the absence of the registered CDM project activity'.212 The 
exact requirements for demonstrating additionality vary depending on the 
classification of the project. Many large-scale projects, for example, use the standard 
methodology provided by the CDM EB, namely, the '[t]ool for demonstration of 
additionality' ('additionality tool').213  
 
The additionality tool requires proponents to address several steps.214 First, identifying 
realistic and credible alternatives to the proposed CDM project. Second, either an 
'investment' or 'barrier' analysis. The investment analysis needs to show that the 
project is not the most economically or financially attractive (compared to business-as-
usual (BAU) options); or is not economically or financially feasible without CER 
revenue. The barrier analysis needs to show that the project faces barriers that would 
normally prevent the implementation of this type of project (such as a lack of private 
capital or the unavailability of the type of technology being used) and would not 
prevent the implementation of a BAU alternative. The third step is a 'common practice' 
analysis which provides a 'credibility check' to demonstrate that the proposed project 
technology or practice is not already widely in use in the relevant sector and region. 
 
Proponents must also establish a baseline emissions scenario. This is the scenario that 
'reasonably represents' the anthropogenic emissions that would occur 'in the absence 
of the proposed project activity.'215 Existing or new baseline methodologies approved 
by the CDM EB must be applied.216  
4 The CDM and Environmental Integrity Concerns 
Numerous concerns were raised by Kyoto Parties both during and prior to the post-
2012 negotiations regarding the operation of the CDM. Among these were: 
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 that CDM projects often failed to contribute to sustainable development in 
developing countries – the key purpose of the mechanism other than helping 
Annex I Parties to achieve their mitigation targets;  
 that awarding CERs has created perverse incentives to increase emissions in 
some sectors – with some Chinese enterprises, for example, purportedly 
increasing production of  HFC-22, and deliberately not introducing more 
efficient manufacturing practices, so as to profit from CDM projects that 
destroy HFC-23 (a side effect of the HFC-22 manufacturing process);  
 that CDM projects have excessively high transaction costs for the level of 
abatement achieved;  
 the poor regional distribution of projects with most projects occurring in China, 
Brazil, India and South Korea;  
 the under-representation of more 'desirable' project-types such as renewable 
energy;  
 that the CDM has allowed developed countries to pursue the least-expensive 
mitigation options in developing countries, leaving the more expensive options 
to be later undertaken by developing countries; and  
 that the mechanism creates a disincentive for Annex I Parties to undertake 
domestic emission reductions.217  
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It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine all of the perceived defects of the 
CDM, which have been well-canvassed in the literature.218 Rather, this chapter focuses 
on the issue of 'environmental integrity', the key issue in terms of assessing the 
environmental effectiveness of the Rudd government's approach to implementation. 
a) Party Views Regarding Environmental Integrity 
Many Parties raised concerns during the post-2012 climate negotiations regarding the 
environmental integrity of the CDM. New Zealand, for example, highlighted 
'substantial concerns' as to whether the CDM was 'generating real, additional, and 
verifiable emission reductions',219 while the Environmental Integrity Group stated that 
a number of CDM projects were 'of questionable quality' and that 'additionality [was] 
… difficult to prove'.220 In addition, the EU highlighted that it was 'methodologically 
challenging' to accurately determine baseline emissions,221 which, if inaccurate, may 
result in an overestimation of the abatement achieved by a project.  
 
The Rudd government sent mixed signals on this issue. On the one hand, it 
acknowledged that it was 'important for the [flexibility] mechanisms to deliver 
"genuine" emission reductions'222 and that despite the CDM's 'rigorous verification 
procedures, any assessment of whether abatement is truly "additional" entails a 
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degree of judgment'.223 The government also identified 'environmental effectiveness' 
as a core principle in relation to any reform of the flexibility mechanisms.224  
 
On the other hand, the Rudd government appeared to wilfully ignore this issue, stating 
for example, that the Kyoto Protocol framework 'ensures that all CERs are credible, 
robust, and meet sustainable development objectives'225 and that achieving all of 
Australia's emission reductions domestically would 'deliver no additional 
environmental gain'.226  
b) Have CERs Resulted in Genuine Emission Reductions? 
By the time the CPRS was being designed several studies (discussed below) had 
examined the performance of the CDM, including regarding the environmental 
integrity issue. Most concerns related to establishing additionality and credible 
baselines.  
i) Assessing Additionality 
As noted, the Protocol requires CDM projects to achieve emission reductions that are 
'additional to any that would occur in the absence' of the project. Logically, this test 
appears likely to guarantee the environmental integrity of the mechanism. In practice, 
however, the additionality test has proven difficult to apply. As stated by Schneider, 
then a member of the CDM Methodologies Panel, the test is both 'hypothetical and 
counter-factual' and can 'never be proven with absolute certainty.'227 While criteria 
used to assess additionality, such as the investment, barrier and common practice 
tests, help to introduce some objectivity into the assessment, ultimately it is 
impossible to definitively establish whether the financial incentive of receiving CERs is 
the critical factor in a proponent's decision to invest in a CDM project.228 Indeed, the 
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prospect of being awarded Kyoto credits for a CDM project creates a strong incentive 
for proponents to misrepresent their motivations for establishing such projects.229  
 
The most detailed analysis of the CDM's operation, by Schneider, examined 93 
randomly selected CDM projects that were approved between 2004 and 2007 and 
found evidence of widespread misapplication of the additionality tool by project 
proponents, DOEs and the CDM EB.230 The criteria applied to assess additionality were 
also found to be flawed. The barrier analysis, for example, was reported to be 'highly 
subjective, vague and difficult to validate in an objective and transparent manner'.231 
The common practice test was also compromised especially as only some approved 
methodologies explicitly defined what did not amount to a common practice (for 
example, less than 5 per cent of similar projects).232 Technologies could also be defined 
very narrowly so as to avoid conflicting with the test.233 Schneider's study concluded 
that that '[s]ince no approach for determining additionality is perfect, it needs to be 
accepted that some projects are not additional.'234 Other studies have reached similar 
views. The US Government Accountability Office, for example, concluded in its 
assessment of the CDM that 'it is nearly impossible to ensure that projects are 
additional'.235  
 
Studies have been particularly critical of several CDM project-types in China, the major 
host of CDM projects. Wara, for example, criticised the CDM EB's decision to approve 
natural gas-fired power station projects despite evidence that CER revenue was not 
critical to these projects going ahead, with these projects being strongly encouraged 
by the Chinese government for domestic policy reasons such as energy security and 
reducing air pollution.236 Wara and Victor made similar arguments in relation to other 
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important Chinese CDM electricity generation projects, including hydropower and 
wind farms, which were also actively encouraged by Chinese government policies and 
laws.237 Overall, studies have estimated that the percentage of non-additional CERs on 
the market may be anywhere from 20 per cent238 to over 50 per cent.239 It should be 
noted that the CDM EB has improved oversight of CDM proposals since the CDM was 
first established, leading to a greater number of projects being rejected, often on the 
basis of additionality.240 However, a widely held view among CDM experts, including 
those with field experience, is that CER revenue often represents the 'icing on the 
cake' for CDM projects rather than the crucial factor in the decision to invest.241 
ii) Baselines 
The ability to develop credible baseline scenarios (an estimate of the emissions that 
would occur without a CDM project) has also been heavily critiqued. As with 
additionality, emission baselines suffer from the weakness that any baseline is 
hypothetical and counterfactual.242 As stated by Boyd et al, 'it is impossible to tell and 
monitor what would have really happened if the CDM project had not been 
implemented'.243 A key issue is that project proponents may inflate their baselines in 
order to receive more CERs.244 Problems have also been created by the CDM EB's 
management of the issue. In order to avoid creating a disincentive for developing 
countries to introduce emission reductions laws, the CDM EB decided in 2005 that 
proponents could, when establishing project baselines, ignore laws adopted by host 
countries after 2001 that gave comparative advantages to less emissions-intensive 
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technologies.245 As well as undermining claims of additionality, this means that CDM 
project baselines will become increasingly less plausible over time as developing 
countries continue to enact domestic laws and policies to reduce emissions.246 
iii) Validation and Oversight 
Briefly, a further issue affecting environmental integrity has been the quality of the 
registration and validation process provided by DOEs and the CDM EB. A variety of 
measures were introduced by the CDM EB to improve the integrity of the approvals 
process following problems in the early years of the CDM, which led to a greater 
number of projects being rejected.247 However, problems with the approvals process 
were not entirely eliminated. For example, while evidence used to determine 
additionality can easily be manipulated by project proponents to their advantage (such 
as financial data for the investment analysis), DOEs do not generally have the time or 
expertise to properly evaluate this data.248 Similar criticisms have been made regarding 
the ability of the CDM EB to provide adequate oversight, due to time and resource 
constraints, meaning that it is 'prone to approve projects.'249   
c) Can Environmental Integrity Concerns be Addressed? 
The Rudd government's claim that all CERs were 'credible' and 'robust' was clearly 
wrong. However, despite the various problems with the CDM, the overwhelming view 
of Kyoto Parties was that it was desirable for the CDM and other flexibility mechanisms  
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to continue in the post-2012 period. The Parties agreed to this position in May 2008, 
early on in the climate negotiations.250 As with Australia, other developed countries 
believed that the flexibility mechanisms were crucial to achieving cost-effective 
mitigation, and also provided broader benefits including delivering significant financial 
flows to developing countries for abatement projects and involving the private sector 
in climate mitigation.251 Many developing countries, even if critical of the CDM's flaws, 
nonetheless supported its continuance, seeing local benefits, for example, in its 
contribution to sustainable development by facilitating investment in renewable 
energy.252 Experts such as Schneider similarly argued that the broader benefits of the 
mechanism warranted its continuation so long as environmental integrity concerns 
could be addressed.253  
 
As part of the post-2012 negotiations, Kyoto Parties discussed various reforms to the 
CDM. The two proposals which appeared to have the most potential to address 
environmental integrity concerns were 'discounting' and the introduction of 'sectoral 
approaches'.254 
i) Discounting 
Discounting would essentially apply a 'discount rate' to CDM projects at a level 
determined by the Parties. If, for example, a discount rate of 30 per cent was applied, a 
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project normally receiving 100 CERs would instead receive 70, potentially reducing or 
nullifying any credits that were not genuinely additional.255  
 
Parties were divided on the merits of discounting. The EU believed that this approach 
could strengthen the CDM's environmental integrity,256 a view shared by some 
developing countries.257 Many developed and developing countries, however, 
including Australia, were opposed to discounting on the basis that it would introduce a 
level of artificiality into the calculation of CERs.258  
 
Discounting has been a popular idea in the literature with some believing that it could 
help to address the problem of additionality.259 Sterk, however, notes that discounting 
would diminish the incentive for truly additional projects (which require the full rate of 
CER revenue to be financially viable), while non-additional projects would only have 
their windfall profits reduced.260 Thus, it is not clear that discounting offered a 
workable approach to improving environmental integrity. 
ii) Sectoral Approaches 
Proposals for sectoral-based approaches represented a far more significant reform. 
While some Parties discussed introducing sectoral approaches under a new flexibility 
mechanism, Parties also discussed the idea as a reform to the CDM. The major 
proposals included 'sectoral crediting', 'sectoral trading' and 'NAMA crediting'.  
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Sectoral crediting and trading were both pushed heavily by the EU.261 Crediting would 
be based on an agreed emissions target/threshold, set below the BAU emissions trend 
for a given sector. Emission reductions below the threshold would generate credits 
which could then be sold to developed countries. The target would be 'no-lose', 
meaning that no penalty would be applied if the target was not met. Sectoral trading 
was similar but would involve a mandatory cap on emissions and penalties for non-
compliance.262 
 
The EU believed that sectoral approaches would provide significant advantages over 
the project-based CDM, among them: providing greater financing for developing 
countries' mitigation; strengthening the engagement of developing countries in 
mitigation activities; and reducing the potential for intra-national emissions 'leakage' 
by capturing all emissions within a sector.263 Importantly, adopting sectoral reference 
levels would remove the need to assess additionality.264 It would also move beyond a 
pure offsetting approach, allowing developing countries to make a net contribution to 
global mitigation as emission credits would only be awarded for reductions that 
exceeded the agreed threshold.265 The literature similarly highlighted a number of 
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potential advantages of sectoral approaches, including the potential for improved 
environmental integrity outcomes.266  
 
The Rudd government supported introducing sectoral approaches267 as did many 
developed and developing countries.268 Views differed, however, on the appropriate 
forum for sectoral approaches – that is, the CDM, a new sectoral mechanism, or as 
part of developing countries' nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs).269 
Some non-Annex I Parties, however, rejected sectoral approaches outright,270 or 
specifically opposed sectoral NAMAs.271 
 
Crucially, Parties were divided on whether sectoral approaches would actually improve 
environmental integrity outcomes. Brazil, for example, opposed sectoral CDM arguing 
that setting a BAU reference level would be 'policy oriented and arbitrary and 
therefore [would] … not lead to real and measurable reductions'.272 If the baseline was 
defined too low it would result in 'hot air' (non-genuine emission credits), and if too 
high, would discourage investment in genuine projects.273  
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The literature has recognised that sectoral approaches would need to overcome 
numerous challenges to be effective,274 among them establishing reliable baselines. As 
briefly noted above, establishing reliable BAU emission scenarios and reductions is 
enormously difficult. As explained by Sterk, the BAU scenario (from which emission 
reductions would then be measured) would rely on uncertain modelling and 
projections, these being based on assumptions about the future impact of current 
policies, the development and penetration of technologies and the development of 
economic activity.275 Uncertainties would be particularly great in rapidly growing 
developing countries in which growth rates are more variable and difficult to 
predict.276  
 
The point is illustrated by previous efforts to predict emissions growth in developing 
countries. In 2000, for example, the International Energy Agency (a highly credible 
organisation in this field) projected that electricity generation in China would be 1.5 
trillion kilowatt hours in 2005.277 Actual generation turned out to be 2.5 trillion 
kilowatt hours.278 If China had adopted a sectoral crediting target based on this 
projection, it would likely have failed to achieve its target by a wide margin.279 The 
problem is that under a sectoral crediting or trading approach, faulty baselines would 
have significant consequences. If BAU emissions were overestimated, large quantities 
of non-genuine credits would be awarded.280 Conversely, if the baseline was 
underestimated, credits may not be issued despite considerable mitigation actions 
being undertaken by a host country.281 These risks would create an incentive for host 
countries to inflate their baselines in order to guarantee or increase their credit 
revenues.282  
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d) Implications for the CPRS 
The Rudd government's CPRS White Paper stated that 'as long as accepting a Kyoto 
unit into the Australian Scheme means that one less tonne of greenhouse gases is 
emitted elsewhere in the world, no restrictions on their use are needed.'283 It has been 
seen above that such a guarantee could not be given regarding the CDM, the major 
likely source of international permits for the CPRS up to 2020, even if major reforms 
were introduced such as sectoral approaches.284 This raised strong concerns about the 
design of the CPRS, as some percentage of CERs purchased by liable entities or directly 
by the government would likely represent hot air. As such, it needs to be questioned 
whether the Rudd government's mitigation strategy ought to have been so reliant 
upon the use of international flexibility mechanisms to achieve Australia's post-2012 
targets.  
 
Given the patent deficiencies of the CDM – and the lack of strong reform options 
available to guarantee environmental integrity – arguably the only responsible position 
for the Rudd government was to prohibit, or place a strict quantitative restriction on, 
access to international mechanisms like the CDM – at the very least until 
environmental integrity issues had been satisfactorily addressed. The government did 
of course intend to prohibit access to some categories of international permits which 
had significant environmental integrity concerns, such as AAUs (see discussion 
below).285 However, it is doubtful whether these restrictions went far enough. Notably, 
the government's approach went against the advice of Garnaut who, recognising that 
the CDM was a 'flawed device, from both an environmental and a market 
perspective',286 favoured setting restrictions on both the source and quantity of 
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international permits from such offsetting mechanisms.287 The issue of setting a 
quantitative restriction on the use of international permits is considered further at 
section C.6. 
5 'Hot Air' AAUs and ERUs 
More briefly, it should also be highlighted that the credibility of the Rudd 
government's mitigation approach further had the potential to be undermined by 
allowing access to other types of non-credible international permits. A major problem 
that has emerged under the Kyoto Protocol has been the issuance of non-credible 
AAUs. This occurred as a result of former Soviet Union countries, especially Russia and 
Ukraine, being granted overly lenient Kyoto Protocol targets under the first 
commitment period.288 This situation allowed these Parties to significantly exceed their 
targets without undertaking deliberate emissions abatement, resulting in a large 
surplus of so-called hot air AAUs289 (representing about 6 per cent of 1990 Annex I 
emissions under Kyoto's first commitment period).290 
 
During the post-2012 negotiations, Parties including the African Group called for a 
commitment by Annex I Parties not to use, sell or purchase hot air AAUs beyond the 
first commitment period,291 a move strongly opposed by Russia and Ukraine.292 To the 
Rudd government's credit, the CPRS opted to initially exclude AAUs, due to concerns 
about environmental integrity, as well as their potentially volatile price undermining 
the stability of the CPRS.293 Notably, however, the Rudd government stated that its 
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position would be 'reviewed in the light of international developments'.294 While 
acknowledging the concerns about hot air AAUs, it also saw AAUs as a potential source 
of low-cost abatement and highlighted that all AAUs were 'legitimate compliance units 
under the Kyoto Protocol'.295 It also made the point that AAUs would likely be used at 
some point by a Kyoto Party for compliance and thus the use of international AAUs in 
Australia would 'have no impact on aggregate global emissions'.296 These statements 
appeared to indicate that the government was willing to allow AAUs to be imported 
into the CPRS in future. Thus while it made a responsible choice in initially excluding 
access to AAUs, its broader position was potentially at odds with an environmentally 
effective approach. 
 
This chapter has not examined the ramifications of the Rudd government allowing 
access to unlimited ERUs under the JI mechanism, as this mechanism was less 
advanced at the time the CPRS was designed. But it should be noted that in more 
recent years the JI mechanism, which similarly applies an additionality test, has also 
been heavily criticised for producing non-credible international permits.297 
6 The CPRS and the Principle of Supplementarity 
As highlighted earlier, the emissions trading and JI provisions of the Kyoto Protocol 
stipulate that trading 'shall be supplemental to domestic actions',298 while the CDM 
provides that it may only be used by an Annex I Party to contribute to compliance with 
'part' of its target.299 The Marrakesh Accords further provide that the use of the 
mechanisms 'shall be supplemental to domestic action and that domestic action shall 
thus constitute a significant element of the effort made' by each Annex I Party to meet 
its target.300  
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In light of the above provisions, the Rudd government's intention to provide liable 
entities with unlimited access to eligible international permits, and to directly purchase 
up to 1/5th of Australia's upper 25 per cent target, was a controversial approach, both 
on environmental and legal grounds. During the international negotiations, the G77 
and China insisted that Annex I Parties were 'primarily' obliged to meet their emission 
reduction obligations through domestic measures.301 Given that the Protocol and 
Marrakesh Accords did not quantify the extent to which the flexibility mechanisms 
could be used, some Parties also pushed to do so. Most generously, South Africa and 
China called for the use of international permits to be capped at 50 per cent.302 More 
conservatively, Brazil and Peru preferred a 30 per cent cap,303 while the Philippines 
favoured a cap of just 10 per cent.304  
 
For its part, the Rudd government accepted that domestic abatement measures 
needed to constitute a 'significant element' of its abatement effort,305 but argued 
against quantifying the meaning of 'significant' domestic action. It stated that this 
would help 'to ensure that Parties can continue to reduce emissions at least cost.'306 In 
the government's view the supplementarity principle meant that Australia needed to 
'take some meaningful domestic action to meet its emission reduction target' and 
could not 'rely solely on the flexibility mechanisms.'307  
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Australia's opposition to quantifying the supplementarity principle was generally 
shared by other developed countries308 with many also intending to make significant 
use of the flexibility mechanisms to achieve their 2020 targets. New Zealand, for 
example, whose ETS provided liable entities with unlimited access to Kyoto emission 
permits, indicated that it expected to meet up to 70 per cent of its 2020 target through 
importing permits and that it would reduce its national target if access to international 
permits was restricted.309 Norway stated that about 30 per cent of its target may be 
achieved with international permits.310 The EU, whose ETS had a tight restriction on 
the use of international permits in Phase II (13.4 per cent), relaxed these requirements 
in Phase III to no more than 50 per cent of the required abatement.311 However, this 
did not restrict EU member states from directly accessing international permits outside 
the ETS. The proposed US ETS would have restricted the use of international permits to 
approximately 20 per cent of the Scheme cap.312  
 
In designing the CPRS, the Rudd government acknowledged that the absence of an 
explicit cap on the use of international permits 'may not be consistent with the 
principle of supplementarity'313 and that it had considered establishing a quantitative 
restriction.314 However, it ultimately believed that this was unnecessary. It was 
'confident that even with unlimited access to international units, Australia's use of the 
Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms [would] be supplemental to domestic action.'315 
This was actually a questionable claim. Australia's emissions in 1990 (Kyoto's base 
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year) were 548 Mt CO2-e.316 Its base year emissions were allowed to increase by 8 per 
cent by 2008-2012 (Kyoto's first commitment period) to 591.5 Mt CO2-e.  As noted 
earlier, analysis by Treasury estimated that under the government's minimum 5 per 
cent target Australia's domestic emissions would likely remain about the same by 
2020, meaning that the target would only be met by utilising international permits.317 
The Rudd government emphasised that Australia's domestic emissions were projected 
to be significantly less than under BAU circumstances318 (774 Mt CO2-e by 2020).319 
Viewed from this perspective, it could certainly be argued that the stabilisation of 
Australia's emissions at 2008-12 levels would have involved 'significant' domestic 
abatement. However, as Annex I Parties' mitigation targets are measured from a 1990 
base year, not projected BAU emissions, this arguably applied the wrong metric to 
interpreting the supplementarity principle. Measured from Australia's emissions in 
1990, the above Treasury analysis projected that all of Australia's abatement would 
actually be achieved by importing permits. 
 
In order to avoid breaching its legal obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and 
Marrakesh Accords, there is clearly a strong argument that the government ought to 
have set a cap on the use of flexibility mechanisms. While the Parties have not been 
able to agree upon what constitutes supplemental action, and thus it cannot be 
determined with certainty what the principle legally requires, logic dictates that 
Australia's use of international permits needed to be less than 50 per cent of its 
abatement effort, as proposed by South Africa and China. While the government 
believed that the use of flexibility mechanisms would be supplemental to domestic 
action even without a cap, not establishing one implied that Australia was prepared to 
act in breach of the supplementarity principle, if needed, in order to achieve Australia's 
post-2012 mitigation target at least cost.  
 
                                                     
 
316 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, above n 43, 6. 
317 See Treasury, Australia's Low Pollution Future: The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation 
(Summary), above n 140, 26.  
318 Australian Government, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia's Low Pollution Future (White 
Paper, Vol 1), above n 20, 11-8. See Treasury, Australia's Low Pollution Future: The Economics of Climate 
Change Mitigation, above n 21, 140. 
319 Treasury, Australia's Low Pollution Future: The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation, above n 21, 
48. 
 294 
It should be noted that some use of international permits was probably necessary by 
Australia from an economic and technological perspective in order to achieve its 5 to 
25 per cent 2020 target. According to Pielke, given Australia's projected population 
and economic growth, and historical rates of decarbonisation in the Australian 
economy, a 'herculean effort' was required to meet Australia's targets from domestic 
abatement alone.320 In his assessment, nearly all Australian coal consumption would 
need to be replaced by a zero-carbon alternative such as nuclear or renewable in the 
next decade or less.321 Thus, it was not a realistic expectation for the government to 
prohibit the use of international permits entirely. However, it clearly could have 
established a moderate cap that was both consistent with the supplementarity 
principle, placed a high priority on domestic abatement (and thus environmental 
effectiveness), and also reflected what level of domestic abatement was economically 
and technologically feasible for Australia.  
D Legislating the CPRS: Its Rise and Fall 
This chapter now turns to examining the Rudd government's efforts to legislate the 
CPRS. The government made it a political priority to pass the CPRS Bill prior to the 15th 
Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen (December 2009) at 
which Parties hoped to adopt a new post-2012 agreement. Labor argued that it was 
important to legislate the CPRS prior to COP 15 as this would 'put Australia in a 
position to influence the shape of the post-2012 international legal framework for 
climate change'.322 According to then Minister for Climate Change, Penny Wong, it was 
important for Australian credibility to have 'a means to deliver its targets'.323 Prime 
Minister Rudd also argued that passing the CPRS Bill would 'provide a much-needed 
boost to negotiations on a global deal.'324 Garnaut backed Labor on this issue, believing 
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that legislating the CPRS prior to Copenhagen would enhance Australia's credibility on 
climate change (which had been tarnished by the Howard government's refusal to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol) by demonstrating that 'we were able to deliver on what we 
were promising'.325  
 
The Rudd government and Garnaut probably overstated the actual influence of 
legislating the CPRS on the post-2012 negotiations. As stated by then UNFCCC 
Executive Secretary, Yvo de Boer, the major concern of Parties during the negotiations 
was the mitigation target each nation was prepared to adopt, more so than their 
domestic policies for implementing them.326 Furthermore, any action by Australia on 
the domestic front did not carry the same weight as those of the US, China and the 
other major emitters. It goes without saying, however, that the adoption of an ETS by 
Australia would have been viewed favourably by other nations and added to, rather 
than detracted from, momentum in the negotiations.  
 
Domestically, the government's desire for Parliament to pass the CPRS Bill prior to COP 
15 proved to be highly controversial. Stakeholders, especially from carbon-intensive 
industries, as well as various commentators, argued that it was premature to introduce 
an ETS without first knowing the outcome of the climate negotiations.327 The argument 
made was that establishing an ETS without knowing what domestic measures the 
major emitters were prepared to adopt, especially the US and major developing 
economies, would put Australia at a competitive disadvantage.328 
 
As outlined above, the Rudd government was ultimately unable to secure support for 
the CPRS Bill in the Australian Senate. In its first legislative attempt, the CPRS was 
rejected by 42 votes to 30 on 14 August 2009.329 The Turnbull-led Opposition voted 
against the Bill, being opposed to the CPRS unless much greater assistance was 
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provided to assist industry and protect jobs.330 It also argued that the CPRS should not 
be legislated until both the outcome of the Copenhagen negotiations were known and 
the proposed US ETS became law, sharing the concerns of industry that to do 
otherwise would put Australia at a competitive disadvantage.331  
 
Without Coalition support, the government required 7 votes from non-Labor Senators 
to pass the Bill (5 Australian Greens, 1 Family First, and 1 Independent).332 The Greens 
also voted against the Bill, disagreeing with many of its design features. Among the 
Greens' demands included: 
 a minimum and unconditional 25 per cent national target by 2020 (and up to 
40 per cent under a global treaty);  
 Scheme caps consistent with a long-term 350 ppm CO2-e goal;  
 no free allocation of emission permits;  
 reduced assistance to EITE industries;  
 the removal of the price cap;  
 a 20 per cent cap on the use of international permits;  
 allocating a proportion of Scheme revenue for adaptation and mitigation 
finance for developing countries;  
 improved incentives for individuals and businesses to undertake voluntary 
emission reductions; and  
 the provision of substantial additional finances for renewable energy research 
and development.333  
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Family First Senator Steve Fielding (who contested the existence of anthropogenic 
climate change altogether) and Independent Senator Nick Xenophon (who preferred a 
hybrid baseline and credit ETS), also opposed the Bill.334 
 
In October 2009, the Turnbull Opposition agreed to negotiate with the Rudd 
government on amendments to the CPRS Bill.335  As noted above, Labor and the 
Coalition reached agreement on a series of amendments to the Bill on 24 November 
2009 which significantly increased assistance to industry. However, Turnbull's backing 
of the amended CPRS caused a spill of the leadership within the Liberal Party and the 
election of a new leader, Tony Abbott, who opposed the CPRS in any form. Reneging 
on the deal with Labor, Abbott insisted that legislating the CPRS prior to the adoption 
of a post-2012 agreement would 'damage the Australian economy' and put Australia at 
a 'competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the rest of the world'.336 This saw the CPRS 
rejected for a second time on 2 December 2009. 
 
Following the failure of COP 15 to deliver a binding post-2012 agreement, the Rudd 
government announced in April 2010 that it would defer the introduction of the CPRS 
until 2013, citing both slower than expected international progress and a lack of 
parliamentary support for the Bill.337 On one hand, this was certainly an 
understandable position. It was a genuine political reality for Labor that the 
international negotiations had not delivered what many had hoped for at COP 15 and 
that it did not have sufficient support for the Bill within the Senate.  
 
On the other, the Rudd government's justifications for deferring the CPRS were not 
entirely credible. Prior to COP 15, Labor argued that the passage of the CPRS Bill was 
essential, in part because it would help to build 'momentum' in the post-2012 
negotiations by demonstrating to other Parties that it was 'possible to integrate a 
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carbon price into the economy and reduce emissions with only modest economic 
impacts'.338 Rudd criticised political opponents who called for the CPRS to be delayed 
until after Copenhagen, stating that this demonstrated 'absolute political cowardice' 
and an 'absolute failure of leadership'.339 Rudd further argued that if 'every nation ... 
[made] the decision not to act until others have done so, then no nation will ever act' 
leading to a 'permanent stand-off' in international negotiations' (a situation known as 
the 'prisoner's dilemma').340 If these arguments were valid prior to COP 15, they were 
certainly valid afterwards when the international community needed leadership more 
than ever to keep the post-2012 negotiations on track. 
 
Domestically, the second rejection of the CPRS Bill by the Senate also provided the 
government with an opportunity to call a 'double dissolution' election, in which both 
houses of Parliament would be dissolved. If re-elected, this would have enabled Labor 
to call a joint sitting of Parliament,341 increasing its chances of passing the Bill. In any 
case, a regular federal election was already due to be held in 2010.342 Rudd's decision 
to delay the CPRS prior to testing support for the Bill or similar legislation in a new 
Parliament, clearly represented a significant back flip, especially in light of the 
government's strong political statements on the issue.  Although caution must be used 
when interpreting opinion polling, it is worth noting that polls at the time also 
appeared to show that the government enjoyed majority public support for legislating 
the CPRS, even after Copenhagen failed to deliver a binding global agreement.343  
 
Critics have suggested that Labor's political strategy for negotiating the CPRS – which 
'made sport out of the Coalition's internal divisions over carbon pricing' and refused to 
'engage constructively' with the Greens and Senators Fielding and Xenophon – also 
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contributed to the downfall of the CPRS in the Senate.344 The Greens shared this view, 
being highly critical of Labor's decision not to engage with their Party on the CPRS.345 
While the Rudd government may have been correct in its assessment that the best 
prospect of passing the Bill was to negotiate with the Coalition (given the disparity of 
views between the Greens and the two other non-Labor Senators) it does appear that 
it did not genuinely exhaust all avenues of securing support for the Bill. 
 
Ultimately, the Rudd government's decision to defer the CPRS came at great political 
cost to Rudd, who was accused of being 'a PM without convictions'.346 Having lost the 
conﬁdence of the Labor party and much of the Australian electorate,347 Rudd was 
ousted as Labor leader and Prime Minister by Julia Gillard on 24 June 2010.348 Tellingly, 
Rudd later expressed his belief that the decision to defer the CPRS was a mistake.349 
E Implications for GIC 
As flagged earlier, two issues appeared to be most relevant to assessing GIC in relation 
to the implementation of the Rudd government's mitigation target, namely, whether 
the government's domestic legal and policy approach was likely to be both legally 
effective and environmentally effective. Additionally, this thesis would argue that it 
was particularly important that the government's mitigation approach demonstrate 
leadership, as expected of developed countries under article 3.1 UNFCCC (and also 
generally associated with GIC by Gareth Evans). As noted above, Prime Minister Rudd 
asserted himself that leadership by Australia was important on this issue, given the 
need for momentum to be added to the international negotiations.  
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The above review of the major elements of the Rudd government's legal and policy 
approach to implementation found that Australia witnessed a significant domestic 
debate on the best instrument to reduce emissions, with some preferring alternative 
approaches such as a carbon tax. However, it was concluded that the government's 
choice of a cap and trade ETS was undoubtedly a legitimate policy choice, being 
consistent with the orthodox economic view that emissions trading provides an 
effective and efficient means of reducing emissions. An ETS also appeared to best 
position Australia to participate in the international carbon market established by the 
Kyoto Protocol, including by linking to existing or emerging ETS's in other countries 
such as the EU. 
 
Many concerns were raised, however, regarding the specific design features of the 
CPRS, especially the significant compensation provided to Australia's largest emitting 
industries. These concerns led some commentators to doubt the merits of enacting the 
CPRS. Denniss, for example, criticised the Scheme for being too far removed from a 
'textbook' ETS, in that it failed to cover all sectors of the economy, provided free 
emission permits too polluters, and placed an upper cap on the permit price.350 
Macintosh, Wilkinson and Denniss similarly derided the CPRS for progressively 
becoming 'more economically inefficient as the government offered millions of free 
permits and other handouts to polluters and affected businesses'.351 Another critic, 
Woodward, concluded that the Rudd government's lack of preparedness to 'take on' 
vested interests in the coal mining, coal power generation, agricultural and other 
heavy polluting industries, ultimately 'threatened to undermine the integrity and 
effectiveness of the ETS.'352 Perhaps most notably, the government's key independent 
climate change adviser, Garnaut, formed the view that the question of whether to 
enact the CPRS was 'finely balanced' due to factors such as the weak initial upper 
target of 15 per cent, inadequate funding for research and development and the 
commercialisation of new technologies, and the overcompensation of EITE 
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industries.353 After the government increased Australia's upper target to 25 per cent, 
however, Garnaut did favour legislating the CPRS Bill,354 although this did not stop him 
from describing the policy-making process associated with the CPRS as 'one of the 
worst…we have seen on major issues in Australia'.355 
 
As the above comments make clear, the CPRS, the intended focal point of the 
government's emission reduction efforts, was a heavily compromised emissions 
reduction instrument, both from an economic and public policy perspective. However, 
the key requirement of the government, from a legal and GIC perspective, was to 
establish laws and policies that would enable Australia to meet its future international 
mitigation obligations. International law generally provides nations with broad scope 
as to how their international obligations are implemented at the domestic level. As 
stated by Henkin, '[t]he international system requires that a state meet its 
international obligations, but ordinarily the law has not required that a state meet 
those obligations in a particular way or through particular institutions and laws.'356 
Cassese similarly notes that international law generally requires an 'obligation of 
result', not an 'obligation of means'.357 This is generally true of ICCL as both the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol provide that the means by which a Party may implement 
its obligations is essentially one for the Party, to be decided according to national 
circumstances (so long as it is consistent with any rules imposed by the ICCL regime, 
such as regarding supplementarity or accounting methodologies).358 As highlighted 
above in de Boer's comments, this is also generally the case from a diplomatic 
perspective, with Parties accepting that nations have considerable discretion as to the 
form of domestic emission reduction measures adopted.  
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This chapter found little evidence that the CPRS and complementary measures, despite 
various flaws, would not have been legally sufficient to enable Australia to achieve its 
2020 mitigation targets. This is chiefly because the CPRS set a mandatory cap on a 
wide range of emissions sources and was complemented by other effective emission 
reduction measures such as the RET. The government also had the ability to top up 
Australia's abatement by purchasing international permits, which was allowed for by 
the Kyoto rules. To this extent, the Rudd government's domestic legal and policy 
response was likely to be legally effective.  
 
There were, however, risks that by not setting a cap on the use of international 
permits by liable entities that Australia could breach the supplementarity principle in 
future, at least in spirit if not in letter (with the requirements of the principle not being 
well-defined). The government's intention to purchase up to 1/5th of Australia's 25 per 
cent target created similar risks. A legally responsible approach would have been to 
cap the use of international permits at no more than 50 per cent of Australia's 
abatement, this being the maximum use of the flexibility mechanisms regarded as 
reasonable by other Parties. A further concern was that by neglecting to place a cap on 
the use of international permits, the CPRS would have likely delayed the necessary 
decarbonisation of the domestic economy, thus creating long-term risks for Australia's 
ability to achieve sufficient domestic emission reductions.359 Similar long-term risks 
were also potentially created by putting so much faith in CCS technology, which if not 
realised, could see Australia's domestic emissions remain high for many decades as a 
result of its reliance on coal-fired electricity. Aside from the risk of breaching the 
supplementarity principle, however, it appears that the CPRS Bill was generally 
designed to allow Australia to meet its future targets in a manner that was consistent 
with the ICCL regime, as was the government's intention.360 
 
While the Rudd government's intent to make significant use of international permits 
may have been legally acceptable, aside from the supplementarity issue, its approach 
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to implementation certainly created risks for the environmental effectiveness of 
Australia's emission reduction response. As stated earlier, it goes without saying that 
as a Party to the UNFCCC, it was incumbent upon the government to adopt an 
approach to implementation that resulted in genuine, rather than illusory, emissions 
abatement. This was a clear legal expectation of all Parties given that the central 
purpose of the UNFCCC and related instruments is to reduce emissions so as to avoid 
dangerous climate change. As noted earlier, this expectation is also emphasised by the 
Preamble to Convention which recognises, for example, that Parties should 'enact 
effective environmental legislation'.  
 
This chapter examined environmental integrity concerns chiefly in relation to the CDM, 
as this was likely to provide the major source of international permits for Australia up 
to 2020. It was recognised that many Parties wished the CDM to continue, 
notwithstanding concerns regarding environmental integrity, and that Parties have and 
continue to make reforms so as to improve its environmental effectiveness. However, 
at the time the government was seeking to legislate the CPRS it would have been 
aware that there were significant concerns regarding the credibility of CERs. Nor was it 
clear that any of the reforms being discussed at the international level could guarantee 
that future CERs would always represent genuine emissions abatement. As such, the 
Rudd government's decision not to place a quantitative cap on the use of the flexibility 
mechanisms, or at least the CDM, sent the message that its primary concern was to 
reduce the cost of Australia achieving its mitigation target, regardless of whether or 
not the international permits purchased by liable entities represented genuine 
abatement. To its credit, Labor did place restrictions on AAUs due to environmental 
integrity concerns. Yet it also left the door open for these to become eligible for use 
under the CPRS in future. Furthermore, it backed the creation of new sectoral 
approaches, which would have potentially established a new source of less than 
credible offsets. It will be seen in chapter 8 that the government also wished to 
establish a new REDD flexibility mechanism which, again, had the potential to provide 
a further source of environmentally dubious offsets.  
 
Regarding the need for developed country leadership, it should be emphasised that 
the Rudd government was under no legal obligation to establish an ETS or any other 
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emission reductions laws and policies prior to COP 15. With Australia's target under 
the first commitment of the Kyoto Protocol all but achieved and the post-2012 
agreement still in the process of negotiation, Labor could have opted to delay any 
major policy work until after Copenhagen. It was commendable, therefore, that Labor 
promised to introduce an ETS at the 2007 election, a commitment which it sought to 
honour in government. Given the political difficulty of introducing an ETS in Australia, 
the mere fact that it sought to do so must be regarded as an act of leadership. It also 
constituted an act of leadership internationally as if the CPRS Bill had been enacted, 
the Scheme would have become the first national, mandatory ETS to be established 
outside of the EU.361 Conversely, the flawed design of the CPRS arguably missed an 
opportunity to show international leadership in the design of best practice domestic 
emission reduction laws. This is because a less compromised ETS could have 
demonstrated to other nations that it was possible to reduce emissions in a cost-
effective and environmentally credible manner. Opting not to set a conservative cap 
on the use of international permits and rejecting the quantification of the 
supplementarity requirement at the international level also provided examples of 
missed opportunities to show leadership.  
 
Perhaps the greatest damage to the Rudd government's leadership aspirations, 
however, came in its decision to defer the CPRS until 2013. When Labor's mettle on 
carbon pricing was seriously put to the test, it buckled, backing away from its own 
argument that legislating the CPRS was a matter of urgency. The more politically 
courageous action would have been to take the CPRS to a double dissolution election. 
At the very least, it could have simply deferred the Bill until the next regular election 
and, if successful, sought to legislate the CPRS in a new Parliament. Deferring the CPRS, 
by contrast, relegated Australia to the position of a follower, awaiting the outcome of 
international negotiations to implement its critical mechanism for putting Australia's 
economy on a low-emission path. 
 
                                                     
 
361 Note that New Zealand's ETS has no emissions cap. 
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Downplaying the need to act in an environmentally effective manner was also arguably 
inconsistent with another important principle of the Convention, namely the 
precautionary principle (article 3.3 UNFCCC).362 It is clear that a truly precautionary 
approach would have emphasised abatement options with a high likelihood of 
achieving genuine emission reductions, not just those which represented least cost.  
 
Turning to other attributes of GIC identified in chapter 1, a number of these also had 
clear relevance to the implementation issue. The intention to make significant use of 
international permits, even at the cost of environmental effectiveness, was certainly 
inconsistent with the notion of pursuing 'purposes beyond ourselves'. It was also at 
odds with the notion of advancing 'enlightened self-interest', as it placed Australia's 
narrow economic interests (as well as the government's political interest in achieving 
least cost abatement) ahead of Australia's longer-term interest in avoiding dangerous 
climate change.  
 
As explained in chapter 1, GIC acknowledges that governments are often required to 
strike a balance between being idealistic and realistic and that the desire to be a GIC is 
often hampered by legitimate domestic and international constraints. This was 
certainly the case in relation to the CPRS. The Rudd government's preference to use 
international permits was driven by the fact that Australia faced relatively high 
domestic mitigation costs due to its large share of emission and energy-intensive 
industries.363 As such, the government had a clear political need to minimise the cost 
of abatement in order to maintain the support of the Australian electorate and 
businesses that were most affected by carbon pricing. Indeed, most stakeholders who 
submitted comments on the design of the CPRS to government argued for unlimited 
access to Kyoto units, in order to reduce the costs of compliance.364 The government 
would also have faced a strong industry backlash from EITE entities and other affected 
                                                     
 
362 This requires Parties to take 'precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise the causes of 
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.' Further, 'where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such 
measures'. 
363 See Treasury, Australia's Low Pollution Future: The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation, above n 
21, 196.  
364 See Australian Government, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia's Low Pollution Future 
(White Paper, Vol 1), above n 20, 11-8. 
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businesses if it did not appease their demands for compensation. The slow pace of 
international negotiations also made the CPRS a difficult political sell for the 
government given genuine concerns regarding the competitiveness of the Australian 
economy if Australia acted too far ahead of its competitors. Furthermore, while 
appearing to have public support to introduce an ETS, the government did not enjoy 
favourable political circumstances in the Senate where it counted. Moreover, while its 
political strategy to secure support for the CPRS Bill may have been less than perfect, it 
was the Abbott Opposition, not the government, who was ultimately responsible for 
the failure of the Bill to become law. 
 
In regard to other (more minimalist) GIC criteria, it is clear that the Rudd government 
took an internationalist approach to the design of the CPRS by ensuring that it could 
easily link with other mechanisms such as the EU ETS and was generally consistent 
with the international legal framework established by the Kyoto Protocol (other than 
the supplementarity issue). It was also an active player on the implementation issue, 
seeking to establish an ETS in advance of new domestic abatement laws and policies 
actually being necessary, and demonstrated a willingness to 'pitch in' by seeking to be 
one of the early adopters (outside the EU) of an ETS.  
 
Overall, this chapter argues that it was to the credit of the Rudd government that it 
sought to introduce an ETS as well as complementary measures such as the RET, 
notwithstanding their various flaws. In broad terms, the government's approach to 
implementation would likely have legally positioned Australia to meet its international 
target for 2020 if the CPRS had been legislated. While the CPRS, in particular, had 
significant design flaws such as the overcompensation of EITE industries, its major 
failing from a GIC perspective was in allowing unlimited access to eligible international 
permits, risking the environmental effectiveness of Australia's mitigation response. 
This approach undoubtedly put Australia's shorter-term economic interests, and the 
government's political interests, ahead of the more important need to genuinely 
contribute to global abatement. Further, while the government's effort to legislate an 
ETS was undoubtedly an act of leadership, the design failings of the CPRS, and its 
ultimate deferral in the face of difficult political circumstances, undermined its early 
good intentions and leadership aspirations. In fairness to the government, it must be 
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acknowledged that it faced challenging domestic political circumstances that made its 
task incredibly difficult. However, for this author, its failure to prioritise an 
environmentally effective approach, and its eventual decision to delay the introduction 
of an ETS (turning Australia into a follower, rather than a leader), means that it is 
difficult to classify the Rudd government as a GIC on this issue. The government was 
far from being a poor international citizen, and arguably its sincere efforts to legislate 
an ETS prior to Copenhagen meant that it ought to at least qualify as an above average 
international citizen. However, this chapter suggests that chiefly because of the 
government's lack of resolve to establish an ETS that prioritised genuine, domestic 
abatement, it could only be regarded as an average international citizen with respect 
to implementation. 
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CHAPTER 8. THE RUDD GOVERNMENT AND REDD+ 
 
'REDD can and should make a significant and cost effective contribution to the global mitigation 
of climate change.' The Rudd government, March 2009.1 
 
This chapter examines the Rudd government's engagement with international efforts 
to establish a mechanism to reduce forestry-related emissions in developing countries, 
a major source of global greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), under a post-2012 climate 
change agreement. Negotiations on this topic were mandated by paragraph 1(b)(iii) of 
the Bali Action Plan (BAP),2 adopted at the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP 13) to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)3 in Bali, 
Indonesia (December 2007). Specifically, Parties agreed to consider how to incentivise 
the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (known as 
'REDD'), as well as broader activities including conservation, the sustainable 
management of forests and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks (collectively 
known as 'REDD+'). Indicative of Parties aspirations on this issue, the European Union 
(EU) proposed the goal of halving deforestation by 2020 and halting global forest cover 
loss by 2030.4 
 
Much goodwill existed among the Parties to establish a REDD+ mechanism under a 
post-2012 agreement.5 However, differing views were held on how it should be 
                                                     
 
1 Australia, 'Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries' in 
UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 
2, UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.1/Add.2 (23 March 2009) 3, 3. 
2 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008), decision 1/CP.13, [1(b)(iii)] ('COP 13 Report´). 
3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1771 
UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994) ('UNFCCC'). 
4 European Community, 'EU Ideas on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan' in 
UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 2 
(Part 1), UN Doc FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.2 (Part 1) (6 December 2008) 126, 126. 
5 Note that various Parties including Australia also supported linking forestry mitigation activities to 
developing countries' NAMAs (see chapter 6) or extending the range of forestry activities that could 
generate carbon offsets under the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism: see, eg, Australia, 
'Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries' (23 March 
2009), above n 1, 7. The major focus of Parties, however, was on establishing a standalone REDD+ 
mechanism under a new post-2012 agreement.  
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designed and implemented. A particularly controversial issue was whether or not 
REDD+ should operate as a 'market' or 'flexibility mechanism' (similar to the Kyoto 
Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM – see chapter 7)) or instead only be 
financed by developed country governments. In common with other developed 
countries, Australia favoured a market approach which would generate a new source 
of relatively low cost international carbon credits, and also shift a large degree of 
financing responsibility from developed country governments to the private sector. 
 
The Rudd government made the establishment of REDD (more so than the + activities) 
a priority for Australia in the post-2012 negotiations.6  Australia made a number of 
detailed submissions on REDD and as discussed in chapter 6, made the inclusion of 
REDD in a post-2012 agreement a condition of adopting its upper emission reduction 
target of 25 per cent by 2020.7 Wishing to be a global leader in the development of 
REDD on the ground, the government also established agreements with both Indonesia 
and Papua New Guinea (PNG) to undertake so-called REDD 'demonstration activities'. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to assess whether the Rudd government's activities on 
REDD+ met the standard of good international citizenship (GIC). It does so in the 
following manner. First, the basic legal and policy background to REDD+ is outlined. 
Second, the Rudd government's negotiating positions are examined. The focus of 
analysis is the government's push for a market-based mechanism. This raised concerns 
regarding environmental effectiveness and was judged to be the most significant issue 
from a GIC perspective in relation to the design of the mechanism. Third, the chapter 
examines the Rudd government's major practical activity on REDD, namely the 
Kalimantan Forest and Carbon Partnership (KFCP), which was conducted in partnership 
with Indonesia. The Rudd government was engaged in a number of other REDD+ 
related activities, however, due to space limitations this chapter chiefly examines the 
KFCP, this being the government's flagship REDD initiative. The chapter concludes by 
                                                     
 
6 Note that Australia supported a REDD+ mechanism but its major emphasis was on establishing the 
'REDD' component. 
7 Australia, 'Strengthening Australia's National Ambition for 2020' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on 
Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 3, UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4/Add.3 (1 June 2009) 3, 3. 
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assessing whether the Rudd government's engagement with REDD+ was consistent 
with the standard of behaviour expected of a GIC. As with previous chapters, the 
primary consideration in assessing GIC is whether the government's approach was 
consistent with the relevant legal framework, however, the analysis also takes into 
account the broader attributes of GIC highlighted in chapter 1. 
A REDD+: Legal and Policy Background 
1 The Relationship between Forests and Climate Change 
Forests cover about 31 per cent of the Earth's total land area (approximately 4 billion 
hectares).8 Emissions in the forest sector are a significant contributor to climate 
change accounting for more than 17 per cent of global anthropogenic GHG emissions: 
the third largest source of emissions behind energy supply and industry, respectively.9 
Forests also play a crucial role as a carbon 'sink', containing approximately 77 per cent 
of all carbon stored in vegetation and 39 per cent of all carbon stored in soils.10 
Deforestation – the human-induced conversion of forest to non-forest land through 
activities such as land clearing –11 represents the single largest source of forest-related 
carbon emissions.12 Most deforestation occurs in tropical developing counties where 
an estimated 13 million hectares – an area the size of England – are converted to land 
uses such as agriculture each year.13 Deforestation is exacerbated by forest 
degradation – a reduction in forest biomass from non-deforestation activities such as 
                                                     
 
8 Food and Agriculture Organization, Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010: Main Report (FAO, 2010) 
xiii. 
9 Core Writing Team, Rajendra K Pachauri and Andy Reisinger (eds), Climate Change 2007: Synthesis 
Report (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2008) 36. Annually, the global forest sector 
produces an estimated 5.8 gigatonnes of CO2: Johan Eliasch, Climate Change: Financing Global Forests 
(Eliasch Review) (UK Office of Climate Change, 2008) xv. 
10 Eliasch, above n 9, 15. Forest carbon is found in five so-called 'pools' or 'reservoirs': below-ground 
biomass, above-ground biomass, litter, dead wood, and soil organic carbon: see Harald Aalde et al, 
'Forest Land' in Simon Eggleston et al (eds), 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas 
Inventories (Global Environmental Strategies, 2006) 4.7. 
11 Gert Jan Narbuurs et al, 'Forestry', in B Metz et al (eds), Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate 
Change (Contribution  of Working  Group  III  to the Fourth Assessment Report) (Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) 550.  
12 Ibid 543. 
13 Food and Agriculture Organization, above n 8, xiii; Eliasch, above n 9, xv.  
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selective timber and fuel-wood harvesting.14 Forest degradation represents an 
estimated 30 per cent of emissions in this sector.15  
 
According to the 2008 Eliasch Review, commissioned by the British government, forest 
sector emissions could increase atmospheric CO2 levels by 30 parts per million by 2100 
unless mitigation measures are adopted.16 This would have an estimated economic 
impact of US$1 trillion per year by 2100.17 As such, REDD or REDD+ clearly needed to 
be part of a post-2012 climate agreement aiming to prevent dangerous climate 
change.18  
 
The primary motivation for developing a REDD+ mechanism under the international 
climate change law (ICCL) regime was to reduce CO2 emissions and enhance CO2 
removals. According to the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth 
Assessment Report (IPCC AR4), REDD represented a mitigation option 'with the largest 
and most immediate carbon stock impact in the short term'.19  An agreement on 
REDD+ also had the potential to deliver a broader range of economic, social and 
environmental benefits. Forests, for example, provide an important role in delivering 
'ecosystem services' (such as regulating regional rainfall, ﬂood defence, maintaining 
soil stability and supporting biodiversity) which are crucial for the approximately 1.6 
billion people who are in some way dependent on forests for their welfare and 
livelihoods20 and the estimated 350 million people which live directly in forests.21 
Forests provide fuel-wood, medicinal plants, foods, shelter and many other services to 
these communities.22 Notably, REDD+ had significant potential to reduce the loss of 
                                                     
 
14 Narbuurs, above n 11, 550.  
15 Christof Arens et al, 'REDD Crediting vs REDD Funds - How Avoided Deforestation under the UNFCCC 
Should Be Financed' (JIKO Policy Paper 3/2010, Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and 
Energy, June 2010) 16. 
16 Eliasch, above n 9, xi, xvi. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid xi-xii. 
19 Narbuurs, above n 11, 550. 
20 See Eliasch, above n 9, xv.  
21 Ibid xix. 
22 Ibid. See further: UN-REDD Programme, Multiple Benefits – Issues and Options for REDD (UN, 2009) 4. 
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biodiversity, with tropical forests supporting an estimated 50 to 90 per cent of the 
world's species.23 
2 Legal Overview  
a) UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
Efforts to reduce forest-related emissions in developing countries have evolved slowly 
under the ICCL regime.24 The 1992 UNFCCC only addressed the issue in broad terms. 
Article 4.1 establishes obligations on all Parties to, for example, promote 'sustainable 
management' and 'conservation and enhancement' of 'sinks'25 and 'reservoirs'26 
including, inter alia, biomass, forests and other terrestrial ecosystems.27  These 
obligations are very weak due to the vagueness of the language adopted as well as 
various qualifiers including that the Parties commitments are subject to the principle 
of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' and their specific 'priorities, objectives 
and circumstances'28 and the principle that 'economic and social development and 
poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities' of developing countries.29 
Developing country obligations are also subject to developed countries first fulfilling 
their commitments regarding financial and technology transfer.30 
 
A number of Parties to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC31 sought to incentivise 
the reduction of forestry-related emissions in developing countries during the 
negotiations on the Protocol's detailed rules, known as the 'Marrakesh Accords' 
                                                     
 
23 Eliasch, above n 9, 10. 
24 Various international legal instruments outside of the ICCL regime also have relevance to forestry in 
developing countries, for example: Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 
1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993); Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of 
Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All 
Types of Forests in UNFCCC, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 
UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. III) (14 August 1992). 
25 'Sink' means any process, activity or mechanism which removes a GHG, an aerosol or a precursor of a 
GHG from the atmosphere: UNFCCC art 1.8. 
26 'Reservoir' means a component or components of the climate system where a GHG or a precursor of a 
GHG is stored: Ibid art 1.7. 
27 Ibid arts 4.1(a). See also arts 4.1(b)-(d). 
28 Ibid art 4.1. 
29 Ibid art 4.7. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 
16 March 1998, 2303 UNTS 148 (entered into force 16 February 2005) ('Kyoto Protocol'). 
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(adopted in 2001). Several Latin American countries as well as the Umbrella Group 
(including Australia), favoured including 'avoided deforestation'32 as a recognised 
project activity under the CDM.33 Brazil, China, the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) and others, however, strongly opposed including this activity due to concerns 
about a potential loss of sovereignty (as forest usage rights could be transferred to 
foreign states or corporations); the displacement of other types of potentially more 
beneficial CDM projects such as for renewable energy; Parties' ability to accurately 
assess additionality, baseline emissions and leakage; as well as the 'flooding' of the 
carbon market with cheap carbon credits.34 
 
Such concerns resulted in forest mitigation activities under the CDM being restricted to 
two forest35 restoration activities, namely: afforestation – the conversion of land to 
forest that has not contained a forest for at least 50 years – and reforestation – the 
conversion of land to forest that was not forested on 31 December 1989.36 Together 
these activities are known as 'A/R'. Forestry projects have had limited uptake in the 
CDM, chiefly due to: the temporary status given to A/R Certified Emission Reductions 
(CERs), which means that they must ultimately be replaced by the purchaser;37 strict 
                                                     
 
32 The Marrakesh Accords define 'deforestation' as 'the direct human-induced conversion of forested 
land to non-forested land': UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of 
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session: Addendum 3 (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (30 March 2006), decision 16/CMP.1, annex [1(d)] ('CMP Report 1: 
Addendum 3 (Part 2)'). Note that the Marrakesh Accords were initially agreed to by UNFCCC Parties in 
2001, before later being adopted by Kyoto Parties in 2005 after the Protocol came into effect. 
33 Ian Fry, 'Twists and Turns in the Jungle: Exploring the Evolution of the Land Use, Land-Use Change and 
Forestry Decisions Within the Kyoto Protocol' (2002) 11 Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law 159, 167. 
34 See Ian Fry, 'More Twists, Turns and Stumbles in the Jungle: A Further Exploration of Land Use, Land 
Use Change and Forestry Decisions within the Kyoto Protocol' (2007) 16 Review of European Community 
and International Environmental Law 341, 343; Arens, above n 15, 9. 
35 The Marrakesh Accords define a 'forest' as 'a minimum area of land of 0.05-1.0 ha with tree crown 
cover (or equivalent stocking level) of more than 10-30% with trees with the potential to reach a 
minimum height of 2-5 metres at maturity in situ….': CMP Report 1: Addendum 3 (Part 2), decision 
16/CMP.1, annex [1(a)]. 
36 Ibid annex [1(b), 1(c), 13]. 
37 Validated A/R projects issue temporary CERs (tCERs) or long-term CERs (lCERs). tCERs expire at the 
end of the commitment period subsequent to the one in which they were issued. lCERs expire at the 
end of the crediting period for the project (either 20 years, renewable twice, or 30 years). A/R CERs 
must be replaced by Parties which have purchased them with other Kyoto permits at the expiration of 
their crediting period: UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session: Addendum 1 (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (30 March 2006), decision 5/CMP.1, annex [1(g), 1(h), 48]. 
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limits on the use of A/R CERs by Annex I Parties;38 and their exclusion from the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme.39 
 
The idea for a comprehensive agreement on avoided deforestation, then limited to 
'reducing emissions from deforestation' (RED), was re-introduced by PNG and Costa 
Rica in 2005 who suggested developing a separate Protocol on RED or including 
avoided deforestation in the CDM.40 The proposal was not adopted by Kyoto Parties 
but RED was placed on the agenda of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) to address methodological issues,41 and workshops were 
held on RED in 2006 and 2007.42  
b) COP 13 Outcomes 
As noted, Parties agreed under the BAP at COP 13 to formally establish policy-level 
negotiations on REDD+, with the aim of including this sector in a post-2012 agreement. 
Specifically, Parties were to consider:  
 '[p]olicy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries' 
(REDD activities); and  
 'the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement 
of forest carbon stocks in developing countries' (the REDD '+' activities).43 
 
While deforestation and forest degradation were the primary concern of most Parties, 
several countries pushed strongly for the inclusion of the '+' activities. India, which has 
little deforestation, gained the inclusion of conservation, wishing to receive financial 
                                                     
 
38 Total acquisitions of A/R CERs by Annex I Parties must not exceed one per cent of their base year 
emissions, times five: CMP Report 1: Addendum 3 (Part 2), decision 16/CMP.1, annex [14]. 
39 Alexandre Kossoy and Phillippe Ambrosi, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2010 (World Bank, 
2010) 25. 
40 See Fry, 'More Twists, Turns and Stumbles in the Jungle', above n 34, 348-49. 
41 Ibid 349. 
42 See UNFCCC, Report on a Workshop on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing 
Countries, UN Doc FCCC/SBSTA/2006/10 (11 October 2006); UNFCCC, Report on the Second Workshop 
on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries, UN Doc FCCC/SBSTA/2007/3 (17 
April 2007) (hosted by Australia).  
43 COP 13 Report, decision 1/CP.13, [(b)(iii)]. 
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compensation for retaining its remaining forests.44 Japan – a long-time proponent of 
the sustainable management of forests (SMF – essentially sustainable logging 
practices) – pushed for the inclusion of this activity.45 China, whose forest carbon 
stocks were increasing, gained inclusion of the enhancement of carbon stocks (ECS) 
with the aim of obtaining financial reward for growing plantations.46 Other countries 
saw ECS as encompassing other carbon stock enhancement activities such as soil 
carbon improvements through improved agricultural activities, replanting of degraded 
forests, or A/R activities.47 
 
Decision 2 at COP 13 also provided guidance to the Parties on the development of 
REDD+, including by, for example:  
 mandating the SBSTA to continue addressing methodological issues;48  
 encouraging Parties to support capacity-building and provide technical 
assistance and technology transfer to developing countries to improve their 
REDD data, monitoring and reporting and to address their institutional needs;49 
and 
 further encouraging Parties to explore a range of activities, including 
'demonstration activities, to address the drivers of deforestation … with a view 
to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation'.50 
 
B The Rudd Government's Support for a Market-based REDD+ 
Mechanism 
As noted, one of the key issues for the REDD+ negotiations to address was whether or 
not the mechanism should operate as a market or fund-based mechanism (or a mix of 
the two). The essential difference between these approaches was that a market-based 
                                                     
 
44 See Ian Fry, 'Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation: Opportunities and 
Pitfalls in Developing a New Legal Regime' (2008) 17 Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 166, 180. 
45 Ibid 180.  
46 Ibid 180-181.  
47 Ibid 181. 
48 COP 13 Report, decision 2/CP.13, [7]. 
49 Ibid [2]. 
50 Ibid [3]. 
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mechanism would allow carbon credits (also known as emission permits or carbon 
offsets) to be awarded to participating developing countries for achieving emission 
reductions below a defined 'reference emission level'. These credits could then be 
purchased by Annex I Parties (either by governments or authorised private entities) to 
assist in meeting their mitigation targets.51 As with the CDM, a market-based 
mechanism would allow emission reductions to be funded largely by the private 
sector. By contrast, emission reductions under a fund-based approach would not 
generate carbon credits and would instead be directly funded by developed country 
governments.52  
1 The Rudd Government's Position   
The Rudd government's strong advocacy for a market-based REDD+ mechanism was 
heavily driven by economic considerations. It made this clear, stating that REDD was 
'one of the most cost-effective opportunities for reducing global emissions in the 
short-term.'53 This view was informed by the Australian Treasury who estimated that if 
REDD and other forest-related mitigation activities were not included in international 
emissions trading after 2012, global mitigation costs could be up to 25 per cent 
higher.54 The Rudd government thus saw a market-based approach to REDD, 
leveraging the capital of the private sector and encouraging global abatement to occur 
first where it is cheapest, as the most 'efficient and effective means' of achieving global 
mitigation objectives.55 This view was consistent with its broader position that 
flexibility mechanisms should cover 'as many sectors and activities as possible' so as to 
reduce Annex I Parties' mitigation costs.56  
                                                     
 
51 See generally Arens, above n 15, 28. 
52 See ibid 27. 
53 Australia, 'Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries' 
(23 March 2009), above n 1, 7. 
54 Treasury, Australia's Low Pollution Future: The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation (Summary)  
(2008) 27. As a percentage of GWP and in relation to a 550 ppm CO2-e agreement. The Eliasch Review 
estimated that a market-based REDD mechanism could reduce the cost of halving global emissions by up 
to 50 per cent in 2030 and 40 per cent in 2050: Eliasch, above n 9, xii, 84. 
55 Australia, 'Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries' 
(23 March 2009), above n 1, 7. 
56 Australia, 'Emissions Trading and the Project-Based Mechanisms' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on 
the Elements Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 3, UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.1/Add.3 (26 March 2009) 23, 24. 
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While pushing for a market approach to REDD, the Rudd government recognised that 
developed countries would need to directly fund 'REDD-readiness' activities in the 
short to medium-term; such as assistance for carbon monitoring and accounting, 
policy development and institutional capacity-building.57 However, the broader aim of 
this was still to prepare developing countries for participation in a market-based 
mechanism with the government arguing that only carbon markets could mobilise 
investment 'on the scale needed to support and provide incentives for these emission 
reductions.'58 
2 Other Party Views  
Developed countries, among them the United States (US), EU and one of the strongest 
proponents of REDD, Norway,59 also backed a market-based mechanism (although 
again with direct funding by developed countries for REDD-readiness activities). Most 
Parties supporting a market approach, including Australia,60 recognised that due to the 
complexities of REDD+, the mechanism would need to evolve through a phased 
approach with preliminary activities such as establishing GHG inventories, monitoring 
capabilities, demonstration activities, legal frameworks and so forth being financially 
supported by developed countries; with carbon credits only being generated once host 
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countries could deliver verified emissions abatement.61 Potential sources of funding 
for the early phases of REDD+ included, among others, the World Bank-hosted Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)62 and the UN-REDD Programme which are largely 
supported by voluntary developed country contributions;63 bilateral arrangements 
with developed country governments; and the then still to be negotiated post-2012 
Financial Mechanism.  
 
Developing countries were more divided on the market versus fund issue. Many 
expressed a preference for a non-offsetting mechanism funded by the proposed new 
Financial Mechanism,64 among them AOSIS;65 Brazil;66 Ecuador;67 Nicaragua, 
Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Panama;68 and Bolivia.69 Bolivia, for 
example, argued that a fund-based approach would allow for a more 'equitable 
distribution of funds'; be 'more likely to ensure environmental integrity'; better 
'protect the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities as there would be no 
transfer of rights of carbon ownership to the market'; and 'ensure sovereignty and 
national as well as local control over REDD-plus activities'.70  
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Equally, however, many developing countries shared the view that while direct funding 
was needed in the early stages of REDD+, ultimately the mechanism needed to link to 
the market.71 Chiefly, these countries included the 'Rainforest Coalition' (a like-minded 
group of developing nations primarily from the Amazon, Congo Basin and Southeast 
Asia, and led by one of Australia's key REDD partners, PNG);72 Indonesia73 (Australia's 
other key REDD partner); the African Group,74 the Congo Basin countries,75 and India.76 
Importantly, however, the Rainforest Coalition stated that the linking of REDD to the 
market must be preceded by an ambitious collective Annex I mitigation target of at 
least 40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020 and 80 per cent by 2050.77 This was to 
ensure that there was sufficient demand (and hence a sufficient price) for REDD 
credits.78 The Rainforest Coalition and others were also concerned to ensure that 
regardless of the source of financing, REDD+ would deliver 'transparent, adequate, 
predictable and sustainable' funding.79  
3 Would a Market-based REDD+ Mechanism be Environmentally Effective? 
Parties widely recognised that significant hurdles needed to be overcome if REDD+ was 
to be an environmentally effective mechanism. It was of course important for REDD+ 
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to deliver genuine emissions abatement regardless of whether it operated as a market 
or fund-based mechanism. However, the credibility of claimed abatement was 
particularly important if the mechanism was used by Annex I Parties as a substitute for 
domestic emissions abatement. This is because if REDD+ credits represented 'hot air' 
(non-genuine emissions abatement), the use of REDD+ credits would ultimately 
contribute to an increase in global GHG levels.  
 
As argued in chapter 7, a GIC would generally be expected to utilise approaches that 
involve genuine emissions abatement in order to act consistently with the UNFCCC's 
central objective of avoiding dangerous climate change. This chapter therefore 
contends that whether the Rudd government pushed for an environmentally effective 
design for REDD+ was as a key determinant of its GIC credentials on this issue. At face 
value, the Rudd government appeared to recognise the importance of this issue, 
stating that the mechanism ought to be 'effective', 'robust and credible' and 'ensure 
environmental integrity'.80 However, as will be seen below, establishing a credible 
mechanism was likely to be easier said than done. 
 
This chapter now turns to considering the various design issues and hurdles that a 
REDD+ mechanism needed to overcome if it was to deliver credible emissions 
abatement.  
a) Key Design Issues and Hurdles 
i) Scope of Activities 
As a preliminary issue, concerns were raised about the implications of expanding REDD 
to REDD+. Fry (Tuvalu's climate negotiator), for example, argued that India could 
receive unjustified financial compensation as its forest conservation efforts were 
chiefly driven by domestic interests unrelated to preventing climate change.81 
Environmental groups such as Greenpeace also argued that the mechanism should 
focus on REDD activities, seeing the + activities as a distraction from the key objective 
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of protecting primary forest – the largest forest-related carbon stock and the major 
source of biodiversity.82 Parties such as Suriname, however (a so-called 'high forest low 
deforestation' country), warned that unless the mechanism extended to activities such 
as SMF and conservation, these Parties' forests would be susceptible to deforestation 
in future as they sought to develop their economies.83 While it was clearly important 
to avoid 'rent seeking' behaviour from countries such as India, most developed and 
developing countries recognised the need for a broad REDD+ mechanism, as envisaged 
by the BAP, which accommodated the differing national circumstances of developing 
countries.84 
  
In addition to the + activities referred to by the BAP, Australia and Norway favoured 
extending the mechanism to A/R activities, already included, but unpopular, in the 
CDM.85  The Rudd government argued that including A/R under REDD+ would increase 
the abatement potential of the mechanism and the range of Parties which might 
participate.86 Its position was also likely driven by the relatively cheap abatement 
opportunities offered by these activities.87 Concerns have been raised in the literature 
that A/R projects could result in adverse impacts for biodiversity if mono-plantations 
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and non-native species were used.88 However, the Rudd government indicated that it 
was keen to ensure that the mechanism did not result in 'perverse outcomes' for 
biodiversity.89 So long as biodiversity concerns were sufficiently addressed, the Rudd 
government's preference to include A/R appeared to be a sensible approach as it 
would be inconsistent to regulate A/R under the CDM but not include it in a 
comprehensive forestry mechanism. 
ii) National or Sub-national Accounting 
Parties also debated whether to establish REDD+ at a national or sub-national level. A 
national-level approach would see host countries earn credits for emission reductions 
and enhanced removals achieved against a national 'baseline' or 'reference emission 
level'. In contrast, a sub-national approach would operate more like the CDM, 
generating credits for emission reductions or enhanced removals achieved by 
individual projects or groups of projects. The Rudd government90 shared the view of 
most Parties,91 that a national level approach to accounting was necessary if the 
mechanism was to be environmentally effective, even if projects were implemented 
sub-nationally. The risk of not applying a national baseline was that emission 
reductions achieved by one project could be nullified by increased deforestation 
activities in other parts of the country – a process known as 'intra-national leakage'.92 
As a national-approach would be more complex and expensive to implement some 
developing countries argued that REDD+ needed to encompass sub-national 
approaches so as to allow for differing national circumstances (with some potential 
host countries having particularly weak institutional, technical and financing 
capabilities).93 The Rudd government's push for a national-level approach, however, 
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was certainly the more desirable, being better placed to address leakage concerns 
which may otherwise undermine the environmental integrity of the mechanism.94  
iii) Setting Baseline Emission Levels 
A major hurdle for the environmental effectiveness of REDD+ concerned the need to 
develop credible baselines or reference emission levels from which emission 
reductions and enhanced removals could be measured and emission credits ultimately 
awarded.95 The Rudd government accepted that addressing this issue was 'critical to 
the success of a market-based approach.'96 As with sectoral crediting or sectoral 
trading approaches (see chapter 7), REDD+ faced the problem that if host countries' 
baseline emission levels were set too high, some carbon credits would represent hot 
air. On the other hand, if baseline levels were set too low, an insufficient financial 
incentive would exist to discourage deforestation.97 Thus, the challenge was to 
establish methodologies that both ensured the additionality of emission reductions 
and incentivised the participation of developing countries.98 
 
The most straightforward approach to setting baselines was to simply apply host 
countries' historic emission levels. This approach was preferred by Parties such as 
Brazil, India and Indonesia, who believed that historical emissions provided the best 
baseline for measuring actual emission reductions.99 Most Parties, however, including 
Australia,100 the EU, US, Norway and most developing countries, believed that a more 
nuanced 'historical-adjusted' approach was necessary that reflected both historical 
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emission levels and national circumstances.101 A key deficiency of any baseline that 
only reflected historical emissions was that it could not adequately incentivise the 
participation of the high forest low deforestation countries which had yet to 
commercially exploit their forests.102  
 
Parties backing the historical-adjusted approach suggested that baselines should 
reflect a range of forward-looking factors. The Rudd government, for example, 
proposed that baselines reflect:  
 historical emissions data;  
 pre-existing emissions reduction measures; 
 population growth; 
 the drivers of deforestation;  
 relevant national policies and measures;  
 national circumstances; and 
 respective capabilities.103  
 
Other Parties suggested criteria such as gross national product (GNP) per capita;104 
estimated future emissions and removals trends;105 a 'developmental adjustment' 
factor;106 and early action to reduce emissions.107 Numerous approaches were also 
suggested in the literature.108 
 
As discussed in chapter 7 in relation to sectoral mechanisms, establishing credible 
baseline emission levels in developing countries would be a challenging task. This 
would be especially the case for forestry emissions. Setting baselines according to 
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historical emissions would be difficult due to the fact that most developing countries 
have highly inaccurate historical emissions data.109 Meanwhile, historical adjusted-
approaches would risk creating non-genuine credits.110 This is because historical-
adjusted baselines would be based upon assumptions about future deforestation and 
emission rates and thus would only be reliable as the assumptions they relied upon.111 
Notably, even developed countries like Australia have had significant difficulty 
estimating future emissions from deforestation.112 A further difficulty was that a 
REDD+ mechanism needed to secure the wide participation of developing countries in 
order to minimise the 'international leakage' of emissions (see below). This created the 
risk that host countries would be granted inflated baselines (maximising their financial 
return) in order to incentivise their participation. 
iv) Non-Permanence 
Another key issue was how to address the non-permanent nature of forestry-related 
CO2 removals, a feature of the land-based sector which means that certified emission 
reductions and enhanced removals may re-enter the atmosphere at a later point in 
time (for example, if protected forest is later deforested). As noted, Kyoto Parties 
sought to address this issue in relation to A/R CDM projects by classifying A/R CERs as 
temporary, but this approach proved to be unworkable. 
 
The Rudd government proposed to address non-permanence concerns under REDD+ 
by establishing an international 'confidence buffer', that is, a pool of credits that would 
be set aside and used to replace REDD+ credits in the event of a 'major anthropogenic 
event' that caused a reversal of reductions or removals.113 Each host country would 
contribute a percentage of their generated credits to the buffer for this purpose.114 
This would allow REDD+ credits to be classified as permanent. The Rainforest Coalition 
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also proposed a buffer approach,115 which has been utilised in the voluntary carbon 
market by the Verified Carbon Standard and the Chicago Climate Exchange.116  
 
The Rudd government's proposal to address non-permanence appeared to have merit. 
Notably, however, Australia only proposed to replace credits where reversals were due 
to anthropogenic causes and not natural events such as wildfires. This was a major 
flaw from an environmental effectiveness point of view, creating the obvious risk that 
carbon credits could be awarded but later become meaningless if the associated 
emission reductions were reversed by non-anthropogenic events. If forests did not 
regrow after a natural wildfire, for example, the associated emission reversals would  
go unaccounted for. The Rainforest Coalition supported Australia's approach,117 but 
others such as Norway adopted a more environmentally responsible position 
recognising that both anthropogenic and naturally-caused reversals should be 
accounted for.118 
v) International Leakage 
A further barrier to the environmental effectiveness of REDD+ was the problem of 
international leakage, that is, where policy measures to reduce deforestation in one 
country simply displaced this activity to others. The problem of international leakage is 
not unique to REDD+; rather, it is a general issue faced by the ICCL regime. However, 
Parties recognised that international leakage was a major risk to the credibility of 
REDD+, particularly as an offsets mechanism.  Most Parties, including Australia,119 
believed that international leakage was best addressed by encouraging broad 
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participation in the mechanism.120 Norway, however, took a stronger stance in 
proposing that Parties consider applying an 'international leakage discount factor' to 
REDD+ credits until all developing countries were participants.121 
vi) Measuring, Reporting and Verifying Emission Reductions/Enhanced Removals 
Another key challenge was how to establish reliable systems for measuring, reporting 
and verifying (MRV) forestry-related emission reductions and enhanced removals in 
host countries. This would generally require the use of satellite remote-sensing and 
ground-based assessments in combination with appropriate methodologies for 
estimating emissions and removals.122 Most Parties, including Australia, held the view 
that REDD+ was technically viable, especially in relation to deforestation activities, 
given technical advancements and growing scientific expertise in the area of forestry 
accounting.123 But Parties recognised that significant financial, technological and 
human resources, including capacity-building, were required in developing countries 
for reliable REDD+ MRV to eventuate.124  
 
The Rudd government understood the importance of high-quality MRV and proposed 
that prior to participating in the market-phase of REDD+ host countries would need to 
meet minimum and rigorous MRV specifications that were consistent with IPCC Tier 3 
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accounting (the most rigorous  level) and other IPCC guidelines.125 It also suggested 
that the IPCC be involved in developing performance specifications.126 The aim of 
REDD MRV systems would be to ensure that emission reductions were 'real, 
measurable, permanent, additional and independently verifiable'.127  
 
Most Parties shared Australia's view that a high-level of rigour was required for MRV 
systems, especially for market-linked credits, and that these would need to build on 
existing IPCC guidelines.128 Some Parties, however, were prepared to accept less 
stringent MRV systems than Australia. The US, for example, was open to host countries 
applying IPCC Tier 1 accounting (the least stringent level) as the minimum standard for 
participation in a market mechanism,129 while Colombia and Indonesia were open to 
the use of Tier 2 accounting.130 Thus Australia adopted a more environmentally 
rigorous position than some. To its credit, Australia was also actively engaged in 
activities to advance MRV systems in developing countries including in Indonesia (see 
section C). 
vii) Deforestation Laws and Governance 
Inadequate laws and poor governance in many developing countries were further 
recognised problems confronting the successful implementation of REDD+.131 
Acknowledging this concern, the Rudd government proposed that a host country 
would need to implement 'effective national and/or sub-national level policy, 
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governance, enforcement and regulatory frameworks' as a precondition to entering a 
market mechanism.132 Australia was right to highlight this issue, but the literature has 
underscored how difficult establishing effective REDD+ laws and governance is likely to 
be in practice. Multiple issues would need to be overcome including unclear legal 
frameworks (including with respect to land tenure, indigenous land ownership or 
interests, and carbon property rights); inconsistency between national and provincial 
laws; foreign ownership and investment restrictions;133 and the weakness of many 
national, regional and local institutions.134 A major problem is that many developing 
countries have high levels of corruption across their societies and economies, not just 
in relation to forestry, which cannot be quickly or easily resolved by REDD+.135 These 
issues have been seen in relation to the CDM in which many African countries, for 
example, have struggled to participate due to governance and corruption issues.136 A 
particularly significant issue was the need to address the rights of local communities 
and indigenous peoples with an estimated 60 million indigenous people being almost 
wholly dependent on forests.137 See further discussion of this latter issue in relation to 
the KFCP at section C. 
viii) Addressing the Drivers of Deforestation  
Finally, Parties recognised that REDD+ would need to address the various and inter-
linked drivers of deforestation in developing countries.138 The key purpose of REDD+ 
was to make forests worth more to owners standing – in financial terms – than if 
logged, helping to address the major economic driver of deforestation.139 Other drivers 
of deforestation, however, also needed to be addressed. For example, large-scale 
deforestation generally occurs in order to supply timber and agricultural products for 
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both local and global markets140 and demand for such products was likely to continue 
rising as the global population increased.141 Inadequate laws, governance and 
institutions also act as drivers of deforestation. Examples include policy and legal 
frameworks that encourage deforestation by providing subsidies and tax breaks; lack 
of clear and secure land tenure/property rights (meaning that logging concessions are 
easily awarded); and weak law enforcement practices and capacity that allows large-
scale illegal logging to take place.142 Illegal logging in Indonesia, for example, may be 
responsible for between 40 to 60 per cent of its deforestation.143 The decisions of 
developed countries also drive deforestation, such as whether or not consumers 
choose to purchase sustainably produced timber and agricultural products.144 Thus 
while the aim of REDD+ was to address the key driver of deforestation – the economic 
value of logging vis-a-vis forest protection – it was also clear that reducing 
deforestation required a much broader, multi-faceted approach. 
b) Additional Risks of a Market-linked REDD+ mechanism 
In addition to the challenges outlined above, various stakeholders and commentators 
highlighted that a market-based REDD+ mechanism would introduce an additional 
layer of complexity due to the nature of market-based mechanisms (see general 
discussion of these in chapters 6 and 7). According to the 2008 Meridian Report, 
commissioned by the Norwegian government, the major risks that would arise under a 
REDD+ market mechanism included:  
 market flooding: – large amounts of REDD+ credits saturating the carbon 
market (depressing the global carbon price, reducing the income of host 
countries, and decreasing the incentive for developed countries to undertake 
domestic abatement);  
 price volatility; and  
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 price shocks due to uncertainties around the timing of REDD+ credits entering 
the market.145 
Developed countries would also need to adopt sufficiently ambitious mitigation targets 
in order to create the necessary demand for this new source of credits.146  
 
Such concerns were not necessarily insurmountable, however, with various levers 
existing to mitigate potential supply and demand risks, such as: controlling the supply 
of REDD+ credits; requiring Annex I Parties to purchase an agreed percentage of 
REDD+ credits in meeting their targets; capping the quantity of REDD+ credits that 
could be purchased by developed countries in line with the principle of 
'supplementarity' (see chapter 7); and establishing a floor and ceiling price on 
credits.147 The Rainforest Coalition also believed that requiring developed countries to 
directly fund a portion of REDD+ on an ongoing basis would help to mitigate 
fluctuations in supply and demand.148 
c) Quantity and Sources of Funding 
As discussed in chapter 6, developing countries made various proposals regarding their 
post-2012 financing needs. The G77 and China, for example, called for developed 
countries to direct 0.5 to 1 per cent of their GNP to developing countries for mitigation 
and adaptation purposes.149 Developing countries also suggested that a range of 
sources could help Annex I Parties to directly fund REDD+ (either in full or in part), 
among them: 
 new and additional official development assistance;  
 the auctioning of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), which were allocated freely 
to Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period;  
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 the auctioning of national emission permits under developed countries' 
domestic emissions trading schemes (ETS);  
 a levy on the trading of AAUs; and  
 carbon taxes within Annex I countries.150  
 
Environmental groups such as Friends of the Earth also suggested measures such as 
redirecting fossil fuel subsidies (estimated as being worth $US57-$100 billion per 
annum) and establishing new global taxes such as on shipping, aviation and financial 
markets.151  
 
As noted, Australia and many other Parties rejected such approaches, in part due to 
their belief that ultimately the carbon market needed to be utilised if sufficient 
financing for REDD+ was to be available in the long-term. Much of the literature shared 
the view that a market mechanism was preferable as it would enable both public and 
private sector sources to be fully leveraged and also help to deliver least cost global 
abatement by encouraging the cheapest abatement options to be pursued first.152 A 
market scheme would essentially generate finance by allowing host countries to sell 
REDD+ CERs to entities in developed countries, particularly in the private sector, who 
had liabilities under domestic ETSs and wished to reduce their abatement costs by 
purchasing international credits.153 A market scheme would also encourage the private 
sector to invest in REDD+ projects on the expectation of making a profit from the sale 
of REDD+ credits. Importantly, a market-based REDD+ mechanism would avoid the 
need to introduce significant and likely unpopular new taxes to fund REDD+ within 
developed countries. This was a major concern for Annex I Parties in the negotiations, 
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especially with the 2008 Global Financial Crisis placing significant constraints on many 
developed countries' public budgets.154  
 
The reason why developed countries including Australia regarded market mechanisms 
as preferable is obvious when the likely scale of financing needed for REDD+ is 
considered. The Meridian Institute estimated that US$15-$35 billion would be required 
per annum for REDD+ readiness and implementation if global forest emissions were to 
be halved.155 Similar estimates were made by the Eliasch Review and other studies.156 
Tens of billions of additional dollars would also be required for the + activities. 
 
The major outcome of COP 15, the Copenhagen Accord, saw Parties agree on the need 
for the 'immediate establishment of a mechanism including REDD-plus, to enable the 
mobilisation of financial resources from developed countries' for this purpose.157 
Developed countries also agreed to direct new finance to REDD+ as part of their 
broader commitment to provide US$30 billion in fast-start financing for 2010-2012, 
and US$100 billion annually by 2020 for mitigation and adaptation activities in 
developing countries.158 Six nations – France, Japan, Norway, the United  Kingdom, the  
US and, to the Rudd government's credit, Australia – also directly pledged US$3.5 
billion of fast-start finance towards REDD+.159 Parties were unable to agree, however, 
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on the source of long-term financing for REDD+, that is, whether it would be market or 
fund-based.160 
 
Briefly, it can be seen that, notwithstanding environmental effectiveness concerns, 
assessing the merits of the Rudd government's support for a market-based REDD+ 
mechanism is not a simple task. While it is unclear whether a market-linked 
mechanism will be able to generate credible CERs, the substantial funding 
requirements of REDD+ arguably suggest that a market-based approach at least 
needed to be explored and tested. The implications of the Rudd government's support 
for a market-based approach for its credentials as a GIC are considered further at 
section D after first examining its involvement in REDD demonstration activities. 
C The Rudd Government and the Kalimantan Forests and Carbon 
Partnership 
1 Legal and Issue Background 
As noted above, decision 2 at COP 13, Bali, called for Parties to support capacity-
building and to provide technical assistance and technology transfer for REDD to 
developing countries, as well as undertaking REDD 'demonstration activities'.161 
Decision 2 also provided indicative guidelines for demonstration activities,162 while 
basic methodological guidance on conducting REDD+ was later provided in decision 4 
at COP 15.163 
 
Since Bali, various international initiatives have been established in order to support 
the development of REDD+ under a post-2012 agreement. Multilateral initiatives 
(chiefly funded by voluntary donations from developed countries) have included the 
UN-REDD Programme;164 the FCPF and the Forest Investment Program (FIP, both 
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hosted by the World Bank);165 the Congo Basin Forest Fund;166 funding for REDD+ and 
SMF by the Global Environment Facility;167 and the REDD+ Partnership.168 Various 
countries have also established bilateral initiatives, led by Norway's International 
Climate and Forest Initiative,169 which included a results-based pledge of US$1 billion 
to assist Indonesia establish REDD+ at the national level, including by inter alia: 
completing a REDD+ strategy, developing an MRV system and funding instrument, 
piloting province-wide REDD+ schemes, and implementing a two year moratorium on 
new forestry concessions for the conversion of peat and natural forest.170  
2 The Rudd Government's Contribution to REDD+ Readiness: Overview  
Australia's involvement in efforts to reduce forest carbon emissions in developing 
countries was begun by the Liberal National Howard government during its last year in 
office. In March 2007, the Howard government announced the $200 million Global 
Initiative on Forests and Climate (GIFC) which would aim to reduce deforestation, plant 
new forests and promote SMF in developing countries.171 In September 2007, the 
government then announced the $100 million KFCP, in cooperation with Indonesia, 
which promised to reduce emissions by around 700 million tonnes over 30 years in 
central Kalimantan.172 Australia committed $30 million to the Partnership, expecting to 
raise the remainder through contributions from other countries and the private 
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sector.173 At the High Level Meeting on Forests and Climate, hosted by Australia in July 
2007, the Howard government also announced that Australia would the lead 
development of a Global Carbon Monitoring System to help monitor changes in forest 
cover and forest carbon.174   
 
Following its election in November 2007, the Rudd government re-announced and re-
badged the Howard government's GIFC as the International Forest Carbon Initiative 
(IFCI).175 To be implemented jointly by the Department of Climate Change (DCC) and 
AusAID, the IFCI would aim to demonstrate that REDD could be 'part of an equitable 
and effective future global outcome on climate change.'176 It would focus on: 
 improving forest carbon monitoring and accounting capacity, including by 
assisting Indonesia and PNG to develop national forest carbon accounting 
systems; 
 undertaking REDD demonstration activities, particularly in Indonesia and PNG; 
and  
 supporting international efforts to develop market-based approaches to REDD,  
for example by 'taking a lead role' in the REDD climate negotiations and 
supporting initiatives like the FCPF and FIP.177 
 
The government's emphasis on assisting Indonesia and PNG reflected the advice of the 
Labor-commissioned Garnaut Climate Change Review that it would be desirable for an 
Australian ETS to ultimately link to REDD schemes in these countries, providing 
Australia with 'access to low-cost abatement options'.178 Of the two countries, 
Indonesia has been the most proactive on practical REDD initiatives, now hosting 
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around half of all global REDD projects,179 and this country became the focus of the 
Rudd government's activities. 
 
To help implement the IFCI's objectives, the Rudd government announced the Papua 
New Guinea-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership in March 2008, followed by the 
Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership (IAFCP) in June 2008.180 The partnership 
with Indonesia, the focus of this chapter, would concentrate on strategic climate 
change policy dialogue; supporting the development of Indonesia's National Carbon 
Accounting System, and implementing incentive-based REDD+ demonstration 
activities.181  Related to this, Australia and Indonesia announced the Roadmap for 
Access to International Carbon Markets to support Indonesia's participation in a future 
market-based REDD+ mechanism.182 The KFCP, originated by the Howard government, 
was also rebadged as a 'demonstration project',183 consistent with the terminology 
adopted by the BAP. In establishing the KFCP, both Australia and Indonesia claimed to 
be 'demonstrating leadership' on REDD+ as was encouraged by the BAP.184 Australia 
and Indonesia further announced their intention to develop a second demonstration 
activity, the Sumatra Forest Carbon Partnership,185 however, this project ultimately 
never proceeded.186  
 
In addition to its bilateral efforts, the Rudd government supported a range of 
multilateral initiatives, among them: 
 a strategic partnership with the Clinton Climate Initiative to support several 
developing countries to develop their national MRV systems;  
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 providing over $30 million to the FCPF and over $30 million to the FIP; and  
 the REDD+ Partnership.187  
 
The Rudd government's involvement in a wide range of REDD+ readiness activities was 
clearly laudable. A notable achievement was its role in supporting the development of 
Indonesia's National Carbon Accounting System, an essential element of REDD+ for 
Indonesia, which appears to have proceeded well under the Rudd government.188 Due 
to space limitations, this chapter limits its detailed analysis to the KFCP, the Rudd 
government's flagship and most complex REDD initiative.  
3 The Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership 
a) Background 
Indonesia is estimated to be the world's 3rd largest GHG emitter, with 85 per cent of its 
emissions due to land-use change.189 The main cause of deforestation in Indonesia is 
land clearing for agriculture, especially for palm oil plantations.190 A high proportion of 
Indonesia's land-use change emissions are also attributed to the deforestation of peat 
land as well as peat fires.191 Nearly half of Indonesia's emissions result from forest 
fires, and 20 per cent from decomposing dry peat.192 The inclusion of emissions from 
peat forest degradation reportedly increases Indonesia's global ranking as a GHG 
emitter from 21st to third.193  
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The intention of the KFCP was to reduce emissions in the carbon rich peat land forests 
of central Kalimantan.194 The KFCP was located in the Ex-Mega Rice Project area. In 
1995 former President Suharto ordered over one million hectares of Kalimantan peat 
swamp to be drained for conversion to rice growing.195 This project proved to be a 
major failure with the area being unsuitable for this purpose.196 Furthermore, the 
project led to the degradation of peat land ecosystems and significant GHG emissions 
from fire and oxidisation.197 The largely abandoned drained peat land has since burned 
frequently, leading to higher levels of GHG emissions.198 
 
According to the Rudd government and Indonesia, the KFCP was the 'first, large-scale 
demonstration activity of its kind in Indonesia'.199 The project was intended as a 
'learning activity in which technical, scientific, and institutional innovations' could be 
tested, adding 'to the body of REDD knowledge and experience'. 200 The major goal of 
the KFCP was 'to demonstrate a credible, equitable, and effective approach' to 
reducing deforestation and forest degradation, including in peat lands, that could both 
'inform a post-2012 global climate change agreement and enable Indonesia's 
meaningful participation in future international carbon markets.'201  
 
The KFCP was officially ended in June 2013,202 although with many of its major goals 
unfulfilled (see below), AusAID indicated that some aspects of the Partnership may 
continue in future.203 
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b) Key Features 
The KFCP was located within a single 'peat dome' (peat of over three metres in depth) 
of approximately 120 000 hectares.204 The KFCP site included degraded and partially 
degraded fire-prone peat swamp forest which contained very high carbon stocks.205 
Situated within the Kapuas District, the demonstration site was sparsely populated, 
with approximately 9 000 residents (mostly indigenous Ngaju Dayak) living in 14 
villages and hamlets along the banks of the Kapuas River.206 The residents used land 
near their villages for food crops and rubber cultivation, and also harvested timber, 
other forest products and fish in more remote parts. 207 Livelihood opportunities had 
been greatly reduced by the deforestation of large areas since 1996.208 The majority of 
the site was part of the National Forest Estate and thus under the Ministry of 
Forestry's authority.209 However, Dayak communities had lived on the site for 
generations and claimed land within five kilometres of their villages under customary 
law.210  
 
The KFCP was to be implemented in two key phases.211 The 'early implementation 
phase' (originally 1 January to 30 June 2009) would lay the foundation for REDD 
through activities such as designing a MRV system, building the institutional 
framework at the provincial and district level, and completing the project's overall 
design.212 The 'implementation phase' (originally 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2012) would 
then aim to rapidly scale up implementation activities.213  
 
The KFCP had four major stated components: 
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1. reducing GHG emissions through providing incentives to local people and 
technical means; 
2. developing methods and capacity to measure and monitor GHG emissions;  
3. developing and testing equitable and practicable mechanisms to channel 
financial payments to those people and organisations who contributed to 
achieving emission reductions; and  
4. building institutional and technical readiness in local government and villages 
to implement REDD on a sustainable basis.214 
 
As noted, the KFCP as originally announced by the Howard government, was intended 
to protect 70 000 hectares of peat land forests, re-flood 200 000 hectares of dried peat 
land, and plant up to 100 million trees on rehabilitated land, leading to a  reduction of 
700 million tonnes of GHG emissions over 30 years.215 These hard targets were never 
formally revoked by the Rudd government, but were left out of the KFCP Project 
Design Document (PDD).216 The downsizing of the project caused it to be labelled, 
unfairly, 'a total failure' by Australian Greens Leader, Christine Milne.217 The KFCP 
appears to have been downsized for a number of legitimate reasons including that the 
allocated $30 million was found to be insufficient for the task; expected funding from 
other potential partners did not materialise; and also the change of government and 
the subsequent repositioning of the KFCP as a demonstration project within the 
context of the BAP.218  
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c) Criticisms of the KFCP 
A number of studies have examined the design and implementation of the KFCP.219 
The major criticisms that have been raised concern delays and shortfalls in 
implementing the program; the KFCP's effectiveness in reducing emissions; and its 
consistency with the rights of local communities, especially the indigenous Dayak 
peoples. The latter issue had the greatest implications for the Rudd government's 
performance as a GIC and thus receives most analysis here.  
i) Delays and Shortfalls in Implementation 
The KFCP experienced significant delays in its implementation. The Independent 
Progress Report on the IAFCP, commissioned by AusAID, reported in March 2011 that 
the KFCP was only likely to partially deliver on its objective – of demonstrating 
effective and equitable approaches to REDD+ – by mid-2013, let alone be fully 
implemented by 30 June 2012 as was originally intended.220 The report found that 
'[c]onsiderable work' remained to be done in engaging with local communities and 
that the future legal status of the demonstration site and the rights of local 
communities to timber, other forest products and carbon had yet to be negotiated.221 
More positively, however, a 'competent' implementation team was in the field, and 
'[g]ood progress' had been made on the emissions and monitoring program.222 Initial 
payment mechanisms had also been introduced and tested223 and after a slow start, 
local government staff had become more engaged in the KFCP.224   
 
While this report thus found signs of encouragement, a 2012 report by Olbrei and 
Howes found that the achievements of the KFPC had still only been 'modest' with little 
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evidence on the ground of actual reductions in deforestation and forest 
degradation.225 It should of course be noted that the Rudd government only bore part 
of the responsibility for implementation, with its term in office ending on 24 June 2010 
when Kevin Rudd was ousted as Labor leader and Prime Minister by Julia Gillard. 
However, the criticisms made regarding delays in implementation applied to both 
governments. 
 
Ultimately, the KFCP fell well short of achieving the ambitious targets originally set for 
the project by the Howard government. In February 2012, AusAID was still optimistic 
that 25 000 hectares of dried peat land would be re-flooded in Block A, although this 
was only one-tenth of the original target of re-flooding 200 000 hectares.226 However, 
at the time the KFCP was officially ended in June 2013, re-flooding was still yet to 
occur, although the preconditions for doing so (such as conducting appropriate 
scientific studies and obtaining consents from relevant authorities) finally appeared to 
have been achieved.227 While 2.5 million seedlings had been raised, and over 50 000 
trees planted, this was vastly short of the Howard government's original target of 
planting 100 million trees.228  
 
There appeared to be a number of reasons for delays in implementing the objectives 
of the KFCP, among them:  
 the inherent complexity of the project and interaction required with local 
communities;  
 the need for local community consent to activities such as fire-prevention, re-
flooding and re-planting;  
 the need for environmental impact assessments before canal-blocking could 
commence (with approvals being required from various levels of government); 
and 
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 difficulties in the relationship between the IAFCP and the Indonesian Ministry 
of Forestry.229 
 
Notwithstanding the above delays and shortfalls in implementation, it should be noted 
that AusAID claimed a number of positive outcomes for the KFCP as of June 2013, 
among them: the establishment of a forest management unit to manage REDD+ at the 
local level; the successful application of a peat, water table and vegetation monitoring 
system; and the provision of livelihood support for local communities (through 
improving farming and forestry practices and providing payment for activities like 
planting seedlings).230 
 
Overall, while delays in the project and the failures to meet stated objectives were 
certainly undesirable, it would be unreasonable to argue that this had much bearing on 
the government's credentials as a GIC, especially given the challenging and novel 
nature of the project and its explicit function as a learning activity. The delays 
experienced were also consistent with those of other REDD+ projects.231  
ii) Effectiveness in Reducing Emissions in Central Kalimantan 
A second concern was that the basic design of the KFCP (which was chiefly the Rudd 
government's responsibility) was flawed in that it failed to address the real drivers of 
deforestation in central Kalimantan and thus had little prospect of significantly 
reducing emissions in the area (even if its implementation had proved to be more 
successful). This issue was highlighted in February 2011 by a local alliance of Dayak 
community groups, Yayasan Petak Danum Kalimantan Tengah (YPD), in a letter to 
AusAID.232 The YPD's concern was that while the KFCP covered an area of 
approximately 120 000 hectares, this was but a small fraction of central Kalimantan 
(which totals 15.1 million hectares).233 According to the YPD, at least 12.5 million 
                                                     
 
229 Olbrei and Howes, above n 143, 25. 
230 Indonesia Australia Forest Carbon Partnership, above n 203. 
231 See Olbrei and Howes, above n 143, 25; Barber, Hudson and Sari, above n 188, 16. 
232 Yayasan Petak Danum Kalimantan Tengah, 'Letter to the Australian Delegation to Central Kalimantan 
February 2011, Re Community Concerns with the KFCP' (2011) <http://www.redd-
monitor.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/YPD-Letter-to-Australian-Delegation.pdf>. 
233 Ibid 2. 
 346 
hectares of central Kalimantan outside the KFCP site would be converted or destroyed 
in future through clearing for oil palm crops, monoculture pulp plantations or 
mining.234 The resulting emissions would thus overwhelm any minor emission 
reductions that may be achieved by the KFCP.235 This problem was exacerbated by 
illegal land clearing in central Kalimantan by palm oil firms.236  
 
The Independent Progress Report agreed with YPD that site-specific approaches to 
REDD suffered from various problems including their inability to address the broader 
drivers of deforestation. Partly on this basis, it recommended that the Gillard 
government abandon the Rudd government's planned second site-specific project in 
Sumatra, preferring that the government direct support to provincial and national level 
approaches (advice which the Gillard government subsequently adopted, deciding not 
to proceed with the project in Sumatra as originally planned).237 However, the report 
also noted that if well-designed, site-specific approaches could provide a 'good base 
for analysis' and 'could generate lessons which inform both policy and practice'.238 
Notably, site-specific approaches were the dominant model of early REDD+ projects in 
Indonesia,239 presumably because most proponents viewed these as providing the 
most manageable starting point for REDD+. As pointed out by Pickering, the successful 
implementation of broader province-wide and national-level approaches (such as 
being attempted by Norway) would in part depend on lessons gained from site-specific 
projects such as the KFCP.240 As such, while the criticism that the KFCP was too limited 
to have much impact on emissions in central Kalimantan was certainly understandable, 
this view appeared to misunderstand or ignore the real objective of the KFCP, which 
was to trial REDD+ on a small-scale and learn lessons that could later be applied to 
larger-scale projects. 
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iii) Community Engagement and the Protection of Indigenous Rights 
The third major criticism of the KFCP concerned its approach to community 
engagement and the protection of indigenous rights.  As noted above, safeguarding 
the rights of local communities, including indigenous peoples, was one of the key 
challenges for REDD+. While REDD+ has the potential to improve the welfare of forest-
dependent communities, it also presents significant risks. A key problem is that many 
forest areas, which are generally under state control, are characterised by unclear land 
tenure and indigenous land rights that are not guaranteed or enforced.241 This creates 
risks such as the exclusion of forest communities from REDD+ decision-making, 
activities and financial benefits, and indigenous peoples being displaced from their 
traditional territories.242 
 
International Context  
The Rudd government's design of the KFCP took place against the backdrop of the 
international REDD+ negotiations. Decision 2 at COP 13 recognised that the needs of 
local and indigenous communities needed to be addressed by REDD+243 and Parties, 
including Australia, continued to highlight the importance of this in their REDD+ 
submissions.244 Importantly, Parties recognised the relevance of various international 
legal instruments, especially under international human rights law, and also 
international environmental law.245 Among the international instruments relevant to 
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REDD+ are:246 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR);247 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);248 the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development;249 Agenda 21;250 the Convention on the 
Conservation of Biological Diversity;251 the Forest Principles;252 and, mostly relevantly 
to indigenous peoples, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP)253 and the Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries (International Labour Organisation Convention No 169).254  
 
The major focus of attention in the negotiations was the need to safeguard the rights 
of indigenous peoples as outlined by the UNDRIP. The UNDRIP outlines various 
indigenous rights and corresponding duties of states, on matters such as land, 
territories and resources; participation in decision-making; culture; and self-
determination. The Declaration uses treaty-style articles and obligatory language such 
as 'shall'. However, it was only adopted as an aspirational, non-binding declaration by 
the UN General Assembly.255 Notwithstanding this, the legal effect of the UNDRIP's 
articles under international law is not entirely clear. The Declaration was sourced from 
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existing international human rights law and many of its articles essentially inform how 
these rights apply to indigenous peoples.256 Thus various articles may have a binding 
character in practice, either because they give effect to similarly worded treaty rights 
or because they reflect customary international law.257 It has also been suggested that 
the articles of the Declaration may be binding as 'general principles of law recognised 
by civilised nations' under article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice.258 This argument is strengthened by the fact that the UNDRIP was widely 
adopted by members of the General Assembly, with only four countries voting against 
it – Australia (under the Howard government), Canada, the US and New Zealand.259 
The other instrument with major relevance to indigenous peoples, International 
Labour Organisation Convention 169, is a legally binding instrument (being a treaty) 
but its legal and political significance is diminished by its limited number of 
ratifications.260 
 
Regardless of the UNDRIP's precise legal status, this chapter contends that the design 
and implementation of the KFCP needed to be consistent with relevant articles of the 
UNDRIP in order for the Rudd government to qualify as a GIC. Compliance with the 
Declaration would undoubtedly have been expected of Australia if its articles were 
binding in character. As discussed in chapter 1, a GIC is generally expected to adhere to 
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its binding international legal commitments. But even if non-binding (thus only 
establishing legal 'expectations' rather than enforceable obligations), there is a strong 
argument that, similar to the UNFCCC article 3 principles, Australia needed to respect 
the rights enshrined in the Declaration in order to demonstrate the higher form of 
conduct associated with GIC. This was especially the case given that the Declaration 
enjoys widespread acceptance among both states and indigenous peoples and the fact 
that the Rudd government made political capital out of its decision to endorse the 
Declaration in April 2009 (reversing Australia's opposition to it under the Howard 
government).261 Its significance to REDD+ was also highlighted by its formal inclusion in 
the UN-REDD Programme's operational policy instruments.262 
 
Various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) representing indigenous peoples 
made submissions to the post-2012 negotiations regarding the need for indigenous 
rights to be respected in the design and implementation of REDD+, especially 
customary rights to land and the principle of 'free, prior and informed consent' (FPIC). 
The International Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of Tropical Forests, for 
example, insisted that REDD initiatives be 'designed and implemented with full respect 
for the rights of indigenous peoples, including our rights to our territorial lands, the 
right to free, prior and informed consent, and the right to fully enact our 
responsibilities toward our forest land and resources'.263 
 
The UNDRIP protects indigenous peoples' customary land rights in several articles, 
including article 26 which stipulates that indigenous peoples have the right to 'own, 
use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources' that they possess by 
reason of traditional ownership, occupation or use and that states shall give legal 
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recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources.264 The principle of 
FPIC is protected by several articles. These include article 19 which requires states to 
'consult and cooperate in good faith with indigenous peoples … in order to obtain their 
free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them'. Article 32.2 also requires states to 
obtain the 'free and informed consent' of indigenous peoples 'prior to the approval of 
any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources'. 
 
Many UNFCCC Parties recognised the importance of respecting indigenous rights in the 
post-2012 agreement, especially in relation to REDD+. However, clear differences 
emerged regarding the strength with which Parties wished to refer to these rights, or 
incorporate them within a post-2012 agreement. Some Parties wished to specifically 
refer to the UNDRIP within a post-2012 agreement.265 Surprisingly, this did not include 
the Rudd government who opposed including a reference to the UNDRIP on a number 
of occasions. This included a move to replace a direct reference to the UNDRIP in the 
official negotiating text in favour of a vague reference to REDD+ implementation 
needing to be 'consistent with relevant international instruments, obligations and 
national legislation'.266 The Copenhagen Accord ultimately failed to recognise the 
UNDRIP or even the general rights of indigenous peoples, and the REDD+ 
methodological guidance provided at COP 15 only weakly referred to the important 
role of indigenous peoples in REDD, rather than their rights.267 Various developing 
countries also pushed for REDD+ to specifically recognise the principle of FPIC.268 
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However, many developed countries, again including Australia, favoured watering 
down this reference, only acknowledging the need for prior 'consultation' with 
indigenous peoples, rather than explicit 'consent'.269 The Rudd government's approach 
to referencing indigenous rights within a post-2012 agreement gave the impression 
that safeguarding indigenous rights was not a priority for Australia and was certainly a 
negative for its GIC credentials. 
 
Community Concerns with the KFCP 
The PDD for the KFCP specifically acknowledged the importance of community 
engagement and addressing land tenure issues. Regarding community engagement, 
the PDD indicated that gaining the support of 'all segments' of local communities was a 
'precondition' for emission reductions.270 The government recognised that gaining 
community support would be difficult and would 'take time, effort, and the ability to 
offer real incentives' to participate, especially with climate change being a 'remote 
threat' compared to more immediate livelihood challenges.271 Indeed, the PDD 
acknowledged that the potential financial benefits of REDD seemed 'remote' to 
villagers, 'if the concept was understood at all'.272 One difficulty was that local 
communities were generally 'mistrustful of outside interventions' after their negative 
experience with the Ex-Mega Rice Project.273 Public consultations were to be 
undertaken, however, to explain the meaning and benefits of REDD and the KFCP to 
local communities.274  
 
As noted earlier, the majority of the KFCP site formed part of the National Forest 
Estate and thus was under the authority of the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry, 
however, Dayak communities had lived in the area for generations and claimed land 
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within five kilometres of their villages based on customary law. Regarding land tenure, 
the PDD recognised that this was a complex issue to be addressed with much 
uncertainty existing 'over how much land a village may claim' and which rights were 
associated with various types and intensities of land and natural resource use.275 The 
district government was working with local NGOs and villages to formalise land tenure 
and information about this would be collected during the project's early 
implementation phase.276 The PDD recognised the need to resolve these issues prior to 
major project activities taking place such as dam building, reforestation and the testing 
of payment systems.277 The PDD also recognised the principle of FPIC, but only 
indicated that the village engagement process should 'provide the opportunity' for this 
to occur,278 stopping short of guaranteeing that FPIC would be obtained from relevant 
rights holders. 
 
In February 2011 the aforementioned letter by YPD to AusAID outlined a host of 
concerns with the KFCP from a rights perspective. While these complaints were raised 
during the Gillard government's term in office, the concerns extended to the Rudd 
government's initial project design as well the period in which it was responsible for 
implementation. Among YPD's concerns were that the project failed to recognise and 
respect the Dayak peoples' customary land tenure and associated rights.279 YPD 
complained that the Indonesian government had 'yet to formally honour the land 
tenure and rights of the Dayak people' and thus by 'collaborating with the Indonesian 
Government' the KFCP 'condone[d] this lack of consideration and hence the continued 
undermining of our customs and rights.'280 This view reflected the fact that Indonesia's 
REDD+ regulations did not appear to respect the rights of indigenous peoples, 
seemingly allowing the state to establish public and privately held forestry concessions 
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and 'carbon sinks' in forests traditionally owned by indigenous peoples without taking 
into consideration their customary rights.281 
 
According to YPD, community consultation and engagement had 'focused primarily on 
facilitating project activities and getting the project off the ground', which did 'not 
represent a process or an attempt to seek free, prior informed consent.'282 It believed 
that consultations, presentations and community meetings had wrongly focused only 
on obtaining community acceptance and participation in the project without providing 
an opportunity for community members to provide feedback or advice on the KFCP's 
design.283 Despite extensive consultations taking place, it also believed that most 
community members were still unclear on what REDD really entailed and thus their 
participation was 'far from constituting free, prior informed consent.'284 Fearing that 
their 'basic rights and … rights to natural resource management' had not been 
guaranteed, YPD adopted the motto 'No rights, No KFCP'.285 
 
AusAID responded to YPD's concerns in April 2011 stating that 'extensive community 
consultation' had been undertaken beginning in early 2009 to ensure that community 
                                                     
 
281 This concern was directly expressed by the UN Committee on Racial Discrimination: see Chairperson 
of the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Letter to the Permanent Mission of the 
Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations Office at Geneva (13 March 2009) 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/early_warning/Indonesia130309.pdf. REDD+ is 
governed by two regulations and one decree in Indonesia: see Wright, above n 219, 127-128, 130; 
Annalisa Savaresi and Elisa Morgera, 'Ownership of Land, Forest and Carbon' in John Costenbader (ed), 
Legal Frameworks for REDD: Design and Implementation at the National Level (IUCN, 2009) 14, 31-32; 
Butt, above n 170, 267. 
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285 Ibid 3.  See also Friends of the Earth Sydney, Central Kalimantan Peatland Charter: Peat Resources is 
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our-life-blood-and-breath-cop-16-cancun-mexico-2010>. Similar complaints were also made in June 
2011  by Mantir Adat (Custom Keepers) in the Kapuas District but later retracted: see Chris Lang, '"Stop 
the Indonesia Australia Redd+ Project": Indigenous Peoples' Opposition to the Kalimantan Forests and 
Climate Partnership' REDD-Monitor, 15 June 2010 <http://www.redd-monitor.org/2011/06/15/stop-
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Partnership. Previous Statement "Not True"', REDD-Monitor, 25 July 2010 <http://www.redd-
monitor.org/2011/07/25/another-statement-about-the-kalimantan-forests-and-climate-partnership-
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views were incorporated in the project's design and implementation.286 According to 
AusAID, the KFCP had been 'stringent in its efforts to respect customary rights' and had 
been 'in regular communication' with local customary leaders and organisations.287 
AusAID also rejected the assertion that its partnership with Indonesia implied 'any 
disregard or disrespect for customary (or other) rights' and stated that Australian 
government policy required all overseas activities to adhere to Australia's international 
human rights obligations including the ICCPR, ICESCR and the UNDRIP.288 AusAID 
believed that through the KFCP it was 'working to empower local communities to 
manage their own land and forest resources, not to take forest away from 
communities.'289 It further rejected the assertion that there had been a lack of 
effective community consultation, engagement and input into the project design, 
stating that '[f]ull and effective consultation with local communities ha[d] been the 
primary focus of initial activities under the KFCP' and that physical intervention such as 
canal blocking and reforestation had only taken place following 'extensive community 
consultation'.290 
 
It is difficult to accurately determine from the contrasting evidence available whether 
the Rudd government's design and implementation of the KFCP conformed with the 
rights of local indigenous peoples as protected by the UNDRIP. On the one hand it is 
clear, notwithstanding YPD's complaints, that substantial efforts to address land 
tenure issues and consultations with local communities did take place during the early 
and full implementation phases.291 It also appears that the Rudd government did seek 
to undertake significant consultation, if not obtain full consent, before important 
aspects of the project proceeded. Indeed, the complexity of resolving land tenure 
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291 See Olbrei and Howes, above n 143, 20; Bianca Nogrady, 'Indonesia's Peatlands a Test Ground for 
REDD+', ECOS, 28 May 2012 < http://ecosmagazine.com/paper/EC12305.htm>. 
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issues was subsequently identified by the DCC as the key reason for delays in the 
KFCP's implementation.292  
 
What is obvious, however, is that the project-site and basic project design were agreed 
to by the Australian and Indonesian governments without first clarifying land tenure 
issues. Article 26 of the UNDRIP makes clear that indigenous peoples have rights to 
control the lands, territories and resources that they possess through traditional 
ownership and that legal protection must be given to these lands, territories and 
resources (which had not occurred under Indonesia's REDD+ laws). Article 32.2 also 
indicates that states must obtain the 'free and informed consent' of indigenous 
peoples 'prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and 
other resources',293 which clearly did not occur in relation to the KFCP. As such, 
Australia and Indonesia's decision to proceed with the KFCP prior to resolving land 
tenure issues in the project area and obtaining appropriate consents, appears to have 
been inconsistent with the requirements of article 32.2.  
 
The Rudd government seemed to be aware of this problem, but stated its view in the 
PDD that clear land tenure laws could not be made 'a precondition of project 
development', otherwise 'no projects would … ever be developed or they would all be 
developed in the same handful of places.'294 Rather, the government believed that the 
KFCP could act as an 'instrument of change, where community management rights 
[were]… first given to locals in a step-wise process to full land tenure.'295 The Rudd 
government's enthusiasm to announce the KFCP demonstration project without first 
resolving land tenure issues was perhaps understandable, especially in the context of 
the post-2012 negotiations in which the international community felt a sense of 
                                                     
 
292 Evidence to Senate Environment and Communications Legislation Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Canberra, 21 May 2012, 102 (Blair Comley, Secretary, Department of Climate Change and 
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293 See further on FPIC: UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Report of the International 
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urgency to rapidly advance REDD+ so as to begin reducing emissions from 
deforestation in developing countries. It is clear, however, that where indigenous 
peoples are likely to possess customary land rights, and thus their informed consent 
may be required for a project, land tenure ought to be clarified, and relevant consents 
obtained, prior to any decision being made to proceed with such a project. Any other 
approach fails to show due respect for the rights of indigenous peoples enshrined in 
the UNDRIP. 
 
To its credit, the Rudd, and later the Gillard government, appeared to slow the 
implementation of the KFCP once it realised the complexity of the land tenure issue. 
But complaints by indigenous peoples regarding the lack of protection for their rights 
remained ongoing throughout the project's implementation,296 which is unsurprising 
given the way in which it was imposed on local indigenous peoples without their prior 
agreement. 
D Implications for GIC 
Based on the above material, this chapter suggests that several attributes of GIC are 
particularly relevant to assessing the Rudd government's engagement with REDD+. 
First, similar to the concerns raised in chapter 7, it is clear that the government needed 
to pursue an approach to the design of REDD+ that was environmentally effective, in 
that it would likely to result in genuine emissions abatement. This is only logical given 
the UNFCCC's primary purpose is to reduce GHGs so as to avoid dangerous climate 
change.297 The precautionary principle (article 3.3 UNFCCC) also clearly favours the 
adoption of abatement measures with strong prospects of resulting in genuine 
emission reductions. 
 
Research for this chapter revealed that the Rudd government's push for a market-
based REDD+ mechanism had the potential to create a new source of non-genuine 
                                                     
 
296 See Chris Lang, 'Controversy Surrounding Australia's Kalimantan Forest and Climate Partnership REDD 
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credits in the ICCL regime, similar to the issues that have surrounded the CDM. Fears 
that REDD+ could result in a new source of hot air appear to have been well-founded 
given the enormous range of barriers it faced in order to be environmentally effective. 
Significant challenges included establishing reliable baseline emission levels, 
preventing international leakage, and overcoming common problems in developing 
countries such as weak governance and law enforcement, and corruption. A market-
based REDD+ mechanism would also add additional layers of complexity and, if not 
well-designed, could have negative impacts on the effectiveness of the broader carbon 
market by, for example, flooding the market with cheap carbon credits. 
 
The Rudd government was cognisant of these concerns and generally appeared to 
make a positive contribution to the REDD+ negotiations on these issues. It also 
appeared to have a strong desire for REDD+ to be environmentally effective (for 
example, proposing that the most stringent form of emissions accounting be in place 
before a host country could participate in international emissions trading). There were 
also negatives in the government's approach, however, including its position that 
REDD+ accounting need not take account of reversals of emission reductions caused by 
natural events. 
 
Commentators such as Collett have argued that the 'greatest flaw' of Australia's REDD+ 
proposal was in its support for a market-based mechanism.298 While this view is 
tempting given concerns surrounding the market-based approach, such a conclusion 
arguably overlooks the complexity of the REDD+ issue, especially the difficulty of 
obtaining the necessary level of financing without utilising the carbon market. The 
funding needs of REDD+ are certainly large – up to US$35 billion per year. While this 
level of funding is not so vast that developed countries could not conceivably provide 
this level of funding from public expenditure, it needs to be remembered that funding 
for REDD+ only represents a small portion of the hundreds of billions of dollars of 
additional finance developing countries will likely require to meet their future 
mitigation and adaptation needs (see chapter 7). Viewed in this broader context, it is 
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understandable why developed country governments would wish to pursue a market-
based approach to REDD+, given that this would shift much of the cost of financing 
REDD+ to the private sector in developed countries (who would be the major 
purchasers of REDD+ credits) and also encourage least cost abatement at the global 
level.  
 
A second key concern was whether Australia's approach was consistent with the 
notion of leadership. As explained in chapter 1, this is both a legal expectation of 
developed countries under the UNFCCC (article 3.1), as well as a key general attribute 
of GIC emphasised by Gareth Evans and various scholars. Given that the design of a 
REDD+ mechanism was in its infancy, there was clearly a role, and need, for aspiring 
GICs to show leadership by helping to develop REDD+, both in the international 
negotiations and on the ground via demonstration projects and other activities.  
 
At a general level it could certainly be argued that the government demonstrated 
much leadership on REDD+. A number of its activities appeared to be demonstrative of 
this attribute such as its activism in the REDD+ negotiations; the adoption of the IFCI 
and KFCP (continuing and refining the work of the Howard government); assisting 
Indonesia in developing a national carbon accounting system; contributing finances to 
various multilateral efforts on REDD+ such as the FCPF and FIP; and the commitment of 
fast-start REDD+ financing at COP 15.  
 
The government's efforts on the KFCP, at least at a general level, were also particularly 
worthy given the strong need for REDD+ to be tested on the ground. The KFCP was of 
course criticised on the basis that its scope was too limited to address the broader 
drivers of deforestation in central Kalimantan. However, it is also clear that the 
government's selection of a site-specific approach was a legitimate policy choice, 
especially given the KFCP's relatively modest but useful ambition of learning lessons 
which could be applied to future, larger-scale projects. The delays in implementation, 
criticised by some, were also not uncommon for REDD+ demonstration projects, and in 
this case appeared to be largely due to the need to undertake extensive community 
engagement. The government may not have demonstrated leadership to the extent of 
Norway – who placed a substantial US$1 billion on the table to support the 
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development of REDD+ in Indonesia – but Australia's activities nonetheless qualified it 
as one of the leading developed countries on REDD+.299 
 
The government's general standing as a leader on REDD+, and as a GIC, was arguably 
diminished, however, by a number of factors. For some, this would include its push for 
a market-based mechanism. But this is a matter of contention given the clear 
pragmatic requirement for REDD+ to operate as an offsets mechanism in order to 
obtain sufficient financing. Certainly, the Rudd government could have placed its 
diplomatic weight behind a REDD+ mechanism directly funded by Annex I Parties. 
However, GIC recognises that governments often need to strike a balance between 
being idealistic and realistic due to both international and domestic constraints. Clearly 
there was a general lack of willingness among developed countries to fully fund REDD+ 
from public expenditure, including among the wealthiest developed countries like the 
US (who possessed the most capacity to provide the necessary scale of resources). 
Thus there would arguably have been little point (other than symbolism) in Australia 
advocating for a fund-based mechanism. Notably, the practical necessity for REDD+ to 
have access to the financial resources of the private sector, through the carbon 
market, was accepted by many potential host countries who widely endorsed a market 
approach. 
 
The Rudd government's desire for REDD+ to be market-based also reflected the fact 
that Australia has relatively high mitigation costs (see chapters 6 and 7) and thus it had 
a political need to minimise the cost of Australian abatement. While it could be 
suggested that the government's desire to establish a new source of low-cost carbon 
credits was overly driven by narrow self-interest, rather than leadership, on balance 
this chapter accepts that there were sound reasons for the Rudd government to 
pursue a market-based approach to REDD+. It would clearly be wrong for future 
Australian governments to allow liable entities to purchase REDD+ credits under an ETS 
if the REDD+ mechanism cannot ultimately deliver genuine abatement. But there were 
                                                     
 
299 Notably, very few REDD+ demonstration projects have been led by developed country national 
governments, most being run by NGOs: see CIFOR, Distribution of REDD+ Projects Worldwide 
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strong pragmatic reasons for a market-based mechanism to at least be trialled, 
suggesting that the government's support for a market-based approach was not 
incompatible with the notion of leadership. 
 
A third key consideration in assessing GIC was the need for the government's approach 
to REDD+ (especially the KFCP) to be consistent with international law regarding the 
rights of indigenous peoples. This reflected the fact that, as noted earlier, there is a 
general expectation that a GIC will adhere to its international legal commitments. As 
discussed previously, while only being a political declaration, the UNDRIP's articles may 
have a binding character, although this is unclear under international law. Even if only 
non-binding, this thesis would argue that the government needed to respect this 
important instrument in order to qualify as a GIC, especially given the Declaration's 
widespread acceptance among the international community and indigenous peoples, 
and the government's own strong endorsement of it.  
 
The Rudd government's performance as an international citizen was certainly 
diminished by its approach to safeguarding the rights of indigenous peoples in the 
KFCP. While it appeared to engage in significant consultations with local indigenous 
people to resolve land tenure issues and to obtain FPIC, the complaints made by local 
indigenous peoples suggest that its activities in this regard could have been handled 
far better. Furthermore, as argued above, the announcement of the KFCP project 
without first resolving land tenure issues and obtaining relevant village consents did 
not fully respect the rights of indigenous peoples in the KFCP project area. While the 
government's haste in advancing the KFCP was perhaps understandable, given the 
desirability of REDD+ being operationalised as quickly as possible, it is clear that in 
order to act consistently with the UNDRIP it ought to have properly engaged with 
indigenous peoples prior to agreeing upon a REDD+ project at the state-to-state level. 
Such an approach would also have given proper effect to the principle of leadership.  
 
Related to this, the Rudd government's failure to support a strong reference to 
indigenous rights in the post-2012 outcome was also a negative for its GIC credentials. 
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This went against the wish of some Parties to refer to the UNDRIP in the 'objective, 
scope and guiding principles' section of a future agreement,300 an outcome called for 
by various groups representing indigenous peoples. While the government did propose 
a general acknowledgement by Parties of the need to respect their international 
obligations when implementing REDD+, its decision not to support a specific reference 
to the UNDRIP made little sense given its support of this instrument. It also 
demonstrated a lack of leadership with regard to safeguarding indigenous rights.  
 
Regarding other general attributes of GIC identified in chapter 1, a number of these 
were clearly relevant to the assessment of the Rudd government's engagement with 
REDD+. Prima facie, it is arguable that the government's preference for a market-based 
REDD+ mechanism was inconsistent with the notions of acting for 'purposes beyond 
ourselves' and 'enlightened self-interest'. This is because global and broader Australian 
interests unquestionably lay in establishing a REDD+ mechanism that prioritised 
environmentally effective abatement. As explained above, however, this chapter 
accepts that there were legitimate reasons to at least trial a market-based approach, 
not least of which was the pragmatic need for the mechanism to attract sufficient 
funding. In this regard, the government's approach could be categorised as striking a 
reasonable balance between what Evans referred to as idealism and realism. 
 
It is also clear that the Rudd government displayed a number of other, easier to satisfy 
GIC qualities, through its participation in the negotiations and activities in Indonesia, 
among them: internationalism, activism, multilateralism, a commitment to 
international institutions (chiefly the UNFCCC), a willingness to 'pitch in', and that of 
being a good neighbour to Indonesia. Although there were certainly deficiencies in the 
government's approach to indigenous rights, in a broad sense, its active involvement in 
the negotiations also demonstrated a commitment to international law and utilising an 
international law framework to reduce forestry emissions in developing countries.  
 
Overall, there were undoubtedly many positives for the Rudd government from a GIC 
perspective on the issue of REDD+. The government's good intentions were let down, 
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however, by several of the specifics of its international proposals and the design and 
implementation of the KFCP, especially with respect to indigenous rights. This chapter 
suggests that the latter deficiency in particular means that the Rudd government could 
not qualify as a GIC on REDD+ given that the notion of GIC requires a higher form of 
state conduct. The government's significant overall efforts on REDD+, however, and its 
attempt to address concerns relating to indigenous rights in the KFCP once these were 
properly understood, means that it would be overly harsh to classify the government 
as a 'poor' or even 'average' international citizen on REDD+. Rather, and bearing in 
mind the inherent challenges in establishing a demonstration project in a developing 
country, it seems appropriate to mark the Rudd government as an 'above average' 
international citizen on this topic.  
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CHAPTER 9. THE RUDD GOVERNMENT AND LULUCF 
 
'The treatment of LULUCF should not lead to the creation of loopholes to enable Annex I Parties 
to achieve their emissions reduction commitments by simply doing "magic" paper work.' China, 
Submission to the AWG-KP, 2008.1 
 
This final chapter examines the Rudd government's engagement with the most 
technically complex area of the post-2012 climate negotiations relating to mitigation, 
namely, the rules by which developed countries account for emissions in the land use, 
land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector under the Kyoto Protocol.2  The aim of 
this chapter is to assess whether the Rudd government's contribution to the LULUCF 
negotiations was consistent with its aspiration to be a good international citizen (GIC). 
The LULUCF accounting rules, established by the 2001 Marrakesh Accords, were only 
agreed to apply to the Protocol's first commitment period (2008-12).3 This meant that 
Parties required a new decision on LULUCF if the Protocol was extended to a second 
commitment period beyond 2012. Negotiations on LULUCF also had a wider relevance, 
with the rules adopted by Kyoto Parties likely to form the basis of the land sector 
accounting rules for any broader post-2012 agreement established under the Bali 
Roadmap.4 
                                                     
 
1 China, 'Submission by China on LULUCF under AWG-KP' in UNFCCC, Views on Options and Proposals for 
Addressing Definitions, Modalities, Rules and Guidelines for the Treatment of Land-Use, Land-Use 
Change and Forestry, UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/MISC.11 (24 April 2009) 28, 28. 
2 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 
16 March 1998, 2303 UNTS 148 (entered into force 16 February 2005) ('Kyoto Protocol'). The Kyoto 
Protocol refers to 'land-use change and forestry' (LUCF) but the broader category of land use, land-use 
change and forestry (LULUCF) was later adopted by the Marrakesh Accords: UNFCCC, Report of the 
Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session: 
Addendum 3 (Part 2), UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (30 March 2006), decision 16/CMP.1 ('CMP 
Report 1: Addendum 3 (Part 2)'). Note that these rules were first agreed to in 2001 by the UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties, and later endorsed by Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at their first Meeting of 
the Parties in 2005.  
3 CMP Report 1: Addendum 3 (Part 2), decision 16/CMP.1, [4]. As explained in chapter 4, the Marrakesh 
Accords provide the detailed rules for implementation of the Protocol. 
4 Established at the 13th Conference of the Parties, Bali, 2007. See UNFCCC, Bali Climate Change 
Conference – December 2007 <http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php>; UNFCCC, Report of 
the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008), decision 1/CP.13, [1]; UNFCCC, Report of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol on its Resumed Fourth 
Session, UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5 (5 February 2008) annex I. On the Bali Roadmap see chapter 4. 
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LULUCF has long been a contentious topic within the international climate change law 
(ICCL) regime and continued to be so during the post-2012 negotiations.5 From a 
scientific viewpoint, the necessity of reducing emissions in the land sector is well 
accepted.6 Yet the regulation of this sector has proved controversial for several 
reasons. First, the LULUCF sector can provide a significant 'offset' for developed 
countries, lessening the need to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions caused by 
burning fossil fuels.7 Second, accurately accounting for LULUCF emissions and removals 
is far more difficult than for fossil fuel-based sources. This has created concerns that 
developed countries can 'cook the books', artificially inflating the amount of LULUCF 
abatement they are awarded.8 Third, significant natural variations in emissions and 
removals occur in this sector. This makes it difficult to accurately account for the 
anthropogenic component of LULUCF emissions and removals, which is the focus of 
the ICCL regime.9  
 
Parties raised numerous concerns about the LULUCF accounting rules during the 
course of the post-2012 negotiations. While many developing countries initially 
favoured simply extending the first commitment period rules, Australia and other 
developed countries pushed for a variety of reforms. This chapter assesses the record 
of the Rudd government on this issue in the following manner. First, the basic legal and 
policy background is outlined. Second, the chapter examines several of the key issues 
under negotiation, with a focus on forest management, the dominant topic of 
discussion during the period of review. Third, the chapter comments on the 
                                                     
 
5 For historical background on LULUCF negotiations see, eg, Ian Fry, 'Twists and Turns in the Jungle: 
Exploring the Evolution of the Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry Decisions Within the Kyoto 
Protocol' (2002) 11 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 11, 159; Ian 
Fry, 'More Twists, Turns and Stumbles in the Jungle: A Further Exploration of Land Use, Land Use Change 
and Forestry Decisions within the Kyoto Protocol' (2007) 16 Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law 341; Ian Fry, 'If a Tree Falls in a Kyoto Forest and Nobody is There to 
Hear it, Will it be Accounted For? An Insider's View of the Negotiations Surrounding Land Use, Land-Use 
Change and Forestry for the Second Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol' (2011) 20 Review of 
European Community and International Environmental Law 123.  
6 See, eg, Climate Commission, The Critical Decade: Client Science, Risks and Responses (Climate 
Commission, May 2011) 57. 
7 Fry, 'If a Tree Falls in a Kyoto Forest and Nobody is There to Hear it, Will it be Accounted For?', above n 
5, 124. 
8 Ibid 125; International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(400) 
(1 April 2009) 2. 
9 Fry, 'If a Tree Falls in a Kyoto Forest and Nobody is There to Hear it, Will it be Accounted For?', above n 
5, 124. 
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implications of the Rudd government's negotiating positions for its aspiration to be a 
GIC, examining both the consistency of its positions with the relevant international 
legal framework and the broader attributes of GIC highlighted in chapter 1. It will be 
seen that the overarching concern in this area was that any changes to the accounting 
rules for the land sector improved or maintained, rather than diminished, the 
credibility of the existing accounting framework. As such, the key focus of this chapter 
is on assessing whether the rules promoted by the Rudd government were likely to be 
environmentally effective. As argued in previous chapters, a GIC would be expected to 
support mitigation approaches that result in genuine, rather than illusory emissions 
abatement, given that the central purpose of the ICCL regime is to reduce emissions so 
as to avoid dangerous climate change. 
A Legal and Policy Background 
1 The UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and Bali Roadmap 
a) UNFCCC 
Land sector emissions were first addressed by the ICCL regime under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Article 4.1(a) requires 
both Annex I Parties (essentially the developed countries) and non-Annex I Parties 
(essentially the developing countries) to establish national inventories of 
anthropogenic GHG 'sources'10 as well as 'sinks',11 and provide these to the Conference 
of the Parties (COP).12 The land sector is a key source of emissions through activities 
such as deforestation, but also operates as a sink with natural and plantation forests, 
for example, removing CO2 from the atmosphere.13  
 
                                                     
 
10 'Source' means any process or activity which releases a GHG, an aerosol or a precursor of a GHG: 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1771 
UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994) art 1.9 ('UNFCCC'). 
11 'Sink' means any process, activity or mechanism which removes a GHG, an aerosol or a precursor of a 
GHG from the atmosphere: UNFCCC art 1.8. 
12 UNFCCC art 12.1(a). 
13 See generally, UNFCCC, Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry 
<http://unfccc.int/methods_and_science/lulucf/items/4122.php>. 
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The reporting obligations of developed and developing countries differ in line with the 
principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' 
(article 3.1 UNFCCC) with only Annex I Parties being required to provide annual 
inventories of their GHG emissions and removals.14 UNFCCC Parties adopted a 'land-
based' approach to reporting LULUCF emissions, with Annex I Parties reporting 
annually on emissions and removals with respect to: forest land; cropland; grassland; 
wetlands; settlements; and other land.15 Articles 4.2(a) and (b) provide that the Annex 
I Parties' non-binding commitment to return their collective emissions to 1990 levels 
by 2000 can include activities to both reduce emissions and enhance CO2 removals. 
Article 4.1(d) also requires all Parties to promote the 'sustainable management' and 
'conservation and enhancement' of sinks and reservoirs,16 including 'biomass', 'forests', 
and other terrestrial ecosystems. 
b) Kyoto Protocol 
The accounting rules for LULUCF under the Kyoto Protocol are highly complex. This 
reflects the inherently technical nature of the area and scientific uncertainties, but also 
the fact that some rules have been adopted to advance the particular interests of 
various Annex I Parties.17 The LULUCF rules only apply to Annex I Parties who have 
adopted mitigation targets under the Protocol (Annex B Parties).18 The rules which 
applied to the first commitment period were contained in several places, chiefly 
articles 3.3, 3.4 and 3.7 of the Protocol; the Marrakesh Accords (specifically decision 
                                                     
 
14 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session: Addendum (Part 2, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (6 June 1995), decision 3/CP.1, [2(b)]. 
15 See UNFCCC, Updated UNFCCC Reporting Guidelines on Annual Inventories Following Incorporation of 
the Provisions of Decision 14/CP.11, FCCC/SBSTA/2006/9 (18 August 2006) 59. 
16 'Reservoir' means a component or components of the climate system where a GHG or a precursor of a 
GHG is stored: UNFCCC art 1.7. 
17 See B Schlamadinger et al, 'A Synopsis of Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) under the 
Kyoto Protocol and Marrakech Accords' (2007) 10 Environmental Science & Policy 271, 272-273; 
Bernhard Schlamadinger et al, 'Options for Including Land Use in a Climate Agreement Post-2012: 
Improving the Kyoto Protocol Approach' (2007) 10 Environmental Science & Policy 295, 303; Niklas 
Höhne et al, 'The Rules for Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry under the Kyoto Protocol – Lessons 
Learned for the Future Climate Negotiations' (2007) 10 Environmental Science & Policy 353, 360-366. 
18 Kyoto Protocol art 3. 
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16/CMP.1);19 the Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas 
Inventories20 and the 2003 Good Practice Guidance for LULUCF.21  
 
A key concern of many Parties regarding LULUCF has been to ensure that emissions 
and removals are accounted for accurately. This is reflected in decision 16/CMP.1, 
paragraph 1, which outlines a set of principles to govern the treatment of LULUCF 
activities. These include, among others, that LULUCF should be 'based on sound 
science'; that consistent estimation and reporting methodologies should be used over 
time; and that accounting for LULUCF should not impact the aim of Annex I Parties to 
collectively reduce their GHGs by 5 per cent below 1990 levels by 2008-12 (under 
article 3.1).22  
 
In a departure from practice under the UNFCCC, Kyoto Parties adopted an 'activity-
based' approach to land sector accounting. Annex I Parties are required to account for 
changes in LULUCF emissions and removals on the basis of several mandatory and 
elective activities. Article 3.3 lists the mandatory activities. These include:  
 afforestation – planting trees on land that has not had forest for the past 50 
years;23  
 reforestation – planting trees on land that did not have forest on 31 December 
1989;24 and  
 deforestation – the conversion of forested land to non-forested land.25  
                                                     
 
19 CMP Report 1: Addendum 3 (Part 2), decision 16/CMP.1.  
20 J T Houghton et al (eds), Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (IPCC, 
1996).  
21 Jim Penman et al (eds), 2003 Good Practice Guidance for LULUCF (Institute for Global Environmental 
Strategies for IPCC, 2003). 
22 CMP Report 1: Addendum 3 (Part 2), decision 16/CMP.1, [1(a)(b) and (c)]. 
23 'Afforestation' is the direct human-induced conversion of land that has not been forested for a period 
of at least 50 years to forested land through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of 
natural seed sources: ibid annex [1(b)]. 
24 'Reforestation' is the direct human-induced conversion of non-forested land to forested land through 
planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources, on land that was 
forested but that has been converted to non-forested land. Reforestation activities for the first 
commitment period were limited to lands that did not contain forest on 31 December 1989: ibid annex 
[1(c)]. 
25 'Deforestation' is the direct human-induced conversion of forested land to non-forested land: ibid 
annex [1(d)]. 'Forest' is defined as a minimum area of land of 0.05-1.0 hectare with tree crown cover (or 
equivalent stocking level) of more than 10-30 per cent with trees with the potential to reach a minimum 
height of 2-5 metres at maturity in situ: annex [1(a)].  
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Article 3.4 lists the elective activities. Decision 16/CMP.1 limited these to:26   
 revegetation – the increasing of vegetation that does not qualify as 
afforestation or reforestation;27 
 forest management – the 'sustainable' management of the forest to fulfil its 
ecological, economic and social functions;28  
 cropland management – the management of land used for agricultural crops;29 
and  
 grazing land management – the management of land used for livestock 
production.30  
 
Complicating land sector accounting under the Protocol, two different approaches 
were adopted to account for these activities. Afforestation, reforestation and 
deforestation (article 3.3) as well as forest management (article 3.4) adopted so-called 
'gross-net' accounting. This measured the net changes in carbon stocks that occurred 
in the first commitment period (2008-12). The remaining article 3.4 activities applied 
so-called 'net-net' accounting. This compared the emissions or removals in the first 
commitment period to the emissions/removals in 1990 (the Kyoto base year).31 The 
differing approaches were adopted in an attempt to factor out non-anthropogenic 
influences on LULUCF emissions and removals such as 'CO2 fertilisation', 'nitrogen 
deposition' and the 'age-class structure' of forests (see further below).32 
 
                                                     
 
26 Ibid annex [6]. 
27 'Revegetation' is a direct human-induced activity to increase carbon stocks on sites through the 
establishment of vegetation that covers a minimum area of 0.05 hectares and does not meet the 
definitions of afforestation and reforestation contained elsewhere in decision 16/CMP.1: ibid annex 
[1(e)]. 
28 'Forest management' is a system of practices for stewardship and use of forest land aimed at fulfilling 
relevant ecological (including biological diversity), economic and social functions of the forest in a 
sustainable manner: ibid annex [1(f)]. 
29 'Cropland management' is the system of practices on land on which agricultural crops are grown and 
on land that is set aside or temporarily not being used for crop production: ibid annex [1(g)]. 
30 'Grazing land management' is the system of practices on land used for livestock production aimed at 
manipulating the amount and type of vegetation and livestock produced: ibid annex [1(h)]. 
31 See ibid annex [9]; Höhne, above n 17, 355-56. This was the accounting approach applied to non-
LULUCF sectors. 
32 See Joseph G Canadell et al, 'Factoring Out Natural and Indirect Human Effects on Terrestrial Carbon 
Sources and Sinks' (2007) 10 Environmental Science & Policy 370, 371-75. 
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Once land was accounted for under articles 3.3 and 3.4, all anthropogenic emissions 
and removals on that land were required to be accounted for throughout subsequent 
and contiguous commitment periods.33 This was designed to ensure that Parties which 
received 'credits' for net removals in the first commitment period would also receive 
'debits' should the carbon later be released.34 This was necessary given that LULUCF 
removals can later re-enter the atmosphere due to activities such as deforestation, or 
natural events such as wildfires. Net emissions or net removals resulting from LULUCF 
activities were either added to or subtracted from a party's Assigned Amount Unit 
(AAU) for the first commitment period.35 Parties which received credits under articles 
3.3 and 3.4 could issue removal units,36 which were fully fungible with other Kyoto 
emission permits except that they could not be directly banked for use in future 
commitment periods.37  
 
To address concerns that some Annex I Parties could largely achieve their mitigation 
targets through improved forest management (as well as a result of non-
anthropogenic influences), both general and individual caps were placed on the use of 
forest management by Parties for whom article 3.3 activities represented a net source 
of emissions.38 
 
                                                     
 
33 CMP Report 1: Addendum 3 (Part 2), decision 16/CMP.1, annex [19]. 
34 Höhne, above n 17, 356. 
35 See further on how emissions/removals are calculated: UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session: Addendum 2 (Part 
2, Vol 2), UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 (30 March 2006), decision 13/CMP.1, annex; Höhne, 
above n 17, 357-358. 
36 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol on its First Session: Addendum 2 (Part 2, Vol 2), UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 (30 March 
2006), decision 13/CMP.1, annex [4, 25]. 
37 Ibid [16]. Note, however, that removal units (RMUs) could be banked through a loophole, namely that 
RMUs could be converted to AAUs for the purposes of emissions trading under article 17, and then 
banked as AAUs: Fry, 'More Twists, Turns and Stumbles in the Jungle', above n 5, 343, 346. 
38 The general cap limited reliance on forest management up to the amount of net emissions under 
article 3.3 and not greater than 9 megatonnes of CO2 times 5: CMP Report 1: Addendum 3 (Part 2), 
decision 16/CMP.1, annex [10]. The cap was originally based on 15 per cent of the estimated removals 
on lands subject to forest management, or 3 per cent of AAUs, whichever was lower, but more generous 
caps were sought by and granted to Russia, Japan, and Canada: Schlamadinger, 'Options for Including 
Land Use in a Climate Agreement Post-2012', above n 17, 297.  For the individual caps see decision 
16/CMP.1, annex [11], appendix. 
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The other rule with particular relevance to LULUCF accounting is found in article 3.7. 
The second sentence of article 3.7 requires Annex I Parties for whom LULUCF 
constituted a net source of emissions in 1990 to include their aggregate anthropogenic 
land-use change emissions (that is, deforestation) in their 1990 base year.39 As noted 
in chapter 2, this clause was obtained by Australia under the Howard government.40 
Commonly known as the 'Australia clause', this provision delivered a windfall gain to 
Australia. The rule allowed Australia to add 132 megatonnes carbon dioxide-equivalent 
(Mt CO2-e) to Australia's 1990 base year emissions level. Because Australia's rate of 
deforestation had already dropped significantly prior to the negotiation of the 
Protocol, this made Australia's abatement task significantly easier.41 Indeed, with fossil 
fuel-based emissions in Australia continuing to rise after 1990, lower net emissions 
from deforestation (about 49 Mt CO2-e by 2008-12) were the primary reason Australia 
was able to meet its Kyoto target for the first commitment period.42  
c) The Bali Roadmap 
With the LULUCF rules only applying to the first commitment period, Kyoto Parties 
agreed in 2006 to open discussion on the LULUCF rules as part of their broader 
negotiations regarding mitigation commitments beyond 2012.43 With these 
negotiations unresolved, Kyoto Parties agreed to continue these discussions under the 
Bali Roadmap, pursuant to article 3.9 of the Protocol, and forward the results of their 
                                                     
 
39 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol on its First Session: Addendum 2 (Part 2, Vol 2), UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 (30 March 
2006), decision 13/CMP.1, annex [5(b)]. Other Parties' base year emissions only account for non-LULUCF 
emissions.  
40 See Fry, 'Twists and Turns in the Jungle', above n 5, 161. 
41 See Andrew Macintosh, 'The Australia Clause and REDD: A Cautionary Tale' (2012) 112 Climatic 
Change 1, 3; The Australia Institute, 'A Poisoned Chalice: Australia and the Kyoto Protocol' (Background 
Paper 13, June 1998) 11, 12-13 <www.tai.org.au/file.php?file=web_papers/WP13.pdf>. This clause 
effectively converted Australia's Kyoto target of 108 per cent of 1990 levels by 2008-2012 into a 142 per 
cent target, allowing a significant increase in emissions: Andrew Macintosh, LULUCF Offsets and 
Australia's 2020 Abatement Task (ANU Centre for Climate Law and Policy, 2011) 2. 
42 See Macintosh, LULUCF Offsets and Australia's 2020 Abatement Task, above n 41, 2; Macintosh, 'The 
Australia Clause and REDD: A Cautionary Tale', above n 41, 3; Department of Climate Change and Energy 
Efficiency, Australia's Emissions Projections 2010 (2010) 5; Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF)' (Informal Data Submission to the UNFCCC, September 2009) 2-4. 
43 UNFCCC, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the 
Kyoto Protocol on its Second Session, UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2006/4 (14 December 2006) [17]. 
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work to the 5th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol (CMP 5) in Copenhagen (December 2009).44 
2 General Concerns Regarding the LULUCF Sector 
As noted, many developed countries pushed for various reforms to be made to the 
LULUCF accounting rules (see specific proposals below). This included the Rudd 
government whose general view was that the 'significant abatement potential' of the 
LULUCF sector was 'currently untapped' due to limitations caused by the first 
commitment period rules.45 Many developing countries by contrast were sceptical 
about the need for, and motivations behind, proposed rule changes. Major developing 
countries such as China, India, Brazil, Malaysia and Indonesia all questioned the focus 
on LULUCF issues by developed countries, stressing the priority of reducing fossil fuel 
emissions.46 India, for example, argued that it was undesirable for Annex I Parties to 
increase their reliance on the LULUCF sector as this would divert their attention from 
'more tangible action in [the] crucial sectors of energy, transport, industry and waste 
management.'47 This type of concern led the G77 and China, and others, to propose a 
general cap on the use of LULUCF by Annex I Parties to ensure that other sectors were 
properly addressed; a move rejected by Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada and 
                                                     
 
44 UNFCCC, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the 
Kyoto Protocol on its Resumed Fourth Session, UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5 (5 February 2008) [22(c)]. 
45 Australia, 'Australia's Views on the Definitions, Modalities, Rules and Guidelines for the Treatment of 
LULUCF in the Kyoto Protocol Second Commitment Period' (Presentation to AWG-KP 5 Round Table on 
the Means to Reach Emission Reduction Targets, Bangkok, April 2008) 1; Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use 
Change and Forestry (LULUCF)' in UNFCCC, Further Elaboration of the Options, Elements and Issues 
Contained in Annex IV to Document FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/3 and Annex III to Document 
FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/5…, UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/MISC.5 (6 March 2009) 3, 3. 
46 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(375) (2-13 
June 2008) 6; International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 
12(374) (13 June 2008) 2; India, 'MRV – BAP 1 (b)(i)' in UNFCCC, Ideas and Proposals on Elements 
Contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Addendum 1, UN Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5/Add.1 (17 October 2008) 34, 35; China, 'Submission by China on LULUCF 
under AWG-KP' in UNFCCC, Further Elaboration of the Options, Elements and Issues Contained in Annex 
IV to Document FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/3 and Annex III to Document FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/5…, UN Doc 
FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/MISC.5 (11 February 2009) 34, 35. 
47 India, 'Submission by Government of India on AWG-KP Agenda Item 5 (b)' in UNFCCC, Views on 
Options and Proposals for Addressing Definitions, Modalities, Rules and Guidelines for the Treatment of 
Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry, UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/MISC.11 (24 April 2009) 44, 44. 
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other developed countries on the ground that it would create a disincentive for 
LULUCF abatement efforts.48 
 
The developing countries' concern about an over reliance on LULUCF abatement by 
Annex I Parties reflected a number of issues. First was the fact that emissions and 
removals in the land sector are more difficult to accurately account for. The Coalition 
for Rainforest Nations, for example, raised concerns about the 'high uncertainties' in 
LULUCF data which could 'seriously undermine the credibility' of estimated LULUCF 
emissions and removals.49 The argument being made was that higher uncertainties in 
land sector accounting meant that LULUCF emissions and removals were not directly 
comparable to fossil fuel-based emission reductions (especially those producing 
CO2).50  
 
The concern about the accuracy of LULUCF accounting appeared to be a legitimate 
one. Indeed, Australia has struggled to accurately measure its emissions and removals 
from deforestation since the early 2000s, despite having one of the best carbon 
monitoring systems in the world.51 The Rudd government reported, for example, that 
uncertainties for Australia's forest management emissions and removals were up to 
±40 per cent for 2007.52 While the government had a stated ambition that emission 
                                                     
 
48 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(437) (8 
October 2009) 3; Australian Government, FOI Australia's Target Conditions – Where Do We Stand? 
(2009) 2-3 <http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/articles/publications/foi-original-documents-regarding-
australian-emission-reduction-targets.html/section/478>. 
49 Cambodia, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Myanmar, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Vietnam, 'Other Issues Arising from the 
Implementation of the Work Programme of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for 
Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol - Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry' (Informal 
Submission to the UNFCCC, October 2009) 2.  
50 Ibid 2. Note that uncertainties in LULUCF accounting are within the range of uncertainty for non-CO2 
GHGs: Höhne, above n 17, 353-54. 
51 Macintosh, 'The Australia Clause and REDD: a Cautionary Tale', above n 41, 9-10. 
52 Australia, 'Australian Government Data Submission' (UNFCCC Informal Session Discussion, 4 October 
2009) 5. Uncertainties for 'forest land' data (A/R activities; harvested native forests, plantations, and 
other native forests; fuelwood consumption, prescribed burning and wildfires in forests; and removals 
from recovery post-fire) were also estimated at ±30 per cent: Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF)' (Informal Data Submission to the UNFCCC), above n 42, 1. This did not include 
deforestation (land-use change). 
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reductions and removals in the land sector should be 'genuine',53 this was clearly 
easier said than done due to the technical limitations of accounting in this sector. 
 
Second, developing countries were concerned that the complexity of the new 
accounting rules being discussed could have implications for the environmental 
integrity of the Protocol. China, for example, cautioned against creating 'loopholes' 
that would enable Annex I Parties to achieve their mitigation targets 'by simply doing 
'magic' paper work.'54 Given concerns about the complexities of LULUCF accounting, as 
well as the lack of time available to negotiate new rules by COP 15/CMP 5 in December 
2009 (which had been on the Parties' agenda since 2006), China called for the existing 
rules to simply be extended to a new commitment period.55 
 
The literature has also highlighted the various dangers of relying too heavily on LULUCF 
abatement as a mitigation strategy. Stern and Taylor, for example, emphasise that if 
abatement in the LULUCF sector comes at the expense of reducing fossil fuel 
emissions, this may increase overall mitigation costs in the long-term due to high-
carbon infrastructure being 'locked-in' and inadequate investment taking place in low-
carbon technologies.56 A further concern is that unlike when fossil fuel emissions are 
cut, LULUCF emission reductions and removals are non-permanent, being vulnerable 
                                                     
 
53 Australia, 'Australia's Views on the Definitions, Modalities, Rules and Guidelines for the Treatment of 
LULUCF in the Kyoto Protocol Second Commitment Period', above n 45, 2. 
54 China, 'Submission by China on LULUCF under AWG-KP' (24 April 2009), above n 1, 28. See also 
Malaysia, 'Submission by Malaysia on AWG-KP Agenda Item 5 (b)' in UNFCCC, Views on Options and 
Proposals for Addressing Definitions, Modalities, Rules and Guidelines for the Treatment of Land Use, 
Land-Use Change and Forestry, UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/MISC.11 (24 April 2009) 55, 55. 
55 China, 'Submission by China on LULUCF under AWG-KP' (24 April 2009), above n 1, 28-29; China, 
'Submission by China on LULUCF under AWG-KP' (11 February 2009), above n 46, 34-35; International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(375) (2-13 June 2008) 6. 
56 See Nicholas Stern and Christopher Taylor, 'What Do the Appendices to the Copenhagen Accord Tell 
us about Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Prospects for Avoiding a Rise in Global Average 
Temperature of More than 2°C?' (2010) (Policy Paper, Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy 
and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, March 2010) 19. See 
generally re LULUCF concerns: Johannes Ebeling, 'Risks and Criticism of Forestry-based Climate 
Mitigation and Carbon Trading' in Charlotte Steck et al (eds), Climate Change and Forests: Emerging 
Policy and Market Opportunities (2010) ch 4. 
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to future reversals from human land use and management and natural events, 
especially in a warming climate.57 
 
It should be noted that LULUCF abatement during the first commitment period only 
represented a minor component of the Annex I Parties' overall mitigation effort (about 
2 per cent) due to the restrictions imposed by the rules and the low uptake of 
voluntary activities under article 3.4.58 However, Parties recognised that this could 
change substantially in future with reforms to the rules. If full land-based accounting 
was introduced, for example, net removals from LULUCF could potentially represent 
about 30 per cent of Annex I Parties' abatement by 2030.59 Thus it was widely 
recognised that the credibility of LULUCF accounting was an important issue in terms 
of the Parties' ability to achieve their long-term global mitigation goals.60 
 
Specifically in relation to Australia, modelling by Treasury for the proposed Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS, see chapter 7) estimated that LULUCF would play a 
relatively minor role in Australia's 2020 abatement effort: about 2 per cent from 
reduced deforestation and 4 per cent from increased afforestation and reforestation 
(A/R).61 This estimate assumed that the established LULUCF rules would apply and that 
Australia would continue its practice under the first commitment period of only 
accounting for mandatory activities under article 3.3.62 This meant that Australia's 
reliance on abatement in the land sector could be much higher depending on the exact 
                                                     
 
57 See Climate Commission, above n 6, 57; M G J den Elzen et al, Evaluation of the Copenhagen Accord: 
Chances and Risks for the 2°C Climate Goal (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, May 2010) 
16. As noted above, the LULUCF rules attempt to address this by requiring a Party to account for a unit 
of land on an ongoing basis once it has been included in that Party's accounts: CMP Report 1: Addendum 
3 (Part 2), decision 16/CMP.1, annex [19]. 
58 UNFCCC, Analysis of Possible Means to Reach Emission Reduction Targets and of Relevant 
Methodological Issues: Technical Paper, UN Doc FCCC/TP/2008/2 (6 August 2008) 50-51. 
59 Ibid 54-55. 
60 See, eg, UNEP, Bridging the Emissions Gap (UNEP, 2011). This report suggested that global emission 
levels of approximately 44 gigatonnes of CO2-e (GtCO2-e) in 2020 would be consistent with a 'likely' 
chance of limiting global warming to 2°C. If the low ambition Copenhagen Accord pledges were 
implemented in a 'lenient' fashion there would be a significant 'emissions gap' of 11 GtCO2-e: 8-9. If 
industrialised countries, however, adopted 'strict' accounting rules that minimised the use of 'lenient 
LULUCF credits' (essentially non-genuine credits), the emissions gap could be reduced by up to 0.6 
GtCO2e: 27. 
61 See Macintosh, LULUCF Offsets and Australia's 2020 Abatement Task, above n 41, 4-5; Treasury, 
Australia's Low Pollution Future: The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation (2008) 48, 260-61. 
62 See ibid.  
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reforms made to the accounting rules. Indeed, Macintosh suggested that Treasury may 
have 'significantly' underestimated the potential contribution of LULUCF to Australia's 
mitigation effort.63 This was because much greater abatement was theoretically 
possible from several activities, namely: electing to account for article 3.4 activities 
(especially forest management); from improved vegetation and management schemes 
in New South Wales and Queensland; and by issuing domestic carbon credits to 
landholders for LULUCF abatement under the proposed CPRS.64  
B Reforming the LULUCF Rules: Analysis of Key Issues 
Kyoto Parties agreed early in 2008 that the LULUCF sector would continue to be 
available to Annex I Parties under a second commitment period of the Protocol.65 This 
allowed negotiations to focus on the content of any potential rule changes. Since the 
adoption of the Protocol in 1997 and decision 16/CMP.1 in 2001, numerous 
deficiencies have been highlighted in relation to the first commitment period rules,66 
many of which were directly raised by Parties during the post-2012 negotiations.67 This 
section confines its analysis to several issues that were given priority by the Parties and 
Australia during the period of review, the most important of which was how to address 
deficiencies in accounting for forest management.  
1 Rules or Targets First? 
As a preliminary issue, developed and developing countries disagreed on whether the 
LULUCF rules or new Annex I Party mitigation targets (for the post-2012 period) ought 
to be agreed upon first. The Rudd government had a 'strong preference' for the 
LULUCF rules to be decided prior to Australia and other Annex I Parties committing to 
                                                     
 
63 Macintosh, LULUCF Offsets and Australia's 2020 Abatement Task, above n 41, 6.  
64 Ibid 8-9, 12. Macintosh estimated that LULUCF offsets could reach up to 370 Mt CO2-e/yr by 2020 
compared to Treasury's estimate of 103 Mt CO2-e/yr under a 5 per cent emission reduction target for 
2020: 27. 
65 UNFCCC, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the 
Kyoto Protocol  on the First Part of its Fifth Session, FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/2 (15 May 2008) [19]. 
66 See generally, Schlamadinger, 'Options for Including Land Use in a Climate Agreement Post-2012', 
above n 17, 98. 
67 In addition to the many Party submissions to the AWG-KP (available at UNFCCC, Submissions from 
Parties <http://unfccc.int/documentation/submissions_from_parties/items/5900.php>) see, eg, Fry, 'If a 
Tree Falls in a Kyoto Forest and Nobody is There to Hear it, Will it be Accounted For?', above n 5; 
UNFCCC, Analysis of Possible Means to Reach Emission Reduction Targets and of Relevant 
Methodological Issues: Technical Paper, above n 58, 48-62. 
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their final quantitative targets.68 Its belief was that making a decision on the rules prior 
to the announcement of national targets would allow Australia and other developed 
countries to make 'an objective commitment' for the second commitment period.69 
This was because net LULUCF emissions and removals were either added to or 
subtracted from a Party's AAU, meaning that the land sector rules would have an 
impact on the level of effort required in other sectors of the economy to meet any 
given mitigation target.70 Whether Parties were seen to be making a '[c]omparable 
effort' would thus be impacted by the LULUCF rules on matters such as forest 
management caps, which land sector activities were covered, whether activities were 
mandatory or elective, the baselines adopted, and so forth.71 
 
Australia's preference for 'rules before targets' was widely shared by developed 
countries,72 but the issue was controversial with many non-Annex I Parties. China, for 
example, regarded the developed country position as a 'delaying tactic'.73 The G77 and 
China (as well as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)) argued that developed 
countries should set their targets based on the existing rules, and then increase their 
targets if rule changes were later made that lessened the mitigation effort required of 
them.74 Developing countries such as Tuvalu, however, accepted the merit of the rules 
being decided before targets.75 It noted that the process of setting targets before rules 
                                                     
 
68 Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)' (6 March 2009), above n 45, 3. This 
view extended to the broader Kyoto rules and mechanisms, such as those pertaining to use of the 
flexibility mechanisms. Analysis here is confined to the LULUCF issue. 
69 Australia, 'Views on the Means to Achieve Mitigation Objectives of Annex Parties for the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol' in UNFCCC, 
Views and Information on the Means to Achieve Mitigation Objectives of Annex I Parties: Addendum 2, 
UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/MISC.1/Add.2 (March 2008) 2, 4. 
70 See Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)' (6 March 2009), above n 45, 4. 
71 Ibid 3-4. See broader discussion on the notion of comparable effort in chapter 6. 
72 See, eg, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(400) 
(1 April 2009) 2 (EU, Japan); International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, vol 12(358) (1 April 2008) 1 (New Zealand); International Institute for Sustainable Development, 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(389) (5 December 2008) 1 (Canada). 
73 China, 'Submission by China on LULUCF under AWG-KP' (24 April 2009), above n 1, 28.  
74 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(400) (1 April 
2009) 2. 
75 Tuvalu, 'Submission on Definitions, Modalities, Rules and Guidelines for the Treatment of Land Use, 
Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) in the Second Commitment Period' in UNFCCC, Further 
Elaboration of the Options, Elements and Issues Contained in Annex IV to Document 
FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/3 and Annex III to Document FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/5…: Addendum 1, UN Doc 
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under the first commitment period had led to the undesirable situation in which 
certain accounting rules were developed to suit the needs of individual Parties, rather 
than for sound policy reasons.76 Establishing rules before targets would thus be 
preferable, allowing developed countries to consider the implications of the 
accounting rules before setting their final targets.77  
 
Tuvalu's statements as well as the literature on this issue78 suggest that the Rudd 
government's preferred position had a sound policy basis. Indeed, several of the 
proposed rule changes being discussed had the potential to allow Australia to achieve 
its minimum 5 per cent target reduction for 2020 solely through its LULUCF activities,79 
highlighting the sense in formalising the accounting rules before setting final mitigation 
goals. 
 
Ultimately, given the complexity of the LULUCF negotiations, and the inability of 
Parties to quickly resolve this issue, it became clear that developed countries needed 
to announce their mitigation targets prior to the adoption of new LULUCF rules. If not, 
Parties would have been unable to engage in meaningful negotiations on mitigation 
targets prior to COP 15/CMP 5 in Copenhagen (December 2009). To its credit, Australia 
ultimately announced its mitigation goal for 2020 regardless of the lack of consensus 
on the LULUCF rules, recognising the practical need to do so,80 as did other Parties. 
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2 Activity Versus Land-Based Accounting 
As noted, the Kyoto Protocol adopted an activity-based approach to LULUCF 
accounting. One of the most far-reaching proposals in the LULUCF negotiations was to 
introduce full land-based accounting, the approach of the Convention.81 The key 
proponent of this approach leading up to CMP 5, known as 'Option B', was Papua New 
Guinea (PNG), backed by the Coalition for Rainforest Nations and various other 
developing countries.82 PNG's joint submissions argued that activity-based accounting 
'significantly erode[d] the environmental integrity' of Annex I Parties' mitigation 
targets.83 This was because Annex I Parties were able to opt out of voluntary article 3.4 
activities, thereby avoiding to account for a 'significant portion' of anthropogenic 
GHGs.84 The rules also allowed Annex I Parties to 'cherry pick' the land areas and 
activities they reported on under article 3.4 activities – that is, Parties could choose to 
account for areas generating removals and exclude areas causing emissions.85  
 
Several developed countries including the EU and Switzerland initially expressed an 
interest in considering land-based accounting for the second commitment period.86 
However, while recognising the benefits of this approach, most Parties ultimately 
opposed introducing land-based accounting at that time, seeing it as a longer-term 
                                                     
 
81 See generally UNFCCC, Analysis of Possible Means to Reach Emission Reduction Targets and of 
Relevant Methodological Issues: Technical Paper, above n 58, 54-55. 
82 See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(425) (13 
August 2009) 3; Cambodia et al, above n 49; Central African Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Guyana, 
Honduras, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea and Uganda, 'Item 5(B) of the 
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Schlamadinger, 'Options for Including Land Use in a Climate Agreement Post-2012', above n 17, 296. The 
broad and narrow approaches allowed for forest management accounting in particular allows Parties to 
preferentially exclude forest areas that are sources and include sink areas to maximize LULUCF offsets. 
86 See, eg, Switzerland, 'Views on the Methodological Issues Relevant to the Rules to Guide the 
Treatment of Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)' in UNFCCC, Views and Information on 
Relevant Methodological Issues Relating to the Analysis of Means to Achieve Mitigation Objectives, UN 
Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/MISC.3 (27 March 2008) 7, 7.  
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goal.87 The major concern was that emissions data was not yet sufficiently reliable for 
all land areas and would thus increase the uncertainty of emissions and removals 
estimates.88 This was particularly the case in relation to wetlands, settlements and 
changes in soil carbon stocks.89  
 
The Rudd government indicated that its preferred option was to move to land-based 
accounting in a third commitment period (post-2020),90 believing that more modest 
revisions of the activity-based approach were 'more feasible' in the negotiating time 
available.91 The government also introduced a related proposal to list LULUCF as a 
sector/source category in Annex A of the Protocol, removing the complex approach to 
calculating Parties' final emission reductions and removals that is collectively required 
by articles 3.3, 3.4 and 3.7.92 The 'inclusion in target' proposal would have required 
Annex I Parties' emissions baselines to reflect net emissions from all mandatory and 
elected activities for the purposes of determining its AAU.93 This approach was seen as 
                                                     
 
87 See, eg, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(425) 
(13 August 2009) 3; International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 
12(447) (2-6 November 2009) 6. 
88 See, eg, Japan, 'View on the Treatment of Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)' in 
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FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/3 and Annex III to Document FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/5…, UN Doc 
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Methodological Issues: Technical Paper, above n 58, 55. 
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(FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/L.3)', in UNFCCC, Views on Options and Proposals for Addressing Definitions, 
Modalities, Rules and Guidelines for the Treatment of Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry, UN Doc 
FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/MISC.11 (24 April 2009) 5, 6. 
91 See Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)' (6 March 2009), above n 45, 10; 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(425) (13 August 
2009) 3. 
92 Australia, 'Australia's Views on the Definitions, Modalities, Rules and Guidelines for the Treatment of 
LULUCF in the Kyoto Protocol Second Commitment Period', above n 45, 2; International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol 12(375) (2-13 June 2008) 6. 
93 See Australia, 'Text to be Included in the "Draft Conclusions Proposed by the Chair" 
(FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/L.3)', above n 90, 5-6, 11; Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry 
(LULUCF)' (Informal Data Submission to the UNFCCC), above n 42, 10. 
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a transitional means of moving towards full land-based accounting,94 but did not have 
the backing of other Parties.95 
 
It is clear from a scientific point of view that full land-based accounting was ultimately 
a preferable approach, representing a more complete form of carbon accounting.96 
PNG's joint-submission argued that the quality and quantity of data reported by Annex 
I Parties had continuously improved overtime and that the 'principle of 
conservativeness' could be applied to prevent overestimation of emissions and 
removals.97 However, it needs to be appreciated that, as noted earlier, implementing 
land-based accounting could increase Annex I Parties' net removals by up to 30 per 
cent by 2030.98 As such, Parties including Australia were right not to push ahead with 
this accounting method in the second commitment period given that Annex I Parties 
were not yet able to do so with a sufficient degree of confidence in its environmental 
integrity. 
3 Harvested Wood Products 
A further rule change sought by Annex I Parties, including Australia, was to introduce 
accounting for so-called 'harvested wood products' (HWPs).99 With Parties unable to 
agree on how to account for HWP emissions when negotiating the Marrakesh Accords, 
this subject was not addressed by the first commitment period rules.100 This meant 
that the carbon stored in these products was simply assumed to be released into the 
atmosphere at the time the relevant forest was harvested. The Rudd government 
sought reform of this rule, arguing that carbon stored in wood products was only 
                                                     
 
94 Kirsten Macy, Bill Hare and Claudine Chen, 'LULUCF Guide' (AirClim Briefing No 8, AirClim, 2011) 18. 
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n 5, 125. 
96 See, eg, Schlamadinger, 'A Synopsis of Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) under the 
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98 See Analysis of Possible Means to Reach Emission Reduction Targets and of Relevant Methodological 
Issues: Technical Paper, above n 58, 55. 
99 HWPs are wood-based products that store carbon for varying periods of time depending on their use. 
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There to Hear it, Will it be Accounted For?', above n 5, 133. 
100 Schlamadinger, 'Options for Including Land Use in a Climate Agreement Post-2012', above n 17, 297. 
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released into the atmosphere once a wood product decayed or was burnt.101 It 
preferred that HWPs be accounted for so as to accurately reflect 'what the atmosphere 
sees'.102 This would create an incentive for Parties to maximise the time in which 
carbon was stored in HWPs by creating longer-lived wood products.103 Other 
developed countries also generally supported the introduction of accounting for HWPs 
so as to incentivise the storage of carbon in this manner.104   
 
Parties discussed several options for HWP accounting. Three methods under 
consideration, proposed as far back as 1998, included the stock-change approach, the 
production approach and the atmospheric-flow approach. These methods differed in 
terms of whether the producer or consumer country would be held responsible for 
changes in carbon stocks and in the wood products pool.105 New Zealand also 
proposed the 'emissions-to-atmosphere' approach, which was backed by the Rudd 
government.106 This approach proposed to account for emissions from forest 
harvesting on the basis of when they occurred, subject to reliable data being 
available.107 The responsibility for the relevant emissions would rest with the wood 
producing country, irrespective of whether the HWP was exported to another 
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Methodological Issues: Technical Paper, above n 58, 60-61; Mario Tonosaki, ‘Harvested Wood Products 
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106 Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)' (6 March 2009), above n 45, 11. 
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FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/5…, UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/MISC.5 (24 February 2009) 48, 54.  
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country.108 Emission estimates would be derived by applying default internationally 
agreed average lifetimes of different end-uses for wood products and by-products (tier 
2 accounting) or agreed country-specific lifetimes (tier 3 accounting).109 New Zealand 
proposed that accounting for HWPs be introduced for both A/R activities and forest 
management.110 The Rudd government believed that New Zealand's proposal offered a 
'practical approach'111 and suggested that the IPCC be tasked with developing the 
appropriate methodologies.112 
 
While introducing accounting for HWPs was generally supported by developed 
countries, key developing countries including China and India expressed strong 
reservations. China argued that 'difficulties in relevant data and methodologies' should 
prevent its inclusion in the second commitment period.113 Similarly, India noted that 
accounting for HWPs was 'not easy' and that 'no universally acceptable methodology' 
was then available.114 As such, it saw HWP as a 'grey area' which it was unable to 
support unless the accounting approach adopted was 'foolproof'.115 Tuvalu, however, 
supported including HWP, albeit on a more restricted basis. Unlike the emissions-to-
atmosphere proposal, Tuvalu preferred that Annex I Parties only account for 
domestically consumed HWPs (not those that were exported), in part to make HWP 
accounting simpler, more transparent and verifiable.116 It also proposed that HWP be 
limited to reforestation, biomass decline, forest management, and generally to 
'relatively long lived HWPs'.117  
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Parties were ultimately unable to agree on an accounting approach for HWP at 
Copenhagen, with the different approaches under discussion being seen to advantage 
or disadvantage particular countries.118 It should be noted that while this issue was 
pushed heavily by several developed countries, accounting for HWPs was only 
expected to have a minor impact on Annex I Parties' overall emissions and removals.119 
This included Australia for whom the emissions-to-atmosphere proposal (its preferred 
option) would have only marginally increased its claimable removals from A/R and 
forest management.120 Nonetheless, the concerns of some Parties regarding 
environmental effectiveness were understandable given that unreliable HWP 
accounting would undermine the credibility of LULUCF accounting, regardless of its 
small overall impact on emissions. Introducing HWP would also have allowed Annex I 
Parties to marginally decrease their immediate emission reductions in their fossil fuel 
sectors, as accounting for carbon emissions from HWPs would be delayed until a later 
date (instead of being presumed to occur at the time of harvest). Nonetheless, it was 
entirely reasonable for the Rudd government to back the inclusion of HWP accounting 
– so long as it could be done reliably – as this reform would have enabled Parties to 
more accurately account for the emissions the atmosphere actually sees and also 
incentivised the use of long-lived wood products.121   
4 Inclusion of Other Article 3.4 Activities 
Another key topic of negotiation was whether or not to extend the list of activities 
which Parties could voluntarily account for under article 3.4. Proposed new activities 
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included devegetation, forest biomass decline, forest degradation and wetland/peat 
land management.122 A number of developing countries were greatly concerned about 
the potential consequences of adding new activities, such as increasing accounting 
complexities, creating new accounting loopholes and potential obfuscation.123  This 
included China and India, who both cited environmental effectiveness concerns. China 
argued that due to 'difficulties in relevant data and methodologies' new activities such 
as wetland management should not be considered for the second commitment 
period,124 while India opposed including new activities without improvements to the 
quality of accounting.125 The Rudd government did not prioritise this issue and thus 
this chapter does not consider the topic in detail. However, the government did 
indicate that it was open to considering the inclusion of new activities such as 
wetland/peat land management, subject to its broader concerns regarding the effects 
of natural disturbances and inter-annual variability on Parties' accounts first being 
addressed126 (see discussion below). This view appeared to be consistent with that of 
other developed countries,127 many of whom were open to including new activities, 
although Japan also highlighted the need for improvements in data quality.128 
Notwithstanding the concerns raised by several developing countries, the Rudd 
government's openness to considering the inclusion of new activities appeared to be 
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reasonable, bearing in mind the need for more comprehensive accounting of the 
LULUCF sector until full land-based accounting can be introduced.129  
5 Forest Management: Force Majeure and Forest Management Reference Levels 
This chapter now turns to examining in detail the issue of forest management 
accounting, the major concern of Annex I Parties regarding LULUCF, including 
Australia, during the period of review. The two major topics of negotiation included 
how to address the effects of major or extreme natural disturbance events (such as 
wildfires and droughts), and how to address the effects of other 'indirect' non-
anthropogenic effects. These latter effects included: 
 CO2 fertilisation – increased forest growth caused by rising CO2 levels, which is 
greater in some regions than others;  
 nitrogen deposition – increased forest growth from deposited nitrogen, from 
various sources, which varies from region to region; and  
 the effects of pre-1990 activities, particularly the age-class structure of forests 
– which absorb less carbon as they age, meaning that some Parties' forest sinks 
are naturally growing, while others are shrinking.130  
 
Before considering the Parties' specific proposals on these issues, it is necessary to 
outline the broader historical context to the forest management negotiations. 
'Factoring out' non-anthropogenic effects from LULUCF accounting was a significant 
concern in the Marrakesh Accord negotiations. The LULUCF principles adopted at 
Marrakesh recognise that emissions and removals caused by these effects should be 
excluded from Parties' accounts.131 At the time, however, Parties did not consider it 
practical to explicitly exclude these non-anthropogenic effects, resulting in Parties 
aiming to indirectly achieve this aim by defining special land-use change 'activities' 
(deforestation, A/R, forest management etc) and specific accounting rules.132  
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As noted, Parties adopted a gross-net approach to forest management accounting, 
combined with a cap, in the first commitment period. This meant that Annex I Parties 
only accounted for net emissions and removals during 2008-12, rather than comparing 
emissions and removals in 2008-12 to 1990 (the net-net approach applied to fossil 
fuel-based sectors). The gross-net approach was adopted for forest management 
primarily due to concerns that some Parties would be unfairly penalised by the age-
class distribution of their forests if net-net accounting was used.133 This was because in 
many Annex I countries, reforestation policies were initiated prior to 1990, and forests 
could be reaching maturity and their point of carbon 'saturation'.134 Net-net 
accounting could thus result in these Parties incurring emission debits that were not 
the result of anthropogenic activities.135 Gross-net accounting introduced the risk, 
however, that some Parties could receive windfall credits, as all emissions and 
removals from forest management lands during 2008-12 would be assumed to be the 
product of deliberate policy measures.136 This meant that some Parties could earn 
credits from indirect non-anthropogenic effects or actions taken prior to 1990.137 
Indeed, if fully utilised, forest sinks in the US, Canada and Japan could have achieved 
removals roughly equivalent to Annex I Parties' collective target for the first 
commitment period (5 per cent below 1990 levels),138 while the US could have 
achieved its Kyoto target solely from pre-existing forest management activities.139 Thus 
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Protocol and Marrakech Accords', above n 17, 277.  
138 See Höhne, above n 17, 365. 
139 See Michael Grubb and Farhana Yamin, 'Climate Collapse at The Hague: What Happened, Why and 
Where Do We Go from Here?' (2001) 77 International Affairs 261, 271. Note that the US did not 
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at COP 6, 2001, the EU, G77 and China and AOSIS sought to limit the use of sinks.140 
Ultimately, a deal was reached that saw Annex I Parties accept a cap on the use of 
forest management removals in meeting their mitigation targets.141  
 
Notwithstanding these efforts to address concerns regarding forest management 
accounting, many Annex I Parties, including Australia, opted not to account for this 
voluntary activity during the first commitment period, chiefly due to concerns about 
the impact of non-anthropogenic influences on their emissions and removals.142 This 
meant that in the post-2012 negotiations, a number of Annex I Parties were concerned 
about how to best exclude the impacts of non-anthropogenic effects so as to enable 
them to account for forest management beyond 2012. This issue was the major focus 
of the Rudd government in the LULUCF negotiations.143  
 
The two specific concerns of Australia and other Parties are now addressed in turn. 
a)  Addressing Major Natural Disturbances/Force Majeure 
i) Australia's Concerns 
The Rudd government was strongly concerned about the impact of 'major natural 
disturbance events', as well as inter-annual climatic variability, for forest management 
accounting in Australia.144 It highlighted that events such as large wildfires, drought, 
extensive windthrow or pest outbreaks, could lead to significant variations in yearly 
emissions and removals.145 The risk of large wildfires, and to a lesser extent inter-
                                                     
 
140 See Höhne, above n 17, 365.  
141 See ibid. See above, n 38, regarding cap details.  
142 See New Zealand, 'Input to AWG-KP Session 6 (Ghana August 2008) on Land Use Land-Use Change 
and Forestry Rules for Post-2012', above n 109, 8. 21 of 37 Parties (excluding the European Community) 
elected to account for forest management. 
143 Note that Australia was also concerned about the role of non-anthropogenic effects on other article 
3.3 and 3.4 activities. Discussion here is limited to forest management. While non-anthropogenic factors 
were also relevant to mandatory accounting of A/R activities under article 3.3, the A/R 'debit-credit sub-
rule' allowed Australia to manage the risk. This rule prevents debits (emissions) being larger than credits 
(removals) on harvested land. Australia supported the rule continuing in CP2, if necessary, depending on 
what other rule changes were made: see Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)' 
(6 March 2009), above n 45, 12; CMP Report 1: Addendum 3 (Part 2), decision 16/CMP.1, annex [4]; 
Höhne, above n 17, 356. 
144 Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) Sector', above n 102, 64, 65. 
145 Ibid. Windthrow refers to trees being uprooted or broken due to severe wind. 
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annual climatic variability, caused the government not to elect to account for any 
article 3.4 activities during the first commitment period.146  
 
The Rudd government accepted that 'usual levels of variability', such as minor fires and 
pest activity, should be accounted for under forest management.147 Its main concern 
was to exclude emissions from 'major' natural disturbances, which could leave Parties 
with 'no control over meeting or exceeding their [mitigation] commitments'.148 Major 
Australian wildfires in 2003, for example, had caused 190 Mt CO2-e emissions on 
article 3.4 lands, about one third of Australia's annual 591.5 Mt CO2-e emissions 
allowance for 2008-12.149 While reporting methods under the Convention allowed 
Parties to symmetrically include or exclude CO2 removals and emissions from natural 
disturbances on 'managed lands', no such procedure existed under the Protocol.150 
 
The Rudd government was further concerned about the effects of inter-annual climatic 
variability, such as rainfall or average temperature, which also caused large annual 
variations in Australia's carbon emissions and removals.151 A single year in Australia 
could produce a large spike in emissions. In 2002, for example, inter-annual rainfall 
variability caused a jump in emissions of around 70 Mt CO2-e from croplands (about 12 
per cent of Australia's base year emissions) which was then recovered in 2003.152 The 
government wished to address this by allowing Parties to account for emissions and 
removals using a rolling average –153 for example, 3, 5 or 7 years, which would flatten 
out any emissions or removal spikes in particular years.154 This proposal received little 
attention in other Parties' submissions, and is not discussed in detail here as Parties 
instead opted to address this issue when setting forest management reference levels 
(see below). 
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147 Ibid 65. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)' (6 March 2009), above n 45, 7. 
150 Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) Sector', above n 102, 66-67. As per the 
IPCC's 2003 Good Practice Guidance for LULUCF: see Penman, above n 21, ch 3.  
151 See Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) Sector', above n 102, 65, 67. 
152 Ibid 68; Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)' (6 March 2009), above n 45, 7. 
153 Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)' (6 March 2009), above n 45, 9. 
154 Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) Sector', above n 102, 68. 
 391 
The Rudd government made clear that without appropriate rule changes being made 
to the treatment of these non-anthropogenic emissions, Australia would be unable to 
elect to account for forest management in future commitment periods, limiting 
Australia's mitigation potential in this area.155 This would have an ongoing impact on 
the completeness of Australia's accounts given that all of its forest lands were 
regarded as 'managed' under the Protocol (due to activities such as prescribed burning 
to reduce the severity of wildfires).156 As noted in chapter 6, the 'adequate treatment' 
of natural disturbances was made a condition of Australia adopting its upper 25 per 
cent reduction target for 2020.157  
 
Briefly, it should be noted that this issue overlapped with another important topic in 
the LULUCF negotiations, namely whether accounting for article 3.4 activities ought to 
be voluntary or mandatory. The G77 and China wished to stop the ability of developed 
countries to 'pick and choose' which activities they accounted for and thus called for 
accounting of all article 3.4 activities to be mandatory for the second commitment 
period.158 The Rudd government, however, made clear that it would not support a 
move to mandatory accounting unless major natural disturbance and inter-annual 
                                                     
 
155 Ibid 65. 
156 Australia, 'Australian Government Data Submission', above n 52, 2; Macintosh, 'Are Forest 
Management Reference Levels Incompatible with Robust Climate Outcomes? A Case Study on Australia', 
above n 85, 12. The IPCC Good Practice Guidance for LULUCF divided forested land into 'managed' and 
'unmanaged' categories. Only managed forest lands must be accounted for: see Penman, above n 21, ch 
3. 
157 Australian Government, FOI Australia's Target Conditions – Where Do We Stand?, above n 48, 2. See 
chapter 6 regarding Australia's 2020 target and conditions. 
158 Fry, 'If a Tree Falls in a Kyoto Forest and Nobody is There to Hear it, Will it be Accounted For?', above 
n 5, 127. 
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variability issues were addressed,159 a view shared by other developed countries  such 
as New Zealand.160 
ii) Proposals to Address Major or Extreme Non-Anthropogenic Emissions 
The Rudd government's concern regarding non-anthropogenic influences on emissions 
and removals was held by a range of other Parties, especially those with similar 
national circumstances to Australia like Canada and Russia.161 According to the 
UNFCCC, natural disturbance impacts under a second commitment period could 
amount to about 5 per cent of Annex I Parties' total non-LULUCF emissions in 1990.162  
 
To address its concerns, the Rudd government introduced a proposal to exclude the 
impacts of certain natural disturbance events. Its proposal built on the approach 
available in Convention reporting. Parties with sufficient accounting practices 
(preferably tier 3, the most stringent IPCC level) would be able to symmetrically 
include or exclude CO2 emissions and removals from 'major natural disturbances'.163 
Only emissions that were 'not direct-human induced' would be excluded.164 
Presumably this meant that emissions that were, for example, caused by deliberately 
lit fires, would be included in a Party's accounts, but the government did not make this 
clear. 
                                                     
 
159 Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) Sector', above n 102, 65-66. In 2012, 
the Gillard government reversed Australia's position, opting to account for cropland management, 
grazing land management and revegetation in the second commitment period due to satisfactory 
changes being made to the rules on major natural disturbances (see below) and improvements to the 
way Parties could estimate emissions from land activities which reduced the risk of emissions from 
natural causes being accounted for: see Australian Government, 'New Opportunities for Land Sector 
Participation in Carbon Markets' (Fact Sheet, 2013) 2. 
160 New Zealand also argued against mandatory accounting due to 'data limitations and uncertainty' and 
'the high cost of measurement and monitoring': New Zealand, 'A Submission to the Ad-Hoc Working 
Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)' (24 February 
2009), above n 107, 53. No decision was made on this issue at CMP 5, Copenhagen. Parties later agreed 
at CMP 7, Durban 2011, that accounting for forest management would be compulsory in the second 
commitment period but that other article 3.4 activities would remain voluntary: CMP 7 Report, decision 
2/CMP.7, annex [6-7]. See further, Fry, 'If a Tree Falls in a Kyoto Forest and Nobody is There to Hear it, 
will it be Accounted For?', above n 5, 127. 
161 See UNFCCC, Analysis of Possible Means to Reach Emission Reduction Targets and of Relevant 
Methodological Issues: Technical Paper, above n 58, 57; Canada, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF)', above n 104, 13.  
162 See UNFCCC, Analysis of Possible Means to Reach Emission Reduction Targets and of Relevant 
Methodological Issues: Technical Paper, above n 58, 57. 
163 Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) Sector', above n 102, 70. 
164 Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)' (Informal Data Submission to the 
UNFCCC), above n 42, 6. 
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The overarching principle behind Australia's proposal was that only anthropogenic 
emissions and removals should be accounted for.165 Key features of the proposal were 
that: 
 previous credits for removals on a unit of land prior to the major natural 
disturbance could be maintained; 
 the unit of land could re-enter the national accounts only once the CO2 
removals equalled the carbon stock losses from the disturbance event (as the 
forest regrew, absorbing CO2);  
 emissions would not be excluded if a land-use change occurred after the major 
natural disturbance, such as deforestation (to prevent creating a perverse 
incentive to deforest land affected by wildfires and other natural events); 
 the threshold for determining what amounted to a 'major natural disturbance' 
would be supplied by the Party who would need to demonstrate that the event 
was 'an anomalous event differentiated from background emissions'. This 
would be subject to expert review; 
 non-CO2 emissions would be permanently excluded from a Party's accounts (as 
non-CO2 emissions are not absorbed by terrestrial ecosystems); and  
 direct-human induced emissions and removals on the land subject to the major 
natural disturbance would still be accounted for.166   
 
Tuvalu, a developing nation which has long had a particular interest in improving 
LULUCF accounting, made a similar proposal to allow an accounting time-out for what 
it termed a force majeure event, a legal concept that exists in both international and 
domestic law.167 Tuvalu's proposal had a higher conceptual threshold for the exclusion 
of non-anthropogenic emissions, with force majeure defined by Tuvalu as 'an 
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extraordinary event or circumstance that is beyond the control of Parties'.168 The 
concept would not 'excuse negligence or other malfeasance of a Party.'169   
 
Alternative approaches were also proposed by various other Parties. PNG and others 
suggested that Parties could 'carry over' emission debits caused by such events to the 
subsequent commitment period, thus avoiding any penalties.170 This was based on the 
idea that any emission debits would be offset in future commitment periods due to 
forest regrowth.171 The Rudd government was strongly opposed, however, to any 
carry-over provision. It argued that non-anthropogenic emissions would still remain in 
Parties' accounts and would thus remove comparability between their mitigation 
commitments (as non-anthropogenic emissions would be accounted for by those that 
experienced major natural disturbances in a given commitment period but not 
others).172 It would also reduce the ability of some Parties to adopt ambitious post-
2012 mitigation targets as countries like Australia would still need to factor in the 
potential impacts of major natural disturbances.173 These concerns were clearly 
justified and were shared by countries such as Canada.174 
 
A further proposal was to introduce a 'discount factor' for awarded debits and 
credits.175 This was supported by the EU, Switzerland176 and others but opposed by 
                                                     
 
168 Tuvalu, 'Submission on Definitions, Modalities, Rules and Guidelines for the Treatment of Land Use, 
Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) in the Second Commitment Period', above n 75, 7. Emphasis 
added. As with Australia's proposal, the clause proposed addressing major non-anthropogenic events 
such as wildfire, severe pest outbreak, flooding, landslide, volcano, earthquake, or severe wind storm.  
169 Ibid.  
170 Central African Republic et al, above n 82, 20. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Australia, 'Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)' (6 March 2009), above n 45, 7-8. 
173 Ibid 8. 
174 Canada, 'Information and Data on Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)' (Informal Data 
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Australia and others including Canada and Russia.177 The Rudd government's concern 
was again that non-anthropogenic emissions would still remain in Parties' accounts, 
limiting the incentive to account for forest management and to mitigate this source of 
emissions.178 
 
The approach that ultimately received most interest was that of a time-out or force 
majeure type provision, along the lines proposed by Australia and Tuvalu. A key point 
of contention arose, however, regarding the threshold at which such a provision 
should apply. Some Parties preferred to adopt a stronger threshold than Australia. In 
preference to Australia's threshold of a 'major' natural disturbance, New Zealand and 
Indonesia shared Tuvalu's view that a force majeure clause should only apply to 
'extraordinary' natural disturbances that were beyond a Party's control and that 
resulted in a compliance risk.179 The EU was similarly chiefly concerned about 
'extreme' events causing a compliance risk.180 New Zealand suggested that 
determining what constituted a force majeure could be achieved by comparing the 
scale of the event in percentage terms to a Party's total emissions or similar factors.181  
 
                                                     
 
177 Canada, 'Views and Proposals on Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry' in UNFCCC, Further 
Elaboration of the Options, Elements and Issues Contained in Annex IV to Document 
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Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)' (28 April 2009), above n 179, 58. 
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Other Parties supported a weaker threshold. Canada argued that thresholds such as 
'major' or 'extraordinary' were unworkable due to its national circumstances. It stated 
that 'significant emissions' from natural disturbances occurred every year in Canada 
(namely from wildfires and insect infestations), 'not just on an exceptional basis'.182 
This was despite its 'substantial protection efforts'.183 Thus Canada argued that limiting 
factoring out to natural disturbance emissions that met the threshold of 'major', 
'extreme', force majeure or a 'compliance risk', would not adequately remove the 
effect of lesser natural disturbances in Canada's accounting.184 It thus proposed 
seeking guidance from the IPCC on methodological approaches for excluding natural 
disturbance emissions and removals.185  
 
Other Parties such as India were reluctant to support a force majeure provision at all. 
India argued that this was a 'grey area', highlighting that there was 'a thin line between 
an event being "force majeure" or … man-made.'186 In doing so, India raised a major 
methodological problem regarding a force majeure clause, namely, how to determine 
whether major or extreme events were 'natural' or 'anthropogenic'. Many wildfires in 
Australia, for example, are deliberately or accidentally started by humans,187 and it 
would clearly be difficult to distinguish between such emissions. India also highlighted 
the difficulty of establishing whether an event was beyond a Party's control, as it 
would need to be considered whether a Party took adequate preventative or control 
measures before and after the event, respectively.188 Japan was also cautious on this 
issue, believing that excluding natural disturbance impacts from accounting risked 
reducing the incentive to prevent natural disturbances and restore affected areas as 
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 397 
part of normal forest management activities, but was nonetheless open to a force 
majeure provision using the threshold of 'extraordinary'.189 
iii) Analysis 
There were clearly risks from an environmental effectiveness perspective in 
introducing a time-out/force majeure provision for forest management accounting, 
especially as 'natural' disturbances such as wildfires can both be caused and 
exacerbated by human activity. The type of provision being proposed by Australia and 
others undoubtedly risked introducing a new accounting loophole for developed 
countries. Australia was criticised by some environmentalists during the post-2012 
negotiations for proposing such a provision. Then Deputy Leader of the Australian 
Greens, Christine Milne, for example, labelled the Rudd government's proposal an 
attempt to 'cook the books', while Greenpeace International labelled it an 'accounting 
fraud'.190 Such critics, however, seemed to ignore the legitimate need for Parties like 
Australia to exclude emissions from events which it could not practicably control as 
well as the focus of the ICCL regime on reducing human-induced, rather than natural, 
sources of emissions. In stating this, it needs to be emphasised that Australia has, for 
many years, undertaken significant efforts to limit the extent of events such as 
wildfires through prescribed burning and other practices; yet these practices are 
typically unable to prevent major fires caused by extreme weather.191 
 
As such, notwithstanding the potential risks involved in the Rudd government's 
proposal, its call for a provision to address emissions from natural disturbances was 
warranted, at least in principle. Without such a provision, it was clear that future 
Australian governments would remain unable to account for any emissions and 
removals on forest management lands, providing no incentive to abate emissions in 
this area and limiting Australia's access to a legitimate and relatively low cost source of 
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mitigation.192 Electing to account for forest management without such a rule change, 
would put Australia at risk of breaching its future mitigation commitments, and likely 
require it and other Annex I Parties with similar national circumstances to import 
international emission permits to cover any shortfall. In reaching this conclusion, it 
should reiterated that the clear aim of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol is to address 
human-induced, rather than naturally-caused emissions,193 and thus the Rudd 
government's desire not to be held responsible for non-anthropogenic emissions was 
perfectly consistent with the objective and provisions of the ICCL regime. The ICCL 
regime's focus on mitigating anthropogenic emissions also suggests that the Rudd 
government's proposal to exclude emissions from 'major' natural events, as opposed 
to 'extraordinary' or some other particularly stringent level, was reasonable. 
 
While this chapter thus suggests that the Rudd government's negotiating positions on 
the force majeure issue were thus broadly reasonable and not inherently inconsistent 
with an environmentally effective approach, it needs to be appreciated that during the 
period of review, Parties had yet to agree on the precise threshold and conditions they 
would need to satisfy before invoking such a clause.194 It was apparent from the 
Parties' discussions that the environmental integrity of a force majeure clause would 
ultimately hinge on the precise details of when it could be invoked by Parties. 
Negotiations on this were ultimately not concluded during the period of review.195 
                                                     
 
192 Note that forest management accounting was made compulsory at CMP 7, Durban 2011, due to the 
rule changes later agreed to on this issue (see below). 
193 UNFCCC art 2; see, eg, Kyoto Protocol art 3.1. 
194 Subsequent to the first Rudd government's term in office, Australia and Canada made further 
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b) Alternatives to Gross-Net Accounting 
The second major issue for the negotiations on forest management was how to 
address the perceived inadequacies of the accounting method adopted for the first 
commitment period – gross-net accounting plus the application of general and specific 
caps. Several Annex I Parties believed that the existing rules were satisfactory and 
should be retained. Japan, for example, stated that extending the use of gross-net 
accounting and caps would provide the best incentive for sustainable forest 
management; prevent introducing new methodological challenges and arbitrariness in 
accounting; and avoid granting excessive credits.196 Having elected to account for 
forest management in the first commitment period, it also favoured continuity of the 
rules as the growth of its forests (resulting from deliberate policies to increase carbon 
removals) would take several decades.197 Many Parties, however, supported reforms 
to the rules.  
 
Several Parties strongly favoured applying net-net accounting.198 Russia, whose forest 
emissions have dropped considerably since 1990, favoured net-net accounting with a 
1990 base year, from which it would benefit.199 This approach was unpopular with 
others, however, as while it could cancel out some long-term trends in carbon ﬂuxes 
due to global warming, CO2 levels and nitrogen deposition,200 net-net accounting 
would penalise Parties such as New Zealand because of the age-class structure of its 
managed forests.201 In preference to the 1990 base year, Tuvalu proposed introducing 
net-net accounting using emissions and removals in the first commitment period as a 
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base period.202 However, New Zealand highlighted, and Tuvalu itself accepted, that 
adopting a base period would still not fully address the effects of age-class structure.203 
 
The other major alternative was to introduce forest management reference levels.204 
The most influential proposals in this regard were the 'forward-looking' approach 
promoted by Canada, and the 'bar' approach introduced by the EU.205 The Canadian 
proposal, which appeared to have most influence on the final outcome, proposed that 
debits and credits be awarded for emissions and removals that were beyond those 
expected under BAU conditions.206 The reference level (which would be subject to 
expert review) would be based on a variety of data such as forest inventories; existing 
policies to reduce emissions and removals; historical data and BAU management 
plans.207 Following the conclusion of the second commitment period, actual emissions 
and removals would be compared to the reference level, and then Parties would be 
issued with either emission debits or credits.208  
 
As an alternative to this, the African Group preferred to set the reference level based 
on historic emissions and removals only (for example, emissions or removals from 
2000-09).209 However, Canada argued that the forward-looking approach would best 
address indirect non-anthropogenic effects including age-class legacy, CO2 fertilization 
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and nitrogen deposition (as these would be factored into the reference level),210 while 
natural disturbances could also be specifically excluded.211 Canada also suggested that 
the reference level approach would remove the need for forest management caps.212  
 
Among developing countries, the G77 and China initially opposed the use of reference 
levels, being concerned about the uncertainties associated with this approach.213 
Tuvalu also cautioned that BAU reference levels would be 'complex and difficult to 
verify'.214 The G77 and China's initial opposition to the use of reference levels later 
relaxed, however, as the reference level approach became accepted within the REDD+ 
negotiations for use by developing countries in their national REDD+ schemes (see 
chapter 8).215  
 
During the period of review, Kyoto Parties failed to reach agreement on an approach 
for forest management accounting beyond 2012.216 However, Parties were invited to 
submit data on their forest management reference levels, without presuming 
particular accounting rules, by November 27, 2009.217 The Rudd government 
submitted a reference level applying a BAU approach, lending its support to this 
accounting method (see analysis below).218 This was ultimately the preferred method 
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of most developed countries and was later endorsed for use by Parties at COP 16/CMP 
6 in Cancun (December 2010).219 Parties then submitted updated reference levels at 
COP 17/CMP 7 in Durban (December 2011).220 
i) Analysis  
The question that arises on this issue is whether it was reasonable – from the 
perspective of environmental effectiveness – for the Rudd government to adopt a 
forward looking reference level approach for forest management or whether it should 
instead have backed other accounting methods.  It must be noted that it is difficult to 
fully assess the Rudd government's approach to this issue. This is because ultimately 
the rigorousness of the methodology and the accuracy of data employed by Australia 
in determining its reference level will have a major bearing on whether its reference 
level will prove to be environmentally effective. The limited period of review of this 
chapter means that such questions are outside its scope. However, it can be examined 
whether it was appropriate to back the forward-looking reference level approach at a 
more general level.  
 
To begin with, it is clear that while some Parties backed the status quo on forest 
management accounting, the methodology adopted for the first commitment period 
was demonstrably flawed. Gross-net accounting, as highlighted by various Parties and 
in the literature, clearly failed to adequately isolate the human impact on forestry 
emissions and removals, meaning that Parties could receive either windfall gains or 
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liabilities regardless of their direct policy measures.221 The deficiencies of this 
accounting method provided little encouragement for many Parties to elect to account 
for forest management in Kyoto's first commitment period.222  
 
Net-net accounting is generally regarded as an improvement upon gross-net 
accounting, especially if a long base-period is used.223 This approach is relatively simple 
to implement and partly removes indirect and natural disturbance effects. This is 
because if these non-anthropogenic effects have an equivalent impact both in the base 
period and in the accounting period, the effects may cancel each other out.224 
However, net-net accounting still reflects indirect effects and natural disturbances 
where these change between the two periods of comparison.225 Fixed net-net 
baselines also have a diminishing capacity to remove the effects of age-class structure 
and CO2 fertilisation as trees mature.226 As noted, Kyoto Parties rejected net-net 
accounting for forest management in the Marrakesh Accords as a result of such 
concerns.  
 
Given deficiencies in the above approaches, the interest in the use reference levels 
was clearly understandable. As noted, however, Parties like Tuvalu raised concerns 
about the environmental integrity of this approach, a concern shared by 
environmental groups such as Climate Action Network International (CANI).227 CANI 
argued that forward-looking baselines would, among other things, 'disconnect the 
accounting mechanism from reality' and be 'open to manipulation and impossible to 
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verify'.228 Essentially, by introducing the use of BAU projections as a basis for 
measuring emission reductions, the BAU reference level approach could create similar 
credibility problems to those experienced by the Clean Development Mechanism, and 
which are anticipated for reference levels under REDD+ (see chapters 7 and 8, 
respectively). This is because 'there is no fool proof way of making counterfactual 
forecasts' of BAU emissions.229 
 
CANI further argued that the forward-looking reference level approach could allow 
Parties to include increased forest harvesting in their baselines, but escape receiving 
increased debits by describing these as BAU activities.230 This latter concern was 
particularly significant. According to Greenglass et al, the reference levels submitted by 
Annex I Parties (as of October 2010) would see removals due to forest management 
plans reduce significantly (from historic levels of -937 Mt CO2e per year (1990-2008) to 
-484 Mt CO2-e per year).231 Thus the atmosphere could see an increase of 453 Mt CO2-
e per year from forest management activities, an increase that would not be recorded 
in Annex I Parties' accounts under the reference level approach.232 Furthermore, 
Parties could potentially avoid any penalty for increasing emissions from future 
management activities by including these in their projected baselines.233 Given the 
types of concerns raised above, both Greenglass et al and CANI argued that Parties 
ought to have adopted a net-net approach to accounting with a historical base period 
(1990-2008, or at least 10 years).234  
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Turning to the specifics of Australia's reference level, the Rudd government's initial 
submission to the UNFCCC in December 2009 projected annual removals on forest 
management lands of -9.16 Mt CO2-e (between 2013-2020).235 The Rudd government 
did not publicly provide details on precisely how this reference level was derived. 
However, the Gillard government later provided information on this as part of the 
Parties' ongoing activities on this topic.236 While this thesis is concerned only with the 
actions of the Rudd government, it appears that the reference levels submitted by the 
Gillard government were largely based on the work of its predecessor, meaning that 
some lessons can be drawn from the information it provided. 
 
Macintosh's analysis of the reference levels submitted by the Gillard government 
found that there were a number of dangers created by its accounting approach. 
Several aspects of Australia's reference level could lead to 'false accounting',237 
especially, the government's definition of managed lands; data uncertainties in 
relation to native forests and major natural disturbances; and uncertainties in technical 
modelling of emissions and removals.238 Estimating future emissions also required the 
government to make assumptions about factors such as the rate of forest harvesting; 
the likely level of emissions under a BAU scenario; and the impact of major natural 
disturbances, all of which required judgements to be made.239 Irrespective of the 
methods applied in determining the reference level, this meant that there would 
'remain a significant risk of credits and debits being recorded for changes in net 
emissions that … [were] not attributable to additional direct anthropogenic actions.'240  
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On the other hand, Macintosh noted that the BAU reference level approach potentially 
also had advantages from an environmental effectiveness perspective, as both gross-
net and net-net accounting approaches could result in large windfall credits being 
awarded to Australia.241 The advantage of the reference level approach was that it 
could better isolate the additional direct anthropogenic influence on forest carbon 
fluxes.242 While uncertainties associated with counterfactual projections meant that 
'considerable scope' existed for 'false accounting', this risk could be guarded against if 
a cap was placed on the use of credits.243 This was ultimately the approach adopted by 
Parties at CMP 7, December 2011, with decision 2/CMP.7 restricting the use of forest 
management credits to 3.5 per cent of a Party's base year emissions.244 The cap had 
been pushed for by the G77 and China since 2010,245 but opposed by the Rudd 
government – who wished to use LULUCF offsets as fully as possible – 246 and other 
developed countries including New Zealand.247 As a further safeguard, Parties agreed 
to a procedure that would allow ex-post adjustments to be made to reference levels 
where these proved to be incorrect.248 
 
Overall, it is clear that a number of risks were associated with the BAU reference level 
approach adopted by the Rudd government. It is also apparent, however, that this 
approach evolved in response to a genuine need to find a more accurate means of 
excluding the impacts of non-anthropogenic effects on forest management emissions 
and removals and that the forward-looking approach offered many advantages in this 
regard. As such, the Rudd government's preference for the forward-looking reference 
level approach appeared, again, to be broadly reasonable. Only time will tell, however, 
whether the use of BAU reference levels by Australia and other Parties will prove to be 
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environmentally effective. That is, while Australia's approach was defensible in 
principle, the proof of its merits will require analysis of its effectiveness in practice at a 
later date. 
C Implications for GIC 
As argued in previous chapters, a GIC would generally be expected to pursue 
environmentally effective approaches in order to act consistently with the ultimate 
purpose of the Convention, namely, to reduce GHG emissions so as to avoid dangerous 
climate change.249 This was the key test of GIC in relation to the Rudd government's 
engagement with the negotiations on LULUCF. Environmental effectiveness was a 
major concern due to a range of factors including the high complexity involved in 
accounting for land sector emissions and removals and the ability of Annex I Parties to 
game the LULUCF rules in their favour (as the Howard government did for Australia in 
relation to article 3.7 at Kyoto).  
 
This chapter highlighted that many developing countries were initially opposed to any 
modifications being made to the LULUCF rules for the second commitment period, 
being concerned that Annex I Parties would increase their reliance on LULUCF 
removals at the expense of reducing fossil fuel emissions. While these concerns were 
certainly understandable, it would clearly be wrong to suggest that in order to be a GIC 
Australia ought to have backed the status quo. This is because there were undoubtedly 
major deficiencies in the first commitment period rules and thus there was a justifiable 
basis for seeking accounting reforms. The question, however, is whether the changes 
sought by Australia were likely to improve the environmental integrity of LULUCF 
accounting, or conversely, to detract from it.  
 
Regarding the 'rules before targets' issue, while criticised by some Parties, this chapter 
found that there were sound policy reasons for the Rudd government to seek a 
decision on the new rules prior to developed countries announcing their targets. This 
was a sensible approach as the accounting rules can heavily modify the stringency of 
Parties' mitigation targets. Thus, an early agreement on the rules would have allowed 
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Annex I Parties to more accurately compare the strength of their commitments. 
Further, it would have avoided the potential for a repeat of the Australia clause 
situation in which a Party's headline mitigation target was subsequently watered down 
by favourable accounting rules. Given the difficulty Parties had in agreeing upon new 
rules, however, the Rudd government ultimately adopted a responsible position by 
announcing its post-2012 target prior to a new decision on LULUCF being reached. 
 
Regarding activity versus land-based accounting, the Rudd government also appeared 
to adopt a responsible position. The activity-based approach adopted in the Protocol 
was widely recognised to be flawed, however, Parties also accepted that emissions 
data was not yet sufficiently accurate to enable a move to land-based accounting in 
the second commitment period. As such, the Rudd government's emphasis on 
transitioning towards land-based accounting in a third commitment period appeared 
to be sensible. 
 
Regarding HWP accounting, it was noted that some developing countries were 
concerned about the accuracy of HWP data. However, there again appeared to be 
sound reasons for including HWP in the second commitment period. This was because 
doing so would more accurately reflect when emissions actually occur and also 
incentivise the use of long-lived wood products as a mitigation strategy. Similarly, 
there appeared to be sound reasons behind Australia's backing for the inclusion of new 
article 3.4 activities (subject to accurate data being available), given that this would 
encourage some Parties to account for a broader land-area (such as wetlands or peat 
lands) as a transitional measure towards full land-based accounting. 
 
As noted, the major issue addressed by Parties during the period of review, and the 
focus of the Rudd government, was how to improve forest management accounting. It 
was seen that the gross-net accounting method adopted by the Parties during the first 
commitment period prevented several developed countries, including Australia, from 
accounting for this activity. This was perfectly understandable, given the potential of 
natural emission events to overwhelm emission reduction efforts in other sectors. The 
Rudd government's proposal to provide Annex I Parties with a time out clause for 
major natural disturbance events appeared to make a solid contribution to the 
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negotiations on this topic. However, there were also obvious risks involved, including 
that Parties would seek to 'pass off' anthropogenic emissions (such as deliberately lit 
fires or poor management of fires) as natural disturbances. The government also 
provided little clarification (in quantitative terms) of exactly how severe natural 
disturbance events would need to be to warrant being excluded from a Party's 
accounts. Given the emphasis of the ICCL regime on reducing anthropogenic 
emissions, however, it seems clear that the Rudd government's approach was 
generally warranted, and that the methodological difficulties simply needed to be 
resolved by Parties going forward.  
 
Similarly, it is clear that there were legitimate reasons behind the Rudd government's 
desire to move away from gross-net accounting. It was seen, however, that there were 
also risks associated with the BAU reference level approach it supported, including that 
it relied on the ability of Parties to make accurate assumptions about the likely impact 
of government policies on emissions or the expected impact of natural disturbances. If 
Australia's reference level proved to be inaccurate there were certainly risks that it 
could be awarded windfall credits in the second commitment period. Nonetheless, as 
with the issue of excluding major natural disturbances, the use of a BAU reference 
level appeared to have sound policy justifications, notwithstanding the risks involved, 
given the deficiency of alternative accounting options. Parties would clearly need to 
monitor the environmental effectiveness of the BAU reference level approach, 
however, and make adjustments in future if it proved to be flawed. 
 
Overall, then, this chapter suggests that the Rudd government generally adopted 
defensible positions from an environmental effectiveness standpoint.  
 
As with the topics previously considered by this thesis, this chapter again contends 
that displaying leadership was important to the government's GIC credentials (which is 
both expected of developed countries by article 3.1 UNFCCC, and a key general 
attribute of GIC as articulated by Gareth Evans). Given the potential of LULUCF 
accounting reforms to undermine the credibility of land sector abatement, promoting 
environmentally effective approaches was an obvious means by which a Party could 
distinguish itself as a 'good' rather than 'average' or 'poor' citizen on this topic. 
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Regarding leadership, it is clear that the Rudd government did not display the blatantly 
nationalistic behaviour of the Howard government in negotiating article 3.7 at Kyoto. 
Certainly, the Rudd government's positions were also aimed at advancing Australia's 
narrow self-interest, namely, its economic interest in opening up a new source of low-
cost abatement opportunities in forest management – thus reducing the overall cost to 
Australia of meeting its post-2012 mitigation target. However, unlike its predecessor, 
the Rudd government did not appear to push these narrow economic interests to an 
unreasonable extent. This is because its proposals generally appeared to be aimed at 
unlocking genuine sources of abatement for Australia, rather than windfall credits.  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Rudd government's positions were generally 
defensible, it is clear that it could have done more to demonstrate leadership in terms 
of improving the environmental effectiveness of land sector accounting. For example, 
there were strong indicators that given the risks involved in introducing a time-
out/force majeure clause and BAU reference levels, a precautionary approach was 
needed (as expected by article 3.3 UNFCCC),250 and thus a new cap on forest 
management was appropriate for the second commitment period. Establishing a cap 
would also have helped to address developing countries' legitimate concerns that 
Annex I Parties would rely excessively on LULUCF offsets in future, at the expense of 
reducing fossil fuel emissions. While, as noted, Annex I Parties did later agree to a new 
forest management cap at CMP 7 (December 2011), this move was not supported by 
the Rudd government during its involvement in the negotiations. Indeed, the 
government indicated that Australia would not adopt its mid and upper range 
mitigation targets for 2020 (of 15 and 25 per cent, respectively) if a cap was placed on 
the use of LULUCF sinks.251  
 
Similarly, the Rudd government could have done more to address concerns that major 
human-induced emissions, such as those resulting from deliberately lit fires, could be 
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excluded from Parties' accounts by classifying them as natural events. It could, for 
example, have proposed specific rules for inclusion in a LULUCF decision. In the same 
vein, it could have suggested specific rules on how to distinguish between 'major' and 
'non-major' natural disturbance events, to help place reasonable limits on which 
emission events may be factored out. Further, if the Rudd government genuinely 
wished to be a leader on LULUCF, it could have offered to correct the windfall gain 
Australia received in the first commitment period by virtue of article 3.7. This could 
have been achieved, for example, by undertaking to purchase international emission 
permits at a level equivalent to the quantity of non-genuine abatement Australia 
would be credited with by virtue of the Australia clause.  
 
Regarding other general attributes of GIC identified in chapter 1, several of these were 
again relevant to this issue. In particular, attributes such as acting for 'purposes 
beyond ourselves' and 'enlightened self-interest' support the view that it was 
incumbent upon the government to advance environmentally effective approaches, 
such as a forest management cap and rules to transparently distinguishing between 
major and non-major natural disturbances, and natural and anthropogenic emissions. 
This is because Australia and other Parties' long-term interests undoubtedly lay in 
having credible LULUCF accounting rules which helped to achieve the goal of avoiding 
dangerous climate change.  
 
As with all other topics assessed by this thesis, the Rudd government's cooperative 
engagement with the LULUCF negotiations was indicative of an internationalist, 
activist, multilateralist and institutionalist approach. The government also 'pitched in', 
contributing useful policy inputs to Parties' deliberations. While it could have done 
more to advance environmentally effective accounting rules, its approach nonetheless 
displayed a general commitment to international law as the preferred means of 
resolving this issue.  
 
Overall, it is apparent that the Rudd government made a solid contribution to the 
negotiations on LULUCF and the positions it advanced generally had a reasonable 
policy basis. It is too early, however, to conclusively assess the impact of the major 
changes sought by the Rudd government during its term in office – namely, the 
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exclusion of major natural disturbances, the use of BAU reference levels and HWP 
accounting. The new LULUCF rules eventually adopted at CMP 7 in Durban (which 
incorporated a number of the positions favoured by the Rudd government) will likely 
need to operate for several years before the true ramifications of its negotiating 
positions are known. Complicating assessment of this topic was the fact that a new 
decision on LULUCF was not settled by Kyoto Parties until CMP 7 – meaning that the 
analysis in this chapter only covers the early period of the negotiations on the LULUCF 
rules. It should also be noted that assessing the behaviour of the government on this 
issue was especially difficult due to the particularly technical nature of the land sector 
rules, which make it challenging for those outside the negotiating process or the 
relevant government bureaucracies to fully assess their implications.  
 
Leaving aside these limitations, this chapter suggests that the Rudd government is best 
described as an 'average' international citizen on the LULUCF issue. The government 
did not, by and large, appear to unreasonably advance Australia's narrow self-interest 
in the negotiations, in contrast to the earlier Howard government. However, its 
negotiating emphasis was unquestionably on achieving rule changes that would 
advantage Australia by providing it with greater LULUCF abatement opportunities. 
While there is nothing inherently wrong with this approach, arguably it needed to 
display a greater level of leadership in promoting environmental effectiveness to 
distinguish itself as a GIC. This is especially so given the higher level of conduct 
associated with the GIC ideal. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
'At the heart of the concept [of good international citizenship] is the notion that every country 
has a major interest in seeing the … resolution of what Kofi Annan used to describe as 
transnational "problems without passports", which are by their nature beyond the capacity of 
any one of them, however great and powerful, to deliver or resolve.' Gareth Evans, 2012.1  
 
A Assessing Good International Citizenship: Final Remarks 
The aim of this thesis has been to assess whether the first Rudd Labor government 
qualified as a good international citizen (GIC) in its engagement with international 
climate change law (ICCL) from December 2007 to June 2010. The major focus of 
analysis has been the government's engagement with the post-2012 climate 
negotiations – this being the key development in ICCL during the period of review – 
and more specifically, the topic of mitigation, the central issue for the climate 
negotiations to address. 
1 What is Good International Citizenship? 
The initial challenge for this thesis was to understand the meaning of the term GIC 
(often used interchangeably with 'good global citizen') and to determine how to apply 
the concept to the thesis question. The notion of GIC was first popularised in Australia 
in the late 1980s by former Labor Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, who argued that 
alongside traditional security and economic interests, Australia had an interest in 
'being, and being seen to be a good international citizen'.2  
 
At its most basic level, the notion of GIC reflects an uncontroversial view that there are 
both 'good' and lesser forms of international conduct by states which have a bearing 
on their standing as members or 'citizens' of the international community. In other 
words, GIC involves the practice of some form of ethical or 'higher' behaviour by states 
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Lecture, Sydney, 14 August 2012) <http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech482.html>.  
2 Gareth Evans, Making Australian Foreign Policy (Australian Fabian Society, 1989) 9. 
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in the international realm. The problem of course is that identifying what distinguishes 
good from bad international conduct, and the shades of grey in between, is often not a 
straightforward task. There are many examples of behaviour that most would readily 
agree provide clear evidence of good or bad international citizenship. For example, 
providing humanitarian relief to a country affected by a natural disaster is an obvious 
example of GIC, just as failing to protect human rights enshrined in international law is 
a clear example of bad international citizenship. There are many issues on which states 
are engaged, however, where determining what GIC requires, and whether the 
standard has been met, is far less clear-cut. 
 
This thesis formed the view that Evans' writings and speeches on GIC provided the best 
starting point for understanding the concept, notwithstanding the growing body of 
academic literature that has emerged on the topic since Evans first made GIC an 
official goal of the Hawke and Labor governments' foreign policy. This was in large part 
because Evans' articulation of GIC still appears to best represent how Australian 
governments, especially on the Labor side of politics, broadly understand the concept. 
Based on an extensive review of Evans' writings and speeches on GIC, as well as the 
relevant literature, this thesis identified a number of attributes or characteristics that 
Evans associated with the concept. These were identified as follows (while noting that 
some overlap exists between several of them): 
 adopting an internationalist, cooperative approach to international affairs, 
rather than an isolationist one;  
 an activist, rather than passive or reflexive,  approach to addressing 
international issues; 
 the display of leadership; 
 'pitching in' to international tasks – such as contributing to humanitarian or 
peacekeeping efforts; 
 promoting more ethical or moral courses of action – including seeking to 
advance 'purposes beyond ourselves', not just narrow self-interest; 
 practising a values-based foreign policy – especially one influenced by 
universal values such as human rights;  
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 embracing a broader or more 'enlightened' approach to determining where 
the national interest actually lies  – that is, advancing 'enlightened self-
interest'; 
 supporting multilateralism and international institutions like the United 
Nations; 
 supporting, and complying with, international law; 
 being a good neighbour – that is, being a good citizen within one's own region;  
 acting consistently on the domestic front with the values and agendas a GIC 
promotes abroad; and 
 striking a defensible balance between idealism and realism. While promoting a 
more idealistic approach to foreign policy, Evans emphasised that GICs needed 
to be realistic about what they could achieve in international affairs in light of 
both international and domestic constraints (whether political, economic, or 
other). Thus Evans did not suggest that narrow self-interest must be 
completely sacrificed by GICs. Rather, GIC was about seeking to achieve more 
idealistic or ethical outcomes within the constraints of government. 
 
With respect to international law, the major concern of this thesis, Evans' writings and 
speeches indicated that a GIC would be expected to engage appropriately in the four 
major stages of the international legal process, namely by: 
 helping to develop international law in a positive direction – such as in 
negotiating new treaties to tackle global problems; 
 adopting relevant international treaties and other instruments such as 
declarations (through ratification or signature, as required); 
 complying with all of its international legal obligations; and 
 generally playing a role in the advancement and upholding of international 
legal norms within the international community, such as by encouraging other 
nations to adopt treaties or holding them to account for any infractions. 
 
It was clear from Evans' account of GIC that the various general attributes of GIC 
outlined above were highly relevant to how a GIC ought to engage with the 
international legal system. For example, a GIC would be expected to be an active 
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participant in treaty bodies, show leadership in developing new international law, and 
generally advance its legal interests in a more ethical fashion. 
 
Evans' enthusiasm for GIC was in part driven by 'hard-headed' reasons, with the 
Foreign Minister believing that in an increasingly globalised and interdependent world, 
acting as a GIC was vital to advancing Australia's broader and longer-term interests. 
But it was also driven by a belief that behaving as a GIC was inherently, from an ethical 
or moral standpoint, the right thing to do. GIC endorsed the view that with citizenship 
of the international community comes a responsibility to advance more than just the 
base interests of the state's domestic citizenry. While accepting that the furtherance of 
narrow national interests, especially security and economic ones, will always be a 
fundamental expectation of government by those who elect them, GIC essentially 
promoted the idea that states have ethical responsibilities to a larger group of 'moral 
constituencies', chief among them, the international community; humankind more 
generally; future generations; and on environmental issues like climate change, non-
human species.3 Whether or not a state meets the standard of GIC is thus often 
determined by the manner and extent to which it favours particular national interests 
over and above the needs of its broader moral constituencies, and vice versa. 
 
At this point, two things need to be said about GIC. First, while Evans' articulation of 
the concept has been influential on this thesis, there is of course no 'correct' account 
of GIC. While it may be possible to agree upon its broad features, ultimately it is a 
subjective concept meaning that any particular account will always reflect the 
                                                     
 
3 To this extent, a GIC can perhaps be viewed as what Lawler terms a 'mediating agent between 
competing moral realms': Peter Lawler, 'The Good State: In Praise of "Classical" Internationalism' (2005) 
31 Review of International Studies 427, 446. Lawler uses this description in relation to the conceptually 
similar notion of the 'good state'.  
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worldview and philosophical leanings of the person providing it.4 It was noted in the 
literature review, for example, that Evans' vision of GIC drew either explicitly or 
implicitly upon multiple political and academic traditions, among them realism, 
idealism, liberal internationalism, citizenship discourse and social democracy. Evans' 
account of GIC thus reflects a Western – not to mention an Australian and Australian 
Labor Party – perspective of what GIC entails, but other perspectives are of course 
possible.  
 
Second, while Evans' account of GIC underpinned how this thesis understood the 
concept, it needs to be emphasised that context is always highly significant to the 
interpretation and assessment of GIC. The thesis identified a range of GIC attributes in 
chapter 1, however, not all of these were found to be equally relevant to, or 
determinative of, the thesis question. Thus scholars need to exercise judgement as to 
which attributes of GIC are actually significant to a given issue. Moreover, the 
attributes of GIC espoused by Evans should only be regarded as the starting point, not 
the final word, on what constitutes GIC. This is because once a close analysis of a 
particular subject is undertaken new attributes relevant to distinguishing good from 
poor international citizenship may become apparent.  
2 Which Attributes of GIC Were Most Determinative? 
As stated in earlier chapters, this thesis argues that the key attribute or characteristic 
which distinguished 'good' from lesser forms of conduct in the current context, was 
the extent to which the Rudd government respected the established principles and 
provisions of the ICCL regime, and where relevant, broader international law norms. 
This attribute followed from the general expectation that a GIC ought to be supportive 
of, and comply with, international law. It was also suggested by the context, namely, 
                                                     
 
4 This thesis' explanation of GIC differs, for example, from that of Pert, a legal scholar who also drew 
upon the work of Evans. Pert suggests that the major attributes of GIC are compliance or engagement 
with international law, support for multilateralism, willingness to 'pitch in' to international tasks, 
'international good deeds', and leadership, in the sense of raising international standards. Pert's thesis 
focused on the first two of these attributes, judging that they were of most interest and relevance to an 
international lawyer: see Alison Pert, 'Australia as a Good International Citizen from Barton to Howard: 
An International Law Perspective' (PhD Thesis, University of Sydney, 2010) 327-328. This thesis agrees 
that these are relevant attributes of GIC but has adopted a more expansive approach to defining GIC 
and how it can be assessed. 
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the Rudd government's involvement in negotiations under the ICCL regime, in which 
relatively clear ethical expectations were established for Parties by the 1992 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),5 the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol,6 as well as subsequent decisions of the treaty Parties including the Bali 
Roadmap.7 While the ICCL framework established little in the way of legally binding 
obligations on Parties in relation to the negotiation of a post-2012 agreement, it did 
provide a clear set of legal expectations. These included, for example, that Parties 
would act consistently with the ultimate objective of the Convention – the need to 
avoid dangerous climate change (article 2 UNFCCC); would act on the basis of equity 
and common but differentiated responsibilities (article 3.1 UNFCCC); and that 
developed countries would adopt mitigation targets that reflected a comparative level 
of effort (decision 1/CP.13 Bali Action Plan).8  
 
Of course, given the capacity of the ICCL regime to evolve through the adoption of new 
treaties and decisions, the established provisions and principles of the ICCL regime 
were open to negotiation. Parties were also free to disagree on how principles such as 
common but differentiated responsibility should be interpreted. Nonetheless, the 
established principles and provisions of the ICCL regime provided solid guidance as to 
how 'good' treaty Parties would conduct themselves, especially where the legitimacy 
of these principles and provisions were well accepted by the Parties. Similarly, there 
was an expectation that Parties would act in accordance with well accepted legal 
norms or principles of broader international law, where relevant, such as those 
contained in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP).9 
                                                     
 
5 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1771 
UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994). 
6 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 
16 March 1998, 2303 UNTS 148 (entered into force 16 February 2005). 
7 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008), decision 1/CP.13; UNFCCC, Report of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol on its Resumed Fourth 
Session, UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5 (5 February 2008) annex I. 
8 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008), [1(b)(i)]. 
9 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st sess, 
107th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007). 
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Probably the key legal expectation overall was the need for the Rudd government to 
act consistently with the Convention's ultimate objective of avoiding dangerous 
climate change. The principle of leadership (article 3.1) was also judged to be highly 
relevant to many of the issues under examination (an attribute also generally 
associated with GIC by Evans). Leadership was often singled out as a particularly 
important legal principle, and GIC attribute, precisely because this quality was all too 
lacking from developed countries in the post-2012 negotiations, yet was essential if 
the negotiations were to achieve a successful outcome. Another principle argued to be 
especially important, was the need for the Rudd government to promote and adopt 
environmentally effective emission reduction measures, that is, measures that would 
likely result in genuine emissions abatement. This was not an explicit principle of the 
UNFCCC, but was clearly implied given that the central purpose of the ICCL regime is to 
reduce GHG emissions so as to avoid dangerous climate change.  
 
A number of GIC attributes associated with Evans (other than leadership) – such as the 
need to promote purposes beyond ourselves and to adopt restraint in the pursuit of 
narrow self-interest – were also relevant to the issues examined by this thesis, and 
thus were commented upon in previous chapters. The thesis found that the notion 
that GICs must balance both idealism and realism particularly relevant, as it was 
evident that the Rudd government faced many conflicting concerns and interests in 
determining its response to climate change. While a GIC is expected to adopt a more 
idealistic and less self-interested approach to international affairs, the thesis accepted 
that governments generally do not have the luxury of being able to ignore pragmatic 
or realistic considerations. Rather, they typically need to balance a range of factors, 
both idealistic and realistic (and often involving multiple moral constituencies), in 
determining what course of action to take. As such, the thesis sought to take due 
account in assessing GIC of any legitimate international and domestic constraints upon 
the Rudd government's behaviour.  
 
On the issue of climate change it was clear that the government faced genuine 
economic and political challenges on the domestic front in seeking to act as a GIC, 
given the potentially significant impact of strong abatement measures for economic 
prosperity and jobs and the absence of bipartisan political support for strong action on 
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climate change. This is not to say that pragmatic constraints should always be regarded 
as excusing poor conduct, and generally this thesis judged that they did not. However, 
the thesis accepted that it is an important part of the GIC analysis if only to help 
understand, if not necessarily excuse, situations in which a government may fail to live 
up to the higher standards expected of a GIC. 
B Concluding Assessment of the Rudd Government's Performance as an 
International Citizen 
It will be evident to the reader that several attributes of GIC associated with Evans in 
chapter 1 were not directly commented on, while others only received relatively brief 
consideration, in the chapters examining the Rudd government's engagement with 
ICCL. This was because they were not regarded to be the most determinative of GIC, 
with the thesis placing greatest weight on the extent to which the government's 
approach respected the relevant international legal framework. At this point, however, 
it is useful to consider these attributes more holistically in relation to the issues 
examined in chapters 5 to 9. 
 
When the Rudd government's activities are viewed as a whole, it is clear that it 
certainly displayed much behaviour that was consistent with the notion of GIC as 
articulated by Evans. To begin with, the government clearly adopted an internationalist 
and cooperative approach to addressing climate change on all issues, as evidenced by 
its high level of engagement in the post-2012 negotiations. Similarly, the government 
undoubtedly adopted an activist approach, both internationally and domestically – for 
example, in making numerous submissions to the post-2012 negotiations; working 
directly with Indonesia on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD); and in seeking to implement a domestic emissions trading 
scheme (ETS). The government also demonstrated a strong willingness to 'pitch in' to 
international efforts to address climate change, as demonstrated, for example, by its 
commitment of fast-start financing for developing countries in the Copenhagen 
 421 
Accord;10 its pledge to reduce Australia's emissions by up to 25 per cent by 2020; and 
its involvement in establishing a REDD demonstration project in Indonesia.  
 
It was argued in chapter 6 that the Rudd government's 5 to 25 per cent target for 2020 
was insufficiently ambitious to be consistent with GIC. However, while less than 
perfect, its willingness to reduce emissions by up to 25 per cent nonetheless broadly 
demonstrated a desire to adopt a reasonably ethical approach to mitigation. This is 
certainly evident when compared to the behaviour of the earlier conservative Howard 
government who was unapologetic in pressing Australia's narrow self-interest in the 
Kyoto Protocol negotiations, unjustifiably winning Australia the right to increase its 
emissions in the first commitment period. The Rudd government's characterisation of 
climate change as a moral issue, as well as its stated desire for Australia to make a fair 
contribution to the global mitigation effort, also indicated that Labor's approach to 
climate change was driven at least to some extent by values, not just strategic 
interests. 
 
Other positives for the Rudd government included that its active and generally 
cooperative engagement with the post-2012 negotiations demonstrated a strong 
commitment to multilateral means of addressing climate change, as well as the 
relevant international institutions (chiefly the UNFCCC, which is both a treaty and a 
treaty body). The Rudd government also generally acted consistently at home with its 
statements and activities abroad, especially as evidenced by its attempt to legislate an 
ETS to ensure that Australia could meet any future emission reduction commitments. 
There was also evidence of Australia being a good neighbour, for example, in its REDD 
activities with Indonesia; although as noted in earlier chapters, the government's 
insufficient global and Australian mitigation targets undermined its standing as a good 
neighbour in other respects, with many of Australia's Pacific neighbours' interests not 
being well-served by Australia's positions in this regard. 
 
                                                     
 
10 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010), decision 2/CP.15. 
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Regarding international law, it was argued that the Rudd government's negotiating 
positions often fell short of giving full effect to relevant principles of the UNFCCC, such 
as the need to demonstrate developed country leadership. Viewed more holistically, 
however, it is clear that the Rudd government generally demonstrated a strong level of 
overall support for the ICCL regime, seeing it as the pre-eminent forum for addressing 
climate change. This was evident, for example, in its decision to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol – reversing Australia's steadfast opposition to this treaty under the Howard 
government; its active involvement in the post-2012 negotiations; and its stated 
preference for the international community to adopt a legally-binding post-2012 
agreement to supplement or replace the Protocol. 
 
General higher level comments should also be made regarding the government's 
activities in relation to the four phases of the international legal process. Regarding the 
development phase of international law, the primary concern of this thesis, it was seen 
in earlier chapters that many of the government's post-2012 negotiating positions 
were flawed in various respects. Key deficiencies included, for example, its preferred 
global and Australian mitigation targets, which were too weak, and its push for Annex I 
Parties to have unlimited access to international carbon credits. Notwithstanding this, 
it would be unfair to conclude that the Rudd government's activities did not, on 
balance, help to advance ICCL in a positive direction. This is because the type of post-
2012 agreement sought by Australia, while not going far enough to achieve the 
ultimate objective of the Convention, nonetheless generally represented an 
advancement from the status quo.  
 
Regarding the adoption phase of the international legal process, it was certainly to the 
Rudd government's credit that it ratified the Kyoto Protocol, backed the Bali Roadmap 
at the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP) (December 2007), and endorsed the 
Copenhagen Accord at COP 15 (December 2009).  
 
Regarding the compliance phase, it was noted that there was no need for the Rudd 
government to establish new laws or policies to enable Australia to meet its mitigation 
target under Kyoto's first commitment period. Nor was there any obligation on the 
government to establish new laws or policies for the post-2012 era, given that a new 
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global agreement was yet to be established. Thus it was a major credit to the 
government that it sought to legislate an ETS in 2009 – the Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme (CPRS) – in order to show leadership and position Australia to meet its future 
international mitigation obligations. As discussed further below, however, the 
government showed less concern about whether or not it complied with its largely soft 
law commitments under the UNFCCC in negotiating a post-2012 agreement, such as 
the need to act in accordance with the principles of developed country leadership or 
the precautionary principle (article 3.3). Similar comments could be made in relation to 
how it viewed its commitments under the UNDRIP in relation to REDD+. 
 
There was also a role for GICs to play in the fourth major stage of the international 
legal process, that of generally advancing and upholding international legal norms 
within the international community. There was an obvious need, for example, for 
Parties to continue encouraging the United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and to 
pressure Parties like Canada to comply with their Kyoto mitigation commitments (with 
the latter country not being on track to do so and ultimately choosing to withdraw 
from the treaty).11 It is difficult to properly comment on the Rudd government's 
performance in this regard, however, as it was not a focus of research for the thesis, 
and therefore it is not clear what, if any, representations were made by the Rudd 
government to other Parties in this regard. 
1 Summary of Key Findings 
The above analysis of the Rudd government's activities demonstrates that the 
government certainly did much that was consistent with the notion of GIC. However, in 
evaluating the government's performance, this thesis ultimately placed the greatest 
weight on the extent to which the government complied with the relevant 
international legal framework, chiefly as provided by the ICCL regime. 
 
                                                     
 
11 Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol because it would not be able to meet its target without 
purchasing a significant quantity of international credits: Kent, Peter, 'Statement by Minister Kent' 
(Ottawa, 12 December 2011) <http://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=FFE36B6D-
1&news=6B04014B-54FC-4739-B22C-F9CD9A840800>. 
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To summarise the findings of chapters 5 to 9, chapter 5 found that the Rudd 
government's push for a 450 ppm CO2-e/2°C climate agreement was unlikely to be 
sufficient to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention – avoiding dangerous 
climate change – especially for the most vulnerable countries. The preferable approach 
would have been to back the 350 ppm CO2-e/1.5°C target favoured by the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). This latter target 
provided much better prospects of achieving the ultimate objective of the Convention 
and supporting it would have been more consistent with several principles contained 
in article 3 UNFCCC such as the precautionary principle and the requirement to give 
full consideration to the needs of the particularly vulnerable countries (article 3.2). 
Similar arguments applied to the Rudd government's preferred goal of reducing global 
emissions by 50 per cent by 2050 (below 2000 levels) and for global emissions to peak 
by 2020, which were also demonstrably too weak. Australia's preferred targets were of 
course likely to be more economically and technologically feasible and had greater 
prospects of being adopted in a post-2012 agreement. However, it was argued that in 
order to be a GIC on this issue the government needed to back global mitigation 
targets that were actually consistent with achieving the ultimate objective of the 
Convention. 
 
Regarding the Rudd government's commitment to reduce Australia's emissions by 5 to 
25 per cent by 2020, chapter 6 accepted that its upper pledge broadly represented a 
comparable or proportionate contribution to a 450 ppm CO2-e agreement in which 
developed countries collectively reduced their emissions by about 30 per cent below 
1990 levels (which was broadly its intention). However, it was argued, for similar 
reasons to above, that to be consistent with GIC the government needed to adopt a 
stronger upper target that was capable of realising the more ambitious 350 ppm CO2-
e/1.5°C stabilisation goal. Various UNFCCC principles including equity, common but 
differentiated responsibility and developed country leadership also suggested that 
developed countries likely needed to collectively reduce their emissions by more than 
30 per cent, as was demanded by developing countries, also necessitating a higher 
reduction target from Australia. Crucially, the government itself indicated that its 5 to 
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25 per cent target was intended to do 'no more and no less' than other Parties,12 
confirming that its aim in making this pledge was never actually to position Australia as 
a leader. The thesis accepted that pledging a higher upper target would have been 
domestically difficult for the government for economic and political reasons. However, 
it was nonetheless judged that in order to be a GIC on this issue the government 
needed to again demonstrate real leadership and pledge a target that was consistent 
with achieving the ultimate objective of the Convention. 
 
The thesis also examined in detail the government's decision to adopt a conditional 
target-range, rather than a single credible target. It was accepted that there were 
legitimate economic and political reasons for this approach, given that cutting 
emissions more rapidly than other nations risked placing Australia's economy at a 
competitive disadvantage and the loss of jobs. However, it was suggested that real 
leadership required the government to set a target that genuinely positioned Australia 
as a mitigation front runner, notwithstanding economic and political challenges. A 
further problem with the government's target range was that its upper end was not 
sufficiently ambitious to genuinely display leadership, even if its conditions were met. 
 
The analysis of the conditions attached to the 25 per cent target found that while 
these were often strict, they were not in the most part unreasonable, as they generally 
did not appear to make unjustifiable demands of other Parties. This was because the 
conditions broadly reflected the basic design elements, including abatement levels, 
that were realistically necessary to achieve the government's preferred 450 ppm CO2-
e goal, on which the 25 per cent target was based. Some conditions, however, were 
undoubtedly inconsistent with a leadership position, especially those requiring 
unrestricted access to international carbon credits and LULUCF abatement, in light of 
legitimate concerns about the environmental effectiveness of these abatement 
options. 
 
                                                     
 
12 ABC, 'Rudd Says Abbott Wrong Again', AM, 14 December 2009 (Prime Minister Kevin Rudd) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2009/s2770394.htm>. 
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With respect to implementation, chapter 7 saw many positives in the Rudd 
government's general approach. As noted above, the government's legal and policy 
response (namely, the CPRS and complementary measures such as the Renewable 
Energy Target) was generally likely to be legally effective in positioning Australia to 
comply with its post-2012 mitigation targets had the CPRS been enacted by 
Parliament. There were, however, a number of notable design flaws in the CPRS. Chief 
among these were: the extensive compensation for emissions-intensive trade-exposed 
industries (reducing the economic efficiency of the Scheme); the decision to provide 
liable entities with unlimited access to eligible international carbon credits (potentially 
undermining the environmental effectiveness of Australia's mitigation target and also 
breaching the principle of 'supplementarity'); and the failure of the CPRS to seriously 
address Australia's heavy reliance on coal (potentially locking-in high Australian 
emission levels for many decades to come if carbon capture and storage technology 
did not prove to be viable). The design flaws in the CPRS not only undermined the 
credibility of the scheme, but represented a missed opportunity for Australia to show 
leadership in the design of best-practice domestic emission reduction laws and 
policies, which could have influenced the practice of other countries around the world. 
 
Of these design flaws, the most damaging from a GIC perspective was the decision to 
allow liable entities unrestricted access to eligible international carbon credits, as well 
as the Rudd government's preparedness to achieve up to 1/5th of the upper 25 per 
cent target through directly purchasing international credits. The government's 
emphasis on the use of international flexibility mechanisms, at the expense of strong 
domestic abatement, ignored legitimate concerns regarding the environmental 
integrity of carbon credits issued to date under the Protocol, especially by the Clean 
Development Mechanism. This approach was argued to be inconsistent with the need 
for abatement measures to be environmentally effective. The thesis accepted that 
there was a pragmatic need to provide Australian businesses with some access to 
international market mechanisms to ensure that achieving Australia's future mitigation 
target was economically feasible. However, placing such a heavy emphasis on the use 
of international credits was inconsistent with the object of the treaty and the 
leadership principle, placing Australia's narrow economic interests ahead of the larger 
need for environmentally effective abatement. A preferable approach would have 
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been to place a stringent cap on the use of international carbon credits, while 
continuing to work at the international level to improve the environmental integrity of 
the flexibility mechanisms. 
 
Despite such design flaws, the thesis recognised that the Rudd government's 
substantial efforts to legislate the CPRS represented an act of leadership in itself, 
particularly given the highly divisive domestic political environment in which it 
introduced the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill (CPRS Bill).13 The government's 
early good intentions, however, were ultimately undermined by its decision in April 
2010 to defer the introduction of the CPRS until 2013, in response to the failure of the 
Senate to support the Bill as well as the slow progress of the post-2012 climate 
negotiations. This was a major policy reversal by the government which undermined 
its earlier display of leadership. Of course, the government did not enjoy a majority in 
the Senate, and the Liberal National Coalition ultimately refused to support the CPRS 
under first Malcolm Turnbull and then Tony Abbott, meaning that securing its passage 
was a tough ask. However, after the CPRS Bill was rejected for a second time the 
government could have exercised the option of calling a double dissolution election, or 
simply have sought a fresh mandate for the CPRS at the next general election, but 
lacked the political resolve to do so. 
 
On the issue of REDD+, chapter 8 highlighted that the Rudd government's strong 
advocacy for a market-based REDD mechanism was controversial, with a market-based 
approach potentially creating a new source of non-credible international offsets, an 
approach that was again potentially at odds with the central purpose of the ICCL 
regime. However, it was accepted that there were sound pragmatic reasons for at least 
testing a market-based approach, given the significant finances required to fund 
REDD+, and thus the need to obtain private sector financing through the sale of carbon 
credits, bolstering direct funding by developed country governments. In many 
respects, the government's active involvement on REDD+ helped give effect to the 
principle of developed country leadership, with Australia being an important 
                                                     
 
13 Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 2009 (Cth). 
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participant in the REDD+ negotiations and involving itself in various practical activities 
to support the development of REDD+ on the ground, including the flagship 
Kalimantan Forest and Carbon Partnership (KFCP) in Indonesia. The government's 
standing as a leader was, however, diminished by failings in the design and 
implementation of the KFCP with respect to the protection of indigenous peoples' 
rights enshrined in the UNDRIP, a declaration Australia signed up to under the Rudd 
government. 
 
Lastly, chapter 9 examined the Rudd government's engagement with the negotiations 
on LULUCF accounting, especially with regard to forest management. The thesis found 
that the reference level approach to forest management accounting favoured by 
Australia involved a risk that developed countries would be awarded emission credits 
for non-genuine abatement (again potentially at odds with the central purpose of the 
Convention). However, it was also recognised that no perfect accounting method 
existed for forest management and that there were sound reasons for testing the 
theoretically attractive reference level approach, notwithstanding environmental 
effectiveness concerns. The government's opposition to placing a cap on the use of 
forest management and LULUCF generally, however, again failed to implement the 
principle of leadership, as the purpose of a cap was to mitigate the risk of non-genuine 
LULUCF credits being awarded under the proposed accounting reforms. Indeed, the 
government's overall approach to the LULUCF negotiations generally appeared to be 
more concerned with establishing new (low-cost) abatement opportunities for 
Australia than on prioritising environmentally effective mitigation. 
 
Overall, the thesis suggested that the Rudd government achieved the following 
'grades' as an international citizen in its engagement with the above issues: 
 long-term global mitigation goal: average; 
 5 to 25 per cent mitigation target for 2020: average; 
 implementation: average; 
 REDD+: above average; and 
 LULUCF: average. 
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Overall, then, despite many positive statements and activities by the Rudd government 
from a GIC perspective, ultimately this thesis concludes that the government did not 
qualify as a GIC in its engagement with ICCL on the issues assessed. While the 
government was by no means a poor international citizen, this thesis argues that the 
higher form of behaviour required to distinguish good from lesser forms of 
international citizenship (especially in this case showing genuine respect for the 
principles and provisions of the ICCL regime and, where relevant, broader international 
law) was not sufficiently or consistently evident to warrant the Rudd government 
being regarded as a GIC. Rather its efforts are probably best categorised as that of an 
'average' international citizen. 
C Final Comments  
Chapter 1 of this thesis highlighted various disparaging views by scholars regarding the 
normative and analytical value of GIC, for example, that the concept was too 
ambiguous, not radical enough in its expectations of government, or that that it may 
be employed disingenuously by states in their political rhetoric to obscure what are 
actually more self-interested motives. More positively, arguments were made that GIC 
offers a useful conceptual tool for both the formulation and assessment of 
government policy; that GIC behaviour represents a more ethical approach to the 
practice of foreign policy than is generally the norm; and that invoking the concept in 
international discourse may help to shift the behaviour of states in a more ethical 
direction. 
 
After considerable examination of the GIC concept, as well as the application of the 
concept to a complex topic of study, this thesis generally concurs with the more 
positive view of the normative and analytic value of GIC. Having said this, several 
points are worth making. 
 
First, it needs to be acknowledged that GIC is not an easy concept to apply when 
assessing government behaviour, there being no universally agreed understanding of 
what constitutes GIC or how it should be measured. While the broad features of GIC 
outlined above appear to require fairly reasonable expectations of states, as noted 
above, ultimately GIC is a subjective concept and thus it cannot be expected that all 
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scholars (not to mention practitioners) will agree upon its practical requirements. The 
porous nature of GIC, however, should not be seen to undermine the concept from an 
academic perspective. It simply means that scholars need to articulate what they mean 
by GIC and explain their reasoning in determining whether or not the standard has 
been met. This is no different to many concepts employed by scholars in the law and 
humanities such as realism, liberal internationalism and cosmopolitanism, discussed in 
chapter 1. This thesis would suggest, however, that it is preferable to adopt 
approaches to assessing GIC that draw upon the concept as articulated by Evans 
(which has not always been the case in the literature), as this arguably remains the 
best starting point for understanding the practical requirements of GIC.  
 
Second, the thesis found that GIC is not necessarily an easy concept to apply for 
someone from an international law, rather than an international relations, 
background. This is because legal scholars, not surprisingly, are more accustomed to 
providing analysis of legal issues than the broader types of concerns raised by GIC, 
such as whether or not a government has achieved a defensible balance between 
idealism and realism, or sought to advance purposes beyond ourselves. Nevertheless, 
this author concurs with the view of Pert that GIC offers a useful tool for international 
lawyers to assess governmental engagement with international law in a more 
qualitative and deeper fashion.14 It is hoped that this thesis demonstrates that while 
applying GIC to the international law field is not without its challenges, it does provide 
a useful and broader perspective from which to understand and assess governmental 
engagement with the international legal system. 
 
Third, this thesis would argue that while the term GIC is often misused by governments 
– in that they may claim to be acting as GICs when this is patently not the case – this 
does not diminish the usefulness of the concept as a political aspiration or motif. While 
public commitments to the ideal do not guarantee that higher standards of 
international conduct will occur in practice, it seems likely that governments which 
profess a belief in GIC are more likely to aim for, if not always achieve, more ethical 
                                                     
 
14 Pert, above n 4, 329. 
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forms of international conduct. It is undoubtedly the case, for example, that the Rudd 
government, despite its flaws, adopted a manifestly more ethical and responsible 
approach to engagement with ICCL than the Howard government, which had little 
interest in being regarded as a GIC in this field. Furthermore, it must be recognised 
that GIC is an essential aspiration for the international community as a whole, not just 
Australia, if dangerous climate change is to be averted. The alternative – continuing to 
preference short-term self-interest – is not a viable option in the face of a 
transnational problem like climate change which requires states to set aside short-
term national gains for the long-term global good. 
 
Finally, it is apparent to this author that national governments in Australia will always 
struggle to meet the standard of GIC on the issue of climate change unless a broader 
political and community consensus can be found on the need for strong action to 
reduce GHG emissions. This is because the decarbonisation of the Australian economy 
will require some degree of economic sacrifice by the Australian community and many 
businesses to modify their practices so as to lessen their carbon impact. As such, 
abatement measures which involve economic costs are never likely to be inherently 
popular with the Australian public and large sectors of the business community. At the 
time of writing, it appeared extremely unlikely that the new Liberal National Abbott 
government had any intention of forming such a political consensus on climate change, 
or to act as a GIC in the ongoing climate negotiations (which were still yet to adopt a 
binding post-2012 agreement). While GIC has largely been associated in Australia with 
Labor governments, who have done the most to advance the issue of climate change, 
GIC ultimately needs to be accepted as an ethical responsibility by both major political 
parties. Unless this occurs, it is difficult to envisage any federal government, even a 
well-intentioned one, ever having the political courage to genuinely act as a GIC on 
what Kevin Rudd correctly labelled 'one of the greatest moral, economic and 
environmental challenges of our age'.15 
 
                                                     
 
15 Kevin Rudd (Speech delivered at the High Level Segment of the 13th Conference of the Parties, United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bali, 12 December 2007) 
<http://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/browse.php?did=15704>. 
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